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A
HISTORY OF THE BRITISH ARMY
I
MACMILLAN AND CO., Limited
LONDON • BOMBAY • CALCUTTA
MELBOURNE
THE MACMILLAN COMPANY
NEW YORK • BOSTON • CHICAGO
ATLANTA • SAN FRANCISCO
THE MACMILLAN CO. OF CANADA, Ltd.
TORONTO
A History of
rhe British Army
BY
The Hon. J. W. FORTESCUE
SECOND PART CONTINUED—FROM THE RENEWAL OF THE WAR
TO THE EVACUATION OF RIO DE LA PLATA
VOL. V
1803-1807
Quae caret ora cruore nostro
MACMILLAN AND CO., LIMITED
ST. MARTIN'S STREET, LONDON
1910
\ 0 / \
Dfl
50
V.5
PREFATORY NOTE
In order to save space, no authorities have been quoted
in the text for statements concerning the recruiting,
strength, and establishment of the Army, or concerning
the Militia and Volunteers at large ; such authorities
being set forth at length in the author's supplementary
volume, The County Lieutenancies and the Army, 1803-
18 14 (Macmillan, 1909).
Since it has become necessary in the present volume
frequently to designate French and occasionally other
foreign Regiments by their numbers, such numbers are
printed in the text in Arabic numerals, to distinguish
them from the British Regiments, whose numbers are
printed in full. Thus " the Thirty-first " signifies a
British Regiment ; but "the 31st" a French or other
foreign Regiment.
ERRATA
Page 41, line 21, for "Halting there for a day" read "Halting there for two
days."
Page 144, note. Since this note was printed, the situation of the fort has been
ascertained, and is inserted in the map.
Page 201, line 6 from foot, for "Act of the 27th of May" read "nth of
June."
Page 292, line 17 from footer "on the 13th of December the Treaty" read
" on the 15th of December the Treaty."
CONTENTS
BOOK XIII
CHAPTER I
The East Indies
PAGE
French Limits under the Treaty of Amiens ... 3
Designs of Bonaparte in the East Indies . . . -4-
The Mahrattas threaten British Power in India . .5
Divisions among the Mahratta Chiefs . . . . .6
Treaty of Bassein and its Results ...... 7
British Force assembled under Sir Arthur Wellesley . . 7
Sir Arthur Wellesley's Supply System ..... 8
His Troops occupy Poona and restore the Peishwa . . 9
Dilatory Negotiations with Scindia . . . . .10
Wellesley's Preparations for War . . . . . .11
His Impatience for Action . . . . . . .12
The Viceroy's Plans for the Campaign . . . . 1 3
Position of the Troops under Generals Wellesley and
Stevenson . . . . . . . . 14, 15
Storm of Ahmednuggur . . . . . 16-18
Stevenson's Irresolution in face of the Enemy . . .19
Manoeuvres of the Contending Armies .... 20,21
Wellesley separates from Stevenson . . . . .22
Strength of the Mahratta Army encamped at Assaye . -23
Wellesley's Force for the Attack 24
Battle of Assaye ......... 29
Losses in the Action on both Sides .... 3 3-34
Pursuit of the Mahrattas after Assaye . . . . -35
vii
HISTORY OF THE ARMY
PAGE
Pursuit of the Rajah of Berar by Wellesley . . . 36
Armistice with Scindia agreed upon . . . . -37
Battle of Argaum 38
Description of the Fort of Gawilghur .... 4 1 -42
Storm of Gawilghur ....... 4 3 -44
Operations against Cuttack ....... 45
Treaty with the Rajah of Berar . . . . . -45
CHAPTER II
The East Indies
Lake's Plan of Campaign against the Mahrattas
. 4O
Dispositions of Lake's Forces
• 47
March of the Army to Aligarh
. 48
Assault and Capture of Aligarh
49-52
Mishap of the British at Shekoabad
• 52
Perron quits Scindia's Service
• 53
Battle of Delhi ....
53-55
Losses of the British
. 56
Capture of Agra by the British
57-58
Lake's Pursuit of the Mahrattas under
Abaji m .
• 59
Battle of Laswaree
59-65
Heavy Losses of the British .
. 66
Criticism of the Action
. 67
The Rajah of Bhurtpore and Others conclude Alliances
with
. 68
Capture of Baroach by Woodington
68-69
Treaties of Peace with Scindia and Ra
gogee .
• 69
CHAPTER III
The East Indies
Threatening Attitude of Holkar towards the British . 70-71
Relations of Lake and Holkar ... . . . -72
Remarkable March of Sir Arthur Wellesley against Freebooters 73
1 /^T^"\TnPT7 \TTC
ix
Sir Arthur Wellesley's Preparations for War with Holkar
PAGE
• 74
i His Instructions to Murray in Guzerat ....
• 75
Pursuit of Holkar by Lake and Monson
. 76
! Capture of Rampoora .......
76-77
Lake retires with the Main Army to Cawnpore
• 77
111 Success of British Operations in Bundelcund
78-79
Monson pursues Holkar southward ....
. 80
Feebleness of Murray .......
. 81
Retreat of Murray and of Monson without effecting a Junction 82
Monson's Disastrous Retreat to Agra ....
83-88
Arthur Wellesley's Criticism of the Retreat .
. 88
His Organisation of a Transport-Service
. 89
Comparison of Lake and Wellesley as Generals
. 90
CHAPTFR TV
The East Indies
Consequences of the Disaster to Monson s .borce .
. 92
H/r 1 f" T T 1 1 1 1 t\ rr
March or Holkar northward to Muttra
• 93
Lake s Army for Operations against Holkar .
• 93
Vain Attempts of Lake to force a General Action .
. 94
Successful Defence of Delhi against Mahrattas
94-95
rursuit of Holkar by Lake ......
96-97
Rout of Holkar's Cavalry at Furruckabad
98-99
And of his Infantry at Deig ......
IOO-IO3
Losses of British and Mahrattas at Deig
. IO4
March of Lake upon Deig ......
. IO5
Siege and Capture of the Fortress of Deig
I06-I08
Description of the Fortress of Bhurtpore
. IO9
First Assault upon Bhurtpore by Lake's Army
I IO-I 12
Insufficiency of Lake's Force for the Operations
• 113
Second Assault upon Bhurtpore .....
II4-II5
Meer Khan's Capture of a Convoy going to Deig .
. Il6
Lake successfully brings in a larger Convoy .
II7-II8
Pursuit of Meer Khan through Rohilcund by Major-
general Smith .......
I18-I20
VOL. V
b
x HISTORY OF THE ARMY
PAGE
Further Operations of Murray about Ujjein . . . .120
Progress of the Siege of Bhurtpore 121
Third Assault upon Bhurtpore ..... 122-125
Fourth Assault upon Bhurtpore . . . . .126-128
Lake retreats from before Bhurtpore 128
Successes of the British against Holkar . . . . .129
Treaty between British and the Rajah of Bhurtpore . .129
Renewal of Troubles with Scindia . . . . 130
Lord Wellesley is replaced by Lord Cornwallis as Viceroy . 131
Character and Policy of Corn wallis . . . . .132
Lake's Final Pursuit of Holkar to the North . . . .133
Treaty between the British and Holkar. . . . . 134
Character and Criticism of Lake ..... 135-137
CHAPTER V
Ceylon
Relations of Dutch Settlers with King of Kandy . . .138
Unsuccessful Beginnings of the British Administration in
Ceylon . . . . . . . . .139
Overtures of the First Adigar to Governor North . . . 140
North attempts to negotiate a Treaty . . • . . . 141
Desire of the Kandians for Independence . . . .142
Garrison of Ceylon in 1803 . . . . . . .142
Plan of Campaign for an Attack on Kandy . . . .143
March of Macdowall's Column to Kandy . . . 143-146
Moottoo Sawmy accepted as King of Kandy by Macdowall . 147
Failure of the British to capture the Fugitive King at Han-
garamkatty . . . . . . . . .148
Difficulties of North and Macdowall . . . . . 149
Negotiations of North with the First Adigar . . . .150
Return of Macdowall's Force to Colombo . . . .150
Garrison of Kandy attacked by Fever . . . . -151
Failure of the Negotiations . . . . . . 151
Ravages of Fever throughout Ceylon , . . . .152
British Garrison at Kandy isolated . . . .152-153
CONTENTS xi
PAGE
The Kandians attack the City . . . . . . 153
The British evacuate Kandy under a Convention . . . 154
Their Retreat arrested by the Kandians . . . . 1 5 5
Massacre of the Captured British Garrison . . . 155-156
Unsuccessful Attacks on various British Posts . . 156-157
North appeals to India for Reinforcements . . . . 157
Further Raids of the Kandians upon British Posts . . 158-159
North's System of Counter-raids . . * . . 159, 160
Squabbles among the British in Ceylon ; Resignation of North 161
Governor Maitland restores Discipline . . . . .162
His Negotiations for the escape of Davie . . . .163
Davie's Letters and Fate . . . . . . .164
CHAPTER VI
England
The Militia Act of 1802 167
Military Estimates and Establishment in 1802 . . .168
Bonaparte annexes Piedmont and Parma . . . .169
French Intervention in Switzerland 170
Strained Relations between England and France . . 171
British Naval and Military Estimates in December 1802 . 172
C. J. Fox proposes a Reduction of the Military Forces . 173
Bonaparte's Threats against England . . . .174
England declares War, May 1803 175
The First Consul orders the Detention of all Englishmen
then in France . . . . . . . .175
The West Indies
British Successes against the French Fleet at St. Domingo 176-177
Demoralisation of the French Officers in the West Indies . 178
Recapture of Guadeloupe by the French . . . .179
Mutiny of the Eighth West India Regiment at Dominica 1 80-1 81
British Forces in the West Indies at the Outbreak of War 1 81-182
Capture of St. Lucia by the British . . . 4 .183
Capture of Tobago . . . . . . . .184
XII
HISTORY OF THE ARMY
Difficulties of the Commander-in-chief in the West Indies
Plans of Ministers for Capture of Dutch Colonies
Demerara and Essequibo surrender to the British
Capture of Surinam by the British ....
Admiral Duckworth attacks Curacoa without Success .
Review of the Operations in the West Indies
. 184.
. 185
. 186
87-191
92
CHAPTER VII
England
Weakness of the French Fleet at the Declaration of War
The French invade Hanover .....
Bonaparte lays the Foundation of the Continental System
His Plans for the Creation of a Flotilla to invade England
Dispositions of the British Fleets .
Possibilities of a British Offensive Movement
Provisions of the Militia Act of 1802 .
Evils of the Volunteer System under Pitt
The Volunteer Act of 1802
The Government's Unsatisfactory Treatment of Volunteers
Serious Condition of the Militia ; further Militia Acts
Parliamentary Criticism of Addington's Defensive Policy
The First Defence Act
New Regulations for Volunteers ; the June Allowances
The Additional Force Act creates the Army of Reserve
Criticism of the Act .
The Levy en Masse Act
Additional Regulations for Volunteers
Allowances ....
The Billetting Act, and its Consequences
Difficulties of Ministers with regard to Volunteers
Yorke's Attempts to settle Disputed Points .
Summary of Addington's Defensive Measures
Rise in the Price of Substitutes . . .
Confusion in the Volunteer Force
96
the August
202
203'
204
193
194
194
l9S
196
■ 197
• 199
199
200
200
201
202
•203
203
•204
•205
206
207-:
207
208
. 209
. 210
210-21 1
. 211
212-213
CONTENTS xiii
PAGE
Question of the Volunteers' Right of Resignation . 213-214
Difficulty of Arming the Volunteers .... 214-215
Criticism of the Volunteer Force . . . . 215-216
Napoleon's Scheme for the Invasion of England . . .216
Impracticability of this Scheme . . . . . .217
Serious Shortage in all Divisions of the British Forces . . 218
The Volunteer Consolidation Act, 1804 . . . .219
Craufurd's Wholesale Condemnation of the Volunteer System 220
Question of Pay and the New Volunteers . . . 221-222
The Volunteers on Permanent Duty . . . . .222
Yorke's Measures for the Augmentation of the Regular
Army . . . . . . . . .223
Last Occasion of " raising Men for Rank " . . . .224
Ill-success of this Method of Recruiting . . . .225
Pitt's Attack on the Government leads to Addington's
Resignation . . . ... . - . 225-226
CHAPTER VIII
England
Formation of Pitt's New Ministry .... 227-228
The Volunteer Consolidation Bill becomes Law . . .228
Pitt's Scheme for the Maintenance of the Regular Army . 229
His Permanent Additional Force Bill . . . . .230
Criticism of the Bill in Parliament . . . . .231
Organisation of Land-transport Service in Britain . . 232
Plans for the Fortification of the Country . . . .232
Dumouriez's Schemes of Defence . . . . 233-234
Napoleon's Difficulties with his Flotilla . . . 234-235
British Attack on Boulogne; the Stone Expedition . .235
Feebleness of the French Navy . . . . . .236
Napoleon's New Plans of Invasion . . . . .236
British Design for an Attack on Ferrol . . . .237
Spain declares War on England . . . . . .238
Napoleon's Plans for a Raid upon the West Indian Islands 238-239
xiv HISTORY OF THE ARMY
PAGE
Failure of Pitt's Additional Force Act . . . 239-240
Bill for Enlistment from the Militia into the Army . . 240
Napoleon's Allies among the European States . . .241
Objects of Pitt's Foreign Policy ; Beginning of the Third
Coalition ......... 242
Efforts of Napoleon to check the Formation of a Coalition . 243
Treaty between England and Russia .... 243-244
Counter-actions of Napoleon in Italy, Holland, and Portugal 244
The West Indies
Missiessy's Raid upon the West Indies
245
French Attack on Roseau in Dominica
246
-247
Gallant Defence of the Island by Prevost .
248
Further Operations of Missiessy ; his Return to Europe
248-
-249
Anxiety in the British West Indies ....
249
Napoleon's Final Plan for a West Indian Raid preparatory
to
Invasion of England
250
Unsuccessful Organisation of the Invading Flotilla
251
The Mediterranean
Anxiety of British Ministers with regard to Egypt and Sicily 251-252
Instructions to Craig on Appointment to the Mediterranean
• 253
Escape of Villeneuve and the French Fleet from Toulon
• 254
Craig and his Force take Refuge in Lisbon .
. 254
The West Indies
Villeneuve sails for Martinique ; Nelson in Pursuit
• 255
Plans for Defence of the British West Indian Islands .
. 256
Admiral Ganteaume fails to escape from Brest
. 256
Villeneuve arrives at Martinique
• 257
Nelson and General Myers pursue the French Fleet
. 258
Villeneuve's Operations in the West Indies ; his Return
to
Europe
258-259
CONTENTS xv
PAGE
British Preparations to reinforce the Troops in the West
Indies ......... 259
Napoleon's Wild Orders to his Naval Commanders . .260
Europe
Arrival of Villeneuve in Europe ; Indecisive Action with
Calder 261
Napoleon's New Orders to Villeneuve . . . 262-263
The Emperor gives up his Plan of Invasion ; the March to
Ulm 263
Discussion of Napoleon's Scheme for Invasion of England 264-265
CHAPTER IX
The Mediterranean
Pitt's Scheme of Operations for the Troops of the Allies 266
Weakness of the British Force despatched to the
Mediterranean ....... 266-267
Craig's Force reaches Malta 267
Proposed Co-operation of Craig with the Russian Force under
General Lascy 268
Lascy's Plan of Campaign ; Craig's Criticism of the
Scheme . 268-269
Craig's Objections thereto ...... 269-270
Reinforcement of the French around Naples . . 270-271
Treacherous Behaviour of the Neapolitan Court . . .271
Disasters to the Austrians on the Danube culminate in the
Capitulation at Ulm ...... 271-272
The United Forces of British and Russians land at Naples . 272
Disposition of the Allied Forces about Naples . . -273
Craig and the Archduke Charles . . . . .274
The Campaign of the Danube ended by the Battle of
Austerlitz ........ 274-275
Critical Position of Lascy 275
Lascy's Proposal for the Defence of Calabria negatived by Craig 276
xvi HISTORY OF THE ARMY
PAGE
The Neapolitan Court attempts to prevent the Retreat of
the British to Sicily ....... 277
Criticism of Craig's Expedition ...... 278
Pitt's Further Plans for Military Operations . . . 279
Formation of the King's German Legion . . . 279-280
Possible Spheres of Offensive Action against Napoleon . .280
Napoleon's Efforts to gain Prussia . . . . .281
Russia claims Prussia's Alliance ...... 282
Frederick William's Ultimatum to Napoleon . . -283
Convention of Britain with Sweden and Russia . . .284
Expedition to the Elbe
Proposed Campaign for Recovery of Hanover . . 285-286
The First Division of Troops sails from England . . . 287
Harrowby's Mission to Berlin ...... 287
Dispositions of the French and Prussians in Hanover . . 288
Squabbles of the King of Sweden with the Russian
Commander ........ 288
Dispositions of the British and Russians in North Germany . 289
The British reinforced and placed under Command of
Cathcart ...... . . . 289
Plans of the Allies for the Invasion of Holland . . . 290
Instructions to Cathcart ...... 290-291
Napoleon's Reception of Prussia's Ultimatum . . . 291
His Counter - ultimatum after Austerlitz ; Treaty of
Schonbrunn ........ 292
Further Reinforcement of the British Troops in Germany . 293
Effect of the Defeat at Austerlitz upon Members of the
Coalition ......... 294
Difficulties of Cathcart's Position . . . . 295
Upon News of the Treaty of Schonbrunn he re-embarks his
Force ......... 296
Criticism of the Expedition to the Weser . . . 297-298
Weakness of Pitt's Military Policy . . . . 299
Death and Character of Pitt . s . . . . 299-300
CONTENTS
xvii
CHAPTER X
England
PAGE
The Ministry of All the Talents 3QI
Failure of the Additional Force Act 3QI
Windham proposes his Short Service Scheme . . . 302
Opinions of General Officers with regard to the Scheme . 303
Windham's Training Act ....... 304-305
Cape of Good Hope
Expedition to the Cape under Sir David Baird . . . 306
Difficulties of the Dutch Commander ..... 307
Successful Action against the Dutch .... 308-309
British Occupation of Capetown ; Acquisition of Cape
Colony 309-310
South America
Character of Sir Home Popham . . . . . 3 10-3 11
Relations of the Adventurer Miranda with British Ministers 3 1 1-3 1 2
Popham's Scheme for the Capture of Buenos Ayres . . 3 1 3
Beresford and Popham start upon the Expedition . . 314
Popham's Idea of capturing Monte Video abandoned . . 315
Action between Beresford and the Spanish Colonists . . 316
British Occupation of Buenos Ayres . . . . .317
Difficult Position of Beresford ; Unsettled Condition of the
Colony .318
Europe
Results of the Victory of Austerlitz in Europe . . .319
Frederick William attempts further Negotiations with
Napoleon . . . . . . . . .320
New Treaty arranged between Talleyrand and Haugwitz . 321
Aims of Napoleon's Policy . . . , . . -322
xviii HISTORY OF THE ARMY
PAGE
Negotiations of Talleyrand and Lord Yarmouth . . -323
Anger in England over the Treachery of Prussia . . -3^3
Naval War between England and Prussia . . . 323-324.
Fox's Negotiations with Russia . . . . 324.
The Russians seize Cattaro ; Anger of Napoleon . . 325
Treaty arranged between d'Oubril and Talleyrand at Paris . 326
Napoleon proclaims the Confederation of the Rhine . .327
Napoleon's Negotiations with England come to naught . 327
Eagerness in Prussia for War with Napoleon . . .328
Attitude of Frederick William 328-329
CHAPTER XI
The Mediterranean
Disembarkation of British Forces in Sicily . . . '33°
Advance of the French to the Straits of Messina . . -33°
Weakness of the Neapolitan Government and Forces . . 331
Windham's Scheme of Operations on the Adriatic Coast . 332
Plans of Sir John Stuart for the Defence of Sicily . . 333
Character of Sir Sidney Smith . . . M . . 3 3 3~3 34
Defects of the French Force at Naples . . . • 334
The Defence of Gaeta 334
Sidney Smith captures Capri 335-336
Plans of Stuart and Smith for a Descent upon Calabria . 336-337
Relations of Sidney Smith with the Court of Naples . 337
Stuart's Force for the Expedition to Calabria . . 338-339
Disembarkation of the British at St. Euphemia . . . 340
Squabbles of Stuart and Sidney Smith 341
Reynier leads the French northwards against Stuart . .342
Battle of Maida . . 343~35°
Failure of Stuart to follow up his Victory . . . 350-351
Arrival of Sidney Smith at St. Euphemia . . . 352
Losses of the British and of the French at Maida . • 353
Discussion of the Tactical Principles of British and French
Troops 354-355
CONTENTS
irther Operations of Stuart and Smith
Smith incites the Calabrese to Insurrection .
British Successes in Southern Italy
Discreditable Behaviour of Sir Sidney Smith
Surrender of Gaeta to the French
Return of Stuart to Sicily ; his Lack of Initiative
The British harass the Retreat of Reynier's Army
Result of Stuart's Expedition .....
General Fox appointed to command in the Mediterranean
Unsatisfactory Position of Affairs in Italy and Sicily .
Projected British Expedition to Portugal
Overthrow of Prussia at Jena .....
XIX
PAGE
355-356
• 357
• 358
358- 359
359- 36o
. 361
. 362
■ 363
. 364
365-366
. 367
. 368
CHAPTER XII
South America
Reinforcements sent by Baird to Buenos Ayres . . 369
Attack of the Spanish Colonists upon the British . . . 370
Beresford obliged to capitulate 371
The Capitulation repudiated by the Colonists ; and the
British carried as Prisoners into the Interior . . .372
News of the Original Capture of Buenos Ayres reaches
England 373
Despatch of Auchmuty with Reinforcements for Beresford 373-374
Criticism of the Action of Ministers with regard to this
Expedition 375
The British occupy Maldonado 376
Windham's Extraordinary Scheme for the Reduction of Chile 377
Lord Grenville's Plan for an Attack upon Mexico . -378
Despatch of Craufurd on the Chilian Expedition . . -379
He receives New Directions to proceed to Buenos Ayres . 380
Arrival of Auchmuty in La Plata .... 380-381
Siege and Capture of Monte Video .... 381-386
Attitude of the Colonists towards a British Occupation . 387
General Whitelocke appointed to command in La Plata . 388
xx HISTORY OF THE ARMY
PAGE
Instructions to Whitelocke ; he arrives in South America . 389
Arrival of Craufurd at Monte Video 390
Attack of the Colonists on the British Garrison at Colonia 390-391
Difficulties of the Campaign ; Choice of a Place of Disem-
barkation ......... 391
Choice of a Line of March ..... 392-393
Question of Transport ...... 393~394
Choice of a Time for the Attack on Buenos Ayres . .394
Evacuation of Colonia by the British 395
Whitelocke's Mistakes in the Choice of Troops for Service . 396
CHAPTER XIII
South America
Disembarkation of the British at Ensenada de Barragon . 397
Leveson-Gower leads the Advanced Guard . . . . 397
Passage of the Troops through the Swamp . . . -398
Difficulties of the Commissariat 399
Lack of Communication between the several Corps of the
Army . - . . 400
Lack of Supplies ....... 400-401
March of the British upon Buenos Ayres . . . 401-406
First Attack upon the Suburbs of the Town by Craufurd . 407
False Dispositions of the Spaniards ..... 408
March of the Main Body of the British under Whitelocke 409-411
Gower's Plan of Attack, accepted by Whitelocke . .411
Whitelocke's Known Objections to the General Principles of
the Scheme . . . . . . . .412
Bourke's Objections to the Plan . . . . . -413
Description of the Town of Buenos Ayres . . . 413-415
Dispositions of the British Troops for the Attack . . . 415
Obscurity of the General Instructions to Officers . . .416
Preparations of the Spaniards for Defence . . . .417
The Attack on Buenos Ayres . 418-426
Whitelocke's Ignorance of the Course of Events . . 427-428
CONTENTS
A. Truce arranged with the Spanish Commander
llSummary of the Position of the British
|The British agree to evacuate the Province
jReception in England of the News of Failure
(Trial of Whitelocke by Court-martial .
Discussion of the Charges against the General
'Criticism of the British Government's Action in sending out
the Expedition .... . . . 4.35-4.37
XXI
PAGE
. 428
. 429
. 429
• 430
430- 431
431- 435
MAPS AND PLANS
{J 11 at the end, in the order shewn by the numbers.)
1. Assaye.
2. Argaum.
3. Gawilghur.
4. Aligarh.
5. Delhi.
6. Laswaree.
7- Deig.
8. India, Campaigns of Wellesley and Lake.
9. Ceylon (two Maps on one sheet).
10. Surinam River.
11. Dominica.
12. Southern Italy and Sicily, Maida, Capri.
13. North Germany and Denmark.
14. Cape Colony.
15. Rio de la Plata, Monte Video, Whitelocke's March.
16. Buenos Ayres.
17. Europe, Peace of Tilsit.
xxiii
BOOK XIII
VOL. V
CHAPTER I
ln Europe the Treaty of Amiens brought at least a 1802.
truce ; but east and west, in India and the Antilles, it
wrought not peace but the sword. The First Consul
tad gained what he sought — a short breathing-space
ipon honourable terms. The boundaries of France
Lad been enlarged eastward to the Rhine, and north-
ward to the Dutch frontier. Holland itself, under the
Lame of the Batavian Republic, was subservient to her ;
md the greater part of Northern Italy was either
tctually French territory or dominated by French
influence. The French Republic within her new limits
now counted a population of forty million souls ; and
with all these vast acquisitions in Europe she still
retained the Colonial Empire of the Monarchy. Her
East Indian settlements were, under the Treaty, to
be restored ; in the West Indies Martinique and
Tobago were to be again hers, as also was St. Domingo
if she could obtain possession of it. Finally, at her
head was the man who, after twice raising her from
deep depression to dazzling glory, had restored law
and order, confidence and credit, and, still insatiable in
energy and ambition, was maturing his designs for the
conquest of a great empire over sea.
The conquest of his dreams was that of India, and,
as a means to that end, of Egypt. Nelson had turned
his first expedition to the valley of the Nile into a
disaster, and Sidney Smith and Abercromby had
deepened the disaster into a humiliation. His vaunt-
ing letter to Tippoo from Cairo had also received a
4
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1802. crushing answer in the storming of Seringapatam and
the overthrow of Hyder Ali's dynasty in Mysore. But
still the man clung to his vision of the tricolour flying
supreme in the Mediterranean, and of French domina-
tion substituted for English in India. Thus it was in
September 1802 he sent General Sebastiani to Algiers,
Egypt, Syria, and the Ionian Islands with orders to take
note of every military detail, and to sound the disposition
1803. of the natives. In January 1803 Sebastiani returned
with a bombastic report that the capture of Egypt
would be child's play, and that the Ionian Islands were
only waiting for an opportunity to declare themselves
French. Meanwhile, to undermine still further British
power in the East, Bonaparte had appointed in June
1802 two even more formidable agents. The first was
Cavaignac, an old member of the Convention, who was
charged with a mission to the Imaum of Muscat. The
second was General Decaen, who bitterly hated the
English, and thirsted for the chance of meeting them
in the field. In title Decaen was merely Commander-
in-Chief of the small French force in the East Indies,
entrusted with the special duty of receiving back the
captured French settlements from the British ; and the
troops that were to accompany him wfre no more than
a garrison for those settlements, little exceeding one
thousand men.1 But the Consul's secret instructions
showed designs of far wider extent. While acting
always with carefully simulated gentleness and simplicity,
Decaen was to inquire as to the strength and disposition
of the British forces, and as to the natives that were
most impatient of British rule. He was to think
out in every detail the best method of carrying on
a war of several campaigns in India, even without
command of the sea ; and, above all, he was to find a
suitable base, with a port which could be defended
against a hostile fleet. "Your mission" (so ended the
document) " is, for military and political purposes, one
of observation . . . but the First Consul, if you faith-
1 Corres. de Napoleon, 6208, Letter to Decres, 25th July 1802.
ch. i HISTORY OF THE ARMY 5
fully fulfil his instructions, may perhaps be able 1803.
to put you in a position to gain the great glory
which prolongs the memory of men beyond the lapse
of centuries."
The date of these secret instructions was the 1 5 th
of January 1803, and in them occurs the expression,
" unless war breaks out before the end of September
1804," which, elucidated by parallel passages in
Napoleon's correspondence, shows that he was reckon-
ing upon that time, and no earlier, for the renewal of
hostilities. Evidently he counted upon choosing his
own moment for aggression, with such a man as
Addington in charge of England ; but even if he had
reckoned truly herein, which, as events were to prove,
he did not, he overlooked the presence in India of
Lord Wellesley and his brother Arthur. The de-
struction of Tippoo Sahib's power in Mysore had at
last brought the British and the Mahrattas face to face ;
and no man of any foresight could doubt that before
long there would be a desperate struggle between them
for the mastery of India. The refusal of the Mahrattas
to take their share in the partition of Mysore had
sufficiently shown their jealousy and unfriendly feeling
over the British successes in that province ; and,
divided though they were among themselves, they
had begun to realise generally that their chances of
supremacy were lost unless they could drive the British
from the country. But this was not all. The French
officer, Perron, though nominally no more than a
commander in Scindia's service, was actually his vice-
gerent in the north, and, while holding the deposed
Emperor Shah Alum in durance, used the imperial
name to dignify and strengthen his own authority. So
great was his power and so wide its range that he had
already seen visions of an independent sovereignty, and
he was known to have corresponded with the French
Directory with the object of obtaining the support of
the Republic. Thus Wellesley was threatened with a
resurrection of French rivalry in India, and that not
{
6
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xii
1803. under the feeble direction of Bourbon kings, but under
the active and indefatigable impulse of Bonaparte. To
the British Viceroy, therefore, the power of the Mahrattas
signified the power of France. Apart from France he
was willing to live at peace with them, if by any chance
a central authority could be established strong enough to
bind the entire Mahratta Confederacy to fulfil a friendly
treaty. Then the British dominions would be delivered
from continual anarchy upon their frontiers. But while
Perron and his compatriots remained in Scindia's service,
there could be no trust and no security.
Nevertheless Wellesley's first essay was towards
curbing the unruly Mahratta chiefs by restoring the
authority of the Peishwa. Since 1798 internal dis-
sensions had brought the whole Confederacy into
confusion. In that year a family dispute had driven
Scindia into collision with the Rajah of Kolapore, who
was already at war with the Peishwa, Baji Rao ; where-
upon Scindia's rival, Jeswunt Rao Holkar, seized the
opportunity to ravage his territory. Perron was fully
engaged with the menace of an Afghan invasion in the
north, so was unable to help his master ; and Scindia
and the Peishwa together had much^ado to check the
advance of the Rajah of Kolapore upon Poona. In
the midst of the troubles, however, Scindia fell at
variance with the Peishwa, first over the property of
the latter's chief minister, Nana Farnavese, who died
in March 1800; and secondly, over the permission
granted by Baji Rao for British troops to follow
Doondia Wao into Mahratta Territory. Meanwhile
Holkar's depredations became so serious that Scindia
found himself obliged to repair to Malwa to check
them. In July 1801 Holkar won two decided suc-
cesses, and, though completely defeated at Indore in
October, soon recovered himself and advanced upon
Poona. The combined armies of Scindia and the
Peishwa strove to repel him, but were utterly routed
before the city itself on the 25 th of October 1802.
Baji Rao thereupon, fled to the coast, taking refuge in
Jch. i HISTORY OF THE ARMY 7
la British ship, which conveyed him to Bassein ; and 1803.
I there on the 31st of December he signed a treaty
whereby he threw himself upon the protection of the
British Government, and concluded with it an offensive
and defensive alliance. Scindia likewise invoked British
i help to save the Mahratta Confederacy from entire
\ dissolution ; and hence Wellesley found himself virtually
the arbiter of the fortunes of the descendants of
Sivajee. But, as he himself said, a principal object of
the treaty was to prevent the sovereign power of
the Mahratta States, or the power of any great branch
j of the Mahratta Empire, from passing into the hands
of France.1
The treaty of Bassein was accepted by the Peishwa
in all sincerity, for the unhappy man felt a genuine
liking for the British, and was as loth to be a tool of
Scindia as of Holkar. Wellesley, therefore, lost no
time in assembling a powerful force at Hurryhur on
the northern border of Mysore, with the double object
of parrying any invasion by hostile Mahrattas and of
escorting the Peishwa to his capital at Poona. In Feb.
taking this step he desired and expected a peaceful
solution of all difficulties.2 Scindia was the chief whose
views were most likely to be adverse to the treaty, and
whose hostility was most to be apprehended ; and when
in March Perron asked leave to pass through British
territory to Calcutta in order to embark for Europe,
Wellesley heaved a sigh of relief. For it seemed as
though at least one dangerous element of strife, inter-
ested alike in Scindia's and Bonaparte's ascendancy,
might be quietly eliminated.
Nor was the promise of a peaceful end to all troubles
belied upon the march of the army from Hurryhur.
Arthur Wellesley had wisely been appointed to com-
mand it, and the fame of his recent campaign against
Doondia Wao was sufficient to ensure him at least a
fearful deference. But the young General knew already
that if deference was to be turned to friendship in an
1 Wellesley Desp. iii. 109. 2 Ibid. iii. 29, 49.
8
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1803. alien territory, his force must never be a burden upon
the inhabitants. There must be no excesses, no plunder,
no marauding, but strict discipline and, as a first means
to that end, an efficient system of supply. It was this
last which occupied his attention from the first moment
when he was ordered to move to Hurryhur. " The only
mode," he wrote, " by which we can inspire either our
allies or our enemies with respect for our operations
will be to show them that the army can move with ease
and celerity at all times and in all situations." His
letters of this period teem with calculations as to
supplies and the cattle that are to draw them ; and the
famous draft-bullocks of Mysore, which had been taken
after Tippoo's death into the Company's service, figure
prominently as one of the chief factors in his army's
efficiency. There was every prospect of difficulty, for
the rainfall in the country adjoining the Western
Ghauts had been scanty during the previous season.
Forage was hardly obtainable ; the crops had failed ;
the stricken districts were face to face with famine ;
even water was wanting in many tanks and streams
where generally it had been abundant. Yet all these
obstacles were overcome by his unflagging industry.
All superfluous baggage was ruthlessly" cut off", and the
march from Seringapatam to Hurryhur was accomplished
without injury or fatigue to the cattle ; whereas the
bullocks of other detachments, under commanders of
higher rank, fell down in hundreds. Finally, when
on the 1 2th of March he crossed the Toombuddra
into Mahratta territory, he was received as a friend
and a deliverer, and joined by all the local chieftains
on his march to Poona.1
Jeswunt Rao Holkar, who was still in possession of the
Mahratta capital, retired upon the news of his advance ;
but Arthur Wellesley continued to move steadily
northward, and by the 1st of April had crossed the
Kistna at Erroor, with his cattle still in perfect condition
1 Wellington Desp. i. 374, 407 ; Supplementary Despatches, iv.
1-10, 17-22, 26-32, 41-43.
ch. i HISTORY OF THE ARMY 9
despite the length of his march. At the same time 1803.
Colonel Stevenson with the subsidiary forces of the
Nizam was marching westward from Hyderabad to
join him; and on the 15th of April the two forces April 15,
opened communication with each other at Ecklaus on
the Neera River, some eighty miles east and south of
their destination. By that time Holkar had reached
Chandore, nearly twice that distance to north of Poona,
leaving only Amrut Rao, a pretender to the Mahratta
throne, with fifteen hundred men to hold the city ;
and Wellesley, judging it unnecessary to lead a large
force against so paltry an enemy, decided to extend
Stevenson's troops over a wider front for convenience
of forage. Three days later came intelligence that
s Amrut Rao was preparing to burn and plunder Poona,
t whereupon Wellesley started with his cavalry on the
morning of the 19th, and though delayed for six hours April 19.
by the difficulty of getting his light guns through the
Little Bhore Ghaut, rode into the Peishwa's capital on
the morning of the 20th, having traversed sixty miles April 20.
in thirty-two hours. Amrut Rao withdrew in haste at
the news of his approach ; the inhabitants, who had
been driven from their homes by Holkar, hurried back
to welcome the British General ; the British infantry
arrived to increase their confidence on the 22nd ; April 22.
and on the 13th of May Baji Rao was escorted into May 13.
the city and reseated with great ceremony upon the
throne.1
So far all had gone well. The Peishwa had been
reinstated, but it remained to be seen whether his
authority could be re-established ; and various symptoms
indicated that the prospect was not altogether promising.
In the first place, Perron had not left India, as had been
expected ; and in the second, Wellesley, on the 30th May 30.
of May, had received despatches from the British
Government forbidding him to restore the French
and Dutch possessions in India until further orders,
all stipulations of the Treaty of Amiens notwith-
1 Wellington Desp. i. 457, 493, 505.
io HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
i8o3- standing.1 This pointed to the near prospect of a re-
newal of hostilities with France, an event which was not
likely to foster a pacific disposition in Scindia. Never-
theless, despite the untowardness of the outlook, the
Viceroy did not seek to precipitate a war before the
French could take part in it. Long and dreary
negotiations followed for week upon week after the
occupation of Poona. Scindia had admitted that the
Treaty of Bassein was not injurious to him, nor to
any of the Mahratta feudatory chieftains ; but he none
the less insisted that Ragogee Bhonsla, the Rajah of
Berar, should join him to discuss the question. The
place of meeting was to be on the frontier of the
Nizam's dominions ; and as the Rajah was to bring
with him as escort the whole of his army, the pretended
consultation became in reality a serious menace to a
faithful ally of the British. Scindia, in fact, told Colonel
Collins, the British resident, that upon the Rajah's
arrival he would inform him whether the issue was
to be peace or war ; but still Lord Wellesley forbore
to take offence. The armies of the two chieftains
duly effected their junction near the Ajunta Ghaut, on
the Nizam's north-western boundary^ on the 3rd of
June; but several days passed, and still no decision
June 12. was announced to Collins. On the 12th of June he
demanded his dismissal, but consented to stay upon
being pressed by Scindia ; 2 and after this the Mahratta
chiefs continued to play the game of procrastination
for two whole months, Collins frequently threatening
to take his leave, and as frequently postponing his
departure. The time thus gained was employed by them
in endeavouring to persuade Holkar to join them in
war against the British ; and their motive was so trans-
parent as to be secret to no one. Arthur Wellesley
in wrath wrote repeated letters to Collins to cut
the negotiations short, but without effect. Reiterated
representations were made to Scindia and his ally to
withdraw their troops, but were utterly thrown away
1 Wellesley Desp. Hi. 84. 2 Wellington Desp. H. 28.
HISTORY OF THE ARMY
upon them ; and the negotiations dragged on and on 1803.
through June and July, as though they would have no
ending.
Throughout this period of suspense Arthur Wellesley
waited with almost feverish impatience. He had laid
all his plans with the express object of fighting the
Mahrattas during the rainy season, when the rivers
would be high ; and he had many months before
ordered the preparation of boats and pontoons, which
would enable him to pass these rivers at any time and
place, whereas his enemies would be dependent on fords
which, in time of flood, would be impracticable. With
this advantage and with his transport efficiently
organised, he felt confident of success. Scindia
might fight pitched battles and Holkar might pur-
sue the more dangerous guerilla warfare which was
traditional with the Mahrattas, but the young General
was prepared to cope with either. British infantry
would be too much even for Perron's best battalions ;
and the Mysore bullocks would enable him to follow
Holkar so swiftly that, even though he were not over-
taken, that wily chieftain would find little time for
mischief, and would see his following dwindle daily
from sheer lack of plunder.
Two circumstances, for a time, reconciled Arthur
Wellesley to some delay in June, namely the loss of a
great number of bullocks from bad forage and exposure,1
and the failure of the authorities at Bombay to produce
the boats for which he had asked. This latter was, in
fact, the beginning of a long series of differences with
the Governor of Bombay, Mr. Duncan, who for some
reason was singularly obstructive to the whole of the
General's arrangements. Recognising the difficulty
of acting from a base five hundred miles distant at
Seringapatam, Arthur Wellesley had, as early as January,
procured the formation of a large depot on the coast,
which should be at once within easy reach of Bombay
by water and close to the mouth of the Ghaut that
1 Wellington Desp. ii. 15, 18, 38.
12
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
l8o3- leads to Poona ; but he could obtain no cattle to draw
the supplies from the dep6t to his camp, and the army
was in great straits for food. Duncan had promised
him a number of bullocks by the end of May ; but not
one of them had arrived. He had undertaken to send
up pontoons, but contrived to despatch them in weather
which broke down all the carriages after one march.
Very early Wellesley, giving up the Governor of
Bombay in despair, sought for an advanced base of
his own making. His eye fell upon the fortress of
Ahmednuggur, just twenty miles north of his camp ;
and inquiry soon showed that he had seen aright. " It
is full of everything we want " ; he wrote on the 16th
of June, " the property of this country is lodged there.
The capture of that place will retrieve our immediate
distresses and will give everybody spirits." From that
day forward information as to Ahmednuggur was
eagerly gathered ; and the General fully decided that
the capture of the fort must be the first operation of
the war, if war there should be.1 But the favourable
months kept slipping away without the slightest
apparent approach to a decision, and at last in the
July, middle of July Arthur Wellesley's patience gave way.
Collins was still pressing Scindia to withdraw his army
to Hindostan ; but Scindia showed not a sign of yielding.
" We ought,' ' wrote the General, in effect, " to have
insisted on his retiring in May. Since that time six
valuable weeks have elapsed. We have gained nothing ;
on the contrary, we have consumed our resources.
Holkar is still north of the Taptee and, even if his
intentions be hostile to us, cannot join Scindia for some
time. The swelling of the rivers still protects our
frontier and exposes that of the enemy. Every day's
delay deprives us of this advantage, and therefore no
time should be lost." An amusingly insolent rejoinder
of the Mahratta chiefs to a reiterated request for the
withdrawal of their armies at last brought matters to a
crisis. On the 3rd of August Collins quitted Scindia's
1 Wellington Desp. ii. 10, 27, 36, 39, 40, 47, 97.
HISTORY OF THE ARMY
camp, and the fate of the Mahratta Empire was 1803.
committed to the hazard of war. Au2- 3-
The Viceroy's plans for the campaign had for some
time been matured, and he had resolved to carry the
war into every part of the enemy's dominions. The
principal forces to be faced were the joint armies of
Scindia and of the Rajah of Berar in the Deccan, and
the main army of Scindia commanded by Perron in the
north. The former, which still lay about the Ajunta
Ghaut, numbered in all about fifty thousand men
with one hundred and ninety guns : of this force thirty-
eight thousand were cavalry, ten thousand five hundred
regular infantry, and a thousand rocket-men and match-
lock-men. In the north Perron, who had fixed his
headquarters at Coel, about fifty miles north of Agra,
was at the head of about thirty-five thousand men,
including from sixteen to twenty thousand horse, with
a very large and well-appointed train of artillery.
To oppose these hosts there were formed two
principal armies : the northern under General Gerard
Lake, the hero of Linselles in 1793 an<^ tne obedient
tool of Dublin Castle in 1798 ; the southern under
Arthur Wellesley. Lake's headquarters were at Cawn-
pore, and the troops under his immediate command
numbered ten thousand five hundred men, including
three regiments of British cavalry and one battalion of
British infantry. In addition to this force, between
three and four thousand men were assembled near
Allahabad for the invasion of Bundelcund ; about two
thousand more were collected at Mirzapore to cover the
city and province of Benares, while other detachments
guarded the frontier from Mirzapore over three hundred
miles eastward and southward to Midnapore.
Arthur Wellesley's charge was the greater and more
onerous. First, on the eastern coast a force of close
upon five thousand men, including about six hundred
European troops, was assembled at Ganjam under
Lieutenant-colonel Harcourt to invade the province of
Cuttack and the possessions of the Rajah of Berar.
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
l8o3»This column was to act independently. Secondly, on
the west there were in Guzerat and Surat nearly three
thousand British and nearly four thousand native
infantry, affording, after all garrisons had been provided
for, a field-force of rather more than four thousand
men.1 This was parted into two divisions, each about
two thousand strong, the first being posted north of
the Nerbudda at Baroda, and the second south of the
Taptee between Surat and Songhur. Arthur Wellesley
had particularly insisted upon the importance of
Songhur itself, which lies fifty miles to eastward of
Surat and commands a Ghaut which leads down to that
city.2 Both divisions were designed to operate east-
ward against Holkar, if he should declare war, and
in any case to capture Baroach and the possessions
of Scindia in their vicinity. Both were placed, at
Arthur Wellesley's request, under the command of
Colonel John Murray, and he had reason to regret his
choice both then and later. For this was the Murray
who, having done good service as Baird's Quartermaster-
general in Egypt, was destined in the Peninsula to
wreck Wellesley's plans at the passage of the Douro,
and to bring himself to disgrace at Tarragona.
Thirdly, there was the army under Jtrthur Wellesley' s
personal command, just over eleven thousand strong,
including over sixteen hundred Europeans, but exclusive
of some five thousand Mysore and Mahratta horse.
In addition to this force, and forming almost a part
of it, was the Hyderabad contingent under Colonel
Stevenson, numbering over nine thousand men, of
whom nine hundred were Europeans. Wellesley's
headquarters at the outbreak of the war were at
Walkee, eight miles south of Ahmednuggur,3 towards
which fortress he had for some days past been slowly
1 H.M. 65th, 86th, and Royal Artillery . . . 1677
Two battalions each of the 1st and 6th Bombay N.I. . 2604
2 Wellington Desp. ii. 156-159.
3 Six miles is the distance named by himself {Well. Desp. ii.
173). Grant Duff, Hist, of the Mahrattas, iii. 168, gives the figure
at eight miles, which seems more correct.
ch. i HISTORY OF THE ARMY 15
advancing, as the sands of the long negotiation gradually l8o3'
ran out. Stevenson was still guarding the various
passes on the northern frontier of the Nizam's dominions
about Aurungabad. As a reserve for Arthur Wellesley
a force of over eight thousand men, together with large
quantities of supplies, had been assembled at Moodgul,
a little to the south of the River Kistna, under General
Stuart ; but the arrival of new garrisons for the French
settlements had caused Stuart himself to return to
Madras, and a part of his troops to be sent down to
the Carnatic. The reserve was thus reduced to about
four thousand men, of whom over twelve hundred were
Europeans, and the remainder natives. In all, the
British force assembled in India numbered, including
the garrisons at Poona and Hyderabad, nearly fifty
thousand men.1
1 Wellesley's Army —
Cavalry. H.M. 19th Dragoons . . .384
4th, 5th, 7th Madras N.C. . . 1347
1731
Artillery . . . 173
Lascars and Pioneers . . . . 10 10
Infantry. H.M. 74th and 78th . . . 1368
i/2nd, 1 and 2/3rd, i/8th, 2/1 2th,
2/i8th Madras N.I. . . .5631
6999
99*3
Add \ for Officers, Sergeants, etc. . .. . 1240
Total . . 11,153
Stevenson's Army —
Cavalry. 3rd and 6th N.C. ..... 909
Artillery . . . . . . .120
Lascars and Pioneers . . . 488
608
6891
Infantry. H.M. Scotch Brigade . . . 778
1 /6th, 2/7th, 2/9th, 1 and 2/1 ith 61 13
8408
Add £ for Officers, Sergeants, etc. . - . 105 1
Total
9459
16 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1803. On the 6th of August Arthur Wellesley received
Aug. 6. news 0f the final rupture with Scindia ; but foul
Aug. 8. weather made the roads impassable until the 8 th, on
which day he moved northward, pursuant to his long-
cherished design, upon Ahmednuggur. This stronghold
consisted, as usual, of a peitah or fortified native town
and a fort proper, the two being about half a mile
apart. The pettah, which was very large, was sur-
rounded by a strong wall, without a ditch, but very
neatly built and rounded off at the top so that it was
hardly broad enough for a man to stand upon. It had
twelve gates, without detached works, also some forty
bastions at intervals of about a hundred yards from
each other, of which eight were large enough to
mount two guns, and the rest were loopholed. Within
were many high buildings with narrow streets and mud
walls shutting off various enclosures, all of which
contributed to make a formidable defence ; and the
garrison consisted of one thousand of Scindia's regular
infantry with five small field-guns, and one thousand
Arabs ; the whole being under the command of three
French officers. Altogether its capture to an ordinary
man would have seemed no easy matter.
The General had already selected *the leaders of his
storming parties ; and on arriving before the pettah^ the
walls of which were seen to be crowded with men, he
halted at long cannon-shot, reconnoitred the place, and
directed an escalade to be attempted at three different
points. According to the rule then observed in all
marches in India, the advanced guard was composed of
one half-company from each battalion of infantry,
forming the picquets coming on duty under the field-
officer of the day ; and to this body, reinforced by the
flank-companies of the Seventy-eighth, was entrusted
the left attack. The right column was composed of
the flank companies of the Seventy- fourth and a
battalion of Sepoys1 under Captain Vesey, and the
centre column of the battalion - companies of the
1 i/3rd Madras N.I.
I ch. i HISTORY OF THE ARMY 17
i Seventy - fourth and another battalion of Sepoys,1 1803.
under Lieutenant-colonel Wallace. The left column,
"1 commanded by Colonel Harness, reached the walls first,
J- planted its ladders, and strove with the utmost gallantry
Id to force its way into the town ; but the men were
n hurled down as fast as they ascended, and after ten
le minutes abandoned the attempt, the Seventy -eighth
r< having lost six officers killed and some fifty men killed
7 and wounded. Vesey's men were delayed by an
is elephant from the artillery train, which took fright
d and ran down through the middle of them, scattering
y them in all directions. They soon reformed, however,
n and planted their two ladders at a re-entering angle
0 formed by one of the bastions, when there was such a
n rush to be foremost that one of the ladders was broken
d down. The men, however, swarmed up the other, and
h the flank-companies of the Seventy-fourth, with about
e two hundred more, had surmounted the wall when the
ir only remaining ladder was smashed by a cannon-shot,
d and Vesey was left alone with three hundred men.
e Without hesitation his party swept the enemy out of
jf the streets adjoining the wall, until they reached a gate
which had been marked out as the point of assault for
s the central column. Heavy firing announced that
e Wallace had already begun his attack ; the gate was
e opened to admit his troops ; and the two parties
1 uniting soon drove the whole garrison out of the town
t with very heavy loss. Few of the enemy reached the
1 fort, the bulk of them flying in other directions ; and
f by three o'clock in the afternoon the British were in
, comfortable possession of Ahmednuggur at a cost of
- about one hundred and twenty killed and wounded.
e The effect of this attack was great. " These English
i are a strange people and their General a wonderful
f man," wrote a Mahratta chief from Wellesley's camp
1 after the action. " They came here in the morning,
e looked at the pettah-wall, walked over it, killed all the
1 garrison, and returned to breakfast." On the following Aug. 9.
1 i/8th Madras N.I.
VOL. V C
1 8 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1803. day the General reconnoitred the fort; and on the
same evening seized a favourable spot, on which during
the night he constructed a battery of four eighteen-
Aug. 10. pounders. At daylight of the 10th these opened fire
with great effect, breaching two contiguous bastions,
insomuch that the native commandant presently begged
for a cessation that he might arrange terms of surrender.
Wellesley answered that he should continue to fire
until he should have taken the fort or received its
submission, and proceeded to batter the walls until on
the evening of the nth the enemy's hostages for the
Aug. 1 2. capitulation arrived. On the morning of the 12th the
commandant marched out with his private property and
his garrison of fourteen hundred men ; and Arthur
Wellesley had gained what he needed. The capture
of Ahmednuggur gave him a fortress which covered
Poona and the Nizam's western frontier, which cut
Scindia off from the southern chiefs and controlled all
his territory south of the Godavery, and which, most
important of all, provided him with a good advanced
base with abundance of supplies and stores from which
to pursue his campaign.
This, though now forgotten, was a remarkable feat of
arms, the fall of the fort being undoubtedly due to the
moral effect produced by the escalade of the town. The
fort was pronounced, not only by Wellesley himself but
by his officers also, to be nearly, if not quite the
strongest, that they had ever seen in the plains of India.1
It was nearly circular in form, well built of solid stone,
with bastions sixty feet high at short intervals, each
mounting three or four guns, and the whole surrounded
by a wide dry ditch. The glacis was so high that it
covered about thirty feet of the walls, but, being of abrupt
slope, enabled besiegers to find shelter close to the place
when once the guns had been dismounted. This was]
the defect of the stronghold ; but none the less it had
1 It must, however, be remarked that one of his engineer officers
describes it as a place of no great strength. Twelve Years' Military
Adventure, p. 133.
I ch. i HISTORY OF THE ARMY 19
lt| proved too formidable even for Holkar at the zenith of 1803.
§1 his power. Wellesley mastered both fort and pettah
'"I in three days at a cost of seventy-nine Europeans and
e sixty-two natives killed and wounded.1
i The General halted four days at Ahmednuggur to
d arrange the details for the protection and administration
r- of the captured territory. Meanwhile a report came
e that Holkar was on the march to join Scindia ; and, as
ts though to confirm it, a party of irregular horse passed
1 the Ajunta hills, apparently to make a raid upon the
e Nizam's dominions. Stevenson, as is not uncommon
e with a general who has a wide front to watch, became
I uneasy and irresolute, being anxious for his convoys and
it communications. First he moved back, then he moved
e forward, forming elaborate plans for shielding from
d attack the supplies that were on their way to him.
it Wellesley could hardly suppress his impatience. " Keep
II your infantry in a central situation and let your supplies
>t collect on them," he wrote ; " move forward yourself
d with the cavalry and one battalion, and dash at the
h first enemy that comes into your neighbourhood. You
I will either cut them up or drive them off. ... A long
if defensive war will ruin us. . . . By any other plan
ej than that above proposed we shall lose our supplies,
.e| do what we will." Poor Stevenson endeavoured to
it mend his ways, but still could not refrain from a slight
e movement rearward which brought his young chief's
! hand down upon him once more. " Depend upon it
"I that no straggling horse will venture to your rear so
h long as you can keep the enemy in check and your
d detachment well in advance. Dash at the first fellows
it that make their appearance, and the campaign will be
)t our own." 2 The chase of Doondia Wao had not been
:e thrown away upon Arthur Wellesley.
is Meanwhile by the 17th of August his cavalry had Aug. 1
d reached the Godavery ; and on the following day he
1 The foregoing account is based on Well. Desp. ii. 193, 204,
rs 313, and Welsh's Military Reminiscences in the East Indies, ii.
' 155-165.
2 Well. Desp. ii. 208, 210, 21 9.
20
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xii
1803. was on march with his infantry to join them. The
river, being swollen by the rains, was very wide, and
the troops crossed in wicker boats made by themselves
in the jungle, and covered with bullock-skins. On the
Aug. 24. 24th Wellesley's headquarters were at Toka, about
Aug. 29. fifty miles north of Ahmednuggur, and on the 29th
he reached Aurungabad. The difficulties of the
campaign seemed to increase with every step. The
country through which he passed was completely
exhausted and depopulated ; vast numbers of bullocks
had died of starvation and exposure ; and though
there were supplies enough for the troops, and the
army itself was, as Wellesley said, " in excellent
marching trim," yet the provision of food for the
followers appeared to be impossible.1
Meanwhile Scindia and the Rajah of Berar, after
drawing Stevenson as far east as Jafferabad by a feint
in that direction, doubled back to westward, entered
Aug. the Nizam's territory by the pass of Ajunta with
23~24- their cavalry only, and seemed to be pushing forward
rapidly towards the Godavery. Though Arthur
Wellesley had matured all arrangements for repel-
ling them if they should succeed in crossing that river,
Aug. 30. he immediately made one march to the eastward from
Aurungabad, and then turned southward, so as to
cover at once the advance of his supplies from
Hyderabad and the Kistna, and to press closely
upon the enemy if they should continue their advance.
Sept. 2. By the 2nd of September he had reached Rackisbaum
on the Godavery ; and on the same day Stevenson,
who had hurried back to westward, assaulted and took
the fort of Jalnapore, an isolated possession of Scindia
some sixty miles east of Aurungabad. The enemy by
that time had reached Partoor, about forty miles east
and north of Rackisbaum, where they halted during
Sept. 3-4. the 3rd and 4th to await the arrival of some of Scindia's
regular infantry. Wellesley and Stevenson likewise
Sept. 5-6. remained stationary on those days ; but on the 5th and
1 Well. Desp. ii. 235, 245.
CH. I
HISTORY OF THE ARMY
21
iicl 6th Wellesley, finding that the Godavery was by a most 1803.
::I unusual accident fordable, made two marches eastward
es SI so as to start level with the Mahrattas in case of a race
m to Hyderabad. At the same time, being satisfied that
utl nothing could save the Nizam's territory from a raid
till except a counter-raid of the British upon Berar, he
ie| determined at all risks to send Stevenson north-eastward
ie| by way of Ellichpoor to attack the Rajah's fort of
[?| Gawilghur, and if possible to plunder Nagpoor. As to
:;| himself he felt confident enough, for his transport was
111 now in such perfect order and his cattle and horses in
ic such excellent condition, that a march of twenty-three
it miles in a day was an easy matter.1
.e Scindia and Ragogee, however, by no means en-
joyed the vicinity of Arthur Wellesley on the Godavery.
r " They appear to be very much afraid of this division,
it and very little so of Colonel Stevenson's," wrote
J Wellesley ; and accordingly on the night of the 6th Sept. 6.
ft they broke up their camp and returned to the Ajunta
Ghaut. Stevenson had unfortunately moved westward
on the 5th from Jalnapore, which would have been
an ideal position from which to intercept them ; and
though on the 6th and again on the 9th he surprised Sept. 9.
and dispersed two parties of the enemy's horse, yet he
did them little real harm. In fact he was still nervous,
and wrote letters to Wellesley alleging doubts as to the
sufficiency of his army for the raid into Berar, which
brought upon him at least one very unpleasant reply.
During the ensuing days both Generals were tied fast
to their stations by the need for keeping open a
j passage for their convoys and supplies ; but Wellesley
comforted himself by the thoughts that Scindia, by
bringing up his infantry and artillery, would be less
difficult to overtake and more easily brought to action.
The infantry duly joined the Mahratta army at Ajunta
to the number of sixteen battalions, and on the 21st Sept. 21.
the entire force of the enemy was assembled between
Bokerdun and Jafferabad. Meanwhile on the 16th
1 Well Desp. ii. 273-277.
22 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1803. Wellesley moved eastward up the Godavery to meet
Sept. 20. his convoy, and turning northward on the 20th met
Stevenson in consultation at Budnapore, a little to the
west of Jalnapore, on the 21st. They then arranged c
to march upon the enemy, Stevenson taking the western
route and Wellesley the eastern round the hills between
Budnapore and Jalnapore, and on the evening of the
24th to attack him with their united forces.1
Beyond all question this division of the army was a
most dangerous manoeuvre, for it left the Mahratta
leaders free by a small lateral movement to throw the
whole of their force upon either moiety of the British.
Wellesley, indeed, was so keenly alive to its faultiness
after the event that he was careful to defend it,
before it was attacked, when reporting it to a friend
who was also a military critic. His excuse then was
that he thought it necessary thus to separate his force
into two parts, first to avoid delay in passing through
defiles, and secondly to ensure that while he was ad-
vancing northward by one road, the enemy should not
slip past him by the other. The real truth probably
was that, knowing Scindia to be afraid of him, he did
not hesitate to take even the most perilous liberties.
Sept. 23. On the 23rd Wellesley, on reaching Naulniah, some
twenty miles north of Jalnapore, learned that the
Mahratta chiefs had moved off in the morning with
their cavalry, but that the infantry had not yet marched,
and was still lying within six miles of his proposed
encampment. Thereupon, though Stevenson was still
out of reach, he sent word to him that he meant to
attack at once ; and having secured his baggage at
Naulniah, marched forward without further delay.
Riding on with his staff and the cavalry only, he came,
at about one o'clock of the afternoon, in sight not of
the infantry alone but of the entire army of Scindia and
Ragogee, encamped upon a peninsula formed by the
rivers Kaitna in their front, and Juah in their rear.
The Kaitna was impassable except by certain fords ; the
1 Well. Desp. ii. 284, 289, 295.
HISTORY OF THE ARMY
23
Juah was of smaller volume, but had very steep banks ; l8o3-
and the ground along both rivers was much broken by Sept'
ravines. The enemy was in great force, for the whole
of the peninsula was swarming with men. The
cavalry, numbering twenty or thirty thousand, formed
the right of the hostile army about the village of
Bokerdun ; and their encampment extended to eastward
till it met that of the infantry, which prolonged the
line to the village of Assaye. Among these last, as
Wellesley knew, were sixteen regular battalions, amount-
ing in all to more than ten thousand men ; namely, the
brigade of Pohlmann, a German, six thousand men ; that
of Dupont, two thousand five hundred men ; and four
auxiliary battalions of the Begum Somroo,1 numbering
yet two thousand more. With them was a certain pro-
portion of European officers, though many, especially
the English, had been enticed away by a proclamation
which had been issued by the Viceroy at the beginning
of the war, offering to all Europeans and British subjects
the same pay as they received from Scindia. Besides
these regular troops there was a mob of irregular
infantry belonging to both of the Mahratta chiefs, and
a good force of regular artillerymen with over one
hundred guns. Altogether the host must have counted
from forty to fifty thousand men.
Wellesley was in an extremely awkward situation.
He had laid it down as a principle that the Mahrattas
must never be attacked in a position of their own
choice, nor on the other hand suffered to attack the
British, no matter how strongly the defenders might
be entrenched ; but that they must always be allowed
to get into motion, whether for advance or retreat, and
must then be assailed while in the disorder of march.2
His information had led him to expect that part of the
Mahratta army would have been already withdrawn to
1 The widow of the French officer, mentioned in vol. iii. 64.
2 Well. Desp. ii. 403-404. The letter to Stevenson in which these
maxims are laid down is dated Oct. 12, 1803, or more than seven
weeks after the action ; but it is evident that the plan had been
thought out beforehand.
24 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1 803. some distance, and that the rest would be moving off
Sept. 23. tQ jQ-n them< Yet there was the whole of it united, t
ready, and, as usual, well posted ; for Wellesley freely
acknowledged that the positions chosen by the
Mahrattas were always " confoundedly strong and
difficult of access." His own force consisted of two
battalions of British and five of native infantry, the
Nineteenth Light Dragoons and three regiments of
native cavalry, a battalion of pioneers, and something
fewer than five hundred artillerymen, of whom one-
third were Europeans. In all he could put in line
about seven thousand of all ranks,1 with but fourteen
cannon besides the eight light pieces attached to the
cavalry and known as " galloper-guns." Stevenson,
whom he had originally intended to join with him in
the attack, was ten or twelve miles away. If he
attempted to retire to Naulniah to await him, he
would certainly be followed and surrounded by the
enemy's cavalry, harassed until nightfall, and obliged
either to risk the loss of his baggage or to weaken his
attack on the following day by detaching a large
baggage-guard. On the other hand, if he assailed the
1 Return of rank and file : —
19th L.D ....... 313 rank and file.
4th N.C., 5th N.C., 7th N.C. . . . 1145 „
European Artillery . . . . 1 54 „
Gun Lascars . . . . 323 „ „
H.M. 74th 500 „ „
H.M. 78th ....... 670 „ „
i/2nd N.I., i/4th N.I., i/8th N.I., i/ioth N.I.,
2/l2th N.I 3OI4
1st battalion Pioneers ..... 605
6724
Add one-eighth for officers and N.C.O. . 800
Total . . 7524
Deduct for baggage-guard say . . . 500
Final Total . . 7024
The bulk of the 2nd N.I. (750) reinforced the baggage-guard.
IcH. i HISTORY OF THE ARMY 25
^IMahrattas at once near the junction of the Kaitna 1803.
^land the Juah, their straitened position would forbid SePt* 2 3*
Cithern to take advantage of their enormous preponder-
ance in numbers, and he could use the two streams for
^Bthe protection of his flanks. Of course the defeat of
10|his own force in such a narrow tongue of land would
le|mean its certain annihilation.
-| That risk he was prepared to take ; but there
'gjremained still the difficulty that the only ford known to
--■his guides was commanded by the Mahratta artillery, and
[e Ithat consequently the forcing of the passage would be
n extremely hazardous. Sweeping the line of the banks
e with his glass, he noticed at some distance to his right
i) the two villages of Peepulgaon and Waroor close
1 together on opposite sides of the Kaitna, and, in spite
s of the denial of his guides, concluded that there must
2 be a ford between them. A staff-officer was despatched
: to ascertain the truth ; and during this delay the
I Mahrattas struck their tents and formed a single line of
1 battle behind the Kaitna, with the cavalry on their right
and the infantry on their left. Moreover, two large bodies
of horse actually crossed the river to make closer
observation, but kept at a safe distance when they
found Wellesley's twelve hundred sabres ready to
meet them. In due time the staff-officer came
galloping back with the news that the General was
I correct in his conjecture about the ford ; and orders
were sent to the infantry, which had been carefully
kept out of the enemy's sight, to diverge to their right
and march upon Peepulgaon. The regular cavalry
covered the rear of the battalions during the move-
ment, and formed behind them for the passage of the
river. Wellesley left his irregular horse, part of it
Mysorean and part of it from the Peishwa's army, to
keep in check the enemy on the south of the Kaitna.
He was told, just at this critical moment, that the
Peishwa's troops intended to turn against him ; but he
took no notice, rightly judging that they would await
the issue of the action before they changed sides.
26 HISTORY OF THE ARMY bookxiii
1803. As the British infantry drew near to the river
Sept. 23. enemy's guns opened fire, but with little effect.
Strange to say, no attempt was made to dispute the
passage of the ford ; but the crossing took some time,
for there were difficulties in dragging the guns through
the water ; and the Mahrattas used the opportunity
to bring down a battery close to the bank on their own
side of the river. As the head of the British column
began to ascend from the ford to the peninsula this
battery immediately poured upon it a heavy and con-
tinuous fire, which caused great loss. The head of
Wellesley's orderly dragoon was carried away by a
cannon-shot ; the dead body remained in the saddle ;
and the whole of the staff was scattered by the
plunging of the terrified horse until at length the
ghastly burden fell to the ground. However, the
column filed on, and Wellesley, leaving one of his
staff-officers to watch the enemy's movements, busied
himself with the formation of his order of battle.
Still fully persuaded that he was sure of falling on
the Mahrattas' flank, he drew up his force in three
lines. The first line from right to left consisted of the
picquets, two native battalions, and the Seventy-eighth ;
the second line, of the Seventy-fourtti and two native
battalions, and the third of the cavalry, which played
the part of a reserve. These dispositions had been
nearly, if not quite, completed behind a slight ridge
which concealed them from the enemy, when the
staff-officer came galloping back with the news that the
Mahrattas were changing position to their left, a
manoeuvre of which Wellesley had believed them to
be incapable. The information was, however, correct ;
and the evolution, though performed unscientifically,
went forward with perfect order and precision. The
Mahratta regiments did not break into column, but
each battalion moved off in line to the new alignment ;
so that while in motion they presented the appearance
of an echelon of battalions with the left in advance. It
was, however, but half of the hostile infantry which
I cH. i HISTORY OF THE ARMY 27
I moved in this direction, the second Mahratta line 180
a retiring to the Juah, and there taking up a position Sep
1 parallel to the river, with its left resting upon the
[ village of Assaye.1
Wellesley, of course, was little concerned as yet
I with this second line ; but on hearing of the enemy's
■; change of position, and perceiving that the space
i between the two rivers became wider immediately
5 before him, he at once, and rightly, became anxious
■ for his flanks, and prepared to extend his own front.
'I With this object he ordered the picquets, which
: formed the right of his first line, to take ground to
the right, so as to make room for the two native
s battalions of his second line on their left. At the same
: time he commanded the Seventy-fourth to incline to its
i right hand, and to form on the right of the picquets, and
directed the cavalry to file up to the Juah for the purpose
I of protecting his right flank. Strict injunctions were
given to Colonel Orrock, the officer in command of the
picquets, that he was on no account to advance upon the
village of Assaye nor to approach too closely to it.
The troops were about to enter upon this movement
when the Mahratta line brought forward guns and
opened a most destructive fire. The native bullock-
drivers with the British artillery at once became
unsteady ; not a few teams were severely maltreated,
and several cannon which had been advanced to answer
I the enemy's fire were disabled. Moreover, since the
enemy's echelon had advanced from its left, the first of
its battalions to come into action were, of course, those
opposed to the British right, which was precisely the
quarter where the alterations in the line of battle
1 I venture to differ at this point from Colonel Biddulph, who
makes this movement to the Juah occur in the middle of the action.
I base my opinion on Notes relative to the late Transactions, pp.
61-62, Wellington's memorandum on the battle {Desp. ii. 323),
read in conjunction with the map in the Notes, and on the account
given in Wellington Suppl. Desp. iv. 185-190, note. But I confess
that it is with diffidence that I dissent from the view of so high
an authority. The subject is strangely difficult and obscure.
28
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
i8o3- were going forward. In a very short time the fire of
Sept. 23. Manratta guns became so terrible that no troops
could long endure it ; and Wellesley gave the word to
advance, ordering the battalions of the second line to
fall into their appointed places during the movement.
Even then the picquets were slow in moving off, and
Wellesley sent an impatient message to ask the cause.
Orrock's reply was that his battalion-guns were disabled.
" Then tell him to get on without them," rejoined the
General ; and presently the advance began.
Thereupon the enemy 's cannonade redoubled in
violence. Within a front of less than a mile one
hundred pieces, admirably trained and very rapidly
served, poured a tempest of shot upon the British ranks.
The storm was severest in the centre, where the Sepoy
battalions, unable to face it, swerved to their left and
crowded in upon the Seventy-eighth. However, the
greater part of them advanced rapidly and in good
order under Wellesley's personal leadership upon the
enemy's right wing, and, without pausing to fire, forced
it back without difficulty ; for the Mahratta infantry
stood only so long as their artillery continued to play,
whereas the gunners stuck to their guns most gallantly
to the last, and were actually bayoneted in the act of
loading their pieces. But even so this infantry was
thrust back rather than beaten off ; and the enemy's
centre, being still untouched, presently closed in towards
the Juah, while one compact division, six thousand
strong, under the command of Pohlmann,1 retired in fair
order direct to its rear, that is to say westward, for
some distance, when it halted and faced about. So far,
therefore, all that had been accomplished was the
capture of the guns on the right wing of the
Mahrattas.
And meanwhile at the other extremity of Wellesley's
line matters had gone disastrously wrong. Colonel
Orrock, at the head of the picquets, for some reason,
1 I suspect Pohlmann's brigade to have formed part of a second
line immediately in rear of the troops which faced Wellesley.
ch. i HISTORY OF THE ARMY 29
forgot alike the object of his oblique movement to the 1803.
right and Wellesley's explicit order to keep clear of SePt- 2
Assaye. Possibly he was afraid that his men might
give way if he attempted to alter the direction, for they
had lost a third of their numbers before they fired a
shot ; or possibly he was himself so dazed by the fire
that he could do nothing but lead on in the same
direction that he had originally taken. But, be that
as it may, it is certain that he continued to edge away
to his right, widening the gap already made in
Wellesley's centre by the swerving of the Sepoys already
described, and that the hapless Seventy-fourth, trying
in vain to take its appointed place upon his right,
followed inevitably in his wake. Advancing straight
upon Assaye, the two unfortunate corps were exposed
to a terrific fire of musketry and artillery ; and, though
the Seventy-fourth carried the picquets forward for
some way, yet at length the trial was too severe for the
native troops. The picquets broke and ran back
with confusion on to the Seventy-fourth, which
happened at the time to be in difficult ground among
cactus hedges ; and while the British regiment stood
alone, exposed to the concentrated fire of the enemy's left
wing, a body of Mahratta horse came galloping round
the village of Assaye and swooped upon its right
flank, cutting the white soldiers down as only Eastern
horsemen can cut, with all the terror and havoc of the
sword.
Yet still this glorious band, though reduced from a
battalion to one strong company, " clung round its
colours, undaunted and unbroken " ; and it was not
destined to be utterly swept away. Colonel Maxwell,
who commanded the brigade of cavalry, was watching
for the moment to act, and ordered the Nineteenth
Light Dragoons and the Fourth Native Cavalry to
advance. The two regiments, therefore, galloped
forward amid the cheers of the wounded men of the
Seventy-fourth, swept the Mahratta cavalry before
them, and bore down swiftly upon the left of the
30 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
i8o3- enemy's first line of infantry. These stood firm for
Sept. 23. a t'me an(j receivec[ the British cavalry with a storm of
grape-shot ; but the Nineteenth, totally heedless of the
fire, leaped straight into the midst of them, when the
whole broke and fled across the river in their rear.
Meanwhile Wellesley had wheeled up his own left
wing to the right, in order to attack the enemy's reserve
by the Juah ; but thereby he necessarily exposed its
left flank to the hostile cavalry and his right to the fire
of the enemy's centre, which had faced about to con-
front him. Maxwell's charge, however, delivered him
from the danger on his right ; and Wellesley's battalions,
breaking into double quick time, charged the reserve and
drove it across the river. The Sepoys began to disperse
in pursuit, but the Seventy-eighth fortunately stood firm
and daunted any attempt of the Mahratta horse upon
their flank ; while Maxwell's cavalry, finding a second
stream of fugitives added to that already before them,
dashed over the water, hewing mercilessly among them,
and for a time disappeared from the field of battle.
Wellesley then reformed his infantry on the bank of
the Juah, and found that there was a second engagement
before him. The enemy's cavalry still hovered round
him on the west, with Pohlmann's brigade looming in
more solid menace behind them ; the unbroken infantry
of their centre and a mass of rallied infantry had formed
themselves into a huge half-moon with their right
resting on Assaye and their left on the Juah ; and finally,
scattered parties of Mahratta troops, some of which
had feigned death during Wellesley's advance, had
seized the deserted guns in all parts of the field and
were playing upon the British rear. Wellesley detached
first one native battalion and later a second against the
mass of men round Assaye, but both were beaten back,
having accomplished nothing. Now, however, the
cavalry reappeared on the scene, for Maxwell, rallying
his men from the pursuit, had led them down the bank
of the Juah to a ford by the village of Borekerry, and
by that passage had regained the army. The General
ch.i HISTORY OF THE ARMY 31
or then ordered the Seventy-eighth and the Seventh Native l8o3-
Cavalry to head a fresh attack upon Assaye, and was Sept' 23
actually drawing up the former regiment in line when
his horse was shot under him. The enemy, however,
did not await the onslaught of the white infantry,
but retired across the Juah and made good their
retreat.
There remained Pohlmann's brigade, and the scattered
gunners dispersed over the ground formerly occupied
by the enemy's first line ; and Wellesley, leaving
Maxwell to deal with Pohlmann, led the infantry to
secure the Mahratta guns. This last was not ac-
complished without sharp fighting, in the course of
which the General had another horse badly injured
under him by the pikes of Scindia's brave gunners.
Meanwhile Maxwell led his brigade against Pohlmann's
column, though its ranks were by this time greatly
thinned and both men and horses were exhausted by their
previous efforts. Pohlmann awaited the attack in line,
and Maxwell led the charge obliquely against his left.
At the moment of contact Maxwell was struck dead by
a grape-shot. By a convulsive movement he threw up
his sword and checked his horse before he fell. The
squadrons behind him swerved at the movement; and
the whole body of horsemen, who had acquitted them-
selves so nobly an hour earlier, edged with increasing
speed down the whole length of Pohlmann's bayonets,
crying, " Halt, halt," and finally galloped away. The
brigade was soon rallied, and retired at a walk ; and
Pohlmann, whose conduct throughout the day bears
strong marks of treachery to his master, seized the op-
portunity to retreat. The Mahratta horse, which by a
little energy and boldness could have ensured the victory
to Scindia while Maxwell was on the other side of the
Juah, lost heart and rode sullenly off. The British
troops, having marched twenty-four miles before the
battle began, were in no condition to pursue ; and the
irregular cavalry of the Peishwa and of Mysore had not
mettle sufficient to attack an unbroken enemy. At six
32 HISTORY OF THE ARMY bookxiii c
1803. o'clock, therefore, the engagement closed, leaving Arthur t
Wellesley victorious in his first general action.1 C
Success was only gained by the most extraordinary 1<
exertions on the part of every man in the field. Had t
Pohlmann done his duty he might at least have em- t
barrassed Wellesley greatly ; and if the Mahratta s
cavalry had behaved with even a show of spirit, the issue t
would have been certainly doubtful, and most probably g
disastrous to the British arms. Colonel Orrock's fc
unfortunate error in misleading the right of the line was \
responsible for the extreme hazard incurred in the fight ; n
but Wellesley, in consideration of the terrible fire which n
he faced at the head of the picquets, forgave him for the t(
blunder. For the rest, though every man, British or b
native, played his part with superlative gallantry, Assaye h
presents a roll of valiant deeds which is unsurpassed in v
our military history. First and foremost, Wellesley 0
himself was throughout, in the hottest of the fray, calm, ti
cool, and collected as if at a field-day. He escaped g
untouched, though, as has been told, two horses were k
killed under him ; but of his staff" eight out of ten sustained
wounds to themselves or their horses. His brigadiers, t(
Harness and Waller, together with most of the members e:
of their staff* and the mounted officer9»of infantry, also si
had their horses shot under them. Regimental and ti
staff-officers vied with each other in heroism. Lieutenant k
Nathan Wilson of the Nineteenth Hussars had his arm k
shattered by a grape-shot early in the action, but charged v
on with the useless limb dangling by his side. With 0
1 The best account of Assaye known to me is in Twelve Years* P
Military Adventure, i. 154 seq., which should be read with %
Wellington Desp. ii. 323-329, 338, 349 ; Suppl. Desp. iv. 185-190 ; a
Notes on the late Transactions, etc., p. 59; Welsh's Military
Reminiscences, i. 171 seq. ; Grant Duff's History of the Mahrattas, I
iii. 169 seq. ; Wilson's History of the Madras Army, iii. 104 seq. ;
Thorn's Memoir of the War in India ; and Colebrooke's Life of
Mountstuart Elphinstone, i. 63 seq. All of these have been admirably
worked up, with some original matter, in The Nineteenth and their
Times, by Colonel Biddulph, who has most kindly furnished me
with notes taken by him in the India Office, and other valuable
material collected by him from private sources.
1 ch. i HISTORY OF THE ARMY 33
^Ithe Nineteenth in the same charge rode a staff-officer, 1803.
] Captain A. B. Campbell of the Seventy-fourth. He had
ar:| lost one arm in the Polygar war ; he had since broken
^ I the other at the wrist by a fall when hunting ; but he
:n>| took his bridle in his teeth and fought fiercely with his
M sword in his mutilated hand. Captain George Sale of
sue the Nineteenth galloped so impetuously at a Mahratta
gunner, who was in the act of firing his gun, that his
horse stuck fast between the cannon and the wheel,
val His covering sergeant, Strange by name, came to his
rescue, and though pierced through the lungs by a pike,
not only saved his officer, but rode on with his regiment
to the end of the day. The Sepoys showed not less
bravery ; and Wellesley confessed that they astonished
him. In the first battalion of the Eighth Native Infantry,
which called itself " Wellesley's Own," five native
officers and non-commissioned officers of a single dis-
tinguished family were killed. They were buried in one
grave, and their comrades refused to mourn over men
who had died in the performance of their duty.
But the loss of the British was very severe, amounting
to nearly six hundred and fifty Europeans and over
eight hundred natives killed, wounded, and missing ; and
since most of the wounded were struck by cannon-shot,
their hurts were very severe.1 The Seventy-fourth alone
lost eleven officers and one hundred and thirteen men
killed, six officers and two hundred and seventy-one men
wounded. Wellesley never forgot their gallant service
on this day, and six months later interposed to save from
the gallows a murderer of infamous character, who was
also a soldier of the Seventy-fourth, rather than punish
a member of such a regiment with death.2 Of the two
Killed. Wounded. Missing.
1 European Officers . 23 30
European Soldiers .175 412 4
Natives . . .230 696 14
Totals . 428 1 138 18 = 1584
2 Wellington Suppl. Desp. iv. 341,
VOL. V
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1803. Sepoy battalions on the right of the first line, one had
one hundred and seventy-four and the other two hundred
and twenty -eight casualties. The cavalry brigade,
besides nearly two hundred men killed and wounded,
lost three hundred and fifteen horses killed and over
four hundred wounded. Indeed there have been few
actions in which horses have suffered so heavily in pro-
portion to their numbers. The enemy left twelve
hundred dead on the field ; their wounded were estimated
at four times as many ; and they abandoned also to the
British ninety-eight guns. They were hardly treated,
for their infantry fought well and stubbornly, being by
Arthur Wellesley's testimony the best troops in India
next to our own Sepoys. But Ragogee Bhonsla fled
at the beginning of the action, and Scindia followed him
soon after ; and with such leaders it was impossible for
the men to do themselves justice.
Wellesley's army bivouacked on the field after the
action, in a state of utter exhaustion after so severe a ,
contest following upon a march of twenty-four miles.
The cavalry was sent back to bring on the baggage and {
camp-equipage, but did not return until next morning. ,
And meanwhile the dead were ungathered, the hurt in ,
many cases un tended, and the living 4ay down among 2
them as they could. Wellesley, overcome by the \
reaction after intense strain of mind and body, sank j
down with the rest upon the ground. Close to him on j
one side lay an officer whose leg had been shot off; ^
close to him on the other was a second officer, dead ;
but the General sat motionless with his head bent low
between his knees, and spoke no word to any man.1 T
Sept. 24. When morning came it was hoped that Stevenson would .
arrive, bringing his medical staff" to help the overworked C
surgeons of Wellesley ; but it was evening before he
appeared. Like a good soldier he had moved at once
towards the sound of the cannon, but being misled by j
his guides had entangled his troops in a defile, so that
1 Biddulph, p. 145, quoting from a MS. in the India Office B
Library.
I ch. i HISTORY OF THE ARMY 35
they were wearied out with marching. All through the 1803.
25th he waited in order that his surgeons might give
assistance ; though even thus it was a week before the
wounds of all the injured could be dressed. Then
on the 26th, leaving Wellesley still encamped near the Sept. 26.
battlefield, he set out in pursuit of the enemy.
The Mahrattas had passed the night of the 23rd
within twelve miles of Assaye, but, hearing of Stevenson's
approach, made off on the morning of the 24th, and
never stopped until on the same night they reached
! the foot of the Ajunta Ghaut. As they fled, they
abandoned or hid several more of their guns, four of
which fell into Stevenson's hands. Their force then
parted into two divisious, the regular infantry retiring
across the Nerbudda, towards which river Stevenson
followed them ; while Scindia and Ragogee, after taking
some guns from the fort of Burhanpore, moved west-
ward along the Taptee, with the intention, as was
supposed, of marching ultimately southward upon
Poona. Wellesley until the 8th of October was still Oct, 8.
occupied in moving his wounded to the fort of Ajunta,
and in the more welcome task of attracting grain-
merchants with thousands of bullocks from Scindia's
army to his own. Upon hearing of the Mahrattas'
movements he decided that he could not advance to
northward without risk to Poona or to the Nizam's
dominions. He therefore ordered Stevenson to take
possession if possible of the forts of Burhanpore and
Asseerghur, upon the north bank of the Taptee, and
himself made a rapid movement from Ajunta south-
ward towards Aurungabad, halting within one march of
that town for the best part of a week. On the night of
the 15th of October he learned that Scindia, finding Oct. 1 5.
his way to Poona barred, had turned again northward.
Stevenson was at that moment on the point of reaching
Burhanpore, which indeed he occupied without resist-
anceonthe 1 6th, afterwards continuing his advance north- Oct. 16.
eastward upon Asseerghur. Divining that Scindia's
sudden change of direction boded no good for Stevenson,
36
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1803. Wellesley on the 16th marched rapidly northward and
foiled his enemy's plans for the second time. The fall
of Burhanpore and Asseerghur, however, signified that
the last of Scindia's possessions in the Deccan had been
wrested from him ; and the surrender of sixteen of his
European officers, upon the terms offered by the Indian
Government, greatly diminished his power for mischief.
Wellesley therefore decided that the Rajah of Berar also
must now feel the weight of his hand, and instructed
Stevenson to equip himself for the siege of Gawilghur,
the chief stronghold of Ragogee's government and the
storehouse of his most precious possessions.
Hardly had he done so when the news was brought
to him that the Rajah had separated his force from that
of Scindia and moved to Chandore ; whereupon,
directing Stevenson to keep a sharp eye upon Scindia,
Oct. 24, he reascended the Ajunta Ghaut on the 24th, and
was again ready to prevent any inroad to the south.
Marching southward he reached Aurungabad on the
Oct. 29. 29th, when he turned south-eastward, making Ragogee's
army shift its position five times in two days by repeated
Oct. 31. menaces, and at last on the 3 1st came in sight of his camp
full twenty miles away. On that day one of the Rajah's
detachments made an attempt upon a British convoy on
the Godavery, but was beaten ofT ; and Ragogee then
hurried eastward down the river, having no mind to let
Wellesley approach him too closely. Wellesley followed
Nov. 10. him as far as Patree, which lies about one hundred miles
east of Ahmednuggur, when he turned northward,
hoping by an invasion of Berar to recall the Rajah from
his raid to the defence of his own territories.
Immediately afterwards two events of some import-
Nov. 1 1. ance occurred. On the 1 ith there arrived in Wellesley's
camp a message from Scindia to sue for peace ; and on
Nov. 12. the 1 2th Amrut Rao, Holkar's favoured candidate for
the throne of Poona, joined the General as an ally of
the British, with three or four thousand irregular troops.
The negotiations were carried on during the movement
of the army northward, which was slow owing to the
ch. i HISTORY OF THE ARMY 37
tardiness of the Nizam's government in sending 1803.
garrisons to occupy the country taken by the British.
On the 20th of November Wellesley reached Wakud, Nov. 20
about sixty miles north of Patree, when he turned north-
westward to Rajoora ; and there on the 22 nd he agreed Nov. 22
to a suspension of hostilities with Scindia.
The considerations which chiefly moved him to this
arrangement were that he could do no more harm to
Scindia, having already captured the whole of his terri-
tory in the Deccan ; whereas Scindia's horse could do
a good deal of harm to him by impeding his operations
against Berar in general and Gawilghur in particular.
The only condition, therefore, upon which he insisted
was that Scindia should retire to some position at least
fifty miles east of Ellichpoor, and should preserve the
same distance from any British troops. In return he
engaged that the advance of the British in Guzerat should
be kept within certain limits. This done, he turned
eastward from Rajoora, and entering Berar on the 25th, Nov. 25
reached Akolah on the 27th, from which two days'
march due north to Parterly1 united his army on the
29th with that of Colonel Stevenson. Nov. 29
Meanwhile, as might have been expected, Scindia
had made no attempt to fulfil his part of the armistice
by retiring to east of Ellichpoor, but had simply
drawn his cavalry nearer to a large force of Ragogee's
regular infantry, which was encamped within sight
of Parterly under the Rajah's brother, Manu Bapu.
Stevenson therefore had followed Scindia, but judiciously
halted for a day so as to allow Wellesley to join him in
the attack. On the morning of the 29th a messenger
from the Rajah of Berar came to Wellesley to tell him
that his master's army was only ten miles distant, and
to entreat him to halt. The General's only answer was
that if he overtook the army he would certainly attack
it, and that the messenger had better remain with the
baggage under protection of the rear-guard. Ascend-
ing a tower at Parterly immediately upon his arrival,
1 Or, as some spell it, Pautoorla.
■
38 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1803. Wellesley perceived a confused moving mass some five
Nov. 29. miles distant, but having made a long march on a hot
day was disinclined to weary his troops with a pursuit,
However, bodies of Mahratta horse at once appeared in
his front ; and when these were chased away, in order
to clear the ground on which he intended to encamp,
he plainly descried the whole army of the enemy drawn
up in order of battle about five miles off on the plains
before the village of Argaum. This was enough.
Though the troops had marched at six in the morning
and it was then three o'clock in the afternoon, he
resolved immediately to attack. The army accordingly
marched off in three columns in a direction nearly
parallel to the enemy's position, the irregular cavalry
covering the left flank and rear. The country was
covered with high grain, and for three miles those in
the ranks could see nothing. Near the village of
Sirsoni, however, the ground opened out slightly, and 1
on the other side of it the cultivated land gave place to
an open plain, perfectly flat though cut with water-
courses, where the enemy's host came into full view
about a thousand yards away.
The road followed by Wellesley's division of infantry <
entered this plain by the village of Sirsoni ; and it was t
the General's direction that the column should leave 1
this village on its right and, having cleared it, should
wheel to the left and form line. The Mahrattas,
knowing that Sirsoni marked the only access to the J
open ground, had trained their guns upon it, and, as
Wellesley's leading battalion emerged from it, they
opened a fire at long range from more than fifty cannon. I
The native troops of the advanced guard, who had J
with them a few field-pieces drawn by bullocks, were $
thrown into disorder ; the bullock-drivers lost their 1
heads ; and the cattle, turning round, carried confusion :
into the ranks behind them. Next to the advanced ii
guard were two native battalions which had behaved
heroically at Assaye ; but, dismayed by the backward
rush and galled by the cannonade, they were now seized !
ch. i HISTORY OF THE ARMY 39
I with panic, broke, and ran. Happily Wellesley was 1803.
close by, or the day would have been lost. At the Nov.
first opening of the cannonade he rode towards the
enemy's line with some uneasiness, but presently
observed to his secretary, " We shall have time to take
those guns before night." Then, finding that the
fugitive battalions would not rally to him when he
stepped out in front, he rode quietly up to them and
bade their officers guide them to the rear of the village,
and reform them under cover of it. When this was
done, he led them as quietly once more to the front
and halted them in their appointed place, while the
rear battalions, which had been checked and delayed by
this mishap, came up and deployed in succession. Guns
were brought into action on each side of the village to
cover the deployment, so far as was possible, against an
overwhelming superiority of artillery ; and each battalion,
after taking up its position, lay down.
The infantry was drawn up in a single line, standing
from right to left in the following order : the advanced
guard or picquets, two native battalions, the Seventy-
eighth, the Seventy-fourth, four more native battalions
of Wellesley 's army, and then the Scots Brigade 1 and
the six native battalions of Stevenson's force. The
regular cavalry, consisting of the Nineteenth and five
native regiments, was drawn up in second line in rear
of the right, and the irregular horse occupied the same
position on the left. The entire force probably
numbered from ten to eleven thousand men.
The Mahrattas were formed in more primitive
fashion. The centre and left were composed of
Ragogee's infantry, artillery, and cavalry ; the right con-
sisted of Scindia's cavalry with a number of Pindarries
or predatory horse. The regular infantry, about ten
thousand strong, was drawn up, together with its guns,
in one line, with a small body of foot in rear. Scindia's
cavalry was massed in two huge bands, one slightly in
advance, and the other in rear of the right of the first
1 This, while it endured, was numbered 94th of the Line.
4o
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1803. line; and the Rajah of Berar's cavalry likewise took
Nov. 29. post somewhat in rear of the left flank. In all the host
numbered, probably, from thirty to forty thousand men
of one description or another, and covered a front of I
considerable extent.
After several minutes' continuance of the fire of the 1
Mahratta artillery, the deployment of Stevenson's 1
battalions completed Wellesley's line, and at half-past I
four he gave the order to advance. The whole then 1
strode forward as if on parade, while Wellesley in 1
person led the cavalry on to within six hundred yards \
of the enemy, and left it with orders to play upon them 1
with their galloping guns and to charge as soon as the 1
fire produced any effect. In the advance of the infantry 1
the centre for some reason gradually outpaced the rest
until, at the moment of attack, the Seventy-fourth, 1
Seventy-eighth, and the native battalions on their left 1
were some distance ahead of the remainder of the line. |
As the two European battalions arrived within sixty j
yards of the Mahratta array the enemy's gunners 1
fired a final discharge of grape into them, and a large ]
body of Arabs, with much shouting, boldly charged them j
with sword and buckler. A short but sharp struggle (
followed, in which the Arabs were beaten back with t
the loss of some six hundred killed and wounded ; and
the rest of the Mahrattas gave way almost immediately. ]
Two feeble attacks of the cavalry upon the extremities f
of Wellesley's line were easily repulsed, and then the i
whole mass of the enemy turned and ran, leaving t
thirty-eight guns behind them. Wellesley instantly
launched his cavalry after the fugitives ; and Colonel
St. Leger, who had succeeded Maxwell as Brigadier,
pressed the pursuit relentlessly by moonlight, cutting
down some three thousand of the enemy and capturing
elephants and camels and huge quantities of baggage.
It was midnight before the British troops finally lay
down to rest, having been under arms for eighteen
hours.
Their casualties in the action were inconsiderable,
• ch. i HISTORY OF THE ARMY 41
^jnot exceeding one hundred and sixty-two Europeans 1803.
^ l and two hundred natives killed, wounded, and missing.1 Nov. 29.
31 1 But the proportion of Europeans that fell was unduly
°f [large, partly, no doubt, because the enemy took care to
[concentrate their artillery-fire upon them. Thus the
le I small remnant of the Seventy-fourth lost fifty-two men,
l8|the Seventy- eighth lost forty-seven, and the Scots
st J brigade forty-one. However, even so, the cost of a
great success was trifling, especially after the mishap to
111 1 the leading native battalions at the opening of the
«| action. "I am convinced," wrote Wellesley, referring
m|to these last, " that if I had not been near them to rally
^ I them and restore the battle, we should have lost the
•ylday."2
st On the day following the action Stevenson's division Nov. 30.
\ marched in pursuit of the enemy, though Stevenson
ft himself was so ill that he was hardly fit to do duty ;
e. and, Wellesley following him a day later, the two
y divisions met once more at Ellichpoor, about forty
s miles east and north of Argaum, on the 5 th of December. Dec. 5.
;e Halting there for a day to establish a hospital for the
n wounded, Wellesley pushed on with his whole force to
le Gawilghur, where the defeated infantry of Argaum had
h taken refuge. The fort itself was situated on a lofty
d mountain in a range of hills between the sources of the
Poorna and the Taptee ; and by the natural con-
s figuration of the ground the stronghold was divided
e into two distinct parts, a main fort or citadel fronting
I to the south, and an outer or lesser 3 fort which covered
y the approach to the inner on the north. Between the
Killed. Wounded. Missing.
1 Europeans 15 145 2
7 Natives 31 163 5
1 One European officer was killed, and ten wounded.
2 Well. Desp. ii. 565. Welsh's Military Reminiscences and
jf Twelve Tears' Military Adventure are the best authorities to read
] with the despatches,
3 Perhaps this should be more correctly described as a
fortified pettan, being in this case smaller instead of, as usual, larger
> than the fort proper.
42 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii c
i8o3- two forts was a deep gorge, on the inner side of which
was an intermediate wall, shielding the access to the e
walls of the citadel from the north. One and all of t<
these defences were well built of stone, with ramparts o
and towers but without a ditch. The roads which led t<
to the fort were three. The first reached the citadel tl
from the south, and was not only very long and steep, d
but so narrow as to be impracticable for cattle. The
second started from the outer fort on the north-west %
side, circled round the western face of the main fort o
within range of its guns for a long distance, and finally *
formed the main communication with the country to *
southward. But it was too narrow to be used as a H
regular approach, besides which the rock on each side *
of the gate had been scarped. There remained a third b
road on the north side, leading to the outer fort b
directly from the village of Labada ; and here the o:
ground was level with the works. But on the other i
hand the road to Labada from Ellichpoor wound for o
thirty miles through mountains and jungle, offering d
terrible obstacles to the transport of guns and stores, A
together with some uncertainty as to the supply of water f
on the way. In fact, as Wellesley said, the great diffi- ti
culty in attacking Gawilghur was to approach it at all. os
However, he decided to make his attempt from the K
north by Labada ; and, since Stevenson had equipped i
his force for a siege, the principal attack was entrusted
to him, while Wellesley himself undertook to cover
the operation with his own infantry and the cavalry of
both armies, and to make such diversions as he could
on the south and west of the fort. Accordingly on
Dec 6. the 6th of December detachments were sent out to
drive away the hostile troops which were encamped to
south of the walls, and to seize the fortified village of
Damergaum, which covered the access to Labada at the i
Dec. 7. entrance to the mountains. On the 7th both armies
marched from Ellichpoor, Stevenson's upon Damergaum,
and Wellesley's on Deogaum, towards the south front
of Gawilghur.
ch. i HISTORY OF THE ARMY
43
For four long days Stevenson's men struggled with 1803.
extraordinary difficulties in dragging the heavy guns
to their appointed place. First they had to make roads
[over the ruggedest of mountains and ravines, and then
to haul their cannon and stores with frightful fatigue to
I the desired spot. The work, however, was cheerfully
[done ; and on the night of the 12th Stevenson erected Dec.
two batteries, the one of five, the other of four guns,
against the northern front of the outer fort. Wellesley
1 on his side also threw up a battery of four guns, though
with little hope of success, over against the gate of the
south front of the citadel. All three of these opened
fire on the 13th, Stevenson's playing with great effect, Dec.
while the shot from Wellesley's battery simply re-
bounded from the solid wall and rolled down the hill
back to the very muzzles of the guns. By the night
of the 14th the breaches in the wall of the outer fort Dec.
upon Stevenson's side were practicable, and at ten
o'clock of the following morning the assault was Dec.
delivered by the flank companies of Stevenson's
division, supported by the Scots Brigade. Simultane-
ously Wellesley launched two columns, consisting of
the Seventy-fourth and Seventy-eighth regiments and
one battalion of Sepoys, as a diversion, against the
the southern and north-western gates. Stevenson's men
soon forced their way into the outer fort, and the
enemy, striving to escape from their bayonets by the
north-western gate, were met by one of Wellesley's
columns, which forced them back, and, entering the
gate with them, soon mastered the outer fort.
Then to their astonishment the British for the first
time discovered that the citadel stood on a separate
hill on the other side of a deep gorge, beyond which
appeared the intermediate wall and its gate. However,
Colonel Kenny, almost by himself, found a track which
crossed the gorge towards the gate, and the Ninety-
fourth, presently finding it also, crowded after him to
the intermediate wall. This rose out of a steep pitch
of ground, and the men could only climb it slowly and
44 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1803. with difficulty, one by one, under a heavy fire from
Dec. 15. the walls of the citadel. Meanwhile the British supports &
came hurrying up, and, halting on the edge of the outer
fort, poured in an answering fire of musketry while the £
Ninety-fourth were clambering over the wall. Beyond ir
this obstacle was a narrow rocky road leading to yet ®
another wall and gate — those of the main fort — which or
seemed to be inaccessible. However, after some H
trouble a place was found where this last wall could be &
escaladed ; and the light company of the Scots Brigade, 4£
fixing their ladders, forced their way into the strong- K
hold and opened the gate to admit the storming party. &
These rushed in, and in a very short time the British *
were in possession of Gawilghur. The total loss during w
the siege was fourteen killed and one hundred and B:
twelve wounded, the European share of the casualties *4
being sixty-seven ; so that the resistance was evidently £
ill-organised. The garrison was some four thousand ?-
strong, being composed chiefly of regular infantry which P"
had fled from Argaum ; and, the British troops being fc
savage, the slaughter among the enemy was fearful, f
It should seem that the greater number of them was &
killed with the bayonet or driven over the walls and -
dashed to pieces. On a smaller scate, the assault of
Gawilghur appears to have been as bloody as that of "
Seringapatam.1
Meanwhile the expedition against Cuttack had met ■
with complete success. The total force allotted for k
the operations numbered close upon five thousand men, k
of which three thousand2 were assembled at Ganjam t
I:
1 Wellington Desp. ii. 583, 599 ; Wilson's Madras Army, iii. L
1 1 8 - 1 22 ; Welsh, Military Reminiscences, i. 195-197; Twelve [
Tears' Military Adventure, pp. 218-219.
2 Europeans. 2 companies, 22nd Foot .... 200 t
102nd Foot .... 300 |t
Artillery, etc 73
Natives. 20th Bengal N.I., i/9th M.N.I., i/i9th
M.N.I., Cavalry and Artillery . . 2468
Total . . 3041
1
; |h. i HISTORY OF THE ARMY 45
■or. Binder the command, first, of Lieutenant - colonel 1803.
)rt> jfcampbell of the Seventy-fourth, and, upon his serious
ite- Illness, of Colonel Harcourt of the Twelfth Foot,
tklrhe rest of the troops were stationed in detachments
)ne|it Jelasore, Balasore, and Midnapore. Harcourt
ve: Inarched from Ganjam on the 8th of September, and Sept. 8.
idjpn the 18th occupied Juggernaut without opposition.
melHeavy rain then detained him until the 24th, when he Sept. 24.
beinoved upon Cuttack, and, after some skirmishing on
cJ:he march, took possession of it, unresisted, on the
ig- 10th of October. The fort of Barabutty, about a mile Oct. 10.
distant from Cuttack, made some show of resistance,
being surrounded by a wide ditch containing thirty feet
of water, which could be crossed only by a single bridge.
But after a short cannonade a storming party, on the
14th, boldly crossed the bridge and, with some difficulty Oct. 14.
and delay, succeeded in blowing open the wicket of the
gate. Through this the men passed singly, and were
presently masters of the place, with a loss of little more
than fifty killed and wounded. After this miserably
feeble struggle the greater part of the province sub-
mitted, and the operations practically came to an end,
most disastrously for the Rajah of Berar.
It is not surprising, therefore, that the final stroke
of Gawilghur, over and above all previous losses and
disgraces, should have crushed the spirit of the un-
fortunate Ragogee. On the very day after Wellesley's Dec. 16.
successful assault messengers came to sue for peace ;
and on the 17th a treaty was signed, whereby the Dec. 17.
province of Cuttack was ceded to the East India
Company, and sundry other territories to its friends
and allies. Thus one member of the Mahratta Con-
federacy was crushed, and it was not long before another
30 was to share his fate ; but first it must be told how
00 Scindia fared at the hands of General Lake in Hindostan.
CHAPTER II
t;
t
wi:
On turning from the south to the north of India, from
the correspondence of Arthur Wellesley to that of his
brother the Viceroy, one is struck by the advantage
which Arthur Wellesley enjoyed through his greater
remoteness from Government House. The order to
prepare for war was issued to him at the same time as
to General Lake ; but Lake was required to furnish
an elaborate plan of campaign, against each paragraph
of which the Viceroy penned pompous comments of
approval with as much solemnity as if he had been
Frederick the Great. This was an entirely harmless
amusement, for Lord Wellesley, despite an enormous
share of vanity, was on most affectionate terms with
Lake, and far too able a man to attempt to set him
right upon military matters. The essence of Lake's
plan was summed up in a single sentence, the defeat of
Perron's army in the field. That army once destroyed,
the success of any subsequent operations would be
assured as a matter of course. But Perron's influence
as vicegerent of the puppet-emperor, Shah Alum, was
wide, and his power as leader of a large body of trained
infantry was formidable ; and it was therefore of the
first importance to isolate him completely before giving
him battle. Only thus was it possible to hold the allies
of the Mahrattas in check until a successful action
against Perron should induce them to change sides ; and
only thus could Scindia be prevented from returning
suddenly from the south with his cavalry, and perhaps
46
ch. ii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 47
converting a pitched battle into a British defeat, as he 1803.
might have done at Assaye.
The main army for the field was therefore fixed at
the strength of one British and eleven native battalions,
three British and three native regiments of cavalry,
with forty-nine guns. Four native battalions and one
regiment of native cavalry were stationed at Allahabad
for the invasion of Bundelcund, in order to divert
cavalry from joining Perron from that quarter. Three
battalions and a few horse were ordered to Rohilcund
to cover Rampore and overawe the Sikhs and other
troublesome neighbours. A detachment of the same
strength was designed to cover Benares and bar the
passes to southward of it.1 Lake had fixed his head-
quarters at Cawnpore in July ; but marching from
that place with the garrison on the 7th of August, Aug. 7.
moved up the Ganges to Kanoge, near which place his
force gradually assembled. The camp was luxurious.
The officers were allowed to keep their wives and
families with them, and, the nights being cold, many of
them fitted up their tents with glass doors and brick
chimneys. There was plenty of game in the neighbour-
hood ; and there was at least one officer who was
adventurous enough to spear a tiger, and would
probably have paid for it with his life, had not Lake
himself shot the beast with a pistol in the nick of time.
Lastly, there was plenty of good wine, and there was a
ballroom ; from all of which it may be concluded that
life was merry in that camp on the Ganges.
The last of the troops having come up, the army
was distributed into three brigades of cavalry and four
of infantry, counting in all nine regiments of horse and
fourteen battalions of foot.2 The whole, after absorbing
1 Welle sky Desp. iii. 189-193.
2 Cavalry. 1st Brigade. Lt.-Col. Vandeleur ; H.M. 8th L.D.,
1st and 3rd Bengal N.C.
2nd „ Col. St. Leger ; H.M. 27th L.D.,
2nd and 6th Bengal N.C.
3rd „ Col. Macan ; H.M. 29th L.D., 4th
Bengal N.C.
48 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xnr
1803. many of the detachments so carefully distributed under
the original scheme, must have numbered about fifteen
thousand men, accompanied as usual by about ten times
that number of followers and about the same proportion
of bullocks. The army moved in a huge square, of
which the front face was formed by the picquets coming
on duty, the rear face by the picquets coming off duty,
one side by the cavalry and the other by the infantry.
The artillery kept the high road, next to the infantry,
and the rear of the interior of the square was filled
Aug. 26. with baggage and cattle. On the 26th of August
Aug. 29. the host was at Secundra, and on the 29th it entered
Mahratta territory and marched straight upon the
fortress of Aligarh, where Perron had concentrated his
force to oppose it. The baggage was packed and left
in charge of a detachment about four miles in rear, and
at about seven o'clock the enemy was sighted in the
act of striking camp.
Presently the Mahratta horse, about twenty thousand
strong, drew itself up on the plain, taking post behind
a huge morass, with their right protected by the guns
of Aligarh, and their left resting on a village. There-
upon Lake, taking personal command of his mounted
troops, led them away to the right in column of regiments
and, turning the swamp, wheeled them to the left in two
Infantry, 1st Brigade. Lt.-Col. Monson ; H.M. 76th, 1 and
2/4th Bengal N.I., 4 cos. 17th
N.I.
2nd „ Col. Clarke; 2/8th, 2/9th, i/i2th,
6 cos. 1 6th Bengal N.I.
3rd „ Col. Macdonald ; 2/i2th, 1 and
2/1 5th Bengal N.I.
4th „ Lt.-Col. Powell; 1 and 2/2nd,
i/i4th Bengal N.I.
Artillery. 2 galloper-guns to each regiment of cavalry . 18
2 battalion-guns to each battalion of infantry . 28
1 brigade of Horse Artillery .
6 six-pounders, 4 twelve-pounders . .10
3 five and a half inch howitzers ... 3
1:
it:
ic
let
e:
t-
V
t
Total of guns . -65
ltd
times
::ion
e,of
luty,
ntry.
ntry,
filled
igust
:ered
the
i his
left
and
;ne
sani
hinc
iere
tited
Lents
two
ink
2nd,
ch. ii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 49
lines for the attack, leaving the infantry to follow in 1803
support. Some annoyance was caused during the Aug.
advance by a skirmishing fire of matchlock-men, and
by a fusillade from the village, until the houses were
presently cleared by a native battalion ; and the enemy's
horse retiring steadily, not without punishment from the
guns of the British cavalry, finally abandoned the field
without an attempt to come to close quarters. Perron
with his bodyguard then withdrew to Agra, leaving a
Colonel Pedron in the fort, with orders to defend it to
the last extremity ; and Lake, disappointed at his failure
to force a general action, was fain to occupy Coel and
to encamp. His men had been marching from five
in the morning until two in the afternoon on a day
of intense heat.
Meanwhile he summoned Pedron to surrender, with
the result that six of Scindia's European officers at once
quitted the Mahratta service and came over to the
British camp. Pedron answered with a somewhat
hesitating defiance in order to gain time to improve
his defences ; and Lake, hoping to obtain the fort
by bribery, took no further step until the 3rd of Sept.
September. Finding then that his hopes were baseless,
he resolved to assault at once rather than lose a precious
month in a tedious siege. The decision was a bold one,
for the fortress was deemed impregnable ; and indeed
in the rainy season the swampy ground about it was so
deeply inundated as to render it inaccessible. Aligarh
consisted of an inner and an outer fort, with circular
towers at short intervals, the configuration of the outer
being exactly repeated on the inner lines ; while an
immense wet ditch, " in which a seventy-four might
sail," 1 surrounded the whole, and detached works of
great strength and remarkable intricacy defended the
gate. The fortress mounted in all seventy-three guns
of various calibres, with plenty more in the arsenal to
make good casualties. Since the only possible means
of passing the ditch was by the gateway, Lake decided
1 Lake to Wellesley, Welles ley Desp. iii. 293.
VOL. V E
5°
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii (
I8o3. that the assault should be delivered at that point. Two j
SePt- 3- batteries were thrown up on the night of the 3rd, so as j
to bring a cross-fire to bear on the outworks of the [
gate ; and a storming party was selected of four s
companies of the Seventy-sixth and as many of a native j
battalion, with a second Sepoy battalion in support.1 \
Colonel Monson was appointed to lead the attack, his c
guide being Mr. Lucas, a British officer who had lately r
deserted Scindia's service.
Sept. 4. At three in the morning the forlorn hope moved t
off towards the gateway, and halted within four hundred c
yards of it until dawn. A small party of the enemy I
being visible sitting round a fire, a few men of the ,
Seventy-sixth were sent to surprise them, in the hope (
that they might enter the gate on the backs of the
fugitives and hold it until supported. The British s
soldiers, however, defeated their own object by de- T
spatching every man of the enemy ; but, though the |
alarm was raised, it was fortunately not taken up f
seriously by the garrison. The men of the Seventy- 2
sixth then retired unperceived ; and the sentries on the
ramparts, after firing a few shots, relapsed into calmness t
and security. At dawn the morning gun sounded from L
Lake's camp ; and upon this signal tie storming party, [
covered by a heavy fire from the two batteries, rushed e
at the gate. A hundred yards in advance of it was c
a newly erected traverse mounting three guns, but [
the British were in possession of this work before a shot c
had been fired ; and Monson, pressing on with two ^
companies of the Seventy -sixth, hoped to enter the \
fort with the flying garrison. He was disappointed, j,
The traverse had been abandoned ; the gate was shut ; j
and from three different sides the guns of the batteries j,
and outworks plied the little party with a most de- \
structive fire.
The grenadiers of the Seventy-sixth planted two E
ladders by the walls and attempted an escalade, but L
found the attempt hopeless in the face of a forest of j
, 1 Four companies 17th N.I., zj^th. N.I.
ch. ii HISTORY OF THE ARMY
51
pikes. A six-pounder was hurried up to force the 1803.
gate, without success. A twelve -pounder was then SePt-
brought forward, but owing to peculiarities in the
structure of the gateway it was not easily placed in
position, and four or five rounds were fired before any
impression was produced. Twenty minutes were thus
consumed, during which time the storming party
remained helpless under a deadly converging fire of
grape and musketry, while the enemy, gallantly leaving
the ramparts, swarmed down the scaling ladders to
close with their assailants. Monson was hurt by a
thrust from a pike, several more officers were wounded
with him ; and the adjutant and every officer of the
Grenadiers of the Seventy-sixth were killed outright.
Nevertheless the first gate gave way at last, and the
stormers pursued their way along a circular road, from
within which a circular tower filled with matchlock-men
poured a deadly fire of musketry upon them, while
from without a neighbouring bastion plied them with
a tempest of grape. At the further end of the circular
road was a second gate, which was easily forced ; and
the British now hurried along the causeway which
connected the outwork with the main fortress, caught the
flying enemy crowded at a third gate, which lay at the
end of the causeway, and seized it before it could be
closed against them. Thus, always under a heavy fire
from all quarters, they entered the passage between the
outer and inner forts, only to be stopped by a fourth
gate. The twelve -pounder was again brought up,
for Captain Shipton of the Artillery, though wounded,
had refused to quit his gun ; but the gate was battered
to no purpose, for it was too strongly secured to be
broken down. At length, however, Major M'Leod
of the Seventy-sixth succeeded in passing the wicket
and ascending the ramparts ; and then resistance gave
way to despair. The garrison, seeing the inner fort
entered, thought of nothing but escape, and jumped by
hundreds into the ditch. Great numbers were drowned ;
others swam over to the plain beyond, only to find a
52
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
l8o3-picquet of dragoons in wait for them, and, refusing to
ePt- 4- surrender, were cut down. In all over two thousand
of them perished by the bayonet or the water ; and
after an hour's hard fighting the fort of Aligarh was
won.
This was a fine feat of arms ; and Lake confessed
that he had never spent a more anxious time than
during the long hour consumed in the attack. Nor
were the losses trifling. The four companies of the
Seventy-sixth lost five officers and nineteen men killed,
four officers and sixty-two men wounded ; the Fourth
Native Infantry lost fewer officers but rather more
men ; and altogether the casualties amounted to fifty-
five killed and two hundred and five wounded of all
ranks.
The fortress had not been many hours in Lake's hands
when news came that a large body of predatory horse,
under the command of a Frenchman, Fleury, had
attacked the cantonment of Shekoabad, some thirty-five
miles east of Agra. Macan's brigade of cavalry was
Sept. 5. sent off at two o'clock on the morning of the 5th to
rescue the five companies of native infantry quartered
in the place, but arrived too late. The Sepoys, under
command of Colonel Coningham, had feced five thousand
cavalry in the open plain for two consecutive hours
and had finally driven them off. But the attack
had been renewed on the following day, and after a
further resistance of some hours the British commander,
who was himself wounded, was obliged to engage that
his troops should serve against Scindia no more during
the war ; upon which condition he led them away with
all their arms and their one battalion-gun. Five British
officers and over sixty men were killed and wounded
in this affair. Macan, burning to take vengeance,
pursued Fleury by forced marches as far as Ferozabad,
about twenty-four miles east of Agra, which he reached
on the 8 th. There, finding that the enemy had crossed
the Jumna, he gave up the pursuit, but continued roving
Sept. 17. until the 17th, when he marched to rejoin the main army.
ch. ii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 53
Lake, meanwhile, having strengthened the defences 1803.
of Aligarh and left a native battalion in it for garrison,
marched on the 7th towards Delhi, having intelligence Sept. 7
that Louis Bourquain, one of Scindia's French officers,
was employing the name and prestige of the Mogul
Emperor to the utmost in order to strengthen his
position among the native chiefs. On the evening of
the same day the General received a letter from Perron
reporting that he had quitted Scindia's service, and
asking for a safe-conduct to Lucknow. An escort
was willingly granted, and Perron, with Fleury and
another officer, after a few months' stay at Lucknow,
removed to Chandernagore. Lake, not ill-pleased thus
to be rid of a formidable enemy, pursued his march,
and on the 8th had the satisfaction to find the strong Sept. 8
fort of Koorjah evacuated at his approach, the garrison
having no mind to repeat the experience of Aligarh.
On the 10th a march of eighteen miles brought him Sept. 1
within six miles of Delhi on the eastern side ; and on
the road intelligence arrived that Louis Bourquain had
crossed the Jumna in the night with sixteen battalions
of regular infantry, six thousand horse, and several
guns, with the expressed intention of attacking him.
The troops had come into camp at eleven in the
forenoon, much fatigued ; but hardly had the tents
been pitched, when the enemy appeared in such force
as to oblige the grand guard and picquets to turn out.
More and more bodies of the Mahratta army appeared,
and presently Lake mounted his horse, and, taking
three regiments of cavalry,1 which were all that re-
peated detachments had left to him at the moment,
rode off to reconnoitre them in person. He found
the entire array drawn up on rising ground, with the
Jumna in its rear. The infantry formed the first line,
and was posted very strongly behind entrenchments,
each flank covered by a swamp and the whole length of
the front bristling with guns. Behind the foot stood the
cavalry in second line. High grass and jungle in some
1 H.M. 27th L.D., 2nd and 3rd Bengal N.C.
54
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1803. measure concealed the enemy's dispositions, and, as Lake
Sept. io. proionged his
reconnaissance, the Mahratta guns opened I
fire upon his escort. Having satisfied himself, however,
the General lost no time in sending orders to his
infantry to move to the front at once. Detachments
for various services had deprived him of two complete
brigades of cavalry and five battalions of infantry,
leaving him with three regiments of cavalry and eight
and a half battalions of infantry only. Allowing half a
battalion and the picquets for a baggage-guard, he could
reckon on about four thousand five hundred men for
the coming action ; and with these he prepared to assail
the nineteen thousand under Louis Bourquain.
It was a full hour before the infantry could come
up; and meanwhile the cavalry suffered heavily from
the fire of the enemy's artillery. Lake's horse was
shot under him, and he was obliged to take that
of his son, who in his turn took that of a dead
trooper. At length, seeing that the battalions were
approaching, Lake gave the order for the cavalry
to fall back, hoping thus to lure the enemy from their
position. He was not deceived. The entire Mahratta
line advanced with its artillery, shouting loudly as the
cavalry retired. The regiments continued the retro-
grade movement in line, always masking the advance
of the infantry, until they reached their comrades;
when upon a sudden word they wheeled right and left
into column of troops and galloped away to both
flanks, revealing the line of battalions perfectly formed,
with the Seventy-sixth on the right and the Sepoys in
succession upon its left.1 In a few minutes the cavalrj
was again massed in rear of the right wing ; and then
since the enemy's Sikh horsemen were advancing tc
threaten his right flank and rear, Lake threw out twc
or three squadrons with two galloping guns to check
them. At the same time the left flank battalion, witl
1 The actual position of the various corps was as follows, fron
right to left: 76th, 2/i2th N.I., 2/ijth N.I., 2/2nd N.I., i/Htl
N.I., i/2nd N.I.
tor
ch. ii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 55
(four guns, was thrown forward obliquely with its right 1803
wing resting on a village, in order to cover the left. ^P*-
These dispositions completed, Lake placed himself at
the head of the Seventy-sixth, and ordered the whole
line to advance.
The Mahrattas promptly opened a tremendous fire
of round, grape, and chain shot ; but the battalions
strode on unheeding. The Seventy-sixth kept their
muskets at the shoulder, despite the concentration of
the Mahratta guns upon them, until they came
within range of one hundred yards, when Lake gave
the order to fire a volley and charge. The effect was
as crushing as at Quebec. The British dashed forward,
and the Mahrattas broke and fled in all directions.
The troops were no sooner halted after the charge
than Lake ordered the battalions to form column of
companies ; and the cavalry, galloping through the
intervals, fell upon the unhappy fugitives and hunted
them to the Jumna, where the galloping guns made
terrible havoc among the flying masses. But, while
the cavalry was thus engaged on the front and right,
a part of the Mahrattas had retired to the left ; where-
fore Lake wheeled the line of infantry also to the left,
and, pursuing them among the broken ground and
ravines adjoining the Jumna, completely routed them
and captured all their guns and stores. The action
came to an end at seven in the evening, by which time
the troops had been on foot for sixteen hours, for the
most part under a burning sun. The army then
encamped on the bank of the river over against the
city of Delhi.
It is instructive to compare this action with that of
Assay e, which was fought only a fortnight later. In
both cases the British commanders found their enemy
very strongly posted with very powerful and efficient
artillery, and in both cases they manoeuvred to make
him change position and then attacked. Both, also,
resolved to endure the punishment of the enemy's
cannon for a time, feeling sure that he could not stand
!
56 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii c
1803. the ordeal of meeting their infantry. But here the
Sept. 10. resemblance ends. In Lake's action everything went 2.
right, and the cavalry was fresh for pursuit ; in c
Wellesley's everything went wrong, and the result was K
a narrow escape from disaster. It may therefore be h
concluded that but for the unfortunate error which led }i
Wellesley's right astray, the battle of Assaye would G
have been such another as Delhi. But with all his V,
good fortune, Lake's losses were in one respect serious, a
The total number of killed, wounded, and missing was 2:
four hundred and seventy-eight ; and of these one p:
hundred and thirty-seven, including one officer, c
belonged to the Seventy-sixth. The native regiment S;
which stood next to it lost ninety-one of all ranks Y
killed and wounded ; and the casualties among the I
horses of the cavalry brigade amounted to one hundred I
and seventy. In truth it was no child's play to face the I
fire of the Mahratta artillery, though, when once it had h
been silenced by the charge of the infantry, the action f
in every case came to an abrupt end. The Mahrattas b
on this occasion were estimated to have lost three b
thousand men, and they left sixty-eight pieces of a;
cannon, all admirably made after a French design, as I
the trophies of the victors.
Halting for three days, Lake crossed to the western ti
Sept. 14. bank of the Jumna on the 14th, and on the same day 0
received the surrender of Bourquain and of four more I
French officers, who were presently sent down to |
Calcutta. This gave a mortal stroke to the French I
Sept. 1 6. power built up by Perron ; and on the 1 6th Lake
was welcomed by the emperor, Shah Alum, to the
capital of the Mogul empire. It was the last of many
vicissitudes which the unhappy potentate was to experi-
ence. Old, blind, and broken down by harsh treatment,
he found himself, though still a puppet, yet again by
title an emperor, and entertained as such with honour.
Three years later he died at the age of eighty-six,
having lived to see the occupants of a few small
factories become the masters of India.
Jch. ii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 57
w
the After a week's halt in Delhi, Lake marched on the 1803.
toil 24th upon Agra, his heavy guns and stores being Sept. 24.
conveyed in boats down the Jumna, while the army
followed the banks. On the 25 th messengers arrived
from the Rajah of Bhurtpore, a powerful chief of the
Jats, to beg the friendship and protection of the British
Government, which proposal, being readily entertained
by Lake, was on the 9th of October formulated into
a treaty of offensive and defensive alliance. On the
2nd of October the army reached Muttra, Perron's Oct. 2.
principal arsenal, where Lake was rejoined by the
cavalry and other troops that had been detached to
Shekoabad and other quarters,1 and was further greeted
by four more of Scindia's French officers who had
come in to surrender. Two days later he encamped Oct. 4. 1
on the south side of Agra, when he at once summoned
the garrison to surrender ; but the troops in the city
had risen against their European officers ; all was in
confusion ; and no answer was returned. Seven
battalions of regular infantry with several guns were,
however, encamped upon the glacis, occupying the town
and the ravines which surrounded the south and south-
west faces of the fort ; and Lake realised that until
these were dislodged it would be impossible to conduct
the operations of a siege. Shifting his camp, therefore,
on the 7th and 8th so as to encircle the place as far Oct. 7, 8.
as possible, he on the 10th made two separate attacks, Oct. 10.
each with three battalions of Sepoys, upon the town
and the ravines, and drove the enemy off with a loss
of six hundred men and twenty-six guns. The action,
however, was severe, since the troops were exposed
to the guns of the fort ; and the object was not attained
without the loss of two hundred and twenty-eight
killed and wounded, including nine British officers.
Two days later, however, the remainder of the seven Oct. 12.
battalions, two thousand five hundred strong, sur-
rendered; and on the morrow, before Lake could Oct. 13.
1 8th and 29th L.D., two regiments of native cavalry, and
three and a half Sepoy battalions.
58 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
8o3- make any great progress with his batteries, the two
English officers, Hessing and Sutherland, who com-
manded within the city, wrote to ask for terms, stating
that they had persuaded the troops to offer no further
resistance. Lake replied that he would grant pro-
tection to themselves and their private property, and
continued to work at his batteries, one of which opened
• ^fire with such effect on the 17 th that the conditions
were promptly accepted. On the 18th the British
were in possession of Agra.1
The capture of this great fortress, the key of
Hindostan, produced a profound impression upon the
native mind ; and Lake, when he saw from within how
formidable was its strength and calculated the loss that
must have ensued upon a storm, felt devoutly thankful
for his good fortune.2 All was now going well.
Enormous quantities of stores were taken in Agra,
which pleased the General ; a very large sum in the
treasury was adjudged to be prize-money, which pleased
the officers and men ; and finally two thousand five
hundred of Scindia's infantry had taken service with
the British, while the Rajah of Bhurtpore had brought
to Lake a contingent of five thousand horse. Scindia's
regular infantry, however, was not" yet entirely ex-
tinguished. That chieftain before the battle of Assaye
had detached fifteen battalions from the Deccan to
Hindostan, and these, added to two of Bourquain's
which had escaped at Delhi, made up a force of about
nine thousand men.3 They were excellently equipped
with artillery ; they were further accompanied by four
or five thousand horse, not all of inferior quality ; they
had a good leader in a Mahratta named Abaji ; and
1 Thorn, Wellesley Desp. iii. 393-396, 407.
2 Welles ley Desp. iii. 415.
3 Grant Duff, Hist, of the Mahrattas, iii. 179, gives the number
of detached battalions as seven, and adds to them three more of
Bourquain's besides the fugitives. Lake, however {Wellesley Desp,
iii. 450) speaks of seventeen battalions. All authorities agree thai
the number of men, whatever the number of battalions, was nine
thousand.
ch. ii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 59
Lake was not disposed to allow them to wander at 180 3-
large about Hindostan. On the 27th of October, Oct. 27
therefore, he marched westward, and after a day's halt
at Karowly, due to a very heavy fall of rain, pushed
forward on the 29th nearly to Futtehpoor, where the Oct. 29
sound of the enemy's guns, bombarding a neighbouring
town, roused him to renewed exertion. The heavy
guns and baggage were left at Futtehpoor with an
escort of two battalions ; and two forced marches
north-westward brought him on the 31st to the ground Oct. 31
where the enemy had encamped on the same
morning.
Intent upon overtaking them, Lake started on the
same night at eleven o'clock with the whole of his
cavalry,1 hoping to keep them engaged with the
mounted troops until the infantry should come up.
In six hours he traversed twenty- five miles, and at
dawn of the 1st of November came up with a confused Nov. 1.
mass of men, evidently in hasty retreat. Marking
their disorder, Lake determined to attack at once ; but
the enemy contrived to gain time by cutting the em-
bankment of a large reservoir of water, which made the
road very difficult for the passage of cavalry. Turning
this respite to good account, the Mahratta leaders
pushed on for a short distance, and took up a strong
position between the villages of Laswaree and Mohaul-
pore, the latter of which was fortified. Immediately in
rear of Laswaree flowed a small stream, with banks so
steep as to be barely accessible ; and from its front a
ravine ran diagonally through the right wing of the
Mahratta line of battle. Along the whole length of
that line extended a broad strip of high grass, which
concealed their array and their seventy-two guns com-
pletely from the view of their pursuers. The dense
clouds of dust raised by the enemy's movements contri-
buted also to obscure alike their intentions and their
1 1st brigade, Col. T. P. Vandeleur, 8th L.D., 1st N.C., 3rd N.C.
2nd brigade .... 27th L.D., 6th N.C, 2nd N.C.
3rd „ Col. Macan . . 29th L.D., 4th N.C.
6o HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii <
1803. dispositions, making it almost impossible for Lake to s
ov. 1. divine what they were actually doing.
None the less, having overtaken them only by un- 1
common exertions, he was determined not to let them c
escape. He therefore ordered the advanced guard and 1
the first brigade of cavalry to move upon the point where 1
the enemy had last been seen in motion, which, as a r'
matter of fact, proved to be the left of their new 0
position. The two remaining brigades were to maintain 0
the attack, as quickly as they could be formed after J1
passing the stream which separated them from the
field of action.
The first brigade accordingly crossed the water, and, 1
riding from end to end of the enemy's front, charged ^
the left of their line by Mohaulpore, broke through it,
drove the Mahratta gunners from their guns, and
penetrated into the village. But they were unable to
silence the galling fire of musketry and artillery which c
still played upon them. Their brigadier, Vandeleur,
an excellent officer, was mortally wounded ; and Lake,
seeing that they could do no more, was fain to withdraw
the squadrons, and to allow the guns which they had
captured but had been unable to remove, to relapse into
the enemy's possession. In other quarters the second
and third brigades delivered their attack as gallantly
and with as little permanent effect. Macan, who was
directed upon the Mahratta right, crossed the ravine
with his two regiments under a heavy cannonade,
wheeled into line in the face of a still heavier fire, and
galloped down upon the guns as if he had been at a
review. Nothing could be seen through the long grass ;
and the Mahratta gunners, holding their fire until the
horses were within twenty yards, poured upon them
a storm of grape and chain shot. Yet still the
squadrons galloped on, passed through the batteries,
although the cannon were fastened by chains from
axle-tree to axle-tree, and rallied on the other side. But
already the Mahratta gunners, who had crept under
their guns when the cavalry came upon them, were
!
[Jch. ii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 61
observing them again; while the infantry, entrenched 1803,
jbehind their waggons and carts, showered on the Nov-
Jassembling squadrons a hail of bullets. Nothing
Jdaunted, Macan charged back through the line with
dkhe same irresistible gallantry and the same result ;
e (repeated the charge a third time, and was about to
a Irene w it for the fourth when he was recalled by Lake's
wfcrder, and withdrawn with the rest of the cavalry out
in of range. The troopers had suffered heavily, and,
er though they had taken many guns, yet, for want of
nfantry to secure them, had been unable to retain more
than two. The whole attack indeed was unnecessary,
and would hardly have been delivered had not Lake
Deen under the impression that the enemy was still
retreating. When once he had found out his mistake
le recalled all three brigades, resolving simply to hold
the enemy with them until his infantry should
ome up.
At about eleven o'clock the infantry appeared,
namely the Seventy- sixth and four native battalions.
They had been marching since three o'clock in the
morning, and, having traversed twenty-five miles under
a blazing sun, were much fatigued. Lake therefore
gave them an hour's halt for breakfast ; and in the
interval Abaji, awed by the arrival of the victorious
British infantry, sent a message to the General that,
if certain terms were granted to him, he was willing to
surrender his guns. Lake returned an answer accept-
ing the proposal, and granting him an hour to make up
his mind ; not omitting, however, to make his dis-
8. positions for a fresh attack. Abaji meanwhile shifted
ne his ground, throwing back his right, and took up a
new position. His infantry was formed in two lines,
he the first covering the front or east, and the second in
the rear or west of Mohaulpore, while the cavalry ex-
tended beyond it almost to the stream, with its right
flank in the air. Lake therefore formed his battalions
[er En two columns along the brink of the stream ; the first,
under Major-general Ware, being designed toadvance and
62
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1803. turn Abaji's right flank, and the second, under Major-
Nov. 1. general St. John, to support Ware. Macan's brigade
of cavalry also was to sustain the infantry, while the
first and second brigades were extended widely across
the plain on the British right, with the galloping guns
and a few field -pieces pushed well forward in two
groups, each with a squadron for escort, so as to
menace and contain the Mahratta front.
Meanwhile the stipulated hour expired without a
sign of the fulfilment of Lake's conditions ; and
accordingly his infantry advanced along the bank of
the stream, under shelter of high grass and broken
ground, which for some time concealed their movement.
After a time, however, their march was detected, and
Abaji, divining its purport, threw back his right wing,
covering the manoeuvre by a heavy and destructive
cannonade upon the head of the British column. The
result of this evolution was that the Mahratta array
now assumed somewhat the form of the letter L, but
with an obtuse instead of a right angle at the junction
of the two lines, and that the British column, far from
taking it in flank, was itself exposed to a flanking fire.
The artillery which had accompanied the British
infantry unlimbered and played upoif the new front of
the enemy's right wing, while the three batteries with
the cavalry advanced and did the like upon their left
wing ; but the British guns were overmatched both in
numbers and weight of metal by those of the Mahrattas ;
and matters began to look serious. The Seventy
sixth, which headed the column, had reached its
appointed station, as also had a battalion and a half of
Sepoys which followed immediately after it ; and they
had accordingly wheeled into line. But the remainder
of the column had been delayed by unexpected impedi
ments ; and the three leading corps were compelled tc
await its coming inactive, under a furious and very
well-directed fire. Lake, seeing that no troops could
endure such a trial for long, ordered the Seventy-sixth an
its companions to advance forthwith. They did so wi
ch. ii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 63
alacrity ; but the enemy, with great coolness allowing 1803.
them to approach within range of canister shot, saluted Nov* 1 -
them with a murderous salvo from every gun in their
front, while at the same time a body of cavalry bore
down upon their left flank. Fortunately the Seventy-
Jsixth was on the left of the line, and in spite of terrible
to I losses, retained such steadiness and order as to repulse
this dangerous attack ; but the Mahratta horse soon
rallied and showed unmistakable signs of delivering a
second charge. Foreseeing some such trouble, Lake
had ordered the Twenty-ninth Dragoons to be at hand
to support the advancing infantry. These had been
halted in a hollow behind the British guns by the
stream, where they were partially screened from the
enemy's view, but none the less exposed to rolling and
ricochet shot,1 which killed the commanding officer and
wrought much mischief among both men and horses.
This regiment, to its great relief, was now ordered to
advance. The outlet from the depression in which
they were posted was too strait to admit a broad
front ; and it was in narrow file that they galloped
forward and formed on the left flank of the hard-
pressed Seventy- sixth. The gallant infantry hailed
them with loud cheers, which were echoed by the
dragoons ; and the Mahratta horse, which was advanc-
ing to the charge, beat a very hasty retreat.
There was now a pause. The Mahratta guns were
1 "Nothing is so trying for troops as to stand exposed to a
heavy fire from guns out of point-blank range ; for it cannot be
expected that ordinary flesh and blood will stand and see a shot hit
it without attempting to get out of the way. I would observe for
the benefit of my young military readers that they must not suppose
when they see a round shot going leisurely along the ground that it
is then quite innocuous, particularly if it has a spinning motion ;
for if when in that state it meets with a stone or any irregularity
which raises it from the ground, it will fly off apparently with
renewed force, but really with the force which it was before ex-
pending in its rotatory motion. I knew a person whose leg was
shattered to pieces from his having thought to stop a ball in this
situation by putting his foot upon it." — Twelve Tears' Military
Adventure, p. 201.
64 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1803. silent, the gunners seeming to bide their time to
ov- 1 • annihilate their assailants. On the British side there
had occurred an incident which braced the troops for a
supreme effort. Lake, at the head of the Seventy-
sixth, had his charger shot under him. His son, who
was on his staff, dismounted and offered his own horse,
which the General at first refused, but after some
entreaty consented to mount. The younger Lake
then took a trooper's horse, and had just swung him-
self into the saddle when he was struck by a cannon
shot, and fell very severely wounded before his father's
eyes. For a fleeting moment Lake forgot everything
in the agony of seeing his son, as he thought, killed ;
then, instantly mounting the horse, he was again
directing the battle. The trumpet of the Twenty-
ninth dragoons sounded the charge, and was answered
forthwith by the roar of every Mahratta gun ; but
the troopers, galloping through a tempest of grape-shot
and a general volley of musketry, rode straight into 11
the line of guns, scattering the gunners ; then crashed 1
into the first line of infantry and broke it up ; then '
pressed on against the second line of infantry and C
swept away its right ; and finally, wheeling to the Jl
left, fell again upon the Mahratta ftorse and routed tl
them completely. Lake meanwhile followed hard at t
their heels with the infantry, which by this time had
been increased by a battalion and a half of Sepoys,
secured the guns, and drove the enemy's right wing
in confusion before him. The remainder of his
infantry now came up ; when, advancing with the
whole of them, he attacked Abaji's second line, which
resisted most bravely, contesting every inch of ground.
But at length it was forced back from the village
into the plain, where the indefatigable Twenty-ninth,
returning from the pursuit of the cavalry, swept down
upon it and cut it to pieces.
Even now, however, the first line of the enemy's
left wing before Mohaulpore, scorning to break andli:
fly, strove still to retreat in good order. But by thisle
iicH. ii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 65
toitime Lake could turn nearly the whole of his force 1803.
erejupon them. The Twenty-seventh dragoons and Sixth Nov. 1,
n Native Cavalry cut off their retreat, and at length
tv- breaking into the column, after a long, stubborn, and
fiolmost gallant resistance, cut them down by hundreds.
:se,|A bare two thousand were left at last, and these
melbecame prisoners. The rest of the Mahratta host was
ilce|slain or utterly swept away.
So ended the long agony of this most fateful and
bloody fray, as fierce a fight as ever was fought by
mortal men. It marked the fall of the proud
Mahratta empire ; and, as on the death-day of Hyder
Ali's dynasty, nothing was wanting to mark the horror
of the crash. The seventeen battalions which De
Boigne had trained, and which until this dawn had
been known as the Deccan Invincibles, were reduced
to two thousand disarmed and captured, though always
valiant men. The remainder were lying on the plain
in thousands, dying or dead, and with them most of
their comrades of the horse. The fortified village of
Mohaulpore was sinking into a smoking heap of ashes.
Of the Mahratta guns, some stood in lines as during the
action, with the gunners bayonetted and dead beneath
them ; others, which the drivers had striven to carry
away, lay scattered and overturned. The tumbrils and
ammunition-waggons, in which they had kindled slow
matches, exploded from time to time with a sullen
roar, and veiled the sky with an ever-thickening
canopy of sulphurous smoke. Beneath the canopy
the British troops moved wearily or lay still, utterly
exhausted by hard marching and hard fighting. Above
it there advanced with startling rapidity a dense bank of
clouds, which burst after sundown in a furious thunder-
storm, lighting up the ghastly field with frightful vivid-
ness at every flash, and printing deep upon every mind
an awful memory of the night after Laswaree.
The loss of the British was thirteen officers and
one hundred and fifty-nine men killed ; twenty-nine
officers and six hundred and twenty -three men
vol. v F
66
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1803. wounded ; making a total of eight hundred and
Nov. 1 . twenty-four casualties. Among the killed the British
numbered eighty-two, and among the wounded two
hundred and forty-eight. The chief sufferers, as usual,
were the Seventy-sixth, with a loss among all ranks of
forty-three killed and one hundred and forty-nine
wounded. This raised their casualties in the three
actions of the 4th and nth of September and the
1st of November to eighteen officers and four hundred
and twenty-eight men. Next to the Seventy-sixth
came two Sepoy battalions, the one with one hundred
casualties, the other with eighty-seven ; but relatively
the three white cavalry regiments suffered more than
they. The Eighth Light Dragoons lost fifty-four of
all ranks, and one hundred and sixteen horses ; the
Twenty-seventh, forty-eight of all ranks and eighty-
six horses ; the Twenty-ninth, sixty-two of all ranks,
and one hundred and twelve horses. In all, the cavalry
lost no fewer than four hundred and fifty-three horses
killed, wounded, and missing.
But perhaps the General's staff was the most
heavily punished of all. The Quartermaster's deputy
and one aide-de-camp were killed ; and the Adjutant-
general, Secretary, Political Agent and commander of
the escort were wounded. Lake himself had his coat
burned by a matchlock fired at close range, though
the bullet by a happy chance missed him ; and two
horses were killed under him, one of them a favourite
charger named " Old Port," which was regretted even
by the Viceroy.1 Always in the thickest of the fire,
it seemed to those with him miraculous that he escaped
injury, but in truth his presence alone probably saved
the fight. The enemy fought, as he said, "like devils.!
or rather like heroes . . . and if they had been com-
manded by French officers the event would have
been, I fear, extremely doubtful. I never was in scl
severe a business in my life or anything like it, and
1 " I grieve for the loss of my poor friend 1 Old Port.' '
Wellesley Desp. Hi. 458. Wellesley had given this horse to Lake.
ch. ii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 67
pray to God I never may be in such a situation again." 1803.
In truth in his eagerness to overtake and destroy the Nov. 1.
battalions trained by De Boigne, Lake ran a more
dangerous risk than he had expected. His first onslaught
with his cavalry only was, as it fell out, a simple waste
of men and horses ; but being unable to see anything
when the attack was delivered, he was reasonable in
conjecturing that an enemy which had fled from him
precipitately for some days, would be more likely to
continue its flight than to turn to bay. Probably, too,
in both phases of the action he underrated his enemy's
power of manoeuvre, and, like Wellington, was some-
what taken aback to see Scindia's battalions change
position with order and regularity when menaced by
an attack in flank. It is impossible, indeed, not
to conjecture that Abaji may have secretly nursed a
vague scheme of turning upon his pursuers when they
were exhausted by a long chase. His army was better
appointed than Lake's, as the General confessed. He
had thrice as many men to each gun as the British ;
he had greatly superior bullocks ; and he had camels to
carry the knapsacks of his infantry, which enabled
them to make long marches with little fatigue. All
this, however, availed him nothing. His brave army
was cut to pieces ; his guns, seventy-one in number,
were captured, together with sixty-four tumbrils laden
with ammunition, forty-four stand of colours, five
thousand stand of arms, and the whole of a large train
of baggage. He had the bad luck to meet very fine
troops, flushed with victory and led by a General
whom they trusted, and rightly trusted, to handle them
to the best advantage in a battle ; and he was beaten.
But in spite of his failure he fought a splendid action,
and his men covered themselves with glory. As to
the British troops, the conduct of the Seventy-sixth
ranks with the very highest that has ever been recorded
of any corps in the British Army.1
1 The authorities known to me respecting the battle of
Laswaree are not many. There are the accounts in Thorn, p.
68
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
l%°3- Embarrassed by the number of his wounded, and
other cares, Lake did not quit the battlefield until the
Nov. 8. 8th, when retracing his steps by leisurely marches he
Nov. 13. halted close to Agra on the 13th, sending his sick and
his captured guns into the fortress. From all sides
the neighbouring chieftains and Rajahs swarmed in
to pay their court, and to conclude defensive alliances
with the victor. Among them came Runjeet Singh,
the Rajah of Bhurtpore, an elderly little man, very
plain in his attire, who, having concluded his visit of
ceremony, retired to his capital, doubtless thinking
deeply of the future. Lake was joined by a few
reinforcements, but everything pointed to the prob-
ability that they would not be required. The
occupation of Bundelcund was the only one of the
tasks set to him which he had not fulfilled ; but the
work had been progressing ever since September, and
though obstructed by a rebellious chief, was going
forward rapidly under the bayonets of a small force
of native infantry. With the exception, therefore, of
sending a small detachment to hasten the capture of
Gwalior, there was seemingly nothing more for Lake ,
to do ; and he and his army indulged in a well-
earned rest. ■
By this time Scindia was almost at the last gasp.
He had been utterly defeated in the Deccan, in
Hindostan, and in Cuttack, but even so the cup of his
affliction had not been filled. In spite of all the
apathy and obstruction of the Government at Bombay,
an expedition against Baroach had been duly organised
Aug. 21. in the months of July and August ; and on the 21st of
the latter month a force of about a thousand men, one
half of them being of the Sixty-first and Eighty-sixth,
and the remainder of Native Infantry, under Lieutenant-
colonel Woodington, marched from Baroda, and sat
down unresisted on the 24th before the fortress. On
210 seq., in Notes of the Principal Transactions, p. 93, and Lake's'
letters in Wellesley Desp. iii. 439-447, 449. These are wellj
summarised by Captain May, From Cromwell to Wellington.
ch. ii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 69
the 26th Woodington opened fire from a single battery 1803.
of two guns ; and on the 29th, the breach being practic- Aug. 29
able, Baroach was stormed after a short resistance
which cost the assailants sixty-nine of all ranks killed
and wounded. Thereupon the British took possession
of the entire district of the same name, a rich and
populous territory which afforded a large annual
revenue.
Attacked and despoiled on all sides, Scindia and
Ragogee Rao were fain to sue for peace. A treaty
with the latter was concluded on the 17th of December, Dec. 1;
three days after the fall of Gawilghur ; and a second
treaty on the 30th brought to an end the war with Dec. 3c
Scindia. Ragogee ceded Cuttack, and all his territories
west of the Wurda. Scindia yielded all his country
in the Doab between the Jumna and the Ganges, all
that between the Ajunta Hills and the Godavery, and
the forts and districts of Ahmednuggur and Baroach.
Both engaged themselves never to employ any subject
of any power that should be at war with England ;
and the first phase of the contest with the Mahrattas
was over.
CHAPTER III
1803. While Lake was lying in camp near Agra at the end tc
of December, letters came to him from Jeswunt Rao
Holkar, the only important Mahratta chief who now
remained unconquered or unconciliated, in terms which
the General described as arrogant and improper,
After the tremendous punishment administered to his
peers by the British army it was reasonable to suppose
that Holkar would at least have taken up a respectful,
if not a cordial attitude, and would have made his
friendly overtures in a less patronising tone. The
Government at Calcutta, though willing and even
desirous to come to a definite understanding with him,
saw no particular necessity for including him in the
treaties contracted with Ragogee ana1 Scindia, much
less for entering into a separate alliance with him. If he
would remain quiet and leave the British and their
allies alone, Lord Wellesley was not disposed to disturb
him ; and the probability was that, after all that had
happened, Holkar would give no trouble, at any rate for
the present. He had played false towards his brethren
of Gwalior and Berar by neglecting to come to their
assistance until it was too late ; and it was hardly
likely that he would have now the temerity to
encounter the British single-handed.
But Holkar was an ambitious man, who could think
for himself ; and it is possible that his reflections had
led him to the same conclusion as had recently been
formed by the most sagacious of his enemies. Arthur
Wellesley, when summing up the position in November,
70
ch. in HISTORY OF THE ARMY
7i
averred that the Mahrattas had made a mistake in 1803.
fighting the British with regular infantry and artillery,
that their military spirit had been impaired by the
importation of European officers to train them accord-
ing to European ideas, and that they would have been
far more formidable if they had stuck to their
traditional military policy and fought a predatory war
with cavalry only.1 Be this as it may, Holkar did not
give up the game for lost ; and while still expressing a
friendly disposition towards the British, he proceeded
to levy contributions on Rajpootana, pretending to be
unaware that it had passed under British protection,
and actually to threaten the territory of Jeypore.
This was carrying impudence rather too far. On the
23rd of December Lake broke up his camp near Agra, Dec. 23.
and moving some fifty miles west and south, took up his
station with the main army at Biana, by the pass which
commands the entrance to the dominions of the Rajah
of Jeypore. Thence he addressed a letter to Holkar
disclaiming any hostile intentions, but bidding him
desist from his depredations and, in pledge of his good
faith, to withdraw to his own estates.
Holkar then took up his station about Ajmeer, and
proceeded to murder three British officers who were 1804.
in his service because, in obedience to the Viceroy's
proclamation, they had expressed their intention of
resigning their commissions. Nevertheless Lord
Wellesley was averse from taking strong measures, and
instructed Lake to assure the Mahratta chief that the
Government harboured the most amicable feelings
towards him, though it could not permit him to injure
the allies of the British. The General for his part
feared that permanent peace could not be hoped for
until Holkar's power was annihilated, but promised to
avoid hostilities if possible. Meanwhile he advanced
westward to Dowsa, about thirty miles east of Jeypore,
so as to be ready to check any hostile movement ; where-
upon Holkar renewed so fervently his professions of
1 Wellington Desp.Sx. 518-519.
72 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1804. extreme solicitude to maintain friendship and to abstain
from further aggression, that Lord Wellesley actually
began to think of breaking up the army. Lake was
not so sanguine. He had noticed that Holkar barely
kept within the letter of the law, and, knowing that he
would turn to mischief directly the British force was
withdrawn, begged the Viceroy not to hasten disarma-
ment. " I never was so plagued as I am with this
devil/' he wrote ; " if he does not come in to see me,
which I do not suppose he will, I cannot move on
towards him, as, the moment I advance and leave an
opening for him, he will give me the slip, get into our
territories with his horse, and burn and destroy every-
thing he comes near." But for all his impatience Lake
was loyal. " Don't, my dear Lord, from this language
imagine that I shall commence hostilities with Holkar
or lead you into another war, unless he comes or till I j
hear from you." 1
Such a situation could not last long. The British
Government could not be at the expense of keeping a
large army in the field to watch a chief who refused to
retire, and waited only for its withdrawal to plunder
and ravage. Matters were brought nearer to a crisis
by the interception of several letters"which had passed
between Holkar and certain chiefs of the Rohillas and
Sikhs, wherein a detailed plan was set forth for the
overrunning of all the British territory eastward of
Benares. But Lake, while apprising Jeswunt Rao that \
this correspondence was in his hands, still gave him the
Feb. 20. chance to go in peace. Meanwhile, on the 20th of
February 1804 ne nad moved eastward to Hindoun to
cover the principal roads leading into British territory ;
March 8. and marching thence northward on the 8 th of March,
halted on the 10th at Ramghar. Here again Holkar's
messengers visited him and made extravagant demands ;
and shortly afterwards the chief threw aside all reserve,
sent an emissary to Scindia to ask his assistance in anj
immediate attack on the British, and openly plundered
1 Wellesley Desp. iv. 3-9, 19-20, 45-48.
2H. in HISTORY OF THE ARMY 73
the territories of the Rajah of Jeypore. On the 1804.
1 6th of April Wellesley ordered Lake to commence April i<
hostilities.
As in the case of Scindia, the Viceroy hoped to press
upon his new enemy from all sides simultaneously.
was Arthur Wellesley, since the peace with Scindia, had
retired to southward and encamped about Ahmednuggur,
moving from time to time to break up bands of free-
booters which hung by tens of thousands about the
Nizam's frontier. These little expeditions incidentally
led him to make the most remarkable march of his
whole career. On one occasion he started at six
o'clock on the morning of the 4th of February with Feb. 4.
the Nineteenth Light Dragoons, the native cavalry that
had been with him at Assaye, the Seventy-fourth, a
native battalion, five hundred Sepoys from different
regiments, and four guns. Having travelled by noon
twenty miles, he gave his men a halt of ten hours ;
at ten o'clock at night he marched again, and by nine
the next morning, in spite of bad roads and darkness, Feb. 5.
reached his destination, only to find that the enemy
had received warning of his coming and decamped.
Following them up immediately, he overtook their rear,
cut down many, captured all their baggage and guns,
and by noon had dispersed them completely. Within
thirty hours he reckoned that he had marched sixty
miles, and the infantry arrived at the point of attack as
soon as the cavalry. His own comment on this feat,
of which he was justifiably proud, was apt and pithy.
" I think we now begin to beat the Mahrattas in the
celerity of our movements." 1
With an army in such condition, it might be
hoped that Holkar, even if he pursued the traditional
Mahratta tactics, would quickly be brought to reason ;
and it is somewhat noteworthy that this chief wrote on
the 1st of February to Arthur Wellesley, speaking of
him personally with great civility and respect, while using
very different language of Lake. But since Holkar's
1 Wellington Desp. iii. 43-45, 48.
74 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
i 804. possessions, with the exception of Chandore, lay outside
the Deccan, it was obvious that the operations would
be confined to Guzerat and the frontiers of Hindostan,
unless, as Arthur Wellesley early foresaw, the Mahratta
chief should establish himself among the Sikhs and
Afghans in the Punjaub. Moreover, as Wellesley said, if
his troops went far to the north, fifty Holkars would
certainly start up in the territories of the Peishwa and
the Nizam ; for, in spite of the many hard lessons which
he had taught to freebooters, these pests still flourished
and increased in all the territories of the native
princes. Also, owing to the famine that raged in the
Deccan, the subsistence of any army north of Poona
would be impossible. Wellesley therefore decided,
upon the first alarm of a war with Holkar, to reinforce
Guzerat with three of his native battalions in anticipation
of any orders that he should receive from the Viceroy.
Feb. 27. On the 27th of February a subsidiary treaty of defensive
alliance had been concluded with Scindia ; and with
Scindia's forces and the augmented force in Guzerat he
reckoned that Colonel Murray should be able to
penetrate from that city to Indore. Upon this plan, as
he wrote to Murray, " we ought to be hanged if we do
not get the better of Holkar in a shoft time." 1
Great, therefore, was his surprise on learning, about
the middle of April, that Lake depended upon Wellesley 's
own troops in the south to defeat Holkar in case of a
war, while the Commander-in-chief himself should
look to the safety of Hindostan. The difficulty of the it
situation was further complicated by the fact that for
some time past not a word of instruction had been
received from the Viceroy. In utter perplexity, Arthur
Wellesley wrote to Lake that his plan was out of the a!
question unless hostilities could be delayed until August,!
that he doubted whether the prevailing famine would
permit him even to advance to Chandore, much less to
traverse the six hundred miles from Poona, where hi
army was concentrated, to Indore. Even at Poona
1 Wellington Desp. iii. 164-165, 171, 196.
J
Lh. hi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 75
the horses of his own cavalry were living on rice ;
^uJd further afield his Mysore Cavalry had lost one hundred
horses in a single day from starvation. He could only
recommend that Murray's force should operate from
Guzerat, and Scindia's army from some position north
of Ujjein, so as to attack Holkar in rear, while the
)uld Commander-in-chief attacked him in front. Privately
and he stated his opinion that, if Lake pressed Holkar
i:ch
vigorously, he could end the war in a fortnight ; but
that if he stood upon the defensive merely with a view
to foiling his enemy's raids and depredations, there was
no saying where the contest would end.1
A fortnight later, on the 7th of May, Arthur M
Wellesley received at last official intimation that
hostilities had been declared on the 16th of April,
whereupon he wrote careful instructions to Murray to
take the field at once with his troops at Guzerat.
During the war with Scindia Murray's part had,
through no fault of his own, been obscure ; for the
insurrection of a rebel who aspired to the place of the
Gaekwar had prevented him from invading Scindia's
territory, and limited his exertions to the keeping of
the peace in his own district. The task now assigned
to him was more honourable. He had under his com-
mand at least two European and four native battalions,
besides the native cavalry of the Gaekwar ; and since
Arthur Wellesley could only guess at Holkar's probable
movements, he left Murray a free hand, simply bidding
him to march immediately, move rapidly, and attack
Holkar whenever he could find an opportunity. Welles-
ley's information did not allow him to state positively
the point upon which it would be best to march, but he
divined it to be Ujjein. As for himself, in obedience to
the wishes of the Viceroy, he prepared to march north-
ward. By the 1st of June rain enough had fallen to Ju
ensure a supply of water, and he announced his intention
of sending forward at any rate his train of battering
cannon for the siege of Chandore. But three days
1 Wellington Desp. iii. 231 seq., 235 seq.
76 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
i 804. later he reported the dearth of food and forage to be
such that it was impossible for him to move, and on
the 8th he applied for leave to return home. By the
June 24. 24th he had broken up his army, having no use for it
in the field ; and his force therefore disappears for the
present from the sphere of active operations.
Meanwhile Lake, on receiving his orders to commence
April 18. hostilities, had moved on the 18th of April towards
Jeypore, to which town he had already pushed forward
three battalions under Colonel Monson. Upon the
appearance of this detachment Holkar retired pre-
cipitately to the southward ; and Lake, still advancing,
April 28. encamped on the 28th at Tonga, about fifteen miles
south-west of Jeypore. Holkar, meanwhile, continued
his flight to the south, followed by Lake's irregular
cavalry, which reported his condition to be miserable.
But he completely distanced Monson's detachment,
which moved in advance of the main body, and of
course left Lake's principal army far in rear. After a
week's halt at Tonga, Lake again moved southward
and, after much delay through violent storms and rain,
May 8. on the 8th of May reached Nowai, about forty miles
May 1 o. south of Jeypore. From hence on the 1 oth he detached
Lieutenant -colonel Don with two^epoy battalions,
a regiment of native cavalry and guns to attack
Rampoora, a fortified town rather over thirty miles
to south-eastward, which was Holkar's only strong-
hold to north of the Chumbul. Arrived before the
town, Don, to disarm suspicion, encamped in an opposite
direction to the principal gate, and at two o'clock on
May 1 5. the morning of the 15th sallied forth to the attack.
Under his personal command he took eight companies,
together with one twelve-pounder to blow up the gates.
To protect his rear against a body of hostile troops
which had moved up from Tonk, and to keep down
any fire from the ramparts, he employed three more
companies and four guns ; his cavalry he reserved to
pursue the garrison in the event of its flight. So
incautious was the enemy that the column was within
Ich. in HISTORY OF THE ARMY 77
I
lone hundred yards of the walls before a shot was fired 1804.
Jfrom the town. The gates were then promptly blown
J up, and the garrison driven out into the plain, where
■great numbers were cut down by the cavalry. The
■base with which this success was gained seems to point
J to extremely able management on the part of the
Icommander.
Deprived thus of his one fortress in the district,
I Holkar, who had for the moment turned northward,
Jrecrossed the Chumbul ; and Lake, whose troops were
Bsuffering greatly from the heat, decided to abandon the
[further pursuit of him. He therefore left two parties
jof irregulars under Captain Gardiner and Lieutenant
jiLucan to watch his movements, and committed the
lultimate destruction of him to Murray, with his troops
Jfrom Guzerat, and to Colonel Monson. Since Monson's
Sthree battalions were supplemented by auxiliaries of
jthe Rajah of Jeypore, he reckoned that each of these
Jofficers would be strong enough to deal with Holkar
■independently in case of an action.
Lake therefore retired eastward, and on the 27th May 27.
■regained his old camping-ground at Hindoun. During
jthe last four days of his march he buried some fifty Euro-
pean soldiers who had succumbed to the sun, the thermo-
meter marking one hundred and thirty degrees Fahrenheit
in the shade. The mortality was greatly increased by
the scarcity of water ; and on resuming his march he
separated his force into two columns so as to move the
more quickly. Still, however, the men continued to fall
down, the Sepoys and the camp-followers almost as fast
as the Europeans ; and a single march of eighteen miles
cost the army the loss of over two hundred and fifty
natives and about thirty British soldiers. Ultimately
the main body, after dispersing several corps to various
stations on the way, marched into Cawnpore on the
20th of June. Possibly its losses would hardly have June 20.
been greater if it had followed up Holkar and left him
no rest, as had been the desire of Arthur Wellesley.
Thus the principal army was withdrawn into canton-
78 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1804. men ts, and the prosecution of the war was left to
detachments, scattered in various directions for the
purpose rather of preventing Holkar from doing
mischief than of ending his career for ever by hunting
him until he had not a man left. And now came a
series of mishaps. The operations undertaken by
Colonel Powell for the reduction of Bundelcund had
met with so little resistance as to be unworthy of
detailed notice ; and though the province always lay
open to predatory raids from Holkar's partisans and
other freebooters, of whom one, Meer Khan, was the
most notable, the seven thousand troops which had been
allotted to the service were amply sufficient to beat any
number of banditti. It so happened, however, that
Colonel Powell and the officer next senior to him died ;
and that the command passed into the hands of a
certain Colonel Fawcett, who, to judge by Lake's
language, was an officer of unique incapacity. However
that may be, Fawcett, whose headquarters were at
Koonch, to west and south of Kalpee, must needs on the
May 21. 2 1 st of May send out seven native companies, a troop
of horse and five guns, under a certain Captain Smith, to
reduce a small fort within a few miles of his camp.
The ostensible purpose of this operation was to obtain
forage, there being none left in the district except in
the villages of chieftains who refused to acknowledge
the British authority. At midnight came reports that
five thousand predatory horse were in the vicinity ; and
May 22. two hours later native messengers hurried in with
intelligence that Meer Khan himself with fifteen or
twenty thousand followers was within three miles of the
camp. The troops were at once turned out, and
Fawcett despatched an order to Smith to return to
camp immediately. To this Smith replied that he had
occupied a village under the fort against which he had
been sent, that he could not draw off the men quartered
in it without much loss, and that he hoped to return to
camp directly after dark. The truth of the matter was
that he had stationed the guns with fifty European
ch. in HISTORY OF THE ARMY
79
artillery-men and two companies of infantry in the 1804.
village to attack the fort, and kept the remaining five
companies half a mile apart from them, being apparently
possessed by the idea that, when sent with a few hundred
men to reduce a petty stronghold, he must divide them
into besieging army and covering army.
The predatory bands had no taste for an attack on
the camp at Koonch ; but they speedily discovered the
two isolated companies, fell upon them in overwhelming
numbers by surprise, cut them to pieces to a man, and
carried off the guns. Fawcett, growing anxious as the
morning wore on, marched out at two o'clock in the
afternoon with his whole force to rescue Smith, and
presently came upon him with his five companies, his
troop of horse and one galloping gun intact, having
made his way through his contemptible enemy without
the slightest difficulty. Smith had retreated directly
after hearing from a fugitive of the fate of his two
companies, but apparently had made no effort to rescue
them when firing had been first heard in the village ;
and to this negligence the whole of the detachment,
including five European officers and five guns, had
been sacrificed.1
But this was not the worst of the misconduct in this
affair. It was presently discovered that the leader of
the raid was not Meer Khan, but an ordinary robber of
no great fame or station, and that his force did not
exceed the strength of five thousand men. Emboldened
by his success, this ruffian pursued his way to Kalpee,
marking his path by cruelty, plunder, and devastation,
attacked the town and attempted to cross the Jumna.
But, being beaten back by two companies of Sepoys, he
returned by a fresh route to Koonch, where on the 30th May
of May he was met and very roughly handled by a
small party of irregular levies lately taken into service
by the British from a native chieftain. Yet it was from
this rabble that Fawcett allowed himself to receive a
very forcible and unpleasant blow, and that without
1 Wellesley Desp. iv. 71 seq.
80 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii ,
1804. attempting to return it; for after much aimless :
marching to and fro, which cost the lives of many men ]
from heat and exhaustion, he retired to Kalpee, having \
done his best to spread consternation from end to end (
of Bundelcund.
Lake, much annoyed, superseded him instantly, and 1
placed Captain Smith under arrest. Lord Wellesley, j
still more angry, ordered Fawcett to be tried at once
by court-martial ; but the mischief was done, and there f
was no saying how far it might extend. Happily one ]
officer, Captain Baillie, though in command of no more ;
than fifteen hundred native levies, refused to share in j
the panic ; and, from his station at Banda, he by his ;
firmness and courage maintained confidence and tran- ,
quillity to south of the Betwa.1
Meanwhile Holkar had continued his retreat south- (
ward almost to Ujjein, still followed by Gardiner, who j
May 30. on the 30th of May had made a successful attack upon -
one of Holkar's underlings, forcing two thousand men j
to surrender and capturing all their baggage. Monson, <
also, having been reinforced by Don to a total j
strength of five and a half regular native battalions, j
June, moved southward, and at the beginning of June |
reached Kotah, about sixty miles south of Rampoora. ,
Here he was joined by a contingent of troops in the ,
service of the Rajah of Kotah, after which he continued ;
his movement for about thirty miles south-eastward to j
the Pass of Mokundra. After a short halt to collect (
supplies he resumed his march on the 28th of June,
July 1. and on the 1st of July arrived near the fortress of
Hinglaisgurh, an ancient and much-valued possession
of Holkar's family. Here he ascertained that Holkar
was encamped with his whole force between forty and
fifty miles to south-westward on the other bank of the
Chumbul. He determined, therefore, to attack the
fort at once, and accordingly carried it by assault
July 2. on the following day with little trouble but con-
siderable loss. This done, he again moved forward, and
1 Wellesley Desp. iv. 84, 127-129.
ch. in HISTORY OF THE ARMY
81
finally took up a position about fifty miles south of the 1804.
Mokundra pass, where he was informed that he would
be able to secure supplies. He was expecting also to
open communications with Murray, who, as he knew,
had received orders to march upon Ujjein ; and Ujjein
was, as the crow flies, not , above seventy miles distant
from his encampment.
Now Murray had received instructions, advice, and
encouragement from Arthur Wellesley which would
have stirred the spirit of almost any other man to
abnormal energy and enterprise. " You have a great
game in your hands," the General had written on the
22nd of May ; and the unerring instinct with which,
weeks before and with no information, Arthur Wellesley
had selected Ujjein as Murray's destination, should have
convinced that officer that by following his instructions
he could not go far wrong. But instead of being full of
ardour, Murray was full of complaints. He bewailed
his lack of cavalry, which was indeed serious, for both
Scindia and the Gaekwar had evaded the duty of
providing it ; he bewailed his weakness in numbers,
though on the 1st of June he had five thousand eight
hundred men fit for duty ; finally he bewailed his
want of European troops, though his army included
more than had fought either with Lake or Wellesley
in the previous campaign. Arthur Wellesley wrote to
him in terms which showed his disapprobation of this
querulous spirit; and accordingly, at the beginning of June.
June, Murray began his march from Baroda. He was
much hampered by the difficulty of obtaining transport,
supplies, and forage, though indeed his troubles in this
way were no greater than those that had been overcome
by Wellesley in the campaign of 1803. By the middle
of June he arrived at Dohad, about eighty miles north-
east of Baroda, where it had been arranged that he
should deposit his heavy ordnance and stores ; and on
the 30th of June he reached Badnawar, forty miles west June 30,
of Ujjein. Here he received a letter from Monson,
reporting that the main body of the army had gone into
VOL. V G
82 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
i 804. cantonments, and that he had halted his own detach-
ment at the Mokundra Pass, pending further orders 2
from the Commander-in-chief. At the same time in- t
telligence reached Murray that Holkar was bringing his 1
whole force forward to attack him ; whereupon, dis- f
liking his situation at Badnawar, he turned about, and t
on the following day retreated towards the Myhee, f
intending to take up a strong position in rear of the I
river.
If this decision be reviewed from a strictly theoretic 1
standpoint, it seems difficult to quarrel with it, more t
especially since Murray reported that the heat and 1
fatigue of the march had already cost him three I 1
thousand men — a loss which Arthur Wellesley found r
it difficult, except upon very unflattering hypotheses, to t
account for. But it is certain that Lake blamed him I
very much for his retreat ; and the taking up of a I
defensive position against a Mahratta force was the t
thing of all others against which Wellesley had warned I
him. Beyond all doubt Lake or Wellesley himself, in 2
2l like situation, would have marched straight against t
Holkar and attacked him ; but such boldness was not j
to be found in Murray. He had tlo confidence in 1
himself, and, as he was to prove far too often before he i
was finally laid aside, he was both incapable and 1
unenterprising. He retreated accordingly for four I
JulY 5- days until on the 5th of July he heard that Holkar
had moved eastward ; whereupon he faced about, and
finding nothing to impede his march, arrived on the
8th at Ujjein.1
But meanwhile Monson also had begun to retreat.
July 7. On the 7th he received intelligence that Holkar was
crossing the Chumbul with his whole army and every
gun that he possessed ; and his first instinct was to
march at once to the spot and attack him. He
remembered, however, on reflection that he had but
two days' grain in his camp, that part of his force had
been detached to bring up more grain, that one of his
1 Wellington Desp. iii. 439 ; Wellesley Desp. iv. 374-375.
ch. in HISTORY OF THE ARMY 83
battalions was on march to join him from Hinglaisgurh, 1804.
and that he was expecting a convoy with treasure for
the troops. In fact, shortly after he began his
movement he heard of Murray's retreat, and could
find any number of reasons for not attacking, because,
though a brave man, he was afraid to attack. His
force was not weak, for, over and above the five
battalions already with him, he had been joined not
only by Gardiner's irregulars under Lieutenant Lucan,
but also by Scindia's contingent of horse which ought
to have joined Murray, under the leadership of a
native chief, Bappojee Scindia. This gave him in
all nearly three thousand cavalry ; but he had
no European troops, and like Murray he had not
the nerve of Wellesley and Lake. Moreover, he had
been unwise in trusting to the Rajah of Kotah to
furnish him with supplies, a duty which native chief-
tains were always ready to undertake but could never
be trusted to perform ; and lastly, he had certainly
advanced further than was consistent with safety in
order to ;apture a petty fort, which gave him no
accession of strength or resources, but rather weakened
him by the amount of a small garrison which he could
ill spare. These, though serious, might be deemed
venial mistakes, easily to be redeemed by a bold attack ;
but instead of attack Monson chose retreat.
On the morning of the 8th he began his retrograde July 8.
movement towards the Mokundra Pass, sending off
his baggage and stores at four in the morning, but
remaining with the main body in line of battle until
half-past nine. As the enemy made no appearance, he
then led the retreat with the infantry, leaving the
cavalry to form the rear-guard, which was exactly the
reverse of Wellesley's practice in similar circumstances.
He had not traversed more than twelve miles when
he received intelligence that the rear-guard was attacked
by the whole of Holkar's cavalry ; and soon after-
wards Bappojee Scindia galloped up with the news that
his men and Lucan's had been totally defeated, and
84 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1804. that Lucan himself, an excellent and gallant officer, was
July 8. wounded and taken prisoner. There was therefore
nothing to be done but to continue the retreat to the
Mokundra Pass, which was safely reached without any
July 9. molestation at noon of the following day.
Here Monson halted with some idea of turning the
strength of the position to account, though he was still
troubled by uncertainty about his supplies. At noon of
July 10. the morrow Holkar appeared with his cavalry in great
force, and after summoning the British to surrender,
attacked them at three different points in front and
flanks, but was beaten off at all. He then fell back a
few miles to await the coming of his infantry and
artillery ; and Monson, fearing to be cut off from
Kotah and starved, marched again on the following
July 11. morning. Heavy and incessant rain had set in on the
10th, and the troops suffered much from the weary
tramp through the deep black cotton soil. They did
July 12. not reach Kotah until the 12th, when the Rajah was un-
able to supply them with provisions ; and Monson was
fain to drag on his men for seven weary miles further
before he could obtain food for them. Fortunately he
was able to cross the Chumbul in tfte Rajah's boats,
which he sank after using them, and so reached his
July 13. destination on the morning of the 13th. There he
halted for two days, first because his way was barred
by a flooded stream, and secondly because of the
imperative need for collecting a small quantity of
victuals ; the natural consequences of attempting a
campaign without pontoons, transport, or supplies.
July 15. On the 15th the march was resumed, but was presently
stopped by the state of the roads ; and on the following
July 16. day, the provisions being absolutely exhausted and the
guns sunk too deeply in the mud to be recoverable,
Monson abandoned his artillery and destroyed the
ammunition. He then proceeded on his way through a
country completely under water, only to be stopped again
July 17. within twenty-four hours by the Chambalee, in itself a
mere rivulet, but now swollen to an unfordable torrent.
ch. in HISTORY OF THE ARMY
85
Matters were fast becoming desperate. The 1804.
European artillery-men were sent through the flood
on elephants, but the rest of the army was detained,
and only with great difficulty contrived to collect
grain for two days from neighbouring villages. The
halt enabled Holkar's cavalry to come up, though the
advance of his guns also had been much delayed by the
rains. Monson, however, proved that he had not
served with Lake to no purpose, for he promptly
attacked the nearest Mahratta camp, took several of
their animals, and thus secured for himself respect. At
length, on the 23rd his force was able to begin the July 2
passage of the flooded stream in rafts, while two
battalions were detached under Colonel Don to find a
ford. Even so two entire days were consumed in the
crossing, though the enemy's cavalry made no serious
attack and was easily beaten off with considerable loss.
Finally, on the 27 th Monson's battalions arrived at July 2
Rampoora and were able to send supplies to Don's
detachment, which came in safely on the 29th. All July 2
were alike utterly exhausted, having consumed their
last provisions even before the crossing of the
Chambalee.
At Rampoora Monson found two battalions of Sepoys
with their guns, a body of Hindostani cavalry under a
British officer, Major Frith, and a certain quantity of
grain ; all which had been sent from Agra by Lake
immediately upon his hearing of the retreat. But here
again there had been neglect. Rampoora was held as
a post for the purpose of checking Holkar's movements,
or, in other words, as an advanced base of operations ;
yet no effort had been made to convert it in reality
into such a base by filling it up with abundance of
supplies. Monson set himself to collect provisions,
but with no great success, for up to the 20th of August Aug. 2
he had succeeded in gathering only twelve days' supply
for his own force. Meanwhile Holkar, though much
delayed by floods, had continued his advance ; and by
that same day had approached within twelve or fifteen
86
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
i 804. miles of Rampoora. At this Monson became anxious.
It is not easy to explain why, looking to the difficulties
which he had found in obtaining victuals, he did
not earlier continue his retreat ; it is still less easy
to explain why he did not march out boldly and attack.
His mind appears to have been made up for him by
Lake, from whom on this same day he received a letter,
desiring him to retire to Jeypore if he thought that he
might be again in distress for his supplies. Accordingly,
leaving a garrison in Rampoora, he marched on the j
Aug. 21. 2 1st with five and a half battalions and two howitzers
north-eastward upon Kooshalghur.
The first march brought him to the river Banas,
which, as might have been foreseen, was in flood and
unfordable. Three boats, however, were found, and in
these the treasure was sent forward under escort of six
companies with orders to proceed at once to Kooshalghur,
some twenty miles away as the crow flies. The rest of
the force perforce halted ; and early next morning
Holkar's cavalry appeared, and encamped four miles
Aug. 24. away. On the 24th the river became fordable ; and by
eight o'clock in the morning Monson Jiad thrown across
it the whole of his baggage, with one battalion for
escort. The enemy meanwhile had occupied a village
on his right, from which he promptly dislodged them
with little loss to himself ; but, as the river fell lower,
the Mahratta cavalry began to pass it in great numbers
upon both flanks, and Monson therefore sent over three
more battalions and a howitzer for the better protection
of his baggage. He was now left on the south bank of
the river with his picquets and a single battalion to
support them, and he could see that any attempt to
withdraw these before dark must lead to their inevitable
destruction. Unfortunately the darkness did not come
soon enough for him. At four o'clock Holkar's infantry
and guns appeared, and his batteries presently opened
a heavy cannonade upon Monson's little party. The
Colonel at once retorted by charging the guns with his
infantry and capturing one line of them ; but Holkar
ch. in HISTORY OF THE ARMY 87
met this attack by a destructive fire from a second line 1804.
of cannon, while his infantry and cavalry came up on all
sides of the unhappy detachment. The Sepoys having
suffered heavy loss, gave way, and Monson ordered a
retreat to the river ; but the enemy's horse pressed hard
upon him, and the retreat soon became a panic rush for
the ford. The Mahrattas plunged in after the fugitives,
and were bidding fair to annihilate the whole of them,
when one of the British battalions on the north side of
the river came down to the bank ; whereupon the
pursuit instantly ceased and the enemy retired.
This respite enabled Monson and a few men to Aug. 24
escape, but it was of short duration ; for Holkar's guns
presently unlimbered before the ford, and under cover
of their fire his cavalry began to cross the river.
Monson meanwhile lost no time, but forming his
troops into a hollow square, and letting the baggage
take its chance, he pressed on to Kooshalghur, with
the enemy's cavalry clinging to his rear all the way,
and arrived there in safety on the evening of the
25 th. Here he found the treasure with its escort, Aug. 25
but not, as he had hoped, a large reinforcement of
infantry and cavalry from the Rajah of Jeypore. On
the morning of the 26th Holkar's cavalry overtook and Aug. 26
encamped all round him ; and now came the most
terrible moment of all. The native officers of two of
his battalions, Sepoys of the British service, were found
to be in correspondence with Holkar ; two companies
actually deserted, and half of Frith 's irregulars went off
at the same time. Happily the two remaining battalions
remained faithful, and at seven o'clock on the evening
of the 26th Monson renewed his march. Constantly Aug. 26
harassed by the enemy's cavalry and horse-artillery, he
reached Hindoun on the evening of the 27th, with the Aug. 27
greater part of his baggage lost and the troops in the
last stage of exhaustion.
Halting until midnight, he marched again at one
o'clock on the morning of the 28th, to be overtaken at Aug. 28
daylight as usual by the enemy's horse. Bolder than
88 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
i 804. Was their wont, the Mahratta cavalry made a desperate
Aug. 28. charge m three bodies up to the very bayonets of the
Sepoys, but being beaten off with heavy loss, kept at
a respectful distance for the rest of the day. Sunset
brought Monson to the Biana Pass, at the entrance of
which he halted, hoping to give a little rest to his worn
and weary troops ; but the Mahrattas, bringing their
guns up on all sides, forced him to move on. At nine
o'clock he entered the city of Biana in pitchy darkness,
the baggage being mixed up with the troops in the
greatest confusion; and, all attempts to restore order
being fruitless, the various corps made their way to Agra
Aug. 31. as best they could. By dawn of the 31st all the sur-
vivors had arrived ; and then the reckoning of the
disaster was taken. Twelve British officers had been
killed, two more had been drowned, two more were
missing, and five others had been wounded ; while of
five and a half fine battalions little more than one half
were left, through the sword, fatigue, and desertion. It
was the heaviest blow that had fallen on the British
in India since the destruction of Baillie's detachment.
There was less recrimination than usually follows
upon such occurrences. Monson blame"d Murray for his
retreat as the cause of all the trouble ; and Murray
retorted that his retreat was due to Monson's own
retrograde movement. Arthur Wellesley, as a friend i
of all parties, drew out a searching analysis of the entire
expedition, which is among the most remarkable of his
papers. He criticised Monson for not attacking
Holkar on three different occasions, first before he
began his first retreat, secondly before he retired from
Rampoora, and thirdly before he crossed the Banas.
He blamed him also for halting unduly long at the
Mokundra Pass and, even more, at Rampoora, where
his delay, as Lake said, was fatal. But Wellesley's
final conclusion was that the detachment was doomed
to destruction, even if Holkar had not attacked them
with infantry and artillery ; or, to put the truth
into words which he carefully avoided setting down,
ch. in HISTORY OF THE ARMY
89
the ultimate fault lay with Lake, the Commander-in- 1804.
chief.
The operation assigned to Monson was in fact most
hazardous. He was ordered vaguely to march far
away at the beginning of the rainy season, into a
country everywhere seamed with deep water-courses
and rivers, without any regular system of supplies or
any organised provision for crossing the waters. Nothing
could better have played into the hands of the Mahrattas,
whose practice in warfare had for years been the same.
By means of their cavalry they ravaged the country
until want of provisions compelled their enemy to
retreat, followed him up with that same cavalry while
in motion, and surrounded him with infantry and
artillery when he halted. The way to foil these tactics
was that adopted by Wellesley ; namely, for a com-
mander to amass supplies enough to make himself
independent of the country, to organise the transport-
service to the utmost perfection in order to carry those
supplies, and finally always to possess the means of
passing rivers. Attention has already been called to
the fact that Wellesley made the acquisition of a
pontoon-train his first object upon the menace of a
Mahratta war. Failing to obtain it, he fell back on
wicker-boats, made by his own troops and covered
with hides ; but in addition to this he had established
a regular post with boats upon every unfordable river
from Seringapatam to Poona. Thus it was that he
was able to carry on his campaign during a famine,
and chose, as a preferable time for a Mahratta war, the
opening of the rainy season. In brief, by leaving
nothing to chance, but thinking out every detail
beforehand, he was able to organise victory.
Lake had given no such forethought to his projects
when he ordered Monson's detachment to pursue
Holkar to Ujjein. It seems, too, that the numbers of
Holkar's infantry and artillery — for he was reported to
have one hundred and seventy-five guns — came as a
surprise to every one ; for all previous intelligence,
9o HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
i 804. during his retreat before Lake, showed his force to be
an undisciplined rabble upon the verge of starvation,
whereas in fact he had fallen back upon his main body
of infantry and guns. On the other hand, both Lord
Wellesley and Lake had counted upon a respectable
contingent of troops, to be furnished according to treaty
by Dowlut Rao Scindia ; but that chief had steadily
evaded the discharge of his obligation. Nevertheless, in *
Monson's place Lake would by a happy instinct most
probably have avoided Monson's blunders, and carried
the expedition to a victorious issue. Indeed it was one
of Lake's failings that he gave every commander credit
for possessing that instinct, and could not understand how
any man could possibly lack it. Arthur Wellesley, on
the other hand, reasoned matters out, and ensured that,
if the instinct were wanting, sound and logical instruc-
tions should in some measure take its place. Lake
expected a man to fight his way out of any difficulty
that might arise out of want of provisions, wished him
good luck, and sent him on his way ; and it is probable
that he himself, having a real genius for a pitched
battle, could have acted successfully upon his own
precepts. Arthur Wellesley, on the Other hand, told a
commander that if he made sure of his supplies in the
first instance, he could not fail of success. Lake's
system might suffice for one man ; Wellesley's gave a
chance of success to any man.
Yet, to do the Chiefs justice, they did not turn upon
Monson. Lord Wellesley had expected the ruin of his
force from the first hour of its retreat, and was relieved
to find that any part of it had escaped ; " but," he
added, " whatever the result of his misfortunes to my
own fame, I will endeavour to shield his character from
obloquy, nor will I attempt the mean purpose of
sacrificing his reputation to save mine." Lake's answer
was not less worthy and honourable. " My dear
lord ... all blame ought to fall upon me for detaching
the force in the first instance ... all censure for that
measure must be attributed to me and to me alone, and
ch. in HISTORY OF THE ARMY 91
if called upon I am ready to answer for it before the 1804.
House of Commons ... I stand perfectly at ease on
that score, unless it may be said that I left too much to
the discretion of Colonel Monson." Misfortunes were
not likely to be irretrievable with two such men in
command in India.1
1 The authorities for the account of Monson's retreat are : —
Wellesky Desp. iv. 197 seq., 204, 213-217 ; Wellington Desp. iii.
438, 443, 455-463 ; Thorn, Memoir of the Late War in India, pp.
357-367.
CHAPTER IV
1804. The consequences of the disaster to Monson's detach-
ment were not slow to show themselves. Bappoo Scindia
deserted to Holkar ; the Jats, lately our allies, turned
against us and threatened to seize our newly-acquired
territory in Hindostan ; and the conduct of Dowlut
Rao Scindia became more and more suspicious. Most
dangerous of all was a fact revealed by a correspond-
ence which had been intercepted by Monson during his
stay at Rampoora, namely, that the Rajah of Bhurtpore,
though bound to the British by recent treaty, was
conspiring with Holkar to drive them from India.
Indeed the political consequences of the disaster seemed
likely to be far-reaching beyond all calculation ; but
fortunately the chiefs of every department were not
men who shrank from danger or exertion. The
Viceroy, even before Monson marched from Rampoora,
had decided that the Commander-in-chief must take
the field again in person with his army ; and Lake,
eager to meet his wishes and to crush the power of
Holkar, gave orders for the troops at once to march
from their cantonments and assemble at Agra. Arthur
Wellesley, though still resolved to go home, made
active preparations for the forced march to Chandore
of a column under Colonel Wallace, drew up a scheme
for Wallace's operations, wrote to Murray an admirable
letter as to the best means of carrying out the operations
entrusted to him, and, by no means the worst of his
measures, recommended that Murray himself should be
superseded as soon as possible.1
1 Wellesley Desp. iv. 189, 197 ; Wellington Desp. iii. 447 seq., 453,
463 seq., 468.
92
ch. iv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 93
Meanwhile Holkar pursued his victorious march, 1804.
and after some delay in the Biana Pass, arrived before
Muttra with the whole of his cavalry ; while his
infantry and artillery, far in the rear, toiled forward to-
wards Delhi. The garrison of Muttra, which counted
five battalions of Sepoys, two regiments of native cavalry,
and a proportion of artillery, evacuated the place on the
15th of September, apparently in some haste, for it left Sept. 15
behind not only much baggage but a large quantity
of grain, which must have been very welcome to
Holkar's hungry horsemen. However, the Jumna,
being in heavy flood, forbade the invasion of the Doab
by any but small parties of the enemy, which were easily
driven out ; and thus less harm was done than might
have been apprehended. Meanwhile Lake's regiments
had marched from Cawnpore on the 3rd of September, Sept. 3.
at the very height of the rains, crossed to the south
bank of the Jumna on the 22nd, and reached the Sept .22
rendezvous at Secundra, about six miles outside Agra,
a few days later. The force consisted of the Eighth,
'Twenty-seventh, and Twenty-ninth Light Dragoons,
with five regiments of native cavalry, the Seventy-
sixth Foot, the flank companies of the Twenty-
second, and ten battalions of native infantry. A
week was lost through the necessity of awaiting
supplies ; and on the 1st of October Lake advanced Oct. 1.
upon Muttra.1
1 Cavalry. Colonel Macan, H.E.I.C.S.
1st Brigade. Lt.-Col. Vandeleur, H.M. 8th L.D., 2nd, 3rd,
6th Bengal N.C.
znd Brigade. Lt.-Col. T. Browne, H.M. 27th and 29th L.D.,
1st and 4th Bengal N.C.
European Horse Artillery.
Infantry. Major-General Fraser, H.M.S.
1st Brigade. Lt.-Col. Monson, H.M. 76th, 1 /2nd, 1 /4th Bengal N.I.
znd Brigade. Lt.-Col. G. S. Browne, i and 2/1 5 th, i/2ist Bengal
N.I.
yd Brigade. Lt.-Col. Ball, i/8th, 2/2 2nd Bengal N.I.
Reserve. Lt.-Col. Don, Flank cos. H.M. 22nd, 1 and 2/1 2th,
2/2lSt N.I.
94
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1804. On the morning of the 2nd large bodies of hostile
Oct. 2. horse were encountered, but showed no disposition to
Oct. 3. stand and were easily dispersed. On the 3rd the enemy
succeeded in capturing some baggage as well as a small
convoy which was on its way to Lake from Agra ; and on
that same evening the General reoccupied Muttra. Here
he was detained for some days by lack of victuals ; but on
Oct. 7. the 7th, learning that Holkar had assembled the whole of
his cavalry about four miles away, he moved out before
dawn to attack him. But the alarm had been given
before Lake reached the camp ; and the Mahrattas
instantly fled with such precipitation that only the
galloping guns of the cavalry could come into action
and knock down a few horses and men. The
General, therefore, returned to Muttra ; and Holkar
promptly moved back to his former camp. On the
Oct. 10. 10th Lake made a second attempt upon him, leading
the infantry only against his front and sending the
cavalry round by a wide circuit to cut off his retreat ;
but the Mahrattas were too wary to be caught, and fled
as before, though they returned, according to their
wont, directly the British faced about to retire, and
hung about their flanks and rear.
Oct. 12. At length on the 12th Lake was able to pursue his
march to the relief of Delhi, which he now knew to be
besieged. The enemy still clung round him ; and two
fortified towns on the road, having been provided with
guns by Holkar, threatened resistance ; but Lake
Oct. 18. passed them by, and on the 18th came up to Delhi,
from which the Mahratta infantry and artillery had
already beaten a hasty retreat. Lake started to pursue
Oct. 19. them on the 19th, hoping to capture their guns ; but
once again he was detained by disappointment in the
matter of supplies, and the opportunity was lost.
Delhi, meanwhile, had made a creditable defence,
though its fortifications were in ruins. The resident,
Colonel Ochterlony, had early divined from the direction
of Holkar's march that he would attempt the capture
of the place, and had promptly called in a battalion and
ch. iv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 95
a half of Sepoys which were within reach, supplementing 1804.
them further with twelve hundred local levies. On
arriving before the walls on the 7th of October the Oct. 7.
enemy lost no time in erecting batteries against the
south-west angle of the city, whereby in a few days
the parapet was demolished and the walls greatly
damaged. A sortie was therefore made upon these
batteries, which were stormed with great success, the
British Sepoys spiking every gun and inflicting heavy
loss at small cost to themselves. The enemy then
shifted their guns to the southern face, where a breach
was made, but was speedily rendered useless by retrench-
ments ; and on the 14th they attempted an assault on Oct. 14.
the Lahore gate, from which they were beaten back with
considerable loss. Finally, on the 15th they raised the Oct. 15.
siege and retired, knowing that Lake was in full march
upon them and having no taste for an encounter with
his cavalry. It was a creditable feat that with so few
men Ochterlony should for nine days have held a city
ten miles in circumference.
Having failed at Delhi, Holkar sent back his infantry
by a circuitous route through the hills towards Deig,
a strong fortress belonging to the Rajah of Bhurtpore,
about twenty-five miles west and south of Muttra ; but
while moving with his cavalry up the Jumna to Paniput,
he himself crossed the river with the object of giving
the Doab a taste of the old Mahratta tactics. As soon
as Lake was apprised of these movements, he determined
to divide his force, giving the bulk of the infantry, the
field-artillery, and two regiments of native cavalry to
Major-general Fraser to watch the force at Deig, while
he himself should pursue Holkar across the Jumna with
the rest of the cavalry, the horse-artillery, the two
companies of the Twenty-second, and three battalions
of Sepoys.
He was unable to march until the 31st of October, Oct. 31.
when he proceeded in the lightest order. The usual
number of tents was reduced by one half ; private
wheeled carriages were absolutely forbidden ; and every
3
96 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1 804. fighting man carried six pounds of flour, which was
to last him six days. The first day's march, including
the passage of the Jumna, was of ten miles ; the second
covered fifteen miles ; and the third, in consequence
of bad news, was extended to thirty miles. The single
battalion which formed the garrison of Saranpoor had
been withdrawn for the defence of Delhi ; and the
Sikhs, who were inclined to throw in their lot with
Holkar, had seized the opportunity to blockade the
British resident in the place. Worse than this, the
battalion itself, while marching to relieve Saranpoor,
had been surrounded at Shamlee, between fifty and
sixty miles due north of Delhi, by Holkar's horse, ft
and was known to be in great straits. Happily the to
commander, Colonel Burn, being a capable soldier,
had thrown himself into a ruined fort about a hundred
yards square, where, though suffering heavily from the L0
enemy's sharp-shooters, he was able to hold his own
Nov. 3. until relieved by Lake's advance on the 3rd of |?j
November. By that time his Hindoo Sepoys had
been for some days without food, their caste not per-
mitting them to share the flesh of draught-bullocks with
the Mohammedans. The inhabitants ^f Shamlee having
joined with the Mahratta matchlock-men in shooting
at Burn's men, their town was given up to be plundered
as a warning to others ; and after one day's halt Lake,
Nov. 5. on the 5 th of November, resumed his pursuit of
Holkar.
From Shamlee he turned eastward for fourteen miles,
when he had the satisfaction of learning that an adjacent
town, dreading the fate of its unhappy neighbour, had
fired upon Jeswunt Rao's horsemen rather than admit
them. Thus early was verified Arthur Wellesley's
prediction, when he wrote to Lake that he had only
to press Holkar hard to make every inhabitant turn
Nov. 6. against him. On the 6th of November a march of
twenty-four miles brought Lake to the residence of the
Begum Somroo, who, having succeeded to the command
of the troops raised by her husband, Reinhardt, was
-
ch. iv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 97
now called by his native name with the prefix of a native 1
title. She was a very capable person, and a power
in the land ; for which reason Holkar was conjectured
to have pressed her to join her force to his own. Lake,
however, followed so closely upon the Mahratta host
as to remove all weight from its chief's representations ;
and at noon of the 7th the British at last caught sight N
of the enemy in full flight towards Meerut. On arriving
there the next day Lake found that this town also had
shut its gates upon Holkar and compelled him to double
Dack twenty miles southward to Haper. Having left
:wo Sepoy battalions and some irregular troops at
Meerut, Lake followed him up, always from twenty
:o thirty miles behind, but close enough to hearten
ivery place to resist him and to leave him little time
:o plunder any but unwalled towns. So the chase
:ontinued at the rate of twenty miles a day, through
:lusters of mischievous little forts and luckless burning
tillages, south and eastward from Meerut to Malagur
md Shikarpoor, thence across the Kali river, some
ifteen miles north-west of Aligarh, to Coriagunge,
vhich lies twelve miles to south-east of that fortress ;
md thence, moving always south-eastward, by Klas-
junge and Sirpoora to Aligunge, where Lake arrived
)n the 1 6th. The village was still burning as he N
narched by it, for Holkar's banditti, having been
listurbed at the work of plunder, had solaced them-
ielves by destruction ; but then came the welcome
1 lews that Holkar was certainly at Furruckabad,
hirty-six miles to eastward, a distance so great that
le would assuredly judge himself safe against any
t arly attack.
5 At nine o'clock therefore on the same evening Lake's
f|:avalry and horse-artillery were ready to move, without
>aggage or encumbrance of any kind. Just before he
tarted there reached him the news of a great success at
)eig ; and, with this to excite them to rivalry, the
roopers rode off under a radiant moon into the soft
si/arm air of the night. Messenger after messenger
1 vol. v H
98
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
804. joined the squadrons as they pursued their way, confirm-
ing former intelligence as to Holkar's position ; and his
encampment was not far distant, when the whole column
was startled by a sudden terrific roar. By some unhappy
accident a tumbril of the artillery had exploded ; and
there was at least one man among the sleeping Mahratta
host who heard it and took fright. Holkar had
received bad news from Deig on the previous evening
and had retired, without repeating it to a soul, to pass
a sleepless night. The dull boom of the explosion
roused him to alarm ; but his attendants reassured him. 1
It was only the usual morning-gun at Futtehgarh, 1
they said ; and the chief lay down again, while his men, 1
rolled up in their blankets, slumbered comfortably on
beside their horses. But ten minutes later the true
morning-gun at Futtehgarh was fired ; and some at
least of the Mahrattas rose uneasily, though many t
thousands remained buried in sleep.1
. 1 7. The dawn was just breaking when the head of Lake's I
column, having doubtless quickened its pace after the 0
accident, reached the skirts of the camp ; and the guns b
actually approached within range of grape-shot without
giving the alarm. Then they opChed fire into the ti
thickest of the crowded mass, and Holkar's lieutenants h
ran to tell him that General Lake and the British were k
upon him. He refused at first to believe them, ei
knowing that his enemy had been thirty-six miles away th
at night-fall ; but, being soon convinced, he mounted si:
his horse and galloped off with such men as were aboul ye
him south-westward towards Mainpooree ; nor did h( ac
draw rein till he had passed the Kali eighteen miles away fc
Meanwhile his unhappy men were left surprised, panic- so;
stricken, and leaderless. The Eighth Light Dragoons an
presently came spurring their jaded horses among them ch:
the remaining regiments followed close behind ; and ther k
k
1 Memoirs of John Shipp : edition of 1 843, p. 69. " Had it no it
been for the blowing up of a tumbril yesterday morning, I thinl
we must have had Holkar." Lake to Wellesley, Nov. 18, 1804
We lie sky Desp. iv. 241.
ch. iv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 99
followed such a slaughter as is never seen except when 1804.
troops are thoroughly savage. Holkar had mutilated Nov- l7-
the prisoners taken from Monson and sent them back
to Agra with right hands and noses cut off, so that
there was some excuse for vengeance. Such of the
Mahrattas as had horses rode for their lives, and were
pursued for ten miles. Those whose steeds had
foundered under the stress of the chase were cut down
in all directions, or, climbing trees to conceal themselves,
were discovered and shot by the pistols of the dragoons.1
A body of infantry which formed part of Holkar's
force was totally destroyed by the Eighth Light
Dragoons. In all it seems that literally three thousand
of the enemy were killed ; and many more poor
wretches were wounded, who crowded into all the
villages around for shelter, or perished miserably on
the plains too much exhausted to reach any refuge.
The loss of the British was twenty- eight men and
seventy-five horses killed and wounded, of which the
only two men killed, besides thirteen of the wounded,
belonged to the Eighth Light Dragoons.
This was rather a massacre than a fight, but none
the less was it a great feat of arms. The British column
had traversed three hundred and fifty miles in a
fortnight before it was called upon to make its crowning
effort, and had actually covered twenty-two miles on
the 15 th when it started for its night march of thirty-
six more to Furruckabad. The pursuit led the cavalry
it yet ten miles further afield, so that the total distance
ic accomplished in the twenty -four hours, before the
force finally encamped, exceeded seventy miles. And
something more was achieved even than the total defeat
is and dispersion of Holkar's army. For the Mahratta
; chief had already burned the outer cantonment of
s Furruckabad ; and though the Europeans, who were
mostly civilians, had taken refuge in the fort and
°j defended themselves bravely, they would probably have
H 1 This is the only instance which I have ever encountered of
pistols being of the slightest use to dragoons.
IOO
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1804. succumbed to an assault on the 17th but for Lake's
swift march and most opportune arrival.
Here therefore was Holkar's cavalry shattered to
pieces ; and meanwhile his infantry had already under-
gone the like fate. A few days after the departure of
Lake, General Fraser, who had been detained at Delhi
by want of supplies, was able to march due south
Nov. 1 1. towards Deig. On the nth of November he reached
Goverdun, a short distance from that fortress, and
discovering the enemy to be close at hand, encamped
there for the night. The Mahrattas had taken post in
a narrow space running to southward from the south-
east angle of the walls, and confined between a large
deep tank1 on one side and a still more extensive
morass on the other. They had secured their flanks
by resting their right on an eminence crowned by a
fortified village, and their left on the fortress itself which,
though it belonged to the Rajah of Bhurtpore, was in
perfect understanding with the commanders of Holkar.
Their strength, so far as could be ascertained, was
twenty -four battalions, or at a moderate estimate
fourteen thousand infantry with one hundred and sixty
guns, besides a considerable body *of horse. Fraser
had two British regiments, the Seventy-sixth and the
Hundred-and-First,2 the latter of which had recently
joined the army, besides a detachment of recovered
European invalids, six battalions of Sepoys, two
regiments of native cavalry 3 and artillery. These may
be taken at about one thousand British infantry, four
thousand native infantry and seven hundred sabres, or
about six thousand bayonets and sabres altogether.4
1 A tank is of course simply a pond ; the earlier form of the
word, stank, being indeed identical with the French estang, etang*
Why this archaism should have been preserved in India is a curious
question.
2 Then the First Bengal European Regiment.
8 2nd and 3rd Bengal N.C. i/2nd, i/4-th, 6 cos. 8th, 1 & 2/i5th,
2/22nd N.I.
4 The official returns on the 23rd of November were (including
all sick, etc.) : —
HISTORY OF THE ARMY
IOI
Leaving a battalion and eight companies, together 1804.
with his irregular horse, to guard the baggage, Fraser
marched to the attack at three o'clock on the morning
of the 13th. He had to fetch a wide compass south- Nov. 13.
ward to turn the morass, but on arriving at the
fortified hill which covered the enemy's right, he
wheeled his column to northward in two lines ; the
first consisting of the Seventy-sixth, and the second of
the Hundred-and-First, each forming the centre to
two battalions of native infantry.1 In this order he
advanced upon the village, where the enemy's sharp-
shooters, firing from loopholes, caused his troops much
annoyance. This petty stronghold was, however,
speedily carried, when the Mahratta dispositions be-
came clearer, and as usual were found to be skilful
enough. Their first line with several guns barred the
front of the inlet between the pond and the morass ;
a large body of infantry and artillery being drawn up
with particular cunning on their left, and another on the
right so as to enfilade the British advance on both
flanks. In rear of this was a second line, equally
powerful in artillery ; and beyond this again was a
succession of batteries stationed at such an angle to
each other as to ensure a cross-fire. On their right, in
Cavalry ....... 677
76th 626
ioist . . . . . . . 281
6 batts. Sepoys . . . . . .4176
Total .... 5760
1 First Line. Monson's Brigade. 1/2 N.I. (on left); I /4th
N.I. 76th (on right).
Second Line. Browne's Brigade, ioist (on left), 2/ 1 5th N.I.
1/1 5th N.I. (on right).
Such is the order shewn in the large plan attached to vol. iv. of
Wellesley Despatches ; but for reasons which will presently appear,
I believe the order to have been, from left to right : —
Monson's Brigade. i/4th N.I., 76th, i/2nd N.I.
Browne's Brigade. 1/1 5th N.L, ioist, 2/1 5th N.T.
It was the old rule that the white regiment should be in the centre
between the two Sepoy battalions.
102
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xnr
1804. the open ground outside the tank, their cavalry
Nov. 13. hovered about in large masses, ready to pursue if not
ready to fight. Their position, in fact, resembled that
of the French at Malplaquet, with this further access
of strength, that at the end of the strait between pond
and morass stood the fortress and guns of Deig.
Fraser, however, never hesitated for a moment.
Ordering his two regiments of native cavalry to check
the Mahratta horse, he placed himself at the head of
the Seventy-sixth, and with that regiment alone charged
down the hill to his left upon the nearest line of guns,
under a tremendous cross-fire of grape, chain, and round
shot. The enemy gave way as soon as the British came
near them, and falling back to their second line, con-
tinued to ply them with a murderous cannonade.
Fraser quietly reformed his troops, and was advancing
against the second line when a cannon-shot carried
away one of his legs, and compelled him to relinquish
the command to Monson, the officer next senior to him.
Monson, however, knew Fraser's plans, and, being a
man of extraordinary bravery, was well fitted to execute
them. The British second line having reached the
village, two native battalions,1 taken from both lines,
faced half right and moved forward with their battalion-
guns under command of Major Hammond, to check
the outflanking corps of the enemy at the southern end
of the morass ; while the Hundred -and -First, seeing
the Seventy -sixth engaged far ahead of them, ran
forward to support their comrades, followed by the two
remaining battalions of Sepoys. Monson meanwhile
had without hesitation led the Seventy-sixth forward
against the second line of the enemy ; and from thence
this intrepid band pressed on for two full miles,
capturing battery after battery, till they fairly drove
the mass of fugitives against the walls of the fortress,
where hundreds perished in the swamp which adjoined
the south-east angle and many were even drowned in
1 These were the i/ind and the 2/1 5th N.I. ; the right-hand
battalions, if my order of battle be accepted.
ch.iv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 103
the ditch. Had not our nominal allies in the fort 1
opened fire upon the British, the pursuit would N
probably have been still more destructive.
Thus the front was swept clear, but there still
remained the powerful body at the southern end of the
morass which Major Hammond with his Sepoys was
gallantly holding back, though his three little six-
pounders were utterly overmatched by the far heavier
and more numerous artillery of the Mahrattas. More-
over, a party of horse belonging either to the enemy or
to the Rajah of Bhurtpore's troops which were serving
with our own army, had stolen round the cavalry that
opposed them, and recapturing the first line of guns had
turned them against the British. Captain Norford of
the Seventy-sixth with twenty-eight men (who pre-
sumably had been left to guard them) at once charged
this hostile body and drove it off ; but he fell himself
in the attack, and his little party remained in great peril.
Monson, therefore, reformed his troops, and marching
back to Hammond, first reinforced him with some of
his battalion-guns, and then led his infantry round to
the left flank of the party of Mahrattas that opposed
him. These did not await the attack, but at once
gave way and fled. Many ran back into the morass
and were lost ; the rest were scattered in all directions.
The cavalry then moved down to assist in protecting
the wounded and the captured guns, and the escort of
the baggage arriving at the same time, soon put an end
to further resistance. The British encamped upon the
field of battle.
This was a fine and gallant action, which Lake
declared to have surpassed anything hitherto done in
India. He added, however, the significant remark :
" I have reason to believe that the action of the 13 th
inst. was a very near business. The personal courage
of Monson alone saved it." In any case the native
infantry appears to have done its duty gallantly, though
the casualty list shows that, as usual, the British bore
the brunt of a very severe fight. Six European
io4 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii ;
1 804. officers, including General Fraser, were killed or died ::.
Nov. 1 3. 0f their hurts, and seventeen were wounded. Sixty-
three European soldiers were killed, and one hundred
and eighty-one wounded ; and among them forty-two
of the killed and one hundred and twenty of the
wounded belonged to the Seventy-sixth. Of the natives a
of all ranks ninety-nine were killed, and two hundred c
and seventy-four wounded ; and it is significant that in
not one of these belonged to the two regiments of r
Native Cavalry. The fact that the Mahratta horse
was able to pass them by and recapture the guns, added
to the further fact that the infantry of the baggage- L
guard was brought up to support them, tends to show
that they needed a squadron or two of British dragoons
to hearten them ; and it was presumably owing to their
failure that the action at one moment evidently bore
an extremely ugly aspect. However, the bravery of
Monson and his officers saved the day, and all was
well. The loss of the Mahrattas was reckoned at two
thousand killed, including those who perished in the
swamp. The trophies of the day were eighty-seven
guns, thirteen of them being those which Monson had
lost on his retreat from Malwa, ani which he now
most honourably recovered.1
It is an extraordinary fact that, though he had thus
brilliantly redeemed his fame, Monson decided im-
mediately after the action to fall back to Agra. Lake
was in despair. Most of Holkar's defeated infantry
had taken refuge in the fortress of Deig ; and there
was every chance that Monson's retirement would
allow them to escape and that, his movement being
construed as a retreat, the whole country would rally
to support the Rajah of Bhurtpore. Monson's
ostensible motive was that he must go back to Muttra |
for provisions. " There are sufficient supplies there for 1
1 The authorities for the battle of Deig are meagre. I know j
of none but the account in Thorn's Memoir of the War in India, eked
out by Monson's report and Lake's comments in Wellesley Desp.
iv. 233, 245, 251.
ch.iv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 105
the whole army for two months," wrote Lake, "and 1804.
from thence he ought to have drawn them. He might
have spared a battalion or two to have fetched them. . .
It is somewhat extraordinary that a man brave as a
lion should have no judgement or reflection. ... It
really grieves me to see a man I esteem, after gaining
credit in this way, throw it away in such a manner
immediately." However, the only remedy for the
mischief was that the Commander-in-chief should
hasten to Deig himself, which he resolved forthwith to
do ; and meanwhile he comforted himself with the
news that Colonel Wallace of the Nineteenth Light
Dragoons had, towards the end of September, captured
the fortress of Chandore with little trouble or loss.
On the 20th of November Lake's cavalry marched Nov. 20.
from Furruckabad, leaving the infantry to follow, and
pursued its way on the track of Holkar, first south-
westward upon Mainpooree, thence north-westward Nov. 22.
upon Etah, and thence westward by Assan to Muttra. Nov. 26.
There on the 28th Lake crossed the Jumna and rejoined
Monson, who had fortunately halted at Muttra when
apprised of the Commander-in-chieFs approach. After
a stay of two days, Lake advanced towards Deig on
the 1st of December. The treachery, of the Rajah Dec. 1.
of Bhurtpore had, since the battle of Deig, been so
obvious, that hostilities against him were inevitable ; and
these were to be opened by the siege of the fortress.
On the 2nd Lake encamped within sight of the strong- Dec. 2.
hold ; and, since the heavy artillery had not yet arrived
from Agra, the next nine days were spent in recon-
naissance and in skirmishes with the Mahratta horse
under Holkar 's personal command. At length, on the
10th, the siege-cannon came up under the escort of Dec. 10.
Colonel Don ; and on the 1 1 th the entire force moved
forward, formed in a huge hollow square, with the
transport and followers, amounting to some sixty
thousand human beings and over a hundred thousand
animals, in the centre. Finally, on the 13th the army Dec. 13.
encamped on the western side of the fortress.
106 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xm
1804. Being almost surrounded by marshes and lakes,
Deig was during the greater part of the year nearly
inaccessible to an enemy. The town, of considerable
size, was defended by a strong mud wall with the
usual round bastions, and by a deep ditch which
surrounded it on every side except at the south-west
angle, where the works were prolonged to a high rocky
eminence called the Shah Bourj. Before this eminence
stood what was practically a distinct fortress, consisting
of a square enclosure with four commanding circular
bastions at the four cardinal points, and a smaller
bastion midway between the northern and western of
them ; while the northern bastion and north side of the
western were further covered by external entrenchments
of the pointed form used by European engineers. A
few hundred yards to south of these was an old detached
mud fort, named Gopalghur, which was filled with
matchlock-men and sharp-shooters. Within the town
and about a mile to north-east of the Shah Bourj stood
the citadel, of quadrate form, with circular bastions, and (
surrounded by a deep ditch faced with masonry. The ;
ramparts were high and thick ; the approaches were ,
guarded by massive gateways and lowers ; and the
whole was in excellent preservation and repair.
On the very night of his arrival Lake broke ground \
in a grove over against the western front of Gopalghur ;
Dec. 14. and by the next dawn a mortar-battery, besides another
for two field-guns, was completed. On the evening of
the 14th, volunteers from the British regiments of
dragoons began the construction of a breaching battery B
seven hundred and fifty yards to south-west of the'
Shah Bourj. The workmen, despite much annoyance!
from the sharp-shooters in Gopalghur, completed their B
Dec. 17. task by the night of the 16th ; and on the morrow a
fire was opened from ten heavy guns and four mortars. :
The result was disappointing ; and the enemy mean- ..
while brought guns out into the plain, where, utilising
the inequalities of the ground with great skill, they f
sheltered their artillery from all possibility of damage
ch.iv HISTORY OF THE ARMY
by the British batteries, while pouring upon them in 1804.
their turn a destructive enfilading fire. Fresh cannon
were therefore disposed by Lake to keep these in check,
and on the 20th a new battery of heavy guns was Dec.
erected farther to the north and closer to the Shah
Bourj. These measures proved effective. Many of
the enemy's guns were silenced ; a practicable breach
was made in the Shah Bourj ; and the assault was fixed
for the night of the 23rd December.
The attacking parties were divided into three Dec.
columns. The right column, consisting of four
battalion -companies of the Hundred -and-First and
five of Sepoys, was led by Captain Kelly, and was
ordered to carry the enemy's batteries and trenches on
the high ground to south of the Shah Bourj. The
left column was in charge of Major RadclifFe who,
with four more companies of the Hundred-and-First
and five companies of Sepoys, was appointed to capture
the hostile works to north of the Shah Bourj. The
central column was commanded by Colonel Macrae.
This last, being the storming party proper and entrusted
with the assault of the breach, was composed of the
flank companies of the Twenty-second, Seventy-sixth,
and Hundred-and-First, supported by a battalion of
Native Infantry.
The whole, under the supreme direction of Macrae,
moved off at about half-past eleven, the enemy firing
an occasional gun and burning blue lights to show that
they were on the alert. The two flanking parties
came first into action, drove the enemy from the out-
works and spiked the guns. The storming companies,
however, were much hampered by broken and difficult
ground, and were met by a cross-fire from a strong
entrenchment which lay between them and the breach.
Fortunately the cannon were mostly trained too high,
for the artillery-men stuck most gallantly to their
guns and were actually bayonetted where they stood.
Thus this outer defence was carried, and the British
rushing at the breach, after a desperate fight made
io8 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1804. good their footing in spite of every kind of missile,
Dec- 2 3- and ran down into the fort. Here again they were :
met by guns at the corner of every street and by a I
galling fire of musketry from the buildings ; while some 1
of the enemy rallied under cover of the darkness and
tried to recover their captured ordnance. But at half- <
past twelve the moon rose, and, with its light to help ]
them, Macrae's men were able to work more freely 1
without fear of firing on one another. The columns to c
right and left had been equally successful in carrying t
the detached batteries and entrenchments ; and by two |
o'clock the Shah Bourj, with the whole of its outworks, i
was in Lake's possession. The flanking columns then 1
rejoined Macrae and attacked the main walls of the t
town, which were speedily carried. Preparations were f
made for the battering and assault of the citadel, but t
Dec. 24. the enemy evacuated it during the ensuing night, and t
Dec. 25. on Christmas morning of 1804 the town and fort of 1 1
Deig, with most of the artillery that still remained to c
Holkar, besides a large quantity of grain and two lacs c
of rupees in specie, were surrendered into the hands of c
the British.
The losses of the assailants were Stight considering 0
the difficulties of the assault. Forty-three, including $
two British officers, were killed, and one hundred and p
eighty-four, of whom thirteen were British officers, ii
were wounded. Of the two companies of the Twenty- t
second no fewer than four officers were wounded,
among them being Captain Lindsay who, though twice k
severely hurt by a pike-thrust and a sabre-cut before c
he reached the breach, yet led his men on into the ii
Shah Bourj. Lieutenant Forrest of the Pioneers d
received over twenty wounds and was left for dead, $«
but recovered with the loss of one arm. Considering c
that the issue of all these desperate actions hung upon \
a handful of British officers, it is marvellous that any
of them should have survived.
Having repaired the defences of Deig so as to make j j
Dec. 28. it again secure, Lake, on the 28th of December,
ch.iv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 109
marched south-eastward, picked up a convoy of stores, 1805.
together with the Seventy-fifth regiment, which had
formed its escort, and on the 2nd of January 1805 Jan. 2.
encamped before the maiden fortress of Bhurtpore.
There appears to be no detailed description of this
stronghold before its capture by Lord Combermere in
1826, when it had been much enlarged since 1804.
But even when Lake came before it, it was a place
of great extent, the circumference of the fort and town
being upwards of eight miles. The whole of this vast
perimeter was surrounded by a mud wall of great
height and enormous thickness, with round bastions,
mounting innumerable guns, at short intervals, and
by a very wide and deep ditch. The fort, of quadrate
figure, was situated at the eastern extremity of the
town, upon elevated ground, with three sides within
the town and the fourth overlooking the country. Its
walls were higher than those of the town, and its
ditch wider and deeper. The whole lay within a belt
of jungle and swamp, the water of which could be
drained off to fill the ditch. Indeed upon the arrival
of Lake's army a large expanse of water on the
north-west side suddenly disappeared ; and not for
some time was it discovered that the whole of it had
passed into the ditch, insomuch that in this case also
it was said that " a seventy-four could have floated
there."
The complete investment of so great an enclosure
was beyond the strength of Lake's army, but this
consideration had never weighed with British generals
in the siege of an Indian fortress ; and accordingly he
concentrated the whole of his force opposite the
selected point of attack at the south-west angle of the
city. On the 4th of January a grove in advance of Jan. 4.
his camp was first cleared of the enemy to facilitate
the opening of the trenches ; and on the night of the
5th a breaching battery of six eighteen-pounders was Jan. 5.
erected, which opened fire on the 7th. By noon of Jan. 7.
the same day a second battery of eight mortars was
no HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xm
1805. completed ; and both plied the town with a heavy
cannonade, which was answered as vigorously from the
Jan. 9. walls. On the afternoon of the 9th a breach was
reported to be practicable, and it was resolved that
the storm should take place on the same evening,
before the enemy should have time to pursue their
usual practice of covering the breach with a stockade.
The assault was to be delivered in three columns.
Of these the left was composed of one hundred and
fifty men of the Hundred-and-First and a battalion of
Sepoys under Lieutenant-colonel Ryan, his orders being
to attempt to enter a gateway on the left of our
batteries. The right column, led by Major Hawkes,
was made up of two companies of the Seventy-fifth
and a battalion of Sepoys, and was designed to capture
the advanced guns of the enemy outside the walls and
to the right of our batteries. It was hoped that one
or both of these parties might make their way into
the town upon the backs of the fugitives ; but if they
failed in this, they had orders to turn and support the
central column. This last counted a strength of five
hundred Europeans, consisting of the flank companies
of the Twenty-second, Seventy-fifth, Seventy-sixth, and
Hundred-and-First, besides a battalion of Sepoys, the
whole being under command of Lieutenant - colonel
Maitland of the Seventy-fifth.
At seven o'clock these three bodies moved off to
the trenches ; and upon the firing of the evening gun
at eight o'clock they advanced to the assault. Ryan
and Hawkes to right and left succeeded in their task
of carrying the outer entrenchments and spiking the
guns, but failed to enter the town with the fugitives.
The central column advanced unperceived to within
fifty yards of the breach, when a tremendous fire of
musketry and cannon was opened upon them. Hurry-
ing forward, the leaders of the column found themselves
arrested by a deep trench about twenty yards wide and
full of water, which branched off from the main ditch
and enclosed a small island, on which stood a strong
ch.iv HISTORY OF THE ARMY in
force of the enemy with two guns. These at once i
opened a destructive fire ; and the storming party, J
finding that the obstacle was too deep to be filled by
the fascines and gabions which they carried, plunged
waist-deep into the water and dashed straight at
the enemy. The companies of the Twenty-second
and part of the Seventy-fifth, who were at the head
of the column, followed hard after the forlorn hope
and quickly cleared the island ; but the companies in
the rear broke off to the left in the darkness, leaving
the leaders in isolation. The little band in front,
however, pressed on over the ditch, but on reaching
the breach found nothing but a perpendicular curtain
descending sheer down to the water, with no footing
but stones and logs that had fallen down from above
under the fire of the guns. No more than three men
abreast could ascend it ; but none the less, Sergeant
John Shipp of the Twenty-second, Colonel Maitland,
and Major Archibald Campbell of the Seventy-fifth
made their way to the top, supported by such few of
their men as had not fallen. Here they found their
way barred by a stockade of stakes, stones, bushes, and
pointed bamboo, through the crevices of which a forest
of moving spears made continual thrusts at them ;
while a shower of stones, stink-pots, and bundles of
lighted straw fell on them from above. Staggering
on the loose and treacherous rubbish up which he had
climbed, Shipp drove one of his feet through it, and
through the hole thus made caught sight of the
interior of the fort swarming with men. His foot
was instantly seized, nor could he withdraw it except
at the sacrifice of his boot. Meanwhile the enemy
in the bastion to the right of the stormers set fire to
some dead underwood which they had hung from the
wall for the purpose, and, being thus lighted to their
work, trained a gun upon the little party in the
breach. At the first discharge Maitland, Campbell,
Shipp, and most of the few with them fell dead or
wounded, and the remainder were ordered by
ii2 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1 805. Lieutenant Mauser to sit down at the foot of the
Jan. 9. breach while he went in search of the rest of the
column. But the whole of the supports had gone
astray, being stopped by the ditch. Some of them had
halted by it, while others had turned either to right
or left until they joined the columns of Hawkes and
Ryan, the former of which, pursuant to its orders, was
returning towards the breach after doing its work on the
right. But meanwhile the little party at the breach's
foot, finding itself unsupported and success hopeless, had
retired ; and the order was given to retreat. The enemy
jubilantly redoubled their fire ; and the troops suffered
far more during this retrograde movement than during
the advance. In all, five officers and sixty-four men
were killed, twenty-three officers and three hundred and
sixty-four men wounded. The flank companies of
the Twenty-second, in particular, were terribly cut up ;
while those of the Seventy-fifth lost not only their
colonel, Maitland, killed, but seven other officers
severely hurt. "Worst of all, some of the killed were
men who had been left badly wounded near the breach,
and had been murdered in cold blood by the enemy.
The failure of the assault was doubtless due to in-
sufficient means, and consequently to insufficient pre-
paration and excessive haste. No adequate facilities had
been devised for crossing the ditch ; and if the ditch
had been easier, the so-called breach was really no breach
at all. The troops were not discouraged ; but it was
ominous that on the following day the enemy's working
parties repaired the breach in broad daylight, Lake's
four battering-guns being unable to fire until repaired.
Other materials too were so scanty that during the three
days following the attack there were not sufficient for
more than the repair of the batteries already erected.
However, the engineers now decided to batter the wall
a little further to the right, or south ; and accordingly
an additional breaching battery mounting four eighteen-
pounders and two twenty-four pounders was erected
immediately to the right of the old one, while other
ch. iv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 113
batteries of twelve-pounders were thrown up wide on 1
both flanks so as to divert the fire of the fortress. On
the 1 6th the newly mounted cannon opened upon the J
wall in the appointed place, but with disappointing
results. The mud wall crumbled down before the shot
and disappeared into the ditch, which had been deepened
by the enemy, leaving no foundation for the slope of
a practicable breach, but merely a pile of light dust in
which a man would sink waist-deep.1 Moreover, as
fast as a breach was made, it was forthwith stockaded
by the Rajah's working parties, so that each morning
saw the previous day's work undone.
No effort, however, was made to bring the batteries
within nearer range of the wall so as to ensure greater
and more thorough destruction. The truth was that
the number of the troops was insufficient for the work.
On the 1 8th there arrived from Agra a reinforce- J
ment under Major-general Smith, but this was not
enough to supplement the losses arising from the un-
successful assault, and from the daily and insidious
attacks of sickness and fatigue. At this time also the
freebooter, Meer Khan, threatened to appear upon the
scene with a huge body of horse, having been hired by
the Rajah with six lacs of rupees. Lake's cavalry had
already been fully employed in keeping Holkar's
plundering horsemen at a distance, and the arrival of
fresh predatory bands promised to tax their vigilance
to the utmost. This necessarily threw the task of
protecting the camp more heavily upon the infantry,
which, besides severe duty in the trenches, was required
to take a share in all foraging parties and escorts for
convoys. Hence the horse was harassed by constant
troublesome service, the foot was overtasked, and the
artillery and pioneers, being very few in number, were
simply worked to death. Scarcity of forage was already
1 Memoirs of John Shipp, chap. vii. I should attach little
j importance to this observation of a private soldier were it not con-
firmed in its main features by the journal of the siege in Creighton's
Siege of Bhurtpore, p. 154.
VOL. V I
ii4 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xm c
1805. serious ; and the deficiency of stores was such that the r
two twenty-four pounders were withdrawn from their tl
Jan. 20. battery on the night of the 20th, the supply of their n
shot being exhausted. tl
However, on that same day the breach which had ti
been made was declared to be practicable. During the *
afternoon three brave troopers of the Native Cavalry 1
contrived by an ingenious stratagem to ascertain the si
width and depth of the ditch over against it ; and on 1
Jan. 21. the following morning the troops were marched down d
to the trenches on the right, in order to assault shortly 0:
after noon. A bridge lightly constructed of bamboos, «
and made buoyant by inflated skins, had been devised I
to facilitate the passing of the ditch ; and picked men w
had been trained to bring it forward and handle it. It I
remained therefore only to choose the storming party, tl
which was made up of the surviving men of the Twenty- ai
second's flank-companies, one hundred and twenty of tc
the Seventy-fifth, one hundred and sixty of the Seventy- 1
sixth, and one hundred of the Hundred-and-first. As
soon as these should have forced an entrance, the remain-
ing men of the same four regiments, together with three Si
battalions of Sepoys, were to support them. The Twenty- re
second was to lead the way, and the foremost among 5
them, with eleven volunteers, was Sergeant John Shipp, «
who had held the same place in the assault of the 9th
and, over and above many smaller wounds, had been
struck in the shoulder by a grape-shot. Immediately
behind him was Captain Lindsay of the same regiment
who, owing to previous hurts, had only on that very
day thrown aside his crutches, and still carried his left j
arm in a sling. A second column under Colonel Simpson
was also appointed to make an attempt to force the
Anah gate, to the right or east of the storming party.
The British batteries played upon the breach through-
out the morning, and at three o'clock in the after-
noon opened fire again to cover the advance of the
stormers. A shell from a howitzer was the signal to
move, and this bursting in the muzzle of the gun killed
ch. iv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 1 1 5
two British grenadiers. However, Shipp's little party led 1 805.
the way, followed by the bridge, which was carried on jan. 2 1 .
men's shoulders ; and the enemy at once poured on
them a tremendous fire of musketry and artillery. At
the edge of the ditch Shipp and Lindsay fell, severely
wounded, the former in the head, the latter in the knee ;
and the bridge on being launched was found to be too
short by one-third, the enemy having dammed up the
water and thereby immensely increased its width and
depth. A hurried effort to lengthen the bridge by means
of scaling ladders had no further effect than to overset it ;
when it floated away uselessly down the ditch. There-
upon Lieutenant Morris of the Hundred-and-first,
with Lieutenant Brown and twelve men of the same
regiment, swam the ditch and mounted the breach ; but
they were too few to effect an entrance by themselves,
and the rest of the column remained halted under a
terrible fire. At length Colonel Macrae, who com-
manded the storming party, seeing no hope of success,
gave the word to retreat ; and then it seems that there
was a general rush back to the shelter of the trenches.
Simpson's column, however, now came up in Macrae's
rear, on the way to the Anah gate; whereupon the
storming party rallied and again advanced, though to
no purpose. After a time Simpson returned, finding the
entrance by the Anah gate impracticable ; and the whole
presently retired in good order, though leaving many of
the wounded behind. Morris, finding himself unsup-
ported in the breach, where he had already been wounded,
swam back over the ditch and, though struck by a bullet
in the neck, was brought safely into camp. The enemy
then swarmed out in triumph to murder the wounded
and mutilate the dead ; and thus disastrously ended the
second assault of Bhurtpore.
The loss of the British amounted to twenty-eight
officers and five hundred and seventy -three men,
European and native, killed and wounded. The flank
companies of the Twenty-second lost sixty- five of all
ranks killed and wounded, and the small party of the
n6 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xm
1805. Seventy-fifth, one hundred ; so that there was no lack of
Jan. 21. daring and devotion. Yet no advantage whatever was \
gained, and the troops were much shaken and dis-
heartened. Lake issued a consolatory general order,
and distributed a reward of money to every corps, with
assurances that success was ultimately certain. It was t \
all that he could do, and his outward firmness no doubt 1
made some impression upon the enemy ; but in truth ; 1
he had throughout the day been overmatched. During t
the assault the cavalry had been engaged with the con- I j
federate force of Holkar and Meer Khan which, though !
successfully prevented from doing any mischief, refused a
to be brought to close action, and at sunset followed a
the retiring squadrons of the British almost up to the I d
camp, being kept at bay only by a battery of horse- 0
artillery in the rear-guard. tl
Jan. 22. On the following day the enemy worked busily to v
repair the breach, unmolested by any fire from the ji
British cannon ; and the engineers sought for a more 1 ii
promising site for their batteries to the eastward of n
the existing trenches. But meanwhile a new difficulty, at
which might have been foreseen, aros^ to distract the w
British commander. A large convoy of twelve thousand B
bullock-loads of grain was on its way to the camp at or
Muttra by way of Deig, and on the 22 nd a regiment re
of native cavalry and a battalion of Sepoys under ar
Captain Welsh were sent to bring it in. The escort ■ 1
duly joined the convoy, and encamping with it at a'M
distance of twelve miles from Bhurtpore, marched again n
Jan. 23. with it early on the morning of the 23rd. All went well
until they reached Combir, half-way between Deig and A
Bhurtpore, where the convoy was attacked by the entire k
force of Meer Khan, numbering some eight thousand ca:
horse and foot with four guns. The four hundred its
troopers being too few to protect such a multitude lr
of bullocks, Welsh took post in the village with his escort b:
and such of the animals as he could gather round him. Co.
Here, though beset on all sides, he held his own Lio
gallantly, beating off attack after attack until, two of t
ch.iv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 117
his guns being disabled, the enemy by a desperate effort 1805.
succeeded in capturing a part of his position. The firing, Jan. 23.
however, had been heard at Bhurtpore, and at half-
past eight the Twenty-seventh Light Dragoons and a
regiment of native cavalry under Colonel Need rode
(hastily out of camp to the rescue. The dust raised by
[the column was soon perceived by Welsh's Sepoys who,
Smaking sure that Lake himself was on his way to
them, raised loud cheers, and dashing at the enemy's
|guns, captured the whole of them at the bayonet's point.
|Need came up in time to scatter the enemy's cavalry in
all directions, and catching the fugitives of the infantry
las they fled from their cannon, cut them down without
■mercy. Six hundred of Meer Khan's men were killed
ion the spot, and the chief himself only escaped by
(throwing off his clothes and arms, and running away
(with the press of his followers. Altogether the affair
(Was highly creditable to the troops engaged, whose loss
fin killed and wounded did not amount to fifty of all
|-anks ; and inasmuch as the enemy left forty standards
and four guns in the hands of the British, the story
|$vas capable of being expanded into a lively despatch.
(But the fact remains that of twelve thousand bullocks
jpnly eighteen hundred came into the British camp, the
[remainder with their loads going to feed Holkar's
[army. How it came about that only fourteen hundred
[pen were sent to escort twelve thousand bullocks, when
■Meer Khan was known to be in the neighbourhood
[with a large force, is a matter that was left unexplained.
However, this unpleasant lesson was not neglected.
^ second and much larger convoy of fifty thousand
Dullocks laden with grain, and about eight hundred
:art-loads of stores, ammunition, and treasure was on
ts way from Agra ; and it was of vital importance to
>ring it in safely, for there was not seven days' grain
eft in the camp. Accordingly on the 24th Lake sent Jan. 24.
Zolonel Don to that place with the Twenty-ninth
Jght Dragoons, two corps of native cavalry, and three
>attalions of Sepoys. Arriving there on the 26th, Don
n8 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xi
1805. marched with the convoy on the 28th, and on the 29th,
Jan. 29. at a distance of about sixteen miles from Bhurtpore,
fell in with the united forces of the Rajah of Bhurtpore,
Holkar, Meer Khan, and Bappoo Scindia, all of them
intent on securing so rich a prize. Lake instantly-
marched with the rest of the cavalry and two battalions
of Sepoys to reinforce him ; and such was the terror of
his name, that no attack was attempted in his presence.
His whole camp was surrounded by the enemy that
Jan. 30. night ; but on the morrow he marched in a huge
hollow square, and brought in the convoy safely with-
out the loss of a man or bullock ; while his cavalry and
horse-artillery succeeded in inflicting some damage upon
the hordes of the enemy. " Nothing," said a critical ob-
server, who was not always friendly to Lake, " could have
been better planned or more steadily and coolly executed
than the protection of the convoy upon this occasion. " 1
A little respite was thus gained ; and the preparations
for the renewal of the siege, which had gone forward
somewhat languidly owing to lack of supplies and stores,
Feb. 5. received new life. On the 5th of February a new
parallel was opened towards the Neejjidar gate, on the
southern front of the fortress ; and on the following
day the whole camp was shifted to a new position in
rear of it. Now, however, Meer Khan essayed a fresh
kind of diversion. His recent failure to capture the
great convoy had caused complaint among the chiefs
subordinate to him ; and the quarrels between them
became so hot that he determined to separate from
his friends, and try his fortune in his native country ol
Feb. 7. Rohilcund. Accordingly on the 7th of February he
crossed the Jumna with the whole of his own body
of horse and as many banditti as would join him
concluding that Lake could detach no force in pursuil
of him without raising the siege of Bhurtpore.
No sooner, however, was Lake informed of hi$
departure than he despatched Major-general Smith witt
1 Journal of Lord Lake's Siege of Bhurtpore (apparently by ar
officer of Engineers), appended to Creighton's Siege of Bhurtpore.
ch.iv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 119
the Eighth, Twenty-seventh, and Twenty-ninth Light 1805.
Dragoons, and three regiments of native cavalry to hunt
him down. This detachment marched on the 8th, Feb. 8.
crossed the Jumna by the bridge of boats at Muttra
on the 9th, and at once took up the chase. Reaching
Aligarh on the 1 ith, Smith was there reinforced by two Feb. 11.
regular battalions of Sepoys, some irregular infantry,
and Skinner's Horse. Proceeding north-westward, the
column, after meting out some punishment to predatory
chieftains on its way, dropped the infantry and part of
Skinner's Horse at Arropshehar, and on the 14th en- Feb. 14.
camped on the bank of the Ganges. There intelligence
was received that Meer Khan had failed in an attempt
to traverse the river and had followed it upwards in
the hope of finding a suitable crossing-place. Smith at
once pursued him to a point due east of Meerut, where,
finding that his quarry had succeeded in passing the
stream, he at once led his troops into the water, a mile
broad at that place, and reached the eastern bank in
safety with the loss of a few followers and baggage-
animals.
Thence the chase lay due east by Moradabad to
Rampoor, which was reached on the 20th, and from Feb. 20.
thence south-eastward to Sheergur, where Smith halted,
having driven Meer Khan to the foot of the bleak hills
to northward where he could work little mischief, while
he himself held a good central position for the defence
of Pillibeer, Rampoor, and Bareilly. Moving between
these places for some days, Smith on the 27th turned Feb. 27.
northward from Moradabad, and on the 2nd of March Mar. 2.
received the welcome intelligence that Meer Khan with
the whole of his force was but nine miles distant at
Afzulghur. Marching at once to that spot, he found
the chief's forces drawn up in order of battle behind
a ravine ; and at once attacking, cut the whole of his
infantry to pieces, killed three of Meer Khan's principal
officers, and dispersed his cavalry with heavy loss in all
directions. Smith's casualties in the action did not
exceed forty killed and wounded.
120 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1805. Deserted by many of his followers, Meer Khan fled
by a circuitous route to Moradabad ; and after another
week of defeat in sundry attacks, being hustled in
every direction by columns detached from the British
garrisons in the country, he recrossed the Ganges on
Mar. 11. the nth, having lost alike his baggage, his following,
and his reputation. Smith also crossed the Ganges,
Mar. 23. and on the 23rd, after a month of excessive exertion
and fatigue during a chase of seven hundred miles,
rejoined the army before Bhurtpore.
There, unfortunately, matters had not prospered since
the departure of the cavalry. In itself the detachment
of so many troops was an embarrassment to Lake,
which was not lessened by his losses in the two un-
successful assaults. It was imperative that he should
obtain reinforcements from some quarter ; and finally it 1
had been decided to call up from Malwa a part of the i
Bombay contingent commanded by Murray. That i
officer, indeed, had played a singularly inconspicuous 1
part in the operations. As far back as September 1804, (
Arthur Wellesley had recommended that he should 2
be superseded by Major-general Jones. This was not I
immediately done ; and Murray accordingly remained 1
inactive at Ujjein, until in November Wellesley advised J
that he should be recalled towards Guzerat, where his r
force might be re-equipped with facility and would I
ensure the safety of that district. Lake, however, at {
this same time bade him move northward from Ujjein, I
apparently with the view of using his column to head a
back Holkar if he should again turn towards the south, i
The defeat of Holkar at Deig and Furruckabad made c
these orders useless ; but Murray, to Arthur Wellesley's c
consternation, marched northward to Kota, leaving 1
Holkar's forts of Partabghur and Hinglaisghur untaken t(
in his rear, and sacrificing his communications with I
Guzerat. In December 1804, explicit directions came 1
from Lake that he should join him on the Jumna, which fi
seemed to justify his movements ; though Wellesley did
not conceal his apprehensions lest Murray should share [
HISTORY OF THE ARMY
121
the fate of Monson in Malwa. However, in due time 1805.
General Jones reached the army and took command ;
when it was discovered that Lake's orders for the force
to move northward, far from being due to carelessness
and imprudence on the part of the Commander-in-
chief, had actually been suggested by Murray himself.
Yet this was the same officer who in the previous year
had been so nervous about his supplies and communica-
tions that he would hardly move. The truth seems
to be that when Murray learned that he was to be
superseded he was prepared to march anywhere at any
risk, so long as he could prevent his successor from
joining the army.1
However, on the nth of February Jones arrived Feb. n.
before Bhurtpore with eight companies of the Sixty-
fifth, the Eighty-sixth, five battalions of Bombay Sepoys,
a troop of Bombay cavalry, and a few irregular horse,
in all about seven hundred Europeans and twenty-four
hundred natives. By that time a new breaching battery
of four eighteen-pounders had just been completed, and
a second battery to left of it had been begun, both of
them within four hundred yards of the wall. A new
breach was made by these guns ; but the enemy built
a mud wall in rear of it and kept stockading it and
restockading it as fast as the palisades were shot away.
However, something more of science was shown in the
general prosecution of the siege. Trenches of approach
were carried forward so as to shelter a storming party
almost to the edge of the ditch ; a mine was begun at
the end of them with the idea of blowing up the
counterscarp ; powerful mortar-batteries were erected
on each flank of the breaching battery ; and outlying
works of sandbags were thrown up for lighter ordnance
to keep down the fire of the defence. On the other
hand, the enemy erected batteries and threw up trenches
outside the walls of the fortress so as to enfilade the
British guns. Nor did the besieged lack enterprise in
1 Wellington Desp. iii. 468, 547, 556, 570, 592, 599, 597, 631,
642.
122
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1805. other respects, for on the morning of the 19th they
Feb. 19. attacked an unfinished work which was erecting within
seventy yards of one of their towers, drove out the
Sepoys within it, emptied the sandbags and carried
them off. Lake, however, was satisfied with what had
been done by his engineers, and determined to storm
the breach as soon as the batteries should have swept
away the stockade.
Three columns in all were formed. The left was
made up of most of the European soldiers of Lake's
own army, supported by three battalions of Sepoys, and
was placed under command of Colonel Don for the
assault of the breach. The centre column was com-
mitted to Captain Grant of the Bombay forces who,
with two hundred of the Eighty-sixth and a battalion
of Bengal Sepoys, was to carry the enemy's guns and
trenches outside the town. The right column, com-
posed of three hundred of the Sixty-fifth and two
battalions of Bombay Sepoys under Colonel Taylor,
was to attack the Beem Narain gate at the south-eastern
angle of the fort, which was reported to be accessible
to guns, and therefore capable of being broken in.
During the night of the 19th some parties of the
enemy made a sally and crept into the nearest approach
unperceived, the British troops being for some reason
always withdrawn before the relief arrived to take their
place. Here they remained for some time unmolested,
demolishing the preparations that had been made for a
Feb. 20. mining chamber, and carrying off the tools. At day-
break the British storming party arrived, whereupon
the enemy at once rushed out with pikes and swords
along the top of the trench, thrusting and slashing at
the men below, and occasionally jumping down and
closing with them. Every man of these aggressors was
intoxicated, and their onslaught was most furious.
The trench being very deep and narrow, without
banquette-steps to enable the men to ascend it or to
fire over it, the British were caught at a disadvantage
and were thrice driven back, until the remnant of the
HISTORY OF THE ARMY 123
flank companies of the Twenty-second came up and 1805
swept the savage assailants out. The British guns were Feb.
then turned upon them, as well as the guns of the
fortress, which throughout had played indiscriminately
upon all parties ; and few of this desperate band escaped
alive. But the loss of the British also had been severe ;
the wounded and dying were left where they lay,
exposed to the enemy's fire ; and their miserable
groans and writhings threw gloom and discouragement
over the storming party.
At three o'clock the three native battalions of Don's
column marched into the trenches ; and a little later
Grant's detachment sprang forward and dashed at the
entrenchments and batteries without the walls on the
right of the British guns. The enemy was at once
driven out; eleven guns mounted in the batteries were
captured ; and Grant's men following close upon the
fugitives, pursued them to the walls and on to the Anah
gate, which was barely closed in time to shut out the
foremost of the British. Having no guns, Grant was
powerless to blow in the gate ; and he therefore estab-
lished himself under the bank of a dry pond immedi-
ately outside it, having only narrowly missed forcing
his way into the fortress.
Grant's attack was the signal for the storming party
to move forward, and accordingly Don gave the word
to assault. The orders were that the Europeans at the
head of the column should advance from the left of
the breaching battery, and that the Sepoys should follow
them to the breach. Fifty men with fascines were to
take the lead, throw their fascines into the ditch, and
then wheeling outwards spread themselves along the
glacis to keep up a fire upon the breach while the
forlorn hope rushed on. But the men, though they
were the remnant of the Seventy-fifth, Seventy-sixth,
and Hundred-and-first regiments, which had covered
themselves with glory during the past weeks, refused to
move out. They were depressed by past failures before
Bhurtpore ; they were dismayed by the ghastly agony
i24 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xm
1805. of the wounded men all round them; they were
Feb. 20. discouraged by the success of the hostile sally in the
morning. They had only too readily caught up an idea
that the enemy had established a mine in the unfinished
gallery of their own engineers ; they found their task
made doubly difficult and perilous by the faulty con-
struction of the parallels and the enfilading fire which
consequently swept the approaches ; and in fact they
had come to the conclusion that the operations before
the fortress had been and still were mismanaged, and
had lost confidence in their leaders. In vain their
officers exhorted them by words, gestures, and example :
they would not advance ; and, until they moved, the
native troops in their rear could not pass to the front.
Some of the flankers of the Twenty -second alone
responded to the appeals of their officers, but, finding
themselves unsupported by their comrades, presently
retired.
In desperation Don at last led two battalions of
native infantry to the right of the breaching battery,
and from thence to the ditch. The Sepoys followed
him most gallantly ; but the ditch opposite to the
breach was found impassable, and the column swerved
to its right to the nearest point which had suffered
damage from the besieging cannon, namely a bastion
known to the British as the Tower bastion. Here the
ditch was found to have little water in it ; and the men
began to climb up the bastion by clinging to the shrubs
that grew on its face. On reaching the slope of the
tower most of the party stopped, though a few of the
bravest clambered on and even planted their colours
close to the summit ; but there was no chance for the
ascent of a number sufficient to maintain a footing
united at the top. Those that would not face the peril
of the final climb, hung in crowds round the foot of
the tower ; but no order nor entreaty could induce them
to move round it or to push on to the breach in
the curtain. There they remained huddled together,
while the enemy from above showered on them logs
ch.iv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 125
of wood, fire-pots, and missiles of every description. 1805
Meanwhile the European regiments, observing the Feb.
attack on the tower, imagined that the place was taken ;
and a small party of them left the trenches and pushed on
after the Sepoys. Two of these soldiers actually reached
the summit of the tower, where one was blown to
pieces by a gun, but the rest joined the Sepoys at its
foot, where they endured the enemy's fire for an
hour and a half. At length they were ordered to
retire, when the whole suddenly took to their heels and
rushed back in panic to their trenches. Taylor's
column, meanwhile, having lost its scaling-ladders and
had one of its guns dismounted, had found the forcing
of the Beem Narain gate absolutely impracticable, and
had already retired. Thus the third assault, like its
fellows, issued in a disastrous repulse.
Twenty-eight British officers were killed or wounded
in this affair ; and the total loss amounted to forty-nine
Europeans and one hundred and thirteen natives killed,
seventy-six Europeans and five hundred and fifty-six
natives wounded, making in all little short of nine
hundred casualties. Nevertheless on the same night
it was reported to Lake that if the tower which had
been assaulted by the storming party were battered
for half a day it might easily be stormed, and accord-
ingly the whole of the guns in the new breaching
battery were turned upon it. In the morning Lake Feb.
came on parade and, addressing the European regiments
rather in sorrow than anger, expressed his regret that
they had not followed their officers and so had failed
of success, but added that he would give them an
opportunity of retrieving their reputation. He then
called for volunteers ; and the whole stepped forward as
one man. Two hundred were selected, to each of whom
a reward of one hundred, rupees was promised if the
fortress were taken. Lieutenant Templeton offered to
lead the storming party, and Sergeant John Shipp,
though still disabled by wounds, insisted for the third
time on leading the forlorn hope. Lake therefore
126
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1805. decided to assault once more in the afternoon, his
Feb. 21. supplies and stores having fallen so low that unless he
captured the city he had no alternative but to raise the
siege.
The guns therefore played upon the tower with such
ammunition as was left, and beat so large a gap about
its base as to raise hopes that the upper portion would
fall by its own weight. This expectation was, however,
disappointed ; and Lake was duly informed that the
higher part of the tower was still steep. It was
thought, even so, that it might by some means be
surmounted ; and, since it was reported that the breach
was still unrepaired, Lake decided to make the attempt.
The shattered remains of the Seventy-sixth and of the
flank companies of the Twenty-second, the Sixty-fifth,
Eighty-sixth, the flank companies of the Hundred-and-
first, two battalions of Bengal Sepoys, and one of
Bombay Native Infantry formed the storming party, the
whole being under the command of Monson. Before
four o'clock the signal was given, and the detachment,
cheering loudly as they passed the General, marched
forward to the assault. m
The advance was made with the greatest boldness and 2
regularity, and the men showed all their old bravery in ?
attempting to scale the tower. The gap in its base gave t
shelter to a few, but the breach was still too steep to
be climbed. Determined to carry the fortress if it
were humanly possible, some of the stormers drove their
bayonets into the rampart, one above another, to make t
a ladder ; while others tried to scale the ascent by the 0
holes made by the British guns ; but only two men :
abreast could advance in that way, and numbers so r
small were easily overpowered. The enemy heaped i
missiles upon them, logs of wood, pots of gunpowder, i
flaming packs of cotton dipped in oil, heavy shot, all k
that came to hand ; while the guns of the adjoining n
bastion poured in a sweeping and most destructive fire, i
For two hours the men wrestled with the impossible,
striving to ascend the curtain at any point which i
ch.iv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 127
promised the least semblance of success. Templeton 1805.
was killed just as he had planted the colours near the Feb. 21
summit. Major Menzies, Lake's aide-de-camp, begged
leave to join in the assault, and was slain at the head
of the old breach. All was in vain. Monson at length
gave the order to retire, and the survivors rushed back
under a furious fire to their batteries. Four hundred
and seventy-nine Europeans, thirty-four of them officers,
and five hundred and eight natives had fallen ; making
in all nine hundred and eighty -seven killed and
wounded. The various attacks had cost over three
thousand men, and the fortress was as defiant as ever.
There was no doubt now as to what must be done.
On the night between the 22nd and 23rd the troops Feb. 23
were withdrawn from the trenches, and the ordnance
from the batteries. The guns were unfit for service,
the vents being so much worn that most of them would
hold four fingers, and had only been stopped, in the
later days of the siege, by bags of sand. This, in fact,
was one cause of Lake's failure ; six iron guns of no
great calibre and eight brass mortars comprehended
the whole of his siege-train, which was far too small
and too weak for his purpose. His force of men also
was inadequate, for he began the siege with little more
than six thousand effective infantry and two thousand
cavalry, the latter of which was constantly absent in
chase of predatory horse of one description or another.
Lord Combermere, when he sat down before Bhurtpore
in 1826, had with him eighteen battalions, eight regi-
ments of cavalry, six troops of horse artillery, one
hundred and twelve siege-pieces, and fifty light field-
guns. The historian of Combermere's siege, with
these figures before him, most generously strives to
vindicate Lake against all hostile criticism ; but it
cannot be gainsaid that the main cause of his failure
was his own impatience. " They must have blundered
that siege terribly," wrote Arthur Wellesley from St.
Helena, when he heard the news ; <c for it is certain that
with adequate means every place can be taken ; and,
128
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1805. Lord Lake having been so long before the place,
adequate means must have been provided or in his
power. The fault lies therefore in the inapplication
of them or, most probably, in the omission to employ-
all those which were necessary to accomplish the object
in view, either through the ignorance of the engineers,
or the impetuosity of Lord Lake's temper, which
would brook no delay." Even the Viceroy, greatly
as he esteemed and admired Lake, begged him, upon
the report of the last assault, not to accelerate operations
at Bhurtpore, if he resumed the siege, but to await the
arrival of a sufficient battering-train rather than risk
another failure. Lord Wellesley 's confidence must have
been greatly impaired before he would write in such
terms to his beloved General.1
Lake, however, was still resolute and unshaken.
Feb. 24. On the 24th he drew off his army six miles to north-
eastward of the fortress and encamped so as to cover
the roads to his magazines at Agra, Muttra, and Deig ;
the enemy's horse making the movement both difficult
and hazardous owing to the absence of the cavalry
under General Smith, which had not y>et returned from
the chase of Meer Khan. The troops were then
employed in making fascines and in bringing in large
convoys of supplies and stores, including the battering
train which ought to have been summoned earlier. The
Mar. 10. Rajah began to lose heart, and on the 10th of March,
two days after Lake had received the news that he had
been raised to the peerage, his emissaries were admitted
to headquarters to negotiate for peace. Holkar,
meanwhile, with what remained of his force, lay about
eight miles westward from Bhurtpore in ease and
comfort, since Lake had no cavalry with him. On the
Mar. 23. 23rd, however, Smith returned with his regiments to
Mar. 29. camp ; and at one o'clock on the morning of the 29th
Lake led them out to surprise Holkar's camp, he
himself intending to attack its right, while another
1 Wellington Suppl. Desp. v. 511 ; Wellesley Desp. iv. 301 ;
Creighton's Siege of Bhurtpore, xx. seq.
ch.iv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 129
column moved round its left. But the enemy were 1805.
warned of the movement and were so far prepared for
flight when he came upon them that, after a long
pursuit, he succeeded only in making an end of about
two hundred men and taking a few animals. Holkar,
therefore, took up a fresh camp some way to the south-
west of Bhurtpore, where he thought himself more
secure; but at daybreak of the 2nd of April Lake April 2
came upon him with his cavalry and horse-artillery,
and pursuing him for eight miles, made large captures,
besides working great havoc among the men. Numbers
of Holkar's followers deserted him ; and he was forced
to cross the Chumbul with a mere remnant of eight
thousand horse, half as many foot, and twenty or
thirty guns. A week earlier a detachment of his
infantry with three guns had been routed and dispersed Mar. 26.
near Ahmednuggur by a small column of Sepoys and „
irregulars, which weakened him still further. The
Mahratta chief was now little more than a wanderer
and an outcast, having lost all his strong places, nearly
all his artillery, and the great bulk of his once-powerful
army.
These successes were not without effect on the Rajah
of Bhurtpore ; and Lake presently accelerated the nego- April 8.
tiations with him by marching back to his old encamp-
ment at the south-east angle of the city. On the 10th
of April accordingly the Rajah signed the preliminaries April 10.
of peace ; and a few days later he bound himself by
I treaty to hold no correspondence with the enemies of
Great Britain, to leave Deig in the hands of the British
t Government until it should be assured of his fidelity,
\ and to pay an indemnity of two hundred thousand
e pounds. Thereupon, on the 21st, the army broke up April 21.
0 from before Bhurtpore and moved south-eastward
jj upon the Chumbul.
e There was indeed more than enough to require its
>r presence there. Ever since the first reverses of the
British Scindia had waxed warlike or unwarlike
1 ; according to the prospect of their failure or success in
VOL. V K
130 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xm
1805. the field ; and as disaster followed disaster at Bhurtpore,
he became more and more forgetful of former lessons.
His ostensible ground of complaint against the Viceroy
was that the fort of Gwalior and the territory of Gohud
had, under the recent treaty, been wrongfully withheld
from him. Moreover, it seems that Lake, Arthur
Wellesley, and in fact every one except the Viceroy,
thought that he had a just claim to Gwalior.1 But
other of his grievances were simply impudent ; and in
the autumn of 1 804 he had gone so far as to march
towards Bundelcund, attacking the allies of the British
in violation of the treaty, and openly communicating
with Meer Khan and with other followers of Holkar.
After repeated protests, the British resident at his
Jan. 23. court quitted his camp on the 23rd of January 1805,
but was at once brought back by force and virtually
detained as a prisoner, with every circumstance of
humiliation. Lord Wellesley, seeing that Lake's
strength was already overtaxed, contented himself with
April 23. mild remonstrances ; and Scindia, on the 23rd of April,
intimated to the resident his intention of marching to
Bhurtpore to mediate between the Rajah and the
British. The consequences of this thovement would
undoubtedly have been serious ; but they were averted
by Lake's treaty with the Rajah, which came both to
Scindia and to Holkar as a staggering surprise. None
the less, the two last remained in open communication,
and at last both Holkar and Meer Khan joined their
forces to Scindia's, the whole virtually forming one
united camp.
April 30. Lake crossed the Chumbul near Dholpore on the
30th of April ; and Scindia, thinking better of his big
words, withdrew up the river to Kotah, though he still
refused to liberate the British resident, even when Lake
threatened a renewal of hostilities. The Viceroy,
however, was determined not to precipitate matters ; and
the desertion of a part of Scindia's army to the British
gave that chief warning that he must be careful. Lake
1 Wellington, Suppl. Desp. iv. 386.
ch. iv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 131
detached a force to watch him, and meanwhile employed 1805.
himself in negotiating a treaty with the ruler of Gohud,
whereby the latter pledged himself, by what was called
1 a subsidiary treaty, to take three battalions of the East
India Company's Sepoys into his pay. This done, the
army broke up in the third week of May ; the May.
Bundelcund detachment marching to Gwalior and the
Bombay force to Tonk. Lake with his head-
quarters at Muttra threw his army into cantonments
there, at Agra, at Secundra, and at Futtehpore ; the
whole being kept ready to march and to concentrate
at a moment's warning.
On the 25th of July Lord Wellesley, weary withjuly2 5.
waiting, sent Scindia an ultimatum, bidding him deliver
up the British resident or take the consequences ; but
his term of office had come to an end before any answer
could be received. He had sent home his resignation at
the end of 1803, and had delayed only until the negotia-
tions with the Mahratta chiefs, which subsequently gave
place to war, should have been terminated. Meanwhile
his ambitious and costly policy had commended itself
neither to the East India Company nor to the British
Cabinet ; and war and conquest in India, ever since the
trial of Warren Hastings, could be always held up as
wicked and unnecessary. Hence when his successor,
Lord Cornwallis, arrived at Calcutta on the 30th of July 30.
July, he brought with him both the hopes and the
instructions of the Government for a new era of
economy and peace.
The faith reposed by British ministers in Cornwallis
is somewhat remarkable, for he was not a man of great
ability, and his career had by no means been of the
most successful. In America he had proved himself
decidedly a failure. In India he had been within a
hair's-breadth of actual disaster before Seringapatam ;
and though he had redeemed his first mishaps in the
field by subsequent victory, his neglect or misgovern-
ment had left to his successor very formidable difficulties.
As chief military adviser to Pitt's Cabinet and as Master-
132 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1805. general of the Ordnance, his career, whether by his fault
or not, was the reverse of creditable to him ; and
though he had done well in Ireland in 1798, he had cut
a deplorable figure as a diplomatist at Amiens. He
was beyond doubt a man of sterling integrity, with a
high sense of duty as a public servant ; and these are
gifts which are not so common as to be valued lightly.
But his chief merit in the eyes of the Government seems
to have been what was termed his moderation, of which
it can only be said that it bore a dangerous resemblance
to mediocrity. But in any case his health was so much
broken that, though he most nobly and unselfishly
undertook the heavy charge, it was simple folly to
despatch him to India.
Arriving by no means the better for his long and
tedious voyage, Cornwallis was dismayed to hear that
hostilities with Holkar were not yet ended, and that
even with Scindia they were likely to be renewed.
Within twenty-four hours he decided that no further
military success could be of any profit, but that the
contest must be terminated forthwith by negotiation ; and
he at once set out on a journey to the Upper Provinces.
Examination of the Company's finances, which were
certainly in a deplorable condition, confirmed him in his
opinion ; and he made up his mind at once to restore
to Scindia both Gwalior and Gohud, to withdraw
Wellesley's demand for the liberation of the resident,
to reinstate Holkar in the whole of his dominions,
and to renounce the connexions made by Lake with
the native princes on the Jumna. By happy chance
Lake was able, before Cornwallis's instructions reached
him, to insist that Scindia should set free the resident ;
and indeed, when apprised of their purport, he took
upon himself to keep back the Viceroy's letter to
Scindia and wrote a strong remonstrance against such
proceedings. But Cornwallis was past all work before
Lake's letter reached him. For a month he lingered in
a state of weakness which allowed him to transact little
Oct. 5. business, and on the 5th of October he died at Ghazipore.
ch.iv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 133
Meanwhile Holkar who, with such troops as remained 1805.
to him, had again betaken himself to Ajmeer, marched
northward at the beginning of September, announcing Sept.
that he expected assistance from the Sikhs and even
from the Ameer of Cabul. Lake, being determined
to allow no mischief of this kind, thereupon ordered the
troops at Agra and Secundra to move to Muttra on the
10th of October, sent a detachment to Saharanpoor for
the protection of the Doab, and himself marched on
the 28th of October with two brigades of cavalry, one Oct. 28.
of infantry and sufficient artillery,1 to pursue Holkar in
person. On the 7th of November he arrived at Delhi, Nov. 7.
whence moving northward by easy marches he reached
Paniput on the 17 th, and entered Sikh territory by way
of Kurnah. On the 24th he was at Pattiala, where Nov. 24.
the Rajah reported that Holkar had endeavoured to
attract the Sikhs in those parts to his standard, but
without effect. On the 29th Lake was reinforced by Nov. 29.
three battalions of Sepoys and two bodies of irregular
horse ; and still moving north-westward, he reached
Ludhiana on the 2nd of December. Here he crossed Dec 2.
the Sutlej, being received everywhere in friendly fashion,
and marched on in the hope of coming up with Holkar,
who had failed to cross the Beyah still further to north-
west. He was disappointed, however, for his advanced
guard arrived at the Beyah just in time to see Holkar 's
rear-guard cross it before their eyes ; and by the time
Lake's main body reached the river, Holkar was at
Amritsar. Lake continued his advance to Jallundar ; Dec. 9.
where, under the terror of his name, the chiefs of the
Sikhs declined to give aid to Holkar, sending an
emissary to welcome the British and to offer their
mediation. On the 20th of December Holkar's
messengers arrived ; and on the 24th a treaty dictated Dec 24.
by Lake brought the long contest to a close.
1 1st Brigade — H.M. 24th (late 27th), 25th (late 29th) L.D., two
regiments of native cavalry.
2nd Brigade — H.M. 8th L.D., one regiment native cavalry.
Infantry — H.M. 22nd, 101st (E.I.C. Regt.), two native battalions.
134 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xm
1805. But the treaty was such that the General would
never have agreed to it except under instructions.
After Cornwallis's death Sir George Barlow succeeded
to the Government as Senior Member of Council ; and
he pushed his predecessor's views to extremes. A treaty
was negotiated with Scindia by which Gwalior and
Gohud were ceded to him as a matter of grace, though
not of right ; and to Holkar there was restored the
whole of his dominions intact. This would have been
comparatively a small matter, had not Barlow renounced
also all treaties whereby British protection was granted
to native princes. This abandonment of men, who had
given the British invaluable aid at critical times, to the
mercy of a ruffianly robber like Holkar, was a bitter
grief to Lake, who pleaded earnestly on behalf, at least,
of the Rajahs of Jeypore and Boondy. But Barlow was
inflexible, and even went so far as to order that the
treaty of protection with the Rajah of Bhurtpore should
also be abrogated. But here Lake refused to give way,
and drew such a picture of the confusion which must
inevitably follow, as to frighten the acting Viceroy into
compliance, at any rate for the present, with his will.
The war therefore ended, as have^so many British
wars, with the concession of all that had been gained by
great expenditure of blood and treasure, in order that
more blood and treasure might be expended in fighting
another war for the same object in the near future.
British Governments — perhaps it would hardly be fair
to say the British nation — are seized from time to time
with these revulsions of feeling, which they call remorse
and ascribe to conscience, but which should be called
weariness and ascribed to timidity. The sufferers on
such occasions are not the British themselves, but the
unhappy allies whom they have drawn to their side in
the course of the contest, and whom they desert at the
hour of trial ; and it is from them, and not from
formidable rivals, that Britain has truly earned the title
of perfidious Albion. The work, which had been left
unfinished, needed of course to be done anew. The
ch.iv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 135
power of the Mahrattas was in great measure broken ; 1805.
but two more wars, and the victories of Maheidpore
and of Maharajpore and Punniar, were necessary in 1 8 1 7
and 1839, before the descendants of Sevajee would
accept the fact that the British and not they were to be
final masters of India.
Long before that time most of the chief actors in the
drama of the great Mahratta war had passed away.
Jeswunt Rao Holkar, after a few years of excessive indul-
gence in brandy, died in 181 1. Lake embarked for
England in February 1807, but died soon after his
return on the 28th of February 1808, in time to
be spared the pain of mourning for the gallant son who
had been wounded by his side at Laswaree, and who fell
at Rolica in the same year 1 808. Though he can hardly
be reckoned a great general, Lake left behind him such
fame as has been gained by few British officers among
the native troops of India ; and worthily he had earned
it, for on the field of battle he was not only a grand leader
but a great commander. Had he been born a French-
man and served under Napoleon, he would assuredly
have won a marshal's baton by sheer hard fighting ;
and the Great Captain, who loathed the very name of
supplies,1 and declared that twenty thousand men could
live in a desert, would have pardoned him many short-
comings for the sake of his surpassing prowess in
action. Lake's military experience had been remark-
able, for he had been matched first against the crafty
and tenacious Americans in the most difficult and
dangerous of all the wars fought in the eighteenth
century, then against the tumultuary armies of France
in 1793, and lastly against the Mahrattas in the plains
of India ; and he had seized victory by the hair at
Linselles as at Laswaree. As a disciplinarian he was
strict ; but, like Abercromby, he took thought for the
comfort of his men, and while making great demands
upon their courage and endurance, never subjected them
to fatigue for no object. He spared himself as little as
1 " Les vivres ! Ne m'en parlez pas."
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1805. he spared his men, and whether it was the cavalry or
the infantry that was bearing the brunt of action, Lake,
for all his sixty years, was always to be found at their
head in the thickest of the press and the hottest of the
fire. With such qualities and with natural affability
of manner and kindness of heart, he was adored by all
ranks of his army ; and under his leadership they
wrought marvels. Few, unfortunately, now know any-
thing of the battles which he won ; and his most famous
battalion, the Seventy-sixth, which should at least bear
Lake's crest upon its colours, has, under a new organisa-
tion, become associated with the still greater name of
Wellington.1 None the less should it always be re-
membered as the fighting battalion of one of Britain's
greatest fighting generals.
But here the praise of Lake must end. The siege
of Bhurtpore stands out as a sad example of his
impatience and his love of rough-and-ready methods ;
but the despatch of Monson's detachment on its
isolated march to the south remains a still greater blot
upon his fame. For this measure showed that he had
not studied his enemy, nor thought out the means
of making every movement of the— campaign con-
tribute to his ruin. His fault, it is true, was not
greater than Napoleon's when he sent Dupont's corps
in similar circumstances to Andalusia; and it was,
perhaps, a misfortune for Lake that such a man
as Arthur Wellesley should have been his rival in the
field ; but against the background of Wellesley's
achievements the defects of Lake became very con-
spicuous. If it were only Assaye that were to be
compared with Laswaree, the elder General would
have nothing to fear ; but beneath Assaye is the
solid structure of communications thoroughly guarded,
magazines and advanced bases carefully stored, trans-
port laboriously organised ; everything provided that
prudence and sagacity could foresee, nothing left to
1 It is now the second battalion of the Duke of Wellington's
(West Riding) Regiment.
HISTORY OF THE ARMY
137
chance which could be assured by industry and care. 1
It must at the same time be admitted that Lake, unlike
Wellesley, fought his campaigns in a country of which
very much was absolutely new and strange to the
British ; and that he had not Wellesley's good fortune
in possessing Mysore bullocks for the transport of his
army. Moreover, though Wellesleys are rare, Gerard
Lakes are rare also ; and an honourable place in the
Army's history must always be reserved for this in-
domitable Guardsman, whose magic of leadership could
make men march and fight beyond their ordinary
powers. Loyal to his men, loyal to his officers, loyal
to his superiors, brave as his sword, a cool strong master
in the direction of a battle, a fiery youth in the leading
of a charge, he was a type of English gentleman which
is of untold worth to the Army.
CHAPTER V
The reader has been detained for long in the East, but
there remains still to be narrated the story of a
forgotten little war in that quarter which, from its
extreme inopportuneness, threatened at one moment
to carry with it very serious consequences.
The British, it will be remembered, had in 1796
captured from the Dutch their settlements in the island
of Ceylon. We of this generation have generally
assumed that those settlements embraced the entire
country ; but they did not. The Dutch possessed
indeed the whole coast-line of the island, measuring in
circumference some seven hundred miles ; but the
mountainous country of the centre was still un-
conquered, and owed no allegiance except to the King
of Kandy. The Kandians were not comfortable
neighbours. They were not formidable and they
were not aggressive, but they were amazingly conceited,
jealous, and suspicious ; unwilling to enter into any
negotiation with the Dutch, except as superiors treating
with inferiors, and therefore requiring extravagant
concessions alike of solid gain and of outward respect.
Such an attitude never commends itself to a commercial
nation ; and it was galling to the Dutch to find them-
selves unable to push their trade, as well as inconvenient
to possess no road from Colombo to Trincomalee
except that which followed the coast. At last in 1766
the Dutch declared war, and after many skirmishes and
considerable loss in the field, took possession of Kandy,
only to find themselves very little the better for their
138
ch.v HISTORY OF THE ARMY 139
exertions. Their object was either to conquer the
country outright, or to dethrone the reigning king ;
but they had not troops enough to accomplish the
former, and there was no means of dethroning the king
except by capturing him, which in spite of desperate
efforts they completely failed to do. The operations
were prolonged for some time with no very decisive
result, and in the end a treaty of peace was concluded,
of which it need only be said that it left the position
of Kandy wholly unweakened.
When the British captured the island in 1796 they
too sent an embassy to Kandy, offering concessions in
the matter of navigation which were thought too liberal ;
but the treaty was none the less rejected by the King.
It unfortunately happened also that the expedition
which took Ceylon was sent from India, and was
therefore at first administered by Indian civil servants.
These gentlemen brought with them not only their
detestable system of inflated correspondence, but also
Malabar agents as their underlings, who superseded
the native headmen. By oppressive abuse of their
masters' authority, these subordinates soon drove the
unfortunate Cingalese into spasmodic rebellion ; and
although the Malabar agents were presently removed
and the native officers restored, the incident was not
likely to give the Kandians, who hated all white in-
truders impartially, a favourable impression of British
rule.
In 1798 the King of Kandy died ; whereupon 1798.
Pelime Talauve, the chief minister or (to give him his
local title) First Adigar, contrived to oust all members
of the royal family in favour of a young Malabar of
obscure extraction, whom he seated on the throne as
his puppet, becoming himself the true governor of the
country. The relations of the deceased sovereign he
placed in confinement, from which they presently
escaped ; and one of them, named Moottoo Sawmy,
who had the strongest pretension to the Crown, solicited
for himself and his fellow refugees the protection of the
140 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1798. British Government. The legitimate claimant of an
usurped throne is always a tempting instrument to a
diplomatist who has an object to gain ; but the
Governor, Mr. Frederick North, declined to take
advantage of it in this case. The Kandians seemed to
be content with their new King ; and North therefore
put Moottoo under surveillance, so that he should be
unable to give any trouble to the government in
Kandy.
1799. ^ot l°nS afterwards, in February 1799, the First
Adigar approached North with mysterious proposals,
which in December he made clearer by inviting the
Governor directly to assist him in making away with
the new King, and in placing himself, Pelime Talauve,
upon the throne ; which done, he promised to make
the British masters of the country. North naturally
rejected this overture with indignation ; and the Adigar
then addressed himself to the Secretary of Ceylon,
declaring that he hated the royal race of Malabars, the
oppressors of his fatherland, and that he had raised his
puppet to the sovereignty with the object of bringing
the whole clan into contempt and rousing the people
to drive them out for ever. The Secretary answered
that the British would never conspire to depose a
foreign prince who had been guilty of no aggression
against them ; whereupon the Adigar innocently inquired
whether an invasion of British territory would be a
sufficiently aggressive act to answer the purpose, a
question which not unnaturally stimulated North to
excessive anxiety and suspicion.
What real purpose, if any, may have underlain these
dark overtures of the Adigar, it is difficult to say ; but
in any case North thenceforth was filled with appre-
hensions concerning the murder of the King of Kandy
and the invasion of British territory. He now tried to
approach that potentate more directly, and proposed
that General Macdowall, who commanded the troops
in Ceylon, should go ambassador to Kandy with a
sufficient escort, in order to remove the person of the
ch.v HISTORY OF THE ARMY 141
King to British ground if he was in danger, or if not, 1799.
to negotiate what was called in India a subsidiary treaty.
Macdowall accordingly started on his mission in March
1800; but most of his escort was stopped at the 1800.
frontier, and though he himself proceeded to the
capital, the embassy came to naught. A new negotia-
tion, opened soon afterwards by one of the nobles of
the Kandian court, was equally a failure, as were also
sundry efforts made by North to approach the King
through other channels than the First Adigar. Through-
out this time Pelime Talauve was reported to be active
in inciting his countrymen to war, and the natives in
British territory to revolt.
Early in 1802 the First Adigar or his instruments 1802.
twice approached Governor North with the old in-
vitation to join in dethroning the King of Kandy, with
the usual result, of course, of indignant refusal. In
April matters took a more serious turn. Certain April,
native merchants, British subjects, were arrested in
Kandian territory while carrying on a commerce which
was sanctioned by long usage ; and their goods were
taken from them. Rightly or wrongly, North inter-
preted this as deliberate provocation to war ; but it
was not until September, after minute investigation of Sept.
the case, that he forwarded a remonstrance to Kandy.
He fully expected at this time that he would be com-
pelled to resort to force to bring the King to reason ;
but to his astonishment he was answered not only by a
promise of speedy redress but by an expression of the
First Adigar's wish to conclude a friendly treaty. North
replied that he was equally anxious for an amicable
arrangement, but that, before any further negotiation, he
must insist upon knowing the King of Kandy 's sentiments
with regard to the treaty already submitted to him by
Macdowall. This answer was decisive. The Kandians
were an ignorant and unwarlike people ; but they, and
particularly those about the court, were filled with
extravagant conceit of their greatness and superiority ;
and however unreasonable it may have seemed to North,
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1802 they were not disposed to place their foreign policy
under British direction, to exclude all Europeans except
those who bore a British passport, to see their native
troops disarmed and a British force quartered in the
capital, to yield up a part of their territory in payment
for this privilege, and to see the frontier between their
own land and the British thrown open for purposes of
trade. They wished to keep their country for them
selves in all its primitive sanctity and isolation. It was
bad enough that foreigners should rule the seven
hundred miles of coast that ringed the mountains
about, but it was intolerable that they should be
masters of Kandy. The First Adigar therefore evaded
the grant of the promised redress to the merchants who
had been despoiled, and in spite of all protests, massed
such rude warriors as he possessed upon the frontier
His action was easily to be explained by a natural
desire, by no means alien to British sentiment, to pre
serve the independence of his country. North, how-
ever, could see in it nothing but the nefarious perversity
1803. of an incurable evil-doer. On the 31st of January
1803 ne ordered his troops to march upon Kandy.
The garrison of Ceylon at this tirrffc consisted of the
Nineteenth, Fifty-first, and a small detachment of the
Eightieth Foot,1 a battalion of native infantry, two
companies of artillery lent temporarily by the Indian
Government, and a battalion of Malays, the last-named
extremely untrustworthy and dangerous troops. The
Europeans numbered about fourteen hundred men
altogether ; 2 and these, as well as the native troops
were distributed in small detachments over a dozen
different stations, with no advantage, as may be supposed
to their discipline. The force was amply sufficient
to overcome such resistance as could be offered by the
Kandians ; but this was the least of the difficulties of
the coming campaign. In the first place, there was
from climatic causes but one month in the year when
1 The rest of the Eightieth was in Egypt.
2 There are no returns of their strength in 1803.
ch.v HISTORY OF THE ARMY 143
the force could take the field ; in the second place, 1
the Kandian territory was unexplored, the passes in
the mountains were extremely dangerous, and the tracks
and paths were so bad as to forbid not only wheeled
traffic but even pack-animals ; and in the third place,
it was more than doubtful whether the mere capture of
the capital would in itself produce the slighest effect
in reducing the King of Kandy or his advisers to sub-
mission. These obstacles, however, North appears
either to have appreciated insufficiently or to have
ignored. He had little doubt but that in a month he
would bring his recalcitrant neighbour to reason.
The advance upon Kandy was to be made by two
distinct columns operating from two distinct bases, the
one from Colombo on the west coast, the other from
Trincomalee on the east. The first column, under the
command of General Macdowall, was made up of the
Fifty-first, two companies of the Nineteenth, a thousand
native infantry, two weak companies of Bengal Artillery,
and a small force of pioneers ; in all from eighteen to
nineteen hundred men. The second column, under
Colonel Barbutt, was of slightly inferior strength,
comprising five companies of the Nineteenth, the greater
part of a battalion of Malays, and one company of
Madras Artillery.
On the evening of the 31st of January Macdowall
marched out of Colombo, and after an inspection of his
troops by the Governor on the next day, crossed the
Kalany Gunga at daybreak of the 2nd of February.
Thence his march lay northward upon Ja Ela to Halpe,
from which point he turned a little north of east to P
Allugalla on the Maha Oya river, and on the 6th of
February reached Kotadeniyawa. This place, having
good communication by water with Negombo and the
coast, had been selected as the site for a magazine ; and
Macdowall halted for four days to throw up a small
redoubt for its protection, the work receiving the name
of Fort Frederick in honour of the Governor. Then
leaving a garrison of a hundred Sepoys and a few
i44 HISTORY OF THE ARMY bookxiii
1803. Europeans to hold it, he resumed his advance on the
Feb. 10. 10th, and fording the Maha Oya on that day at Giriulla,
entered Kandian territory.
From this point forward, owing to the difficulty of
the roads in the interior, men's shoulders formed the
only possible means of transport, and all baggage was
therefore reduced as low as might be. The country,
however, was still fertile and well cultivated, and the
troops had to wade for a part of the first two marches
through paddy-fields, knee-deep in mud and water;
but the men were healthy and the inhabitants friendly,
being ordered, as they said, by the King to supply the
Feb. 11. English with all that they wanted. The second day's
march brought the column to Dambadeniyawa, little
more than five miles in a straight line from Giriulla ;
and here supplies failed owing to the death of a com-
missary. The force therefore again halted for four days,
formed a magazine, and threw up a redoubt to protect
Feb. 16.it. On the 16th Macdowall resumed his march in an
easterly direction, and for the first time traversed a
distance of rather over ten miles. But the roads were so
bad that it was necessary to dismount the three-pounder
guns which he had with him, and to* employ men to
carry them. The baggage-coolies fell far behind, and
Feb. 17. the column was consequently unable on the morrow
to advance more than six miles to the Magroo Oya
river. A picquet of the enemy was surprised fast
asleep on this day, and fled with such precipitation on
being awakened, as to diminish any anxiety that the
British might have felt about an active resistance.
Still moving eastward, Macdowall, after a very
fatiguing march of fifteen miles, reached the Deek
Feb. 18. Oya on the 18th, and on the following day encountered
Feb. 19. the two most formidable posts upon the road. The
first, a square and open redoubt,1 built of hewn stone
and seated at the top of a rocky mountain, completely
commanded the narrow pass which led to it ; but the
1 Macdowall calls it Galle Gidehu ; Cordiner calls it Galle
Gedera. I cannot find it upon any map.
ch.v HISTORY OF THE ARMY 145
Kandians, making no effort at defence, fled instantly, 1803.
abandoning three guns and a quantity of ammunition. Feb- J9-
The next stronghold, Geriagame, lay beyond it, very
similar in construction, and so situated that a few
resolute men might, as was said, have defended it with
a shower of stones. The approach to it was by a kind of
natural stairway, winding up the side of the mountain
between impervious thickets, and intersected by a series
of perpendicular rocks, all of which were within range of
the cannon above. The Grenadiers of the Nineteenth,
being in advance, were the first to draw near the fort,
and were at once saluted by a very noisy and ineffective
fire, under which they toiled up to the enemy's guns
and walked into the battery. The enemy promptly
fled as they entered, carrying their wounded with them ;
but Macdowall in the rear, judging from the prolonged
cannonade that there was serious resistance, hurried the
entire column with all haste over the pass. The
casualties amounted to no more than two men wounded ;
but the rapid ascent of the rugged path seems to have
strained the men beyond belief; and it appears that
many soon afterwards succumbed to the effects of the
exertion, or at least were so much weakened by it as
to be unable to stand against the fever which presently
beset them.
A garrison was left in this important post, the
capture of which threw open the road to Kandy.
Macdowall now turned south, and halting in the after-
noon at Kattugastotte, on the Maha-villa-ganga, fired
three guns as a signal to Barbutt, whose artillery he
had heard after the storm of Geriagame. The signal
was promptly answered, for Barbutt was in fact within
two miles of him. He had met with a trifling resistance
at a pass close to Kandy, and again at the Maha-villa-
ganga, but had overcome both by a few cannon-shots ;
and thus the two columns starting from opposite coasts
of the island effected their junction almost to an hour
within three miles of their destination. On the 21st Feb. 21.
therefore the two commanders entered the city, each
vol. v L
146
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1803. with a strong detachment of his force, in great content.
Feb. 2 1 . Barbutt had not a single casualty nor even a sick man
in his camp. Macdowall could hardly say as much,
for some of his Sepoys had fallen down with fever, but
the Europeans were in remarkably good health. Both
of them, and still more Governor North, looked upon
their work as well done.1
The aspect of Kandy, however, was not reassuring.
The main street with its two miles of mean houses, its
innumerable branching lanes, its palace and its temples,
stood untouched in the plain within its ring of wooded
mountains ; but not a living creature, with the exception
of a few dogs, was to be seen in it. The city in fact
was deserted ; the treasure and everything of value had
been carried off ; the magazine had been blown up,
and several of the buildings were in flames. After
1 8 1 2 such a scene would inevitably have reminded a
general of a like desolation at Moscow; but this was
in February 1803, when Napoleon was still First Consul.
Macdowall, Barbutt, and North were perfectly easy and
satisfied, and knew exactly, as they thought, what was
best to be done. On his march from Trincomalee
Barbutt had reported that if Moottoo Sawmy, the
rightful claimant to the throne of Kandy, would but
join him, every Kandian on that side of the country
would flock to his standard. This done, provisions for
the army could be obtained without difficulty. North
grasped eagerly at the idea. He at once gave directions
that Moottoo Sawmy should be escorted to the capital,
intending that in return the new King should cede to
the British two large and rich districts, known as the
Seven Korales and the Saffragam Korale, lying on the
west and north of the Kandian territories. Barbutt
accordingly marched with the Malay regiment to meet
Mar. 4. Moottoo ; and on the evening of the 4th of March the
poor puppet was duly brought by the British troops
into Kandy.
1 Macdowall to North, 5th, 19th, 20th, 21st, 24th Feb. ; Barbutt
to North, 19th, 20th Feb. 1803.
ch. v HISTORY OF THE ARMY 147
In due course North's proposals were submitted to 1803.
him, and not a little to Macdowall's surprise, were
resisted with considerable spirit. North, to do him
justice, willingly abated his claims ; and finally a
convention was signed whereby the British Government
agreed to deliver to Moottoo the town of Kandy and
the whole of the Kandian territory at that time occupied
by British troops, receiving in return the district of
Seven Korales, the two hill -forts of Geriagame and
Galle Gedera, a strip of ground sufficient to make a
road from Colombo to Trincomalee, and certain facilities
for commerce. All this would have been highly
satisfactory had the Kandians but shown the slightest
disposition to receive Moottoo as their ruler ; but on
the contrary not a soul would go near him, so that he
found himself in the palace at Kandy with no further
adherents than his own servants and the British guard.
On the other hand, the deposed King and the First
Adigar, who had fled to a royal palace two days' march
from the capital, enjoyed full control of their bands of
followers and were not slow to prove it. Parties of
armed men skulked continually round the British
outposts, hiding themselves by day but firing at the
sentries by night, and slaughtering every straggler,
coolie, or armed follower, with barbarous mutilation.
But this was not the worst. A few days after the
occupation of Kandy the effects of fatiguing marches
began to tell upon the troops ; and presently jungle
fever attacked them, especially the Sepoys, with terrible
virulence. On the 9th of March Macdowall reported Mar. 9.
5 that he had little more than eighteen hundred bayonets
e fit for duty, that, unless the people should speedily
t declare for Moottoo Sawmy, all hope of reducing the
I interior must be abandoned, and that the army, with
e the exception of a thousand men to hold Kandy itself,
i must be withdrawn without delay to Trincomalee and
Colombo. Then a sudden gleam of hope appeared in
i the shape of a message from the First Adigar, giving
full information as to the position of the King's refuge
148
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xm
1803. at Hangaramkatty, as to the easiest roads by which to
approach it, and the nature of the resistance to be
expected. He also requested that two strong columns
might be sent out to converge upon it simultaneously
by different routes, promising that he personally would
be present to assist in delivering the monarch into the
hands of the British. Nothing doubting, Macdowall,
Mar. 13. on the morning of the 13th of March, sent out two
detachments, the one of five hundred, the other of
three hundred men. The country through which they
had to pass was by nature difficult, and they had
not marched many miles before they realised that
the enemy had turned its strength to account. Guns
were posted upon every height that commanded the
path of the columns, and sharp-shooters lurked in
ambush in the thickest of the jungle. Heavy firing
soon began, and a single volley struck down two
officers and several men, both British and native. With
incredible labour and harassed at every step, the troops
forced their way forward through a perpetual fire ; and
after traversing nearly thirty miles, the two columns
Mar. 14. found themselves on the evening of the 14th before
Hangaramkatty. The palace was instantly taken
without much resistance ; but the King had fled ; and
pursuit, owing to want of transport and supplies, was
impossible. The building was therefore burnt, and the
two detachments reached Kandy safely on the evening
Mar. 16. of the 1 6th. The loss of the troops was slight, not
much exceeding twenty wounded, thanks to the bad
marksmanship of the Kandians, but nineteen unfortunate
transport-coolies were killed, and that at a time when
their numbers were already seriously diminished. In
fact, the entire movement was a complete and rather!
humiliating failure.1
The monsoon was now near at hand ; it was evident!
that the object of the expedition could not be secured
without another campaign ; and North began to grow
1 Macdowall to North, 5th, 9th, 14th, 18th March; Colonel
Baillie to Macdowall, 16th March 1803.
ch.v HISTORY OF THE ARMY 149
anxious. The refusal of the Kandians to accept 1803.
Moottoo Sawmy as their King had upset all his
calculations ; and that unhappy man's failure to perform
the part which the British Government had put him
forward to enact, was quite sufficient, in the Governor's
view, to absolve it from all engagements. On the
23rd of March, therefore, North instructed Macdowall Mar. 2
to dissuade Moottoo from being proclaimed King, since
the British could not undertake to support him. He
spoke too late. On that very day Macdowall, though
acknowledging that the authority of the fugitive
sovereign was now greater than it had ever been, with
singular want of judgment installed Moottoo Sawmy
as King of Kandy amid all the ceremony of a royal
salute. Twenty -four hours later came news from
Madras that General Arthur Wellesley was on his
march from Hurryhur to Poona, and that at such a
conjuncture not a man could be spared from the Mar. 2
Presidency for Ceylon. North instantly wrote to
Macdowall that the quarrel with Kandy must be made
up at once, and that overtures must be reopened with
the First Adigar ; but he was fain to add that the city
of Kandy must be held until some convention had, been
agreed to. He was soon to learn that the contest with
Kandy was not so easily to be concluded.1
While North was thus hurriedly multiplying orders
to Macdowall, that officer became unpleasantly aware,
during the last fortnight of March, that his communi-
cations with Colombo were interrupted. Several small
parties of coolies with provisions had been murdered ;
one mail had been captured from its escort of Sepoys at
Dambadeniyawa ; the rest had been stopped through
want of sufficient protection ; and it was only by sending Mar. 3
down a powerful detachment that Macdowall, on the 30th,
I contrived at last to bring in despatches and supplies.
I Moreover, tumultuous bodies of Kandians had broken
I at more than one point into British territory, and
I 1 North to Col. Sec. of Ceylon, 19th March; to Colonel
I Bar butt, 23rd March ; to Macdowall, 25 th March 1803.
i5o
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1803. though easily dispersed by a few dozen British soldiers,
March, kept the country in constant agitation and alarm. Even
this was not the worst. Many of the posts on the line
of communication proved to be extremely unhealthy,
Fort Frederick in particular being the most deadly of
all. On the 13th of March, when its first commandant
had already been carried from it to die, it was reinforced
by seventy-five men of the Sixty-fifth and fifty Cingalese
infantry. Every individual of this detachment was
struck down by fever ; and orders were despatched
for the redoubt to be destroyed and the post to be
evacuated ; but none the less within a month of the
13th of March one officer and two men were all that
survived of the whole party.
However, North's negotiations seemed at first to
Mar. 30. bear fruit, for on the 30th of March the Second Adigar
came to Kandy bearing the emblems of peace ; and
with him Macdowall arranged what he thought to be a
satisfactory truce. Thereby the First Adigar was to
be invested with supreme authority in Kandy, paying
an annual allowance to Moottoo Sawmy, who was to
retire to JafFnapatam ; and the British were to receive
the province of the Seven KoralSs, the road to
Trincomaiee and Fort Macdowall, and a fort which
commanded that road at a distance of about eleven miles
due north of Kandy, together with the district around
April 1. it. This done, on the 1st of April the General marched
back to Colombo with the Fifty-first, and sent a part
of the Nineteenth to Trincomaiee ; leaving in Kandy
the rest of the Nineteenth, detachments of the East
India Company's artillery, and some companies of
Malays. In all three hundred Europeans and seven
hundred natives remained as a garrison for the city
under the command of Colonel Barbutt.
April 2. On the next day after Macdowall's departure the
First Adigar advanced with a large force to within
three miles of Kandy ; but the movement excited no
alarm, for it was generally supposed that the truce
would shortly be converted into a durable peace. Nor
ch.v HISTORY OF THE ARMY 151
did these favourable appearances seem likely to be 1803.
belied, for not many days later the Adigar sent a
message to North requesting an interview for the final
settlement of the treaty. A meeting was accordingly
held on the 3rd of May at Dambadeniyawa, the capital
of the province so greatly coveted by North — the Seven
Korales. The terms agreed upon by Macdowall and
the Second Adigar were discussed and ratified, with the
stipulation, which to North seemed a mere matter of
form, that the execution of the treaty should be delayed
until the King of Kandy should be delivered into the hands
of the British. Until that time hostilities were to cease.1
All now seemed to be in train for a happy ending to
the quarrel. Some slight embarrassment was caused
by the sudden illness of Barbutt, to whom, as com-
mandant of Kandy, the execution of the treaty was to
have been committed ; but at the request of the First
Adigar, Macdowall went up temporarily to take his
place. The General duly arrived at the capital on the
23rd of May, and found a miserable state of things. May 23.
The garrison, both black and white, was reduced to a
shadow by fever ; many had perished, and nearly all of
the European soldiers were in hospital. Macdowall's
brigade-major had been stricken on the journey upward
and sent back to Colombo, and both he himself and his
one remaining staff-officer were attacked by the same
malady a few days after their arrival in Kandy. In
weakness and misery they awaited in vain the coming
of the First Adigar ; until at last, on the 2nd of June, June 2.
arrived an ominous message that he could not attend
the General without the permission of the King.
Therewith all hopes of a treaty vanished, and North
found himself for the twentieth time the dupe of his
crafty antagonist. Macdowall and his aide-de-camp,
still prostrate with sickness, left Kandy on the nth of June 11.
June, and by good fortune reached Colombo alive on
the 19th. They were the last white men to set eyes
upon the isolated garrison in the hills.
1 North to Hobart, 4th May 1803.
152 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xm
1803. The epidemic fever had by this time spread over the
greater part of Ceylon, attacking blacks and whites
alike with savage virulence. In Colombo itself it
reduced the Fifty -first from four hundred to one
hundred men in less than three months ; and within
the Kandian territory its ravages were even more
frightful. The Kandians, though themselves not spared
by it, welcomed it as an ally and seconded it with
vigour. The newly appointed commissioner to the
Seven Korales was driven from his post within a month,
leaving his secretary dead of fever behind him. The
unhappy transport-coolies, who were still employed to
carry supplies up to Kandy, covered the road with their
corpses, falling victims some to the sword, some to
fever, some to small-pox, some even to famine. In
Kandy itself by the third week in June the British
soldiers were dying at the rate of six a day ; and the
Malay troops, their only comrades, were beginning to
desert. The Kandian warriors meanwhile crept nearer
and nearer to the city, entrenching themselves in strong
positions until their time should come. The First
Adigar, wishing to cut matters short, proposed to
Major Davie, upon whom the chie£» command had
devolved, to make a second expedition to Hangaram-
katty in pursuit of the fugitive king. To give colour
to his suggestion, he alleged that he himself was out of
favour, and that this was the only method whereby
peace could be obtained ; but Davie was not to be
deceived by this trick, even if he could have collected
men enough for the enterprise. For his British soldiers
did not cease to die, nor his Malays to desert.
North now realised that it was high time to evacuate
Kandian territory ; and accordingly a small detachment
June 17. of Ceylon native infantry was ordered, on the 17th of
June, to proceed at once to Kandy in order to help to
escort the sick. But from the extreme difficulty of
procuring coolies the party was unable to set out until
the 26th ; and meanwhile the Kandians struck their
June 23. decisive blow. On the 23rd the posts of Geriagame
ch. v HISTORY OF THE ARMY 153
and Galle Gedera were surprised and taken, a mishap 1803.
which seems less extraordinary when the amazing truth June 2 3-
is told that in each of them there were stationed but
one sergeant and twelve privates of the Malay regiment,
of whom one-third had deserted already to the enemy.
By the fall of these two strong places communications
between Colombo and Kandy were finally severed ;
and on that same day the First Adigar warned Major
Davie that, in spite of all his efforts to prevent
it, the British garrison in Kandy would shortly be
attacked.
Davie made his dispositions for defence ; and at four June 24.
o'clock next morning the Kandians assailed a post on
the hill in rear of the palace where the British troops
were quartered. This small guard, which consisted of
but ten native soldiers with a light field-gun, was
easily overpowered ; and an hour later a strong body of
Kandian Malays attempted to storm the palace by the
eastern barrier, where Davie had stationed a second gun.
They were met by a Lieutenant and a few men of the
Nineteenth ; and the leaders of the two bands closed
in a hand-to-hand struggle, wherein the Malay mortally
stabbed the British officer, but was himself immediately
slain by the Adjutant of the Nineteenth. The alarm
was at once sounded ; and a single discharge of grape
swept away twenty-four of the Kandians, who thereupon
withdrew to a distance and kept up a galling fire from
their light native field-pieces. The British guns replied ;
I and the duel was maintained continually until two
o'clock in the afternoon, when many European officers
entreated Davie to enter into a capitulation, since the
1 enemy was advancing in such numbers that the palace
could not be held for much longer. Nor was this
merely pusillanimous counsel, for the British soldiers
I were reduced to a handful of twenty men, nominally
fit for duty but in reality convalescents who were not
I yet recovered. Of their comrades one hundred and
twenty were helpless in hospital, and the remainder
were dead. There were left the Malay regiment,
154 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xm
1803. which recent events had proved to be not over
June 24. faithful, and the lascars of the East India Company's
artillery. Moreover, the officers themselves were so
weak and exhausted that they were hardly equal to
further resistance. After some hesitation, Davie hoisted
a white flag, and was presently escorted, together
with a loyal native officer of the Malays, to the
quarters of the First Adigar. It was then agreed that
the British garrison should march out with its arms
on the road to Trincomalee, and that Moottoo Sawmy
should be allowed to accompany them ; in return for
which the Adigar undertook to feed and tend the
British sick until they could be removed. The con-
ditions were reduced to writing and signed ; and the
Adigar further gave Davie a passport in the King's
name to enable him to proceed towards Trincomalee
unmolested.
At five o'clock on the same evening the garrison
marched out, fourteen British officers, twenty British
soldiers, about one hundred lascars, two hundred and
fifty Malays, and in the midst of them the unfortunate
Moottoo Sawmy.1 After proceeding for a mile and a
half they were stopped by the river Maha-villa-ganga,
when, finding neither rafts nor boats to enable them to
cross, they bivouacked for the night in pouring rain.
June 25. Next morning the troops were engaged in making rafts
when a number of armed Kandians appeared ; and
some chiefs, approaching Davie, said that the King was
much enraged that the garrison had been allowed to
leave Kandy, but that he would give the troops boats
and forward them on their way, if they would yield
up Moottoo Sawmy to him. Davie reminded the
messengers of the terms of the capitulation, and refused.
Two hours later another party of chiefs came up with
an intimation to Moottoo Sawmy from the King that
1 These are Cordiner's figures, which seem to me to be probably-
correct. The last return of the garrison shows sixteen British
officers and thirty men, eleven native officers, and four hundred
and sixty-five native troops fit for duty.
ch. v HISTORY OF THE ARMY 155
he desired to embrace and protect him. Once again 1803.
Davie refused to let him go; and the messengers J une 2 5-
presently returning threatened that, if Moottoo Sawmy
were not given up, the King would send his whole force
to seize him and prevent the British troops from
crossing the river. Finally Davie, after consultation
with his officers, told Moottoo that he had no longer
power to detain him, and that the King had promised
to treat him kindly. Moottoo answered with a bitter
reproach, which was only too well merited. Davie was
in a difficult position ; but it is plain that he and his
garrison hoped to buy their own salvation by throwing
this unfortunate puppet, whom their own arms had set
up, as a sop to the Kandians. Though, as it turned
out, Moottoo Sawmy 's fate could hardly have been
different whatever the decision of the British commander,
yet it was none the less base and mean to abandon him.
The victim was led away to Kandy and to instant death ;
and Davie was destined to pay dearly for the sacrifice.
In the afternoon a few Kandians joined the British,
and made ostensible preparations to help them to cross
the river, both then and on the following morning. June 26.
Still no boats appeared ; and when, after many diffi-
culties, a British officer succeeded in passing a warp
to the opposite bank, the rope was presently cut by the
Kandians. Upon this the Malays and lascars began to
desert in small parties to the enemy ; and at eleven
o'clock a mob of Kandians ranged themselves close to
the forlorn British, while a chief advanced to bid them
in the King's name lay down their arms and march
back to Kandy, on pain of being immediately surrounded
and put to death. With extraordinary infatuation,
Davie and his officers decided to obey ; and the whole
party was then marched off. Presently the British
were halted between two ranks of Kandians ; and the
Malays were bidden to advance, which, with a few
exceptions, they did. The Europeans were then led
out two by two, and their brains were dashed out with
the butts of muskets. Two officers, Davie and another,
156 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xm
1803. alone were preserved and taken back to Kandy ; a third
June 26. made his escape, but was captured and soon after-
wards died ; one corporal of the Nineteenth, named
Barnsley, though desperately wounded and left for dead,
recovered his senses and contrived to crawl back to Fort
Macdowall. Meanwhile the whole of the Europeans
in hospital at Kandy had likewise been murdered in
cold blood, to the number, according to one account, of
one hundred and twenty ; but it appears more likely
that the full tale of the victims amounted to nearly one
hundred and ninety. In a word, between desertion and
massacre, the entire garrison of Kandy was annihilated.
This attack was the signal for several others in
various quarters, one and all of them so feeble, spiritless,
and contemptible, as to make Davie's weakness more
than difficult of explanation. Captain Madge of the
Nineteenth, who was in command at Fort Macdowall,
June 25. was assailed on the 25th and on the two following days,
but held his own stoutly, though he had but thirteen
men, fortunately all Europeans, fit for duty. Then
Corporal Barnsley brought the news of the massacre at
Kandy ; and Madge thought it prudent to evacuate
the post by night, unfortunately leaving nineteen sick
men of his regiment behind him for want of transport,
but bringing off three officers. For four days he
marched towards Trincomalee under an incessant fire,
until he met a small column of a hundred men from that
garrison, on the sight of which the enemy instantly fled.
At Dambadeniyawa also the fort, a feeble structure of
fascines and earth, was from the 23rd onwards com-
pletely blockaded by the Second Adigar, who sent in a
daily summons to surrender, with promises of peaceful
evacuation, transport of the sick, and similar temptations.
Ensign Grant of the Malay regiment, who held the post,
had no more than fourteen convalescent men of the
Nineteenth and twenty-two invalid Malays ; but though
himself so enfeebled by ill-health that he could hardly
walk, he refused to hear of terms of surrender. He
June 30. was reinforced on the 30th by a detachment of sixty
ch. v HISTORY OF THE ARMY
1S7
men which had been designed to escort coolies to Kandy ; 1803
but their ammunition was soon exhausted, and the
little garrison defied its enemy with the bayonet only,
until brought off by a party of one hundred men on
the 2nd of July. The relieving force had to storm July
more than one battery during its advance ; but this
was not a dangerous service, for the Kandians were too
cowardly to stand for a moment after they had once
fired their guns. Never was there a more miserable
enemy than that to which Davie had surrendered.
However, the fact remained that the Kandians had
now taken the offensive, and that through pestilence,
massacre, desertion, and general mismanagement, there
were very few troops with which to repel them. In
fact the European infantry in Ceylon was reduced to
little more than six hundred, and the native infantry to
fewer than three hundred bayonets. North therefore
sent urgent messages to Madras, Bombay, and Calcutta
for reinforcements, which request was not the more
welcome for arriving just when Arthur Wellesley was
opening his campaign. That General bluntly character-
ised the whole of the proceedings at Kandy as dis-
graceful folly ; 1 and Lord Wellesley seems to have
sent no answer. Governor Duncan, on the other hand,
appears to have been really anxious to oblige North,
probably with the object of disobliging Arthur Wellesley.
But the danger of Ceylon upon a renewal of the war
with France, which though not known was expected
in India, made it impossible to refuse all help. Lord
Clive therefore prepared to send at once from Madras
two hundred of the Thirty-fourth Foot, and five
hundred native infantry known as the Bengal Volun-
teers. North, meanwhile, in despair over the mortality
in the native regiments from jungle fever, began to
buy African slaves, in order to form a corps on the
model of those which had been so successful in the
West Indies. Thus in Ceylon there was witnessed the
1 North to Sec. of State, 31st August 1803 ; Wellington Desp.
(ii. 143, 165).
158 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1803. extraordinary spectacle of a military establishment '
numbering less than two thousand men, but including 1
British, Bengalis, Madrasis, Cingalese, Malays, and '
Africans ; and all to repel an enemy of which two i
thousand would hardly have faced one hundred British i
soldiers in the open field.
However, the King of Kandy, elated by his success,
now sent emissaries to all quarters to detach the native 1
subjects of the British from their allegiance ; and by 1
the end of July he had massed large forces at various 1
points on the frontier to second any rebellious rising.
The sphere entrusted to the First Adigar was the district t
of Matura, at the extreme south of the island ; while I
the King formed the ambitious design of marching on 1
Aug. 13. Colombo itself. On the 13th of August intelligence of t
the renewal of war with France reached Ceylon ; and f
a few days later the Adigar advanced within twenty I
miles of Matura, the rebellious inhabitants meanwhile I
severing communication between that place and Galle. s
The commandant at Matura was seized with panic, and t
was about to withdraw to Galle, when North sent round la
a small reinforcement by sea, and an officer to supersede 1
the nervous leader. The threatened «iishap was thus \
averted. A little activity soon sufficed to drive the I
Kandians back and to restore order among the in- 1
habitants in this quarter. Nor was the King's invasion \
Aug. 21. much more successful. On the 21st of August his c
bands occupied the little fort of Hangwell, about twenty \
miles east of Colombo, and even advanced five miles 1
nearer to the town ; but the place was easily retaken and j
Aug. 27. the invaders driven back with some loss. Another raid :
upon the ruined fort of Chilaw, on the west coast to the 1
north of Colombo, was as futile, for two young civil I
servants and twenty-five Sepoys contrived to hold the t
miserable post against an immense number of Kandians I
for twenty-four hours, until relieved. Finally a second 1
grand attack upon Hangwell delivered by the flower of
the Kandian army under the King in person was beaten
off with very heavy loss by a garrison of fifty Europeans
1
ch.v HISTORY OF THE ARMY 159
and about thrice as many native troops. The casualties 1803.
of the British on this occasion were two men wounded ; AuS-
those of the enemy were known to have exceeded two
hundred and seventy killed ; but the most welcome
result of the victory was the recapture of the lascars of
the East India Company's artillery, who had been made
prisoners after Davie's surrender. Another week saw
the whole of the district cleared of the enemy ; and
though in September the Kandians made a raid upon Sept.
Batticaloa, the invasion for the moment came to an end.
In October the First Adigar reappeared on the fron- Oct.
tier as if to make an inroad upon the district of SafFragam ;
but North, having received his reinforcements from
India, to which Clive had added three hundred men of
the Tenth Foot1 over and above the forces already
promised, now initiated a new system of counter-raids
by small detachments upon Kandian territory. These
little columns, which rarely numbered one hundred men,
simply hunted the unfortunate inhabitants away from
their homes, burned their houses, destroyed their crops,
and cut down their most valuable trees. The service
meant much fatigue though little danger to the troops,
but since it left them free to plunder and destroy, was
by no means unpopular. North was much elated by
the successes of these columns, and wrote home that he
hoped to open a decisive campaign in July 1804,
capture the First Adigar, depose the King, and annex
Kandy. General Macdowall went home at the end of
1803; and was replaced in March 1804 by Major- 1804.
general Wemyss, who entered warmly into North's
projects, and cheered on the troops against their
unfortunate victims with a zeal worthy of a better cause.
North then conceived the extraordinary idea of com-
bining with his incursions a general blockade of the
Kandian territories, so as to cut off their supplies of salt,
and put an end to all commerce ; hoping that the people
would thereby be incensed against the King and depose
him. He accordingly divided his three thousand troops
1 These were drafted into the Nineteenth and Fifty-first.
160 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xm
1804. into minute fractions, with the fond expectation that
by so doing he could close a frontier of some seven 1
hundred miles. Wemyss made no attempt to undeceive i
him ; indeed it seems rather that he fully shared the i
imbecility of North ; and thus the British troops were ]
urged on still further in their career of demoralisation.1 ]
Upon the news of the first disasters at Kandy Lord 1
Hobart wrote drily in March 1804 that he refrained
from all comment, but would send reinforcements, t
These, however, did not arrive until September ; and c
meanwhile a sickly season wrought havoc among the 1
July. British soldiers. Thus when July came and the question s
of transport -coolies with other kindred difficulties v
required to be faced, North decided to abandon the I
decisive campaign, and to maintain what he was pleased b
to call his blockade. So fully did he believe in its }
efficacy and in the reports of the sufferings of the ti
Kandians under it, that he made condescending offers ai
to grant them peace if the King were deposed and the C
authors of the massacre punished. The whole of these e
overtures were rejected with scorn, for as a matter of 1
fact the Kandians were none the worse for the blockade, Ji
though the villagers were incensed t<* madness by the ii
devastation of their fields and the shooting down of ir
their fathers and brothers. North, however, so reported «
these predatory chases as to make them appear great I
operations. This, unfortunately, as a rule, they were m
not ; but one exception must be mentioned. The n
officer in command at Batticaloa misunderstood the i
order countermanding the general attack upon Kandy,
and boldly led his column, consisting of sixty men of
the Nineteenth and two hundred native troops, straight
upon the capital by a new and untried route. He
reached it after a march of nearly two hundred miles,
without the loss of a man ; but waiting for some days
for the remaining columns to come up, he found his
retreat cut off by large bodies of Kandians. Without
hesitation, he attacked and forced his way through ; nor
1 North to Hobart, 3rd March 1804.
ch.v HISTORY OF THE ARMY 161
would he have suffered much loss had not his ammuni- 1804.
tion become exhausted, which caused a panic among
his native troops and transport-coolies. Finally he
returned safely to British territory with the loss of nine Oct. 1
Europeans, sixty native soldiers, and seventy-six coolies
killed and wounded. Contemptible though the enemy
was, this was a creditable feat of courage and endurance.1
At length at the end of 1804 a letter written by
the commanding officer of one of North's predatory
columns found its way to the hands of the Duke of
York, who sent it to the Colonial Office, asking if these
stories of destroying paddy-fields and shooting villagers
were true, since in his opinion they were very disgraceful
to the British arms. Several months necessarily elapsed
before the question could be passed on to Governor
North; and meanwhile in February 1805 an exceedingly 1805.
trivial matter encouraged the Kandians to renewed
aggression. General Wemyss and the Puisne Judges of
Ceylon fell at variance about a minute point in which
each party conceived that its dignity was concerned.
The General behaved with extreme foolishness, the
Judges with ridiculous conceit ; and the Judges eventu-
ally haled the General before them while he was
immersed in the business of directing the blockading
columns, and bound him over to keep the peace. The
Kandians, hearing of the quarrel, seized the moment to
make simultaneous attacks in every direction. They
were of course repelled ; and their rashness brought upon
them the usual reprisals of death and devastation until
July. Nor would their punishment have ceased even
then, had not North resigned the government from ill-
health ; when the British Ministers, suspecting that all
might not be right about this war, sent out General
Thomas Maitland to succeed him.2
1 North to the Sec. of State, 25th May, 25th, 30th Sept. 1804,
I'th Jan. 1805.
2 Colonel Gordon to the Colonial Office, 15 th Nov. 1804;
^orth to the Sec. of State, 8th, 21st Feb., nth March, 13th April,
loth July ; Sec. of State to North, 21st Feb. 1805 ; Colonel Wemyss
.0 Colonial Office, 14th Feb., 10th March 1805.
VOL. V M
162 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xm
Maitland arrived on the 17th of July, and quickly
realised the situation. Overtures for peace had been
made by the Second Adigar in June, in consequence of
the King of Kandy being stricken with small-pox, which
was interpreted as a mark of the divine displeasure ; but
these were as little genuine as any of the previous
proposals. Maitland resolved to wait for a few weeks
in case the King should feel disposed to open negotia-
tions with a new Governor, being determined, in the
contrary event, to take the initiative himself. He
did not ostensibly discontinue preparations to meet
further aggression, but he was resolved to make no
further offensive movement from his side ; and he
issued a stern order to forbid the cruel and useless
burning and plundering with which North had indulged
his columns. It was none too soon, for the troops were
already thoroughly demoralised. Owing to the laxity
and incompetence of Wemyss, and indeed not of ,
Wemyss only but of the entire administration both i
civil and military, public money had been issued 2
lavishly to every subaltern in command of twenty (
men who chose to ask for it ; and the result was an l
enormous military establishment, scandalous waste, and j
great financial distress in the Colony. All this Maitland f
brought summarily to an end with a strong hand. The ((
Sepoy regiments he condemned as useless, the Malays j
as both useless and dangerous ; and he marked out <a
both for speedy disbandment. But above all he r
deplored the condition of the British regiments. They
were lamentably weak in numbers, for the service in r
tiny detachments had killed many by useless fatigue,
and enervated the rest by giving them unlimited oppor- r.
tunities to drink. Their discipline also was very seriously .:.
impaired. The Nineteenth, which had been, by ;,'
Maitland's own testimony, one of the finest regiments ;
in the Service, had lost all sense of subordination ; .
and the General only checked the evil by trying the :
Major and a Captain by court-martial and cashiering;
the Major. By this timely severity and by massing thq :
ch.v HISTORY OF THE ARMY 163
troops in two divisions only, at Trincomalee and 1805.
Colombo, order was presently restored, and the men
regained the good tone and the discipline that they
had lost.
Meanwhile, owing to the withdrawal of the British
raiding columns, the war died a natural death. " I
want peace," wrote Maitland, u first in order to regain
our prisoners, and secondly to enable Ministers to tell
Parliament that there is peace. In point of security we
are just as well off as though peace were signed."
Here Maitland's experience as a member of the House
of Commons stood him in good stead ; but, notwith-
standing all possible moderation in his proposals, he
was unable to persuade the powers at Kandy to enter
upon any formal discussion of a treaty. He therefore
set secret agencies to work in the hope of aiding the
prisoners to escape, and contrived not only that letters
should be conveyed to Major Davie, but that his
answer should be safely brought to hand. That
answer told a miserable story. " I, Davie, am the
only prisoner left," so it ran, " the rest are all dead,
murdered, or starved. I am without meat or clothes.
I expect not to survive many days. Do not tell my
friends that I am alive." Then followed advice as
to the conduct of an expedition to Kandy, with a
plan for his escape, and near the end the ominous
sentence, "I am told that I am to be murdered when
my countrymen come to Kandy."
Maitland's schemes for the captive's escape, though he
spared neither pains nor money to make them successful,
proved abortive ; and for months and years no more
was heard of the unfortunate Davie. At home a
piteous petition came from his mother, praying for
payment of his allowances to herself ; for she had
six daughters, three of them still unmarried, and
no means of support but her son's little estate near
Edinburgh, which hungry creditors were threaten-
ling to seize. In Ceylon, in the year 18 12, when
I Maitland had left the island and a new General had
1 64 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xm
1805. come to take his place, there arrived at Colombo two
ragged scraps of native paper, bearing a few faint and
scarcely legible lines scrawled in pencil by a feeble
and exhausted hand.1 These pitiful fragments, which
may still be seen deeply buried among the pompous
folios of official despatches, were the last sign that any
white man saw of Davie. Maitland's agents soon
afterwards reported that he had died at length of
dysentery and had been buried secretly in the jungle.
If his weakness on his march out of Kandy was
culpable, assuredly he atoned for his fault by such
a penance as is laid upon few men ; for he languished
a prisoner for years within one hundred miles of British
regiments, which practically on any day could have
marched up to deliver him. Yet Thomas Maitland
did his duty when he refused to move a man to
save him ; for it was more important that there should
be peace in Ceylon even than that murdered English-
men should be avenged. While Davie was yet living,
Maitland, as shall in place be told, was summoned
1 Here is the full text.
_ "August 18 1 1.
" Gen. Wilson — Oh be expeditious in saving me. Is there any
question that my wishes are to be released hence without delay ?
I have no means to propose than those formerly mentioned. I have
wrote several times within these 10 months and have got three
small slips of paper without signature. Messenger is of no use
being in [sic) daily sick unto death without money, clothes, or food ;
please send me a little opium or laudanum to alleviate my pains ;
expect to die daily ; could be carried by dooly by way of Gambo
and Ganda. [Here follow illegible scraps about mohurs and rupees.]
If you no intentions {sic) of speedily doing something send me a
pair of pistols to terminate my painful existence, twelve months
unable to rise from mat [illegible] a pen-knife, a little rum, gin, or
brandy and laudanum, stopping at Kalug [illegible] and when night
falls sending a party with a dooly might get out of the country
[illegible] distance without a shot being fired at as my anguish
[illegible]. (signed)
"Ad. Davie."
Second scrap about 4^x2 inches.
" My anguish of body is insupportable, and I see but imperfectly
my dear friend. No paper. My complaints are [illegible]."
ch.v HISTORY OF THE ARMY 165
to reinforce the Indian Army at a moment of supreme 1805.
danger, and was able to answer to the call.1
So ended this forgotten episode of the Great War,
an episode which perhaps may be thought undeserving
of the space that has been allotted to it. Yet it came
at a most critical time alike for England and for India,
when both were required to send to Ceylon regiments
which could ill be spared, and both , made shift to
despatch them ; and to India this might well have been
of most serious consequence. The losses in action
were trifling ; yet this futile enterprise, thoughtlessly
undertaken and thoughtlessly carried out, must have
cost the lives, directly or indirectly, of little fewer than
a thousand British soldiers and of fully as many natives,
and that at a moment when every soldier's life was
precious. The arrival of a French armament before
Ceylon in 1805 — and North was warned that one was
likely to appear in August — would have found the
British troops thinned, worn out, and demoralised ;i while
the capture of Trincomalee would have so heartened
the Mahrattas and their allies that they might have
gone near to sweep the British out of India. None of
these things occurred, and the Kandian war of 1 803 to
1805 has been utterly forgotten ; but it may serve at
least as a warning of the mischief that may be done
by a foolish Governor seconded by a foolish General.
It is idle to rail at the treachery of the Kandians,
and to exalt the good faith and virtuous intentions of
the British. Independence is as dear to primitive races
as to the most highly civilised nation. Deceit is the
natural resource of the weak against the strong, and
duplicity has nowhere been carried to such perfection
of art as in the East. The story of Kandy is one that
will be frequently repeated in this history, the story of
a column which marches to an oriental capital with easy
triumph, and returns not again. Usually the destruc-
1 Maitland to the Sec. of State, 19th, 28th July ; 4th, 18th, 19th
Aug. ; 19th, 28th Oct ; 22nd Nov. 1805 ; 28th Feb. ; 20th Sept.
1806.
i66
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
tion of the first column is followed immediately by the
advance of a second ; but it was not so in Ceylon in
1803. The tattered scraps which record Davie's agony
are the crown of the whole enterprise ; and it is a
crown of thorns. No long time was, however, to elapse
before the Kings of Kandy should cease to be, and
their historic throne should find a new home in
Windsor Castle.
The authorities for this account of the Kandian war are :
Colonial Correspondence, Ceylon, vols, vii.-xxiv. ; and Cordiner's
Description of Ceylon, vol. ii. The latter is based principally upon
official papers, supplemented by private inquiries by the author,
and bears strong marks of having been inspired by Governor North.
CHAPTER VI
From the troubles in the East, which it has been J802.
necessary to follow by anticipation until far into the
renewed contest against Napoleon, I return now to
England, which we left enjoying the hope rather than the
fruition of peace in March 1802. It was somewhat
significant that within three weeks of the signature of the
Treaty of Amiens the Government thought it necessary
to introduce a bill to consolidate the militia-laws and
augment the Militia. " The benefits of peace," said
Mr. Secretary Yorke, when proposing the measure,
" can only be derived from placing the country in a
proper position of defence," an eternal truth which for
once was accepted by the House of Commons, thanks
to the national dread of Bonaparte and the military
organisation of France. The establishment of Militia
was fixed by this Act at seventy-two thousand men for
Great Britain ; forty-nine thousand of whom were to
be at once enrolled for twenty-one days' training, and
the remainder to be called up in case of emergency by
proclamation. The bill, of which more shall presently
be said, was passed without opposition, rather indeed
with the approval of all parties ; and the fact was
extremely significant. It is true that many prominent
members, and notably Fox, were absent from Parliament,
being attracted by very pardonable curiosity to the
court of the First Consul at Paris. But no one felt any
confidence that peace could endure for long ; and hence
this unique acceptance of the proposition that, in the
event of war, England ought to be able to lay her hands
167
i68
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1802. at once on one hundred thousand men for purposes of
defence.1
May 4. Not many days later a bill was brought in to enable
the country to accept an offer from certain corps of
Yeomanry and Volunteers to continue their service ;
and on this occasion a gentleman was found to protest
against the maintenance of such an establishment, " when
the country was in a state of profound tranquillity," as
" adverse to the ancient constitutional practice of the
realm." The unfortunate British Constitution has
been invoked as the protectress of many foolish senti-
ments, but rarely of an opinion quite so foolish as this.
However, the voice of this objector passed unheeded,
for the times were too serious for the pastime of
pedantry ; and without further examination at present
into its provisions, it must suffice to say that the bill
was passed. New estimates were shortly afterwards
introduced for the Army ; and for the first time in
history the regiments were designated to the House of
Commons by their numbers as well as by the names of
their Colonels ; a welcome change, which, slight though
it was, signified that the proprietary rights of Colonels
were beginning to lose their primeval sacredness. The
establishment was fixed at rather over seventy thousand
men for the United Kingdom, over twenty-five thousand,
including six West India Regiments, for the Colonies,
and over twenty-six thousand for India ; which, added
to ten thousand artillerymen, made a total of over one
hundred and thirty-two thousand men. The regiments
of cavalry included, besides the Household regiments
and those of Dragoon Guards, twenty-three regiments
of Dragoons, the three last being those which we have
seen fighting with such distinction in India. Among
the infantry neither the Ninetieth, the Ninety-second,
nor the Ninety-third found a place, the order for their
disbandment having gone forth on the 6th of May ;
but the Scots Brigade still bore prophetically the
number Ninety-four, and Manningham's Rifles, at a
1 Pari. Hist, xxxvi. 535 sq.
ch.vi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 169
ridiculously low strength, were still at hand to claim 1802.
that of Ninety-five. Fencible corps had received their
death-warrant at the same time as the Ninetieth ; and
second battalions were passed or passing into the first
battalions of their own or of other regiments. But
these estimates were calculated to be valid only from
June to December ; and many things were to happen
before December.
As has already been told, the first alarm to the
Ministry was given by Bonaparte's expedition to St.
Domingo. But Bonaparte, unfortunately for himself,
had always a new project upon the stocks before the
first was fairly launched. Now, in the negotiations
at Amiens the King of Sardinia had been one of the
potentates for whom the British envoy had made special
efforts, in the hope of gaining for him some indemnity
for the territory which the French had taken from him in
Italy and merged in the Italian Republic. On the 21st Sept.
of September 1802 Bonaparte by formal decree annexed
Piedmont to France, thus reducing the dominions of
the King to the island from which he took his title.
Valid excuse for this proceeding there was none ; but
there was a sufficiently valid reason in that the possession
of Piedmont assured that of the pass of Mont Cenis.
A month later, upon the death of the Duke of Parma,
his duchy was likewise annexed to France, though
Bonaparte had raised the legitimate heir to the rank of
King of Etruria, and had thereby gained from Spain the
vast province of Louisiana. Finally the First Consul
laid violent hands on a country which appealed far
more than Piedmont or Parma to the sympathy of the
British of all parties. Ever since the first interference
of the Directory with Switzerland in 1798, that
unhappy land had been impoverished and oppressed by
the presence of large bodies of French troops. Its
independence, and its right as the Helvetian republic
to decide upon its own form of government, had been
guaranteed by the Treaty of Luneville ; but still the
French battalions remained in their old quarters and
170
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1802, showed particular reluctance to loosen their hold upon
Swiss ground. The result was that the unfortunate
people were unable to arrive by any peaceful process at
a decision regarding the government which they really
required. There were two parties in the country, of
which the one favoured a strong centralised adminis-
tration, and the other the retention of large independent
powers by each canton. This latter had, for very good
reasons, been the system of the old Swiss Confederacy.
But, as fast as one party came into power, the French
authorities after a few months arranged or connived at
a revolution to displace it, so as to keep the country in
continual commotion and afford constant pretexts for
the intervention of Bonaparte. The truth was that his
heart was set upon gaining possession of Valais in order
to construct a military road over the Simplon pass ;
and until he could obtain this he was not disposed to
relax his grip upon Switzerland. At length in July he
was prevailed upon to withdraw his troops, and to leave
the country to determine for itself the form of its
government. The issue was submitted to the vote of
the whole body of the people ; and the majority
against centralisation was so great as te» leave no room
for further doubt. None the less the minority refused
to accept their defeat, whereupon their opponents
rushed to arms, and were in mid career of a victorious
enforcement of their vote at the polls, when Bonaparte
Sept. 30. suddenly interfered. His troops once again crossed
the frontier ; and he declared that the new Constitution
of Switzerland must be arranged at Paris under his
mediation.
So shameless a violation of the Treaty of Luneville
naturally caused agitation at every court in Europe ;
but the excitement was short-lived. Prussia, in
the hope of gaining further territory in Germany,
was too abjectly subservient to the First Consul
to protest. Austria was too jealous of Prussia to
think of Switzerland ; Russia showed indifference ;
and England alone stood out heartily for the cause of
ch.vi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 171
Swiss independence. So seriously did Addington's 1
Ministry treat the question that vessels were at once
despatched to the West Indies, the East Indies, and
the Cape to cancel, until further directions, the orders
for the restitution of the Dutch and French colonies ;
and, as has been seen, Pondicherry and Chandernagore
were still in the hands of the British when the war was
renewed. But, finding themselves unsupported by
other powers, the British Ministers gave way about
Switzerland ; and fresh commands were issued for the
redelivery of the French and Dutch colonies to their
former masters. Bonaparte then regulated the new
Constitution of Switzerland according to his own
ideas, which were calculated, as a Swiss patriot com-
plained, to assure to the country all domestic happi-
ness, but to annihilate it as a political factor in
Europe.
The Swiss difficulty was only one of a series which
were beginning to arise between England and France.
French troops still continued to occupy Holland, though
nominally the Batavian Republic was independent ; and
this was a matter upon which the British were peculiarly
sensitive. Moreover, commercial relations between the
two countries were strained ; for Bonaparte, less perhaps
from unfriendliness than from extreme ignorance of
everything pertaining to trade, had determined to shut
out British goods from all markets controlled by France.
Remonstrance from England upon any one of these
matters was met at once on the part of the First
Consul by the demand that the British should evacuate
Malta. But on this point the Ministry stood firm.
It had been weak enough to restore its conquests in the
New World even in the face of Bonaparte's high-handed
proceedings in Europe ; but the experience of the last
war had shewn that, under existing conditions, the
Mediterranean was the true field of operations for Eng-
land against France ; and Addington was not disposed
lightly to yield up Malta. In fact Lord Whitworth,
our ambassador in Paris, held instructions which
172 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xm
1802. empowered him practically to claim Malta as indemnity
for the various annexations of France.
All this, however, was hidden from the country at
large, or at any rate Ministers seemed to think so. A
new Parliament met in November, and was opened by a
speech from the Throne so colourless that no one, on
reading it, could have guessed that England had not
for years been living in a state of profound peace.
Grenville in the Lords and Windham in the Commons,
as became men who had disapproved the Peace of
Amiens, did indeed call attention to Bonaparte's
proceedings in the bitterest terms ; but Pitt was silent ;
Fox, of course, took the opposite view ; and, after the
effusion of a suitable volume of prose by Addington,
the address of thanks was passed with little ceremony.
When, however, the estimates came up for discussion
in the first week of December, the case was different.
For the Navy, Ministers had begun by proposing
thirty thousand seamen. This number they suddenly
increased to fifty thousand, alleging first that the
additional twenty thousand would be wanted for a few
months only, but finally asking for them as part of
the establishment for the year.1 Tlae estimates for
the Army likewise testified to a certain uneasiness.
The Secretary at War began by reciting at length
the various forces of France, setting down their total
at over nine hundred thousand men, after which he
asked money for an establishment of over one hundred
and forty-three thousand men ; sixty-six thousand
of them for the United Kingdom, twenty-three thou-
sand for India, forty-two thousand for the Colonies,
and twelve thousand artillery. Of those detailed for
service at home five thousand represented the men
who had formerly been called Invalids, and had been
organised into independent companies. They were now
distributed into seven Garrison Battalions. Among the
troops abroad were over three thousand foreigners, com-
prehending the regiments, nominally Swiss, of Meuron,
1 Pari. Hist, xxxvi. 1054.
ch.vi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 173
Rohan and Watteville, together with Stuart's battalion, 1
at first Minorquin but now composed chiefly of Germans,
which had distinguished itself so greatly in Egypt.
Lastly eight thousand volunteers, principally cavalry,
had enrolled themselves for continued service in
England, and nearly thrice that number in Ireland ;
and altogether it was reckoned that the country could
count upon two hundred thousand men, exclusive of
the troops in India.
It is satisfactory to be able to add that the Commons
showed no backwardness to vote the money required of
them. Bonaparte's treatment of Switzerland had so
incensed all parties that even Sheridan gave his voice
heartily for a large military force. Fox almost alone
advocated a reduction, making light of any idea of
invasion, and apparently contemplating with perfect
serenity a disembarkation of Bonaparte in England
with fifty thousand men, which he declared to be the
largest possible army that could be conveyed across the
Channel in the relative state of the forces of England
and France. He even committed himself to the
characteristic proposition that by maintaining twenty-
five thousand men less, the country would shortly gain
twenty-five million pounds more to apply to her defence
against aggression. It is precisely from acting upon
this fallacious opinion that England has built up her
national debt. Fox must have known perfectly well
that time as well as money is needed to produce trained
and disciplined soldiers, and that no number of millions
can abridge that time. Pitt took no part in the debate ;
and, seeing that he had actually reduced the Army in
1792, he was probably prudent to hold his peace when
ten years later his great rival proposed to outdo that
egregious blunder.
Meanwhile at Paris matters were coming rapidly to
a crisis. Since the publication of Sebastiani's menacing
report as to Egypt, Lord Whitworth had been instructed
to declare that England would not evacuate Malta
until reassured as to Bonaparte's designs upon the
174 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1803. valley of the Nile and the Ottoman Empire at large.
Feb. 18. The First Consul thereupon took the occasion of a
reception at the Tuileries to treat Whitworth to a
torrent of menace and invective which lasted for nearly
two hours. Such an outburst was ill-calculated to
produce any great impression upon an English gentle-
man, who was not to be intimidated, and was, perhaps,
not ill-pleased to see how low so great and formidable
Feb. 20. a man could abase himself. But two days later
Bonaparte addressed an inflated message to his own
Legislative Assemblies upon the state of the Republic,
in which his threats were renewed. " In England," he
said, " there are two parties that struggle for power ; one
of them has made peace, the other has sworn implacable
hatred to France. While this strife of parties continues,
the Republic must take its measures of precaution.
Half a million men must be and shall be ready to
defend and avenge her. . . . England will never be
able to draw other nations into new coalitions. . . .
Alone England cannot stand up against France. "
This, together with Whitworth's report of the scene
at the Tuileries, roused the spirit of the British
Ministers and still more that of the-JGng. On the
Mar. 8. 8th of March a Royal message was brought down
to both Houses setting forth the need for measures
to countervail the preparations which were said to
be going forward in the ports of France and Holland.
As a matter of fact those preparations were as yet
trifling ; 1 and Bonaparte's activity was more easily to
be traced at home, where French spies and agents of
disaffection had been freely dispersed both in England
Mar. 9. and in Ireland. However, the message was met by
an unanimous address of thanks from both Houses ;
Fox carping but not opposing in the Commons, and
Moira warmly supporting in the Lords. Bonaparte
used this proceeding as a pretext for another violent
Mar. 13. address to Whitworth, which was only cut short by the
freezing silence of the Ambassador ; but the First
1 Desbriere, Projets et tentatives de debarquement, iii. 6-8.
ch.vi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 175
Consul did not deceive himself as to the true meaning 1803.
of the situation, and sent a despatch-vessel in all haste Mar. 16.
to divert Decaen's expedition from Pondicherry to
Mauritius. He had made the enormous blunder of
treating the Court of St. James's as if it had been the
Court of Naples ; and the result was that the renewal
of hostilities was not to await his good pleasure until
October 1804, but was to be forced upon him at once,
while his preparations were still incomplete, and his
great West Indian expedition hopelessly compromised.
The British Ministry made a last effort to come to an
understanding ; but Bonaparte was so furious at the
British retention of Malta, as a pledge for proper con-
cessions from France, that no one durst broach the matter
to him. He made a final attempt by a shallow device to
gain time ; but Whitworth was not to be hoodwinked ;
and on the 16th of May 1803 England declared war. May 16.
The First Consul instantly retorted by an order that
all Englishmen in France between the ages of eighteen
and sixty should be detained as prisoners of war. The
pretext for this decree, which condemned some ten
thousand innocent men to indefinite detention and in
many cases to ruin, was that two French merchantmen
had been captured by British frigates before the
declaration of hostilities. This, as was so frequent with
Bonaparte's statements, was entirely and demonstrably
false. There was no excuse for this outrageous action ;
there was no reason for it except the spiteful rage of an
ungovernable man who had been unable to have his
own way. It is too often forgotten that Bonaparte the
First Consul could be quite as mean and petty when
thwarted as Bonaparte the captive of St. Helena. The
result of the decree was that England entered upon the
war not only with indignation but with intense and
implacable hatred.
Since the crisis in Switzerland, Ministers had
suspended many of the reductions ordered in the
Army. The disbandment of the Ninetieth, Ninety-
second, and Ninety-third, as well as of the second
176
HISTORY OF THE ARMY bookxiii
1803. battalion of the Fifty-second, had been revoked between
October and December 1802 ; and the last named was
in January erected into a separate regiment and
numbered the Ninety-sixth. The Cavalry and Guards
had also been slightly augmented in March, so that
preparations were far less backward than usual at the
beginning of a war, and the Ministry could take the
offensive at once. There was no doubt as to the
quarter in which the first blow should be struck. In
St. Domingo the French were barely holding their own
against the negroes, and their chief support was the
fleet under Admiral Latouche Treville which lay at
Cap Francois. Before the French ships could escape,
Admiral Duckworth had brought his squadron to
blockade them, thus not only hemming in the ships
but cutting off all supplies from the troops ashore.
This was a serious matter, for, unless they have been
grievously maligned, many of the French generals
used the campaign simply as a means of enriching
themselves by plunder and embezzlement.1 The
negroes welcomed the unexpected aid of the British
exultingly ; and Duckworth's cruisers played havoc
among the French transports and smaller men-of-war
which were on the coast. A frigate with a General
Morgan and five hundred French troops on board was
the first capture ; and Morgan reported that the army
and the fleet together had already lost sixty thousand
men since the first invasion of the island. Within a
week or two the Commandant of the French garrison
at Leogane entreated the Captain of H.M.S. Racoon to
take himself and his men on board as captives ; and he
was refused only because the frigate, already encumbered
by prisoners from a captured transport, could hold no
more. Then the Duquesne, a French seventy-four, tried
to escape from Cap Francois, but was taken ; though
a more fortunate consort, the Duquay Trouin, together
with a frigate, contrived to sail safely away. The
1 Intercepted letter from Commissaire Ordonnateur Colbert to
Rochambeau, enclosed in Nugent to Sec. of State, 20th May 1804.
ch.vi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 177
garrison of Jeremie, driven from its post by the 1
negroes, and not by negroes only but by some
hundreds of Poles and Germans, deserters from the
French army, surrendered to a British man-of-war,
and was brought to Jamaica. Other detachments
submitted to the like fate, and on the 30th of November M
the garrison of Cap Francois yielded themselves to the
British fleet as prisoners. By the end of the year
nothing was left of the French army but a garrison,
strictly blockaded by the English, in the town of St.
Domingo itself. Of the soldiers and seamen by far the
greater number were dead. Of the survivors seven
thousand, including one thousand officers, were prisoners
in Jamaica, where over five hundred Germans and Poles
entered the ranks of the Sixtieth. Three hundred
invalids, left behind in hospital at Cap Francois, were
placed on board a ship and sent to the bottom by the
negroes. A few soldiers escaped to America, and about
eleven hundred to Havanna, where they were hospitably
received by the Spaniards. But still misfortune dogged
the poor wretches to the end. Eight hundred of these
last sailed in four transports from Havanna to Carolina.
One of these ships with four hundred men on board
was captured by the escort of a British convoy ; two
more were lost with every soul on board in the Bahama
Keys, and one only was left to pursue her solitary course.
As to the men-of-war, the greater number found their
way as prizes to Port Royal, which was full of captured
j vessels of all kinds ; and thus ignominiously ended
:! Bonaparte's expedition to St. Domingo.
History has been strangely silent as to this enter-
prise, and yet surely it must be reckoned as one of the
most disastrous ever recorded. It is probably within
! the truth to say that it cost France forty thousand good
i soldiers and sailors not disabled but dead ; but even so
■this is not the most terrible part of the story. There
are signs enough in the English archives alone to show
that the conduct of the senior officers was infamous.
* 4 Your predecessors," wrote Commissaire Colbert to
M VOL. V N
i78
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1803. Rochambeau on his arrival, "have committed atrocities
which I cannot trust myself to speak of. Our
magazines are empty. I show you1 what we have
legitimately consumed and what our generals have
embezzled. Sarrazin and La Valette are governed
only by the most cruel egoism and the most sordid
avarice. . . . The Generals have done their best to
oppress the people and make the soldier discontented.
The officers and men are groaning under terrible misery
and want. La Valette and the head of the Admini-
stration think only of enriching themselves and giving
favours to their Creole girls." Add to this that
not only two educated mulattoes, one of whom had
come out with Leclerc as a general of division, but
several hundred white men, were driven by maltreat-
ment to take sides with the brigands, and also that
Rochambeau by his cruelties gained for himself the
name of Robespierre, and we can form some idea of the
degradation to which a French army could sink even
under one of the greatest military administrators that
ever lived. It may be pleaded that Napoleon, being in
Paris, was not responsible. No doubt much of the
rascality and embezzlement was kept Jjidden from him ;
yet it was he who gave the tone for the deliberate and
perfidious maltreatment of the blacks which was at the
root of all the mischief ; and he cannot have been
ignorant of the outrageous oppression practised by
his generals. The like evils had flourished among
British officers for a time during their occupation of
St. Domingo, but never among the Generals ; and
upon the first suspicion at home of such mischief,
Simcoe and Maitland were sent out to restore order with
a stern hand. Beyond doubt a little severity would
speedily have recalled the French also to a sense of their
duty ; for it would be absurd to suppose that originally
they were in any way inferior to the British. Yet it is!
certain that they sank far below the British in demoral-j
1 Evidently the letter was accompanied by returns, which are!
not now to be found.
HISTORY OF THE ARMY
179
isation ; and that the British officers in Jamaica, who 1
usually were glad to meet their gallant brethren of
France, could not bring themselves to consort with the
prisoners of St. Domingo. " Their generals as a rule,"
wrote General Nugent from Jamaica, " are a low
ignorant set of people who talk of nothing but their
own prowess and the supremacy of the Great Nation.
. . . The incapacity and atrocious conduct of their
chiefs in St. Domingo are proverbial." Yet these were
the men sent out, with excellent soldiers under them, by
Bonaparte ; and the fact is a very grave reflection upon
either his honesty or his judgment.1
But it was not only to leeward that the British
Ministers turned their eyes. Pitt's example was still
before them, and the conquest of the French Windward
islands promised to be easy, for on that side also
Bonaparte's treacherous policy towards the negroes had
borne fruit. Martinique, it is true, had been taken
over from the British practically unchanged ; but when
Richepanse came before Guadeloupe in April 1802 he
found the two divisions of the island, Grande Terre
and Basse Terre, each under the rule of a mulatto. In
Grande Terre the French troops were received without
opposition, but in Basse Terre they were defied, and for
a time successfully. In truth the French force was so
abominably ill-provided and equipped that Richepanse
was forced to buy clothing and shoes wherever he could
find them, and even to borrow ammunition from the
British. However, by the end of May he had virtually
crushed all resistance, though with the loss of about two
thousand out of three thousand French troops, dead or
disabled in action or by sickness. In fact it was mainly
by the exertions of a corps of black troops under a chief
named Pelage that Richepanse finally prevailed; yet
no sooner had this force done its work than the French
General ordered every man of it to be embarked and
1 Col. Corres. Jamaica. Nugent to Sec. of State, 21st July,
9th Sept., 8th Oct., 19th Nov., 19th, 21st, 25th Dec. 1803 ;
14th Jan., 10th, nth March, 20th May, 10th June 1804.
180 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xii
1802. deported to Rattan, from whence there was e very-
prospect that they would ultimately be shipped off to
the mines on the Spanish Main. Before the hurri-
cane season was ended Richepanse was dead of yellow
fever ; but his successor, as was natural, steadily carried
forward the disarmament of the negroes, regarding all
black regiments as an accursed thing. He was really
only trying to execute Bonaparte's avowed policy of
re-establishing slavery.1
It was therefore tolerably certain that the French
negroes would not take up arms with any great
enthusiasm for their new commanders ; and, apart
from this, the extreme aversion of the French
authorities from black troops worked by a curious
chain of circumstances greatly to their damage and to
the profit of the British. In April 1802 the British
islands were startled by the news that on the night of
April 9; the 9th the Eighth West India Regiment at Dominica
had risen in mutiny, and had murdered three of their
officers and the whole of their white non-commissioned
officers with shocking and hideous mutilation. The
mutineers were quelled after a short pitched battle
which cost them over one hundred casualties and their
assailants nearly thirty killed and wounded. A court
of inquiry was held, and it was discovered that the
mutiny was due to an idea that the regiment was to be
disbanded and the negroes sold as slaves ; the Governor,
a certain Mr. Cochrane Johnston — who gained later an
unpleasant notoriety — having employed the men in
clearing the jungle off his estate, nominally for purposes
of fortification, without giving them working pay.
Such a practice was strictly contrary to the orders of
the General in command, who knew the value of the
the West India Regiments and desired nothing more
strongly than to raise the self-respect of the black
soldiers who composed them. Before the news of
this mutiny could reach England, orders came from
1 CO. Windward and Leeward Islands, General Trigge to Sec.
of State, 17th, 24th, 30th May, nth June, 1st, 10th July 1802.
ch.vi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 181
the Colonial Office for the West India Regiments 1802.
to be reduced from twelve to six, upon the con-
clusion of peace, by the simple process of disband-
ment. The execution of these directions would, in
the circumstances, have been dangerous, for it would
have confirmed the general suspicions which had caused
the outbreak in Dominica, and would probably have
brought about a mutiny of the remaining regiments.
With great good sense General Trigge had issued an
order to reassure the negroes, directing that his
own guard should always be formed from the two
West India Regiments at headquarters ; and he resolved
at any rate not to precipitate the disbandment. Still
the position was difficult, for England was nominally
at peace and the British public would certainly be
clamouring for the reduction of establishments ; and it
therefore occurred to Trigge, since one of the regiments
had been raised in Martinique, to offer it to the French
authorities, provided that the men were willing to take
service with them. The answer, as might be expected,
was an uncompromising rejection by the French of any
such proposal ; and it was finally decided not to risk
the danger of disbandment, but to draft the men of the
last six West India Regiments into the first six, and to
allow time to reduce their numbers.1
Hence it was that at the outbreak of the war the 1803.
West India Regiments were still in fair strength ; while,
owing to the delay in restoring the captured islands to
the French, there was an unusually large force of white
troops at disposal for work in the field. In April
there were, in the Windward and Leeward Islands, not
far from ten thousand men of all ranks and colours fit
for duty, of whom between three and four thousand
I could be spared for active operations. Nor was the
British Government negligent in giving early warning
that war was approaching, for General Grinfield, who
1 Trigge to Sec. of State, 16th, 23rd, 30th April, 4th, 29th
May, 13th June, 1st, 10th July; Grinfield to Sec. of State, 17th
Sept. ; Sec. of State to Trigge, 6th May 1802.
182
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1803. had succeeded Trigge in the chief command, began to
prepare for all emergencies before the end of April 1 803.
By the beginning of June a rupture seemed so certain
to the British in the West Indies that one of the British
cruisers detained a French transport, which was carrying
troops to Martinique, and sent her to Barbados. Grin-
field also embarked six weeks' supplies for four thousand
men, and Commodore Hood made every arrangement
for the embarkation of the men themselves at twenty-
four hours' notice. About the middle of the month
arrived the news of the declaration of war, with orders
for attack upon Martinique, St. Lucia, and Tobago,
each or all of them. Grinfield at once summoned the
June 20. Commodore, who arrived on the 17th of June; and
on the 20th the fleet and transports got under way
and made all sail to leeward.
The British Ministry had been over -sanguine in
expecting the conquest of Martinique, which, well-
garrisoned as it was, required ten thousand men to
master it ; but St. Lucia and Tobago were within the
powers of Grinfield's force, and the former being the
more important as a check on Fort Royal, was clearly
marked out as his first object. He htd three thousanc
excellent troops,1 with at least two senior officers
who were of more than ordinary ability. These
were Thomas Pic ton, who was on his way home
from Trinidad after enduring shameful persecution by
certain malignant commissioners sent out from England,
and Edward Pakenham, who was destined after a
brilliant career to fall before New Orleans. By day-
1 StafF. . . . 17
2/ist 487I
64th 744
68th 765
3rd W.I.R 714.
Royal Artillery, with 14 field-guns and 16 siege-guns . 271
Royal Military Artificers 80
Black Pioneers ........ 71
Total of all ranks . 3149
ch.vi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 183
break of the 21st the armament was off St. Lucia, and 1803.
during the course of the day the greater part of the June 21.
force was disembarked in Anse du Choc, the bay
which lies immediately to the north of Castries. In
the evening the enemy's outposts were driven in, and a
summons was sent to the French commander on Morne
Fortune. This officer, General Nogues, was very
much inclined to surrender ; for the inhabitants of St.
Lucia had welcomed the British with open arms. Indeed
the Prefect and several officers actually entertained
Grinfield and his staff at supper, not without friendly
messages from the General himself. Duty, however,
prevailed with Nogues, who finally returned an answer of
defiance ; and at four o'clock on the morning of the
22nd the British attacked the fortress in two columns June 22.
under Brigadiers Prevost and Brereton, and carried it,
despite a spirited resistance, in half an hour. The
Royal Scots and Sixty-fourth bore the brunt of the
work, Pakenham being wounded at the head of the
latter ; but the fortifications were in too ruinous a
condition to be very formidable, and the casualties did
not exceed one hundred and thirty-eight.1 The troops
on both sides became very friendly directly after the
surrender, and when the six hundred prisoners had
been embarked for France, Nogues and a few of his
officers gratefully accepted permission to retire to
Martinique. Altogether the first contest in the new
war was marked by the best of good feelings.2
Leaving General Brereton with the Sixty-eighth and
three companies of negroes to hold St. Lucia, Grinfield
sailed again on the 25th, and at daybreak on the 30th June 30.
made Tobago. By five in the evening the troops were
landed, when they at once marched straight upon the
town. A dangerous defile on the way being found
1 20 men killed, 9 officers and 109 men wounded.
2/1 st, 9 men killed, 2 officers and 45 men wounded.
64th, 6 „ „ 4 „ „ 34 „ „
3rdW.I.R., 2 „ „ 23 „
2 Sec. of State to Grinfield, 7th, 16th May; Grinfield to Sec.
of State, 28th April, 9th, 10th, 20th, 22nd, 24th June 1803.
i84 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xm
1803. unguarded, Grinfield took the hint and at once sent
June 30. a summons to General Cesar Berthier, who capitulated
forthwith with the honours of war. Berthier had indeed
no choice in the matter, for his garrison numbered but
two hundred men, half of them sailors, while the whole
of the population was hostile to him. He revealed,
however, to Grinfield that his orders had been to
fortify Man-of-War Bay thoroughly and to make the
island a French naval depot, with a garrison of twelve
hundred men. This plan, if fulfilled, would have
placed Trinidad and the whole of the southern islands
at his mercy.
Eight companies of the Royal Scots and a company
of negroes were left at Tobago ; and therewith
Grinfield prudently returned to Barbados. The
conquest of islands might be easy, but the supplying
of garrisons in such a climate was a costly process, and
might become still more costly if the French, with a
powerful force at Martinique, should attempt reprisals.
There was, of course, a British squadron to windward,
and Commodore Hood was an active and zealous
officer ; but his ships were not too many, and Antigua
and Dominica lay invitingly close to -Guadeloupe and
Martinique. Moreover, the Assembly of Antigua,
with characteristic perversity, was declining to vote any
money for its defence or to call out its militia ; and
Grinfield, like other commanders in the West Indies
before him, was beginning to discover the difficulties
of guarding the precious sugar-islands. Ships passed
in and out of their harbours, he knew not on what
errand, and he had not the slightest power to stop them.
The forts, though garrisoned by the King, were mostly
Colonial property, and as such owned no master but the
civil government. Signals were likewise under the
domain of the Colonial authorities, and all flags of truce
were claimed by the civil Governor as concerning him
only. In fact all control was in civil hands, but all
responsibility for protection against the enemy was
thrown on military shoulders. Yet this was the sphere
ch.vi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 185
and these were the conditions in which Pitt delighted to 1803.
make war.1
Nor did Addington Jag behind his great master.
Before Grinfield had been at Barbados a week there
arrived fresh orders from England. Victor Hugues
had recently visited the Dutch settlements on the main- July 20.
land ; and the Dutch planters, dreading a repetition of
the scenes which had troubled Guadeloupe in 1794,
had appealed to England for protection. Ministers
promised to afford it ; and accordingly on the 10th of
June Lord Hobart instructed Grinfield to make
immediate arrangements for taking over Demerara,
Berbice, and Surinam, summoning the Governors to
surrender and attacking them if they refused. Since
the Batavian Republic was dragged into war against
England a week later, the General was of course at
liberty to attempt the capture of Curacoa also, if he
thought fit. Grinfield, like all officers, was eager for
active service ; but on receiving the first conditional
orders for the expedition to the Dutch colonies, he
very rightly pointed out to Ministers that they might
not be aware what they were doing. St. Lucia and
Tobago had already swallowed up nearly two thousand
of his men ; and the occupation of Demerara in addition
would not only deprive him of the whole of his ex-
peditionary force but would leave all his garrisons
dangerously weak. The Government had promised to
send him one battalion from Gibraltar, and he had been
able to save three hundred negroes from a regiment that
had been doomed to disbandment ; but to make good
the daily losses from sickness in the islands, quite apart
from those sustained on active service, he would need
reinforcements of at least five thousand men.2
All this the Government knew or should have known
without Grinfield's information ; but it either ignored
1 Grinfield to Sec. of State, 1st, 5th, 15th July, nth Aug.
1803.
2 Sec. of State to Grinfield, 30th May, 10th, 16th June 1803 ;
Grinfield to Sec. of State (private), 24th June 1803.
i86
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1803. or defied these plain facts and committed itself, without
hesitation, to a large permanent increase of the West
Indian garrisons. The General waited over a month for
his promised battalion from Gibraltar, but in vain ; the
fact being that it had never received its orders to go to
the West Indies. At last, at the end of August, he
decided to eke out his force with Marines and to delay
the attack on Demerara no longer, having ascertained
with tolerable certainty that the Colony would make
Sept. 1. no resistance. He sailed accordingly on the 1st of
September with some thirteen hundred men,1 and
anchoring off Georgetown on the 16th, sent an offer of
good terms which brought about the surrender of
Sept. 20. Demerara and Essequibo. A detachment of five hundred
and fifty men received the capitulation of Berbice a few
Sept. 25. days later ; and thus three rich but pestilent posses-
sions were gained not only with no loss, but with
actual increase of the British force. For the Dutch
garrisons numbered fifteen hundred men, half of whom,
rather than starve, were well content to enter the British
service, which they did under the name of the York
Light Infantry Volunteers.2
With this the operations of 1803 iirthe West Indies
came to an end. The deaths from sickness in the
Windward and Leeward Islands during the last six
months of 1803 numbered close upon seven hundred,
or more than nine per cent of the force, though the
season was by no means remarkably unhealthy. One
of the Brigadiers, Clephane, died before he had been in
the Antilles three months, and Grinfield had hardly
reported this death before he too, with his work still
Nov. 19. incomplete, succumbed to yellow fever. But the Govern-
ment had not yet done with conquests. Early in
November the Sixteenth and Forty-sixth regiments,
both of them strong battalions, were ordered to the
1 Artillery, 90 ; R. Military Artificers, 30 ; 64th, 983 ; detach-
ments of the 3rd, 7th, and nth W.I.R., 208. Total 131 1 of all
ranks.
2 Grinfield to Sec. of State, 17th, 29th Aug., 22nd, 27th, 28th
Sept., 1 6th Oct., 4th Nov. 1803.
ch.vi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 187
West Indies; and though in January 1804 a sudden 1804.
order was despatched from London that no further
operations were to be undertaken, yet on the arrival of
these two regiments and of a new Commander-in-chief,
Sir Charles Green, towards the end of March, an expedi- March.
tion was at once arranged for the capture of Surinam.
The people of that settlement were believed to be
friendly, but the secret of the project had been allowed
to leak out, so that it was necessary to employ a large
and imposing force. During the last weeks of March
both Green and Commodore Hood worked strenuously
at their preparations ; and on the 7th of April the April 7.
armament, numbering over two thousand troops,1 sailed
before the trade wind from Barbados, and anchored on April 25.
the 25th off the Surinam River.2
Paramaribo, the capital of Dutch Guiana and in those
days a thriving town of twenty thousand inhabitants,
lies about twenty miles up the Surinam. This great
river, though swelled to a breadth of two or three miles
at its mouth by the influx of a large tributary, the
Commewyne, is full of banks and shoals, which render
its navigation difficult. It was therefore by no
means a formidable task to defend the passage, and, if
the waterway were closed, effective entrance into the
1 Advanced Corps. Flank companies of the 16th and 64th.
Rifle companies 2/6oth and York L.I. Volrs.
Light company 6th W.I.R.
1st Brigade. Advanced corps, 493 \ Brig.-Gen.
1 6th Foot, 57 3 J Fred Maitland.
2nd Brigade. 64th Foot, 604^ . _Q Hu?hes
6thW.I.R., 30$ J e' hughes.
Royal Artillery . . . 106.
Ordnance. 6 light six-pounders ^ 4. howitzers, in.
2 „ three „ J4 „ „ light.
2 medium twelve-pounders) 1 mortar, 8 inch.
2 light twelve-pounders - J 2 mortars, 10 inch. •
Royal Artificers, 26 ; Black Pioneers, 20 ; Staff, 21.
lotai. 2148 of all ranks.
2 Grinfield to Sec. of State, 4th, 9th Nov. ; Brig.-Gen. Fred
Maitland to Sec. of State, 19th Nov. 1803 ; Green to Sec. of State,
22nd March, 2nd April 1804; Sec. of State to Gen. Moncrieff,
2nd Jan. 1804.
i88
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
804. Colony was practically impossible ; for the country,
though a level plain, was marshy and overgrown with
thick jungle for some distance inland from the sea.
For defence of the river, therefore, the Dutch engineers
had constructed a series of powerful works. The first
of these was a battery of seven eighteen-pounders
situated at Bram's Point, at the eastern side of the
entrance to the river. Further up the stream stood Fort
Amsterdam, mounting altogether eighty guns, which was
placed on the southern bank of the Commewyne at the
point of its confluence with the Surinam. Over against
it to northward, and at about two thousand yards'
distance on the opposite bank of the Commewyne, stood
Fort Leyden, armed with twelve heavy guns ; and
another work called Frederick's Battery, also of twelve
heavy guns, lay about a mile below Fort Leyden.
Nearly opposite to Fort Amsterdam, on the western
bank of the Surinam, stood Fort Purmerend, containing
ten heavy guns, and having its flanks and rear pro-
tected by a marsh. Further up, and on the same bank,
stood Fort Zeelandia, a battery of ten guns, for the
immediate defence of Paramaribo. The whole of these
works could bring a cross-fire to bear upon the one
channel by which ships could ascend the river ; and
the problem set to Green was to open a passage for
the fleet in despite of them.
1 26. On the 26th the Advanced Corps, augmented to
six hundred rank and file by men of the Sixteenth,
Sixty-fourth, and Sixth West India Regiment, and by
one brigade (or, as we should now say, one battery)
of light artillery, was detached on different ships under
General Maitland's command to Warappa Creek, about
thirty miles to east of the Surinam. Maitland's orders
were to land, find communication by water with
Commewyne Creek, collect boats enough from the
various plantations to carry his troops down the
Commewyne to its junction with the Surinam, take up
a position in rear of Fort Amsterdam, and cut off" a
strong detachment of the enemy which was stationed
ch.vi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 189
in a less important work hard by. On the same day 1804.
the men-of-war Pandora and Emerald engaged and
silenced the fort at Brain's Point, whereupon a small
party of the Sixty-fourth landed and took possession,
capturing over forty of the garrison. The ships then
entered the river, and Green sent a summons to the
Governor to surrender. He was answered on the
28th with defiance, and proceeded at once with the April 28.
task before him.
His chief difficulty was that, owing to the shallow-
ness of the river, landing was everywhere difficult except
at the top of the tide, and below Fort Frederick was
almost impossible on account of the marshes and jungle
on the banks. On the 28 th he tried to disembark a force
for the capture of Fort Purmerend, but was completely
foiled by the unfavourable state of the tide ; and it
was not until the following day that he obtained April 29.
information of a path which led through the woods
upon the rear of Fort Leyden and Frederick's
Battery. On that night between ten and eleven
o'clock Brigadier-general Hughes with one hundred
and eighty men, chiefly of the Sixty-fourth, besides a
party of black pioneers carrying axes, landed quietly
and entered the bush under the guidance of some native
negroes. Heavy rain had rendered the path nearly
impassable, and it was only after five hours of an
intensely fatiguing march that the column at last
approached the rear of Frederick's Battery. The alarm
was given in the fort, and a heavy fire of grape was
poured upon the men as they deployed, which was
seconded by musketry as they advanced ; but they
speedily entered the work and swept the enemy out
with the bayonet. The fugitives fled to Fort Leyden,
though not before they had kindled the powder-maga-
zines, which presently exploded, killing and wounding
many of the British. Hughes, however, quickly rally-
ing his little force, pushed on to Fort Leyden along
a narrow road which was enfiladed by the enemy's
guns, and charging up to the Battery in face of a
3 90 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xm
1804. furious fire, captured over one hundred and twenty
April 29. prisoners. Thus the defences of the eastern bank
north of the Commewyne were secured, and with
them a position from which Fort Amsterdam could
be cannonaded and communication assured with Mait-
land's detachment.
April 30. The following day was employed in throwing up
shelters in the captured works against the fire of
Fort Amsterdam, which, however, was soon silenced
when two British mortars were brought into play ; and
on the same evening Green received intelligence that
Maitland had accomplished his disembarkation suc-
cessfully, having defeated a small party of the enemy
which guarded the landing-place at Warappa Creek, and
captured two guns. Accordingly in the course of the
May 1, 2. next two days the bulk of the force that still remained
upon the ships landed at Fort Leyden, and marched
for some distance up the north bank of the Commewyne
May 3. to await the arrival of Maitland. On the 3rd Maitland
appeared, with his entire column afloat, passing
comfortably down the Commewyne, as had been pre-
arranged. He presently landed on the south bank ;
and, his boats being thus released, Grain's troops were
likewise transferred from the north to the south bank.
The operation was not completed till the afternoon of
May 4. the 4th, when Maitland advanced by a road through
the jungle to within a mile of Fort Amsterdam, and
drove in the enemy's advanced parties. Shortly
afterwards a flag of truce reached Green, and on the
May 5. following day Surinam was delivered over to him by
capitulation. His casualties were trifling, as were also
those of Commodore Hood, the total number of killed
and wounded in Army and Navy not exceeding thirty,
though of these no fewer than ten were officers. The
enemy's force numbered about thirteen hundred white
troops and four hundred negroes, besides the crews of
two small men-of-war, which brought the full roll of
the defenders up to two thousand men. With such
strength, and with over two hundred and eighty guns of
ch.vi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 191
one kind and another, the Dutch should have made a 1804.
better resistance, but for the fact that their officers were
divided among themselves. Ministers in England had
supposed that the province would be delivered up at
once by a people eager for protection ; but, as usual,
not a man of the inhabitants would move to help the
British until he saw that they were likely to be successful.
Addington's Cabinet had made the old mistake, so
often made by Pitt and Dundas between 1793 and
1 801 ; and only by good fortune did it fail to be
again disastrous.
With Victor Hugues at Cayenne, Green judged it
imprudent to leave fewer than fifteen hundred men to
guard the new conquest ; though he was fortunate
enough to enlist some hundreds of the Dutch soldiers
into the British service. But none the less here was
another hostage given to fortune, and another British
battalion relegated to a distant station where the annual
casualties by sickness and death could not be reckoned
at less than one-third of the whole. Nor was this all ;
for still earlier in 1804 England had only narrowly
escaped being saddled with Curacoa as well as
Surinam. Admiral Duckworth, without saying a
word to General Nugent at Jamaica, had sailed in
January to Curacoa with two line -of- battle ships, as
many frigates, and a schooner, intent upon playing the
general. Landing eight hundred men without artillery,
he found himself powerless against a garrison of six
hundred men within fortifications, failed to make the
slightest impression upon the defences, and was fain
to re-embark his men ignobly and sail away. Had he
but communicated his ideas to the General, he would
have received a few gunners and mortars, with which,
as he himself acknowledged, he would have forced the
Dutch to surrender in two or three days. Having,
however, like most naval officers in those days, a keen
and pardonable taste for prize-money, he tried to be
soldier as well as sailor and, very fortunately for all
parties, over-reached himself. But for Pitt's mistaken
192
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1804. policy during the last war, the gallant officer would
have been less eager to capture sugar-islands without
orders from the Cabinet.
In truth Surinam, superadded to previous conquests,
was already far too much. The Commander-in-chief to
Windward naturally begged for reinforcements as soon
as the Colony had fallen, sending a return which showed
his entire force to be eleven thousand men, scattered
over thirteen different islands and settlements, with a
sick list, which he truly pronounced to be normal, of
two thousand. In September the Secretary of State
promised him two battalions ; " but," he added, " every
soldier is imperatively needed to repel a possible invasion
of England by France.,, Nevertheless General Myers
at Barbados and Commodore Hood still hankered after
Curacoa, ostensibly as a station for the distribution of
British manufactures in the Spanish Main. This was
a plea likely to commend itself to British manufacturers
and therefore to the Chancellor of the Exchequer ; but
for once the British Government returned a decided and
unmistakable negative. " Multiplication of garrisons,"
wrote the Minister for War, "weakens the whole of
our islands." The comment was justythough it came
a little late, after the West Indian garrisons had been
multiplied by two through the orders of Ministers
themselves. It is now time to return to England, and
to examine the causes which had converted Addington's
Ministry to principles so sound, so sober, and so
novel.1
1 Green to Sec. of State, 13th May (2 letters) ; to Sullivan, 14th
May; Myers to Sec. of State, 7th, 31st Aug.; Sec. of State to
Myers, Nov. 1804.
CHAPTER VII
It has already been told that England's declaration of 1803.
war came to Bonaparte as a surprise, his preparations
being still altogether incomplete ; and in truth the
weakness of France at sea in May 1803 was such as May.
would have daunted many men. Forty-eight vessels,
carrying each from eighty to ten guns, were at St.
Domingo, of which number seven ships only were
destined to escape capture or destruction by taking
refuge in different ports of Spain. The whole, therefore,
might be practically looked upon as lost. In March the
French Admiralty reported that all the ports of France
could in a month's time produce but five ships of the
line and ten frigates ready for sea, and in six months'
time no more than twenty-one ships of the line and
nineteen frigates. In June matters had not improved. June.
There were but three line-of-battle ships at Brest, all of
them short of their complement of men, and as many
more at Toulon. In such circumstances it is not
astonishing that Bonaparte's first care was for the
protection of his own coasts, and that he should have
shown particular anxiety for the safety of the island of
Walcheren as the gate of the Scheldt. But even for
defence his maritime resources were dangerously small,
for though nearly two hundred gunboats remained on
the list of the French Navy, only twenty-seven of them
were even tolerably sound. The naval impotence of
France, as their own writers confess, was as great in
1803 after three years of the Consulate, as in 1793
after four years of revolution.
VOL. V 193 o
1 94
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1803. Powerless to strike at sea, Bonaparte lost no time
in doing England such mischief as he could on land
A few days before the declaration of war he began to
concentrate his garrisons in Holland ; and on the 31st
May 31. of May Mortier invaded Hanover at the head of
twenty-five thousand men, brushed away such feeble
opposition as was made to him, and on the 3rd of
June 3. June took over the entire province under a convention
The Hanoverian troops retired for the moment to the
east of the Elbe, but were destined to avenge them-
selves, as shall in due time be seen, in another land
and under another name. The chief mischief wrought
to England by this stroke was the shutting of the
Elbe and the Weser to her trade ; but to Bonaparte
the gain of the province was indirectly most valuable
for he could use it, as he said, as a bone for Prussia to
gnaw ; and, with such a prize to dangle before her
he could be sure of attracting her to his side
Simultaneously he called upon Spain for the help that
she was bound to afford him under the Treaty of
San Ildefonso, ordered Gouvion St. Cyr to invade
Neapolitan territory and occupy Tarento, Otranto, and
Brindisi, and directed Leghorn to«be placed under
martial law. He also forbade the entry into the ports
of France or her allies of all colonial produce coming
directly from England or from any of her possessions
If he could not meet the British fleet at sea, he would
at least exclude British merchantmen from as many
harbours as possible, especially in the Mediterranean
while the occupation of the peninsula of Otranto served
the additional purpose of threatening the Levant, the
Morea, and Egypt. If he could not prevent England
from foiling his colonial projects and sweeping the
whole of the Antilles into her net, he would at any
rate close against her every market that he could
control, and so lay the foundation of the Continental
System.1
But these measures, however formidable, wer
1 Sorel, vi. 309.
ch.vii HISTORY OF THE ARMY
r95
secondary to a still vaster project which was ripening 1303.
in his brain for more signal humiliation of the inveterate
enemy. In March he had given orders for the creation
of a flotilla of five hundred craft at Dunkirk and
Cherbourg, the whole of which were to be ready by
September ; and in June he compelled the Batavian
Republic to provide ten ships of war, transports for
twenty-five thousand men, one hundred gunboats, and
two hundred and fifty flat-boats for a descent upon
England. From Spain he claimed fifteen ships of
the line besides smaller vessels, though finally after
months of haggling he accepted a subsidy of ^240,000
a month in their stead. From Hanover he required
the construction of flat-bottomed boats in the Weser
and the Elbe. From France herself he demanded
that twenty ships should be fit for sea at Brest by
the third week in November ; and, after many changes Aug. 2
of plan, he decreed that two thousand small craft
should likewise be constructed by the same date.
On the 14th of June he had ordered the concentration
of the Grand Army in six camps, one in Holland, and
the rest at Ghent, St. Omer, Compiegne, St. Malo, and
Bayonne ; and therewith his original design was, on
paper, complete. The small craft for the conveyance
of troops were one and all to be armed, with the
object apparently of fighting their way through the
British fleet, if necessary. One hundred and ten or
twenty thousand men would be embarked on them ;
they would slip across the Channel on some favourable
night of fog and darkness during the winter ; a
revolution would break out in London at the sight of
the French Army, and England would become a
vassal of France.1
Such was the project which from, the end of May
onwards possessed the brain of Bonaparte. For the
present it was, as we shall see, both wild and vague ;
but possibly for that very reason it struck the greater
alarm into the British Ministry. The First Lord of
1 Sorel, vi. 310 ; Desbriere.
196
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1803. the Admiralty at this time was Lord St. Vincent, who,
in the enthusiasm of an economic crusade against the
corruption in the dockyards, had not only allowed
artificers to be discharged and valuable material to be
sold, but had omitted to replenish the stock of necessary
stores. His instinct for strategic dispositions was as
sound as ever ; and squadrons under renowned
commanders were soon watching every one of the
French naval arsenals. Nelson lay before Toulon ;
Pellew shut in the fugitive vessels from St. Domingo
at Ferrol ; Collingwood cruised off Rochefort ; Corn-
wallis, a seaman unsurpassed in vigilance, nerve, and
resolution, blockaded Brest. But the numbers of their
ships were insufficient ; and Nelson complained bitterly,
though to no purpose, that the majority of those under
his command were unfit for sea. Looking to the 1
contemptible strength of the French Navy at the
outbreak of the war, an invasion of England may seem
to us now a plan so hazardous as to be absurd ; but
our ancestors may be forgiven if, with a Bonaparte on e
the other side of the Channel, they wished to be ready a
for any contingency.
In virtue of the large establishment voted in 1802, 0
and by the timely suspension of the disbandment of
many condemned corps, the British Government had
ready to its hand a regular army incomparably stronger
and more efficient than had ever before been seen at
the beginning of any war. Moreover, despite of St.
Vincent's failure at the Admiralty, England's superiority
at sea was overwhelming. Here, therefore, was an k
opportunity, such as is not often afforded, for augment- i:
ing the Regular Army to formidable strength by means b
of the tens of thousands of men trained during the ;
last war, and disconcerting the whole of Bonaparte's :
plans by a vigorous offensive movement. The obvious 1
sphere for such a movement was the Mediterranean.
The French invasion of Calabria was of course a glaring j
violation of the neutrality of the Kingdom of the Two
Sicilies. The Court of Naples, though utterly corrupt .
ch. vir HISTORY OF THE ARMY
197
and inefficient, at least preferred British protection to 1803.
the encroachments and menaces of Bonaparte. The
Apulians hated the French invaders, and might easily be
brought to turn against them savagely, both as individuals
and in masses. Gouvion St. Cyr lay weak and isolated
at the very heel of Italy, almost the remotest point to
southward that could be reached by French troops.
Thirty thousand British soldiers, or forty thousand if
transport could be found for them, concentrated in
Sicily, with their ships ready, would have stirred up
dangerous unrest in the whole of the Peninsula. They
would have compelled Bonaparte to drain men from
France for reinforcement of the Italian garrisons, and
would have constrained him either to double the
strength of St. Cyr's corps, or to recall it altogether and
to relieve Nelson from all anxiety as to the safety
of the Levant, of Egypt, and of India. If Austria,
later on, were drawn into hostilities, forty thousand
British troops could give her most effective help on
either flank of Italy ; while, on the other hand, such
a force might well harden Spain in her reluctance to
yield to Bonaparte's claims upon her under the Treaty
of San Ildefonso. Italy, in fact, the scene of Bona-
parte's triumphs, the acquisition that was dearest to
his heart, was the sphere where a British fleet and
a British army, under command of such a man as
Moore, might have made a diversion that Bonaparte
himself could not have ignored.
But no such ideas occurred to Addington or to his
colleagues. Dumouriez, whom they consulted late in
the year, advocated an attack upon Walcheren and an
expedition to Portugal as the best means of checking
a descent upon Ireland, which he justly held to be the
most vulnerable point in the Empire, Ministers may
well have been justified in rejecting both projects ; but
they were equally deaf to all the protests of Dumouriez
against an inert defensive.1 Their only notion was to
1 Rose and Broadley's Dumouriez and the Defence of England,
PP- 332-337-
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1803. leave to Bonaparte all initiative, and suffer the strength
of England to be paralysed by a menace from Boulogne.
The only augmentation ordered for the army was an
addition of eleven men to every troop of dragoons and
of ten to every company of Guards ; and Mr. Yorke,
June 6. the Secretary at War, when introducing the estimates
took credit for the moderation of the increase.
Ministers, in fact, were resolved to stand wholly on
the defensive, except in the West Indies, and, moreover,
considered the resolution to be exceedingly clever.
The Militia Act of 1802 1 had been framed wholly
with this view. It provided for raising by ballot, and
by no other means, fifty -one thousand five hundred
men between the ages of eighteen and forty-five, and
at least five feet four inches in height, from all the
parishes of Great Britain ; giving the King power,
moreover, on menace of invasion or rebellion to
augment that number by one-half on calling Parliament
together within fourteen days. Any parish which
failed to produce its quota of men was fined annually
£10 for every man deficient. The men were to be
trained for twenty-one days annually ; and enlistment
from the Militia into the Regular Ari»y was positively 1;
forbidden. They were to be chosen by ballot, and if
they accepted the lot that fell upon them, were to serve
for five years ; receiving from the parochial rates, if
they were worth less than £500, a sum equal to half the
cost of a substitute. Such men were at liberty to pro-
long their service on giving notice four months before
the expiration of their term, and stating the sum which
they demanded for such prolongation. But there were j
several ways whereby service in the Militia could be t
evaded. In the first place, parishes could produce If
parochial substitutes and levy a rate to purchase them, j| ;
up to the price of £6 a head. In the second place, a |
ballotted man, or to use the contemporary name, a |-
lotman, could provide a personal substitute, towards the j| \
cost of which the parish gave him, if he were worth |i n
1 42 Geo. III. caps. 90, 91.
ch.vii HISTORY OF THE ARMY
199
less than £500, half the current price of a substitute, 1802.
such substitutes being required to be drawn from the
" same or some adjoining county or place." And
thirdly, he could purchase exemption for five years by
the payment of £10. But whereas ballotted men, who
accepted service, were enrolled for five years only and
then released until their turn to be ballotted should
come again in rotation, substitutes were retained until
the disembodiment of the Militia, or, in other words,
until the end of the war. All sergeants and drummers,
again, were enlisted for life. Hence, unless the
majority of the lotmen were ready to serve in person,
which was contrary to all experience, Addington's
Militia Act promised to lock up a vast number of
men in the Militia, who would otherwise have enlisted
in the Army.
To this enactment the Ministry added another in
the'same session of 1 802 for dealing with the Volunteers.
The Volunteer Acts passed by Pitt during the late war
had expired with the war ; and, in the uncertainty of
the continuance of peace, the Government thought it
expedient to enable such of the corps as were willing, to
prolong their service. Now the Volunteers called into
existence by Pitt had been established upon a totally
false principle. They had been dependent mainly upon
private subscriptions, and governed by committees of
the subscribers, who were not necessarily officers ; and
it was therefore extremely doubtful whether they were
commanded by their titular commanding officers or by
their committees. Jealousy and self-importance had
prompted a vast majority of the corps to organise
themselves into small and insignificant units, so that
they might reserve to themselves the greater indepen-
dence, and indulge to the utmost their peculiar ideas and
idiosyncrasies. They were subject to no discipline
excepting their own rules, which could only be enforced
by public opinion. They were, therefore, practically
under no control ; and as an inevitable consequence,
they were for the most part utterly useless. Here,
200
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
802. therefore, was an opportunity for reconstituting them
upon some sounder basis, if they were to be revived at
all ; but Lord Hobart who, though Secretary of State
for War, had for some reason taken over the charge of
the Volunteers from the Home Secretary, was far too
incapable to think of any such thing. Hence the
Volunteer Act of 1802, without attempting to remedy
a single defect, simply empowered the King to accept
any offers from Yeomanry and Volunteer corps to
prolong their service, and, in return, guaranteed such
corps exemption from the Militia ballot in consideration
of their undergoing five days' exercise annually.
A fair number of corps accepted these terms in
1802, but a great number refused them, seeing no
occasion for any such patriotic display in time of peace.
As the prospects of war became more certain, however,
803. the Government issued on the 31st of March 1803
a Circular calling for more Volunteers, at the same
time submitting a scale of allowances which they pro-
posed to grant for their maintenance and encourage-
ment. The response to this was ready and even eager.
But presently Ministers bethought themselves that if
they created too many Volunteers they»would leave no
men to be ballotted for the Militia ; wherefore, after
effusive acceptance of a great many offers of Volunteer
corps, they suddenly and abruptly declined to answer
further applications. Many thousands of men who
had tendered their services were thus kept in suspense,
and, as was natural, murmured loudly at such treatment ;
and, since they had really been inspired in the vast
majority of cases by truly patriotic motives, they com-
plained that the Government was deliberately damping
the ardour of the people. This was unjust. Adding-
ton and his colleagues were only hesitating until they
should have ascertained their own minds. But this
was a lengthy process, for it was extremely doubtful
whether they possessed any minds beyond such frag-
ments as their lofty patron, Pitt, might choose to dole
out to them.
ch.vii HISTORY OF THE ARMY
201
Meanwhile, on the nth of March a proclamation 1803.
was published for the embodiment of the Militia ; when
that force in Great Britain was found to be in an ex-
tremely unsatisfactory state. Notwithstanding that the
ballots had been going on ever since the previous
December, the levy was still incomplete, and very
seriously incomplete. Even in Ireland, where Militia-
men were raised almost entirely by voluntary enlistment
for a bounty of two guineas, there was a considerable
deficiency. In Great Britain there had been a rush for
substitutes, the price of which had already run up to an
extravagant figure. There had been some recalcitrance
in Scotland, and persistent evasion everywhere ; and
crimps and insurance - societies 1 had been driving a
roaring trade. This was a serious matter, for war was
drawing nearer every day. An Act was passed on the
24th of March to prolong the annual training of the
Militia from twenty-one days to twenty-eight ; and
another Act of the 7 th of April made an attempt to
ensure that there should be some men to be trained, by
doubling the bounty for the Irish Militia from two
guineas to four. Then on the 16th of May, as has
been told, war was declared ; and on the 28 th the
Government called out the additional contingent of
Militia, known as the Supplementary Militia, which
was authorised by the Act of 1802. This signified
that Great Britain, which so far had failed to pro-
duce fifty-one thousand men in four or five months,
must now produce another twenty -five thousand ; 2
and, in order to quicken the process, an Act of the
27th of May levied a cumulative penalty of £10 every
quarter upon the counties for every man deficient of
their quota, raised the fine for exemption from £10
to ^15, and made substitutes who had deserted liable,
upon conviction, to serve in the Regular Army abroad.
This, however, did not prevent but rather stimulated a
1 Societies which, for a certain premium, undertook to provide
men with a substitute or with the amount of the exemption-fine.
2 Ireland had no Supplementary Militia.
202
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1803. second rush for substitutes, with the natural result that
their cost again increased rapidly. With high prices,
which were commonly called, and to all intents actually
were, high bounties, crimps grew rich, and desertion
and fraudulent enlistment flourished more abundantly.
These hasty measures did not escape sharp criticism,
for, when men could gain from £20 to ^30 as sub-
stitutes, they were not likely to accept a bounty of
£7:12:6 to enter the Regular Army. Windham
attacked the whole system fiercely, pointing out that
if men could earn large sums by serving for a few years
at home, they could not be expected to enlist for life
to serve in the Regular Army in any part of the globe.
Pitt echoed Windham's strictures, and both agreed in
condemning a purely defensive policy as alike ruinous
and dishonourable.1 But Addington was popular with
the country members ; and the House accepted his
assurance that he was only dealing with defensive
measures first, in view of the vast preparations of the
enemy. When the opportunity for offensive operations
should arrive, he added, no doubt the country would
afford means for supporting them with honour.
The dull, pompous man was therefore permitted to
proceed with his defensive measures. He had long
paltered with the Volunteers, sometimes urging them to
tender their services, sometimes refusing to accept their
offers; and he now passed what was called a Defence Act,
the object of which seems to have been to stimulate them
to come forward. It directed the Lords- Lieutenant
to furnish lists of all able-bodied men, between the ages
of fifteen and sixty, who were willing to serve in defence
of their country ; distinguishing among these such as
were Yeomen or Volunteers, and such as were ready
to serve as waggoners, pioneers, or the like. It also
required returns as to the vehicles, horses, cattle, forage,
and so forth in the country, giving powers for the
destruction or removal of them in case of invasion,
and for the acquisition of land for military purposes.
1 Pari. Hist, xxxvi. p. 1574, 6th June 1803.
ch.vii HISTORY OF THE ARMY
203
Lastly it ordained that persons enrolled in Volunteer 1803
corps after the passing of the Act should not be called
out except according to their own conditions of service,
nor except in case of invasion or imminent danger
thereof. A more foolish enactment, except as regards
the registration of horses and kindred matters, was
never proposed ; for it was and is the undoubted right
of the Sovereign to call up all able-bodied men to serve
in defence of their country, willing or unwilling ; and
there was little object, therefore, in ascertaining whether
they were willing or not.
Moreover, the enactment as to the Volunteers was
nugatory, for, a few days after the Act had been
passed, Ministers finally made up their minds what they
would do about them, and issued a code of regulations
which became known as the June Allowances. Hereby June
they offered to the Volunteer Corps pay for eighty-five
days' exercise in the year, as well as salaries for
a limited number of officers and for a permanent
staff ; requiring from them in return an agreement to
serve in any part of their military district. On the
other hand, the Government announced that no Volunteer
enrolled after the 16th of June would be exempted
from the ballot for a new force, shortly about to be
called into being. Nevertheless the terms were so
liberal that they were readily embraced on all sides, and
produced many additional tenders of service from new
Volunteer corps. But now the Cabinet took alarm at
the expense ; and once again, amid deep groans from
disappointed patriots, their offers were left unanswered.
On the 20th of June the bill for creating the new
force above-named — the most important of the
Government's measures — was duly brought forward in
the House of Commons, and on the 6 th of July became July-
law under the name of the Additional Force Act. It
ordained that within the year there should be raised by
ballot in the United Kingdom, an Army of Reserve of
fifty thousand men, namely thirty-four thousand from
England, six thousand from Scotland, and ten thousand
204
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1803. from Ireland, the whole to be duly apportioned among
the counties and parishes as in the case of the Militia.
In Ireland the Lord - Lieutenant was empowered to
enlist the men by beat of drum instead of by the
ballot, at his discretion. The standard of height was
to be five feet two inches ; and service could be
commuted by any ballotted man either by the pro-
duction of a substitute, which assured permanent
exemption, or by the payment of ^20, which sum
purchased immunity from the ballot for one year only.
All men were to be enrolled for service in the United
Kingdom and Channel Islands alone, principals for five
years, substitutes for the same term or until six months
after the signature of a definitive peace. Parishes failing
to produce their appointed quota of men were subjected
to a cumulative fine of ^20, to be repeated every
quarter, for every man deficient. Exemption was
granted to all Volunteers and Yeomanry enrolled
before the 22 nd of June, provided that their offers of
service extended, in the event of invasion, to every
part of their military district, or in other words, pro-
vided that they had accepted the June Allowances.
Finally the members of the Army df Reserve were
permitted to enlist into the Regular Army.
The augmentation of the Regular Army was the
principal purpose of the Act, though the fact does not
appear upon its surface. Nor, in theory, was the plan
upon which it was based by any means essentially bad.
The fifty thousand men were to be formed into fifty
second battalions to as many regiments of the line,
and were to be tempted by bounties to fill up the gaps
in the first battalions as occasion might require. The
Duke of York, ever since he had been Commander-in-
chief, had been striving hard to give a second battalion
to every regiment of regular British infantry ; and he
it was, no doubt, who had suggested this organisation.
But Pitt, who had originally urged the measure upon
Addington, had, under the inspiration of the Horse
Guards, very wisely designed to enlarge its scope, and to
ch.vii HISTORY OF THE ARMY
add to it further machinery for filling up the gaps in 1803.
the Army of Reserve itself every year, so that it should
be maintained at a constant strength. This most
important detail was wholly omitted by Addington and
Hobart. Entirely ignorant of all military matters, they
provided simply for sudden increase of the Army by a
spasmodic and costly effort, not for its permanent
support, nor for making good the waste of war.
What they actually did was to augment the number of
men to be raised by ballot in a single year to one
hundred and ten or twenty thousand men, admitting
throughout the principle of substitution, which as a
natural consequence swept into the Militia and Army
of Reserve every man who might with better manage-
ment have been recruited into the Army. The policy
was furiously attacked by Windham, who looked upon
it as fatal to all chance of ever creating an offensive
force. He maintained that no enlistment ought to be
permitted for any troops except the Regulars, and that
for the Militia there should be no alternative between
personal service or heavy fines for exemption, the
proceeds of which fines should be gathered into a
general recruiting -fund. " I would sooner leave the
Militia incomplete," he said, " than introduce that fatal
principle of substitution." 1 He spoke to deaf ears.
Pitt, for reasons best known to himself, defended the
measure as it stood ; and his voice prevailed. The race
for substitutes naturally became a headlong scramble
after the passing of the Act ; but still Addington and
Hobart had not exhausted their powers of ineptitude.
Their next action, however, showed some return of
sense, for it consisted in a bill to amend the absurd
Defence Act of the 1 1 th of June, which became law on
the 27th of July as the Levy en Masse Act. It was July 27.
based upon the undoubted right of the Sovereign to
demand military service of all his subjects to repel
invasion, and provided the following machinery for
that purpose.
1 Pari Hist, xxxvi. p. 1622, 23rd June 1803.
206
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
The Lords-Lieutenant, to whom the entire execution
of the Act was entrusted, were required to obtain lists
of all men between the ages of seventeen and fifty-five,
and to sort them into four classes, namely : first,
unmarried men under thirty years of age, with no child
living under ten years old ; secondly, unmarried men
between thirty and fifty years of age, with no child as
aforesaid ; thirdly, married men from seventeen to
thirty years of age, with not more than two children
living under ten years old ; fourthly, all other men
whatsoever. Exemption was granted to the infirm, to
the judges, to clergymen, schoolmasters, persons actually
serving in the Army, Navy, and Reserve Forces, Lords-
Lieutenant, their Deputies, and peace-officers. The
King was empowered to direct any parish to be provided
with arms ; and to order the three first classes to be
trained, under the superintendence of the Deputy-
Lieutenants, for two hours on every Sunday or other
convenient day in the week from Lady Day to Christmas,
and moreover, until Christmas 1803, on at least fourteen
and at most twenty successive days. Deputy-Lieutenants
were authorised to hire instructors and to appoint
four officers to every six-score met^; and provision
was made for enforcing attendance by means of fines,
and punishing misconduct on parade by fine, and by im-
prisonment for seven days in default of payment. In
case of invasion or imminent danger thereof the whole
or any part of the men enrolled under the Act were
liable to be embodied in new battalions, or in existing
corps of Regulars or Militia, and marched to any part of
Great Britain. If only a part of the classes was to be
embodied, the required number was to be selected by
ballot ; but in places where Volunteer corps had been
formed, or where a number of men of any age between
seventeen and fifty, equal to three-fourths of the first
class, engaged themselves to serve as Volunteers and to
march to any part of Great Britain in case of invasion,
the King was empowered to suspend the compulsory
training prescribed by the Act. An amending Act,
ch. vii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 207
passed a fortnight later, provided further that if the 1803.
number of Volunteers in any county were satisfactory
to the King, he could suspend the operation of the
Levy en Masse Act, even though such number did not
amount to the prescribed tale of three-fourths of the
first class.
This measure amounted practically to an Act to
compel men to become Volunteers, and was meant to
be interpreted as such. The Government on the 30th July 30.
of July had sent a Circular to the Lords- Lieutenant
limiting the numbers of men to be immediately trained
to six times the quota of the Ordinary Militia, or in
round figures to three hundred and nine thousand
privates, and directing that the enrolment of Volunteers
up to that number should be encouraged. This instruction
was supplemented on the 3rd of August by promulga- Aug. 3.
tion of a new set of allowances, known as the August
Allowances, for all Volunteer corps accepted after the
22nd of June. The Circular set forth the impossibility,
on financial grounds, of extending the June Allowances
to a greater number of men than already received them ;
and offered in their stead to such infantry corps as
might in future be formed a grant of ^1 a man for
clothing every three years, and one shilling a day for
twenty days' exercise in the year. No allowance
for clothing and appointments was to be made in
future to men entering corps of Yeomanry ; but, under
the Levy en Masse Act, men who appeared on horse-
back, properly armed and accoutred at their own
expense, were excused from service in the infantry, and
might either be attached to existing corps of Yeomanry,
or formed into new troops or regiments.
Having done this, the Government proceeded, on
the 1 1 th of August, to pass an Act known as the Aug. 1 1 .
Billetting Act, to enable Volunteers and Yeomen to be
billetted upon occasion. Incidentally this enactment
subjected both Yeomanry and Volunteers to military
law, if called out to repel invasion, and transferred
them in the same emergency from the control of the
208
HISTORY OF THE ARMY bookxiii
1803. Lords-Lieutenant to that of the General commanding
their districts. It made likewise some kind of provision
for discipline at other times by vesting the funds of all
Volunteer corps in their commanding officers, and
making the collection of fines, which had been imposed
upon the Volunteers under the rules of their corps,
recoverable by distress. Lastly it ordained the qualifica-
tion of an effective Yeoman to be attendance at twelve
days' exercise, and of an effective infantry Volunteer to
be attendance at twenty-four days' exercise in the year ;
and exempted all such effective men from the ballot,
not only for the Army of Reserve, but for any other
Additional Force that might be raised in future. How
this last clause ever passed through both Houses of
Parliament is and remains a mystery. Sir William
Yonge averred that it had been surreptitiously introduced
into the House at a time when most of the members
had left London for the country in order to drill with
their various regiments ; 1 and this is possible, for the
provision was certainly contrary not only to the Army
of Reserve Act itself but, by their own admission, to
the actual intention of Ministers. Indeed, in spite of
the plain words of the Act, they cdtlld not believe
that the section really exempted Volunteers from the
ballot for the Army of Reserve, until their own Law-
Officers pronounced that undoubtedly it had such force ;
when with infinite mortification they communicated the
unwelcome news to the Lords- Lieutenant. Thus,
with a masterpiece of careless imbecility, ended the
summer session of 1803.
The effect of all these measures concerning the
Volunteers was, of course, immediate. There was a
general rush for enrolment ; and the offers of service
poured in with such abundance that the War Office
Aug. 18. was fairly swamped with them. On the 18th of
August the Lords - Lieutenant were informed by
Circular that the classes need not be called out under
the Levy en Masse Act, and that the operation of the
1 H.D. Commons, 14th Dec. 1803.
ch. vii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 209
measure in regard to training was suspended. It was 1803.
further intimated to them that the voluntary system
could not be carried to an unlimited extent, and that
no additional corps would be accepted in counties
where the number of effective Volunteers, including
Yeomanry, exceeded the appointed number of six times
the quota of the Ordinary Militia. In truth Ministers
were already appalled at the monster that they had
called into being without any adequate means of
controlling it ; and, moreover, they had quite overlooked
the difficulty of arming this host of men. Another
Circular, therefore, was issued to the Lieutenants on the
22nd of August, asking what number of arms could be
procured from public or private sources in each county,
and intimating that for the present the Government
did not propose to issue firelocks for more than one
man in four of the appointed quota, which number
would, in its opinion, suffice for purposes of training.
The remainder would be provided with pikes, of
which there was an amply sufficient supply.
The answers to these Circulars was a howl of dis-
content. The nation was ablaze with the first furious
flame of patriotic ardour, and felt such announcements
to be drenches of cold water. Ministers had asked for
Volunteers to defend the country, and every able-bodied
man was eager to respond to the summons. What
manner of Government was this which presumed to
say that thousands should be excluded from the per-
formance of an honourable duty, and to trifle with the
supply of arms? The clamour was loudest in the
maritime counties, which, being the most exposed to
danger, were naturally and reasonably the most eager
to equip themselves for defence ; and the Government
had put itself in the wrong by the egregious blunder of
making the quota the same for all counties, whether
inland or upon the coast. In the height of the crisis
the direction of the Volunteers was re-transferred from Aug.
the War Office to the Home Office ; and the unhappy
■Mr. Yorke found himself confronted with a vast mass
VOL. V
P
2IO
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xnr
1803. of unanswered letters containing offers of Volunteers
from all quarters. For a week he wrestled with them,
and then giving up the attempt in despair, he issued on
Aug. 31. the 31st two Circulars to announce that all the offers
were accepted, provided that they did not exceed the
quota laid down in Lord Hobart's Circular of the 18 th
of August ; also that a certain number of supernumerary
volunteers might be attached to accepted corps, which
supernumeraries, however, should be entitled to no
allowance whatever from Government and should enjoy
no exemption from the ballot. For the rest, all troops
and companies must be of a certain strength, and
muskets would be issued for one-fourth of the appointed
quota, unless the arms already provided by corps for
themselves rendered so large a proportion unnecessary.
For the remainder of the infantry and for the artillery
there was abundance of pikes, which could be furnished
to any number that was required.
These concessions, though more apparent than real,
stilled the clamour for a time ; and at this point it will be
well to show exactly what the Government had accom-
plished. First, it had ordered some hundred and
twenty thousand men to be raised by ballot within a few
months for the Ordinary Militia, Supplementary Militia,
and Army of Reserve. The general terms of service for
the three were the same, but the standard for the Militia,
until the 27th of July, was five feet four inches, and
for the Army of Reserve five feet two inches. An Act
of the 27th of July,1 however, had lowered the standard
for substitutes in the Militia to five feet two inches ;
so that according to the letter of the law there was one
standard for principals and another for substitutes.
Substitutes for the Militia might not have more than
one child born in lawful wedlock, while substitutes for
the Army of Reserve might have an unlimited number.
In the Ordinary Militia a fine of £io9 and in the
Supplementary Militia a fine of ^15 purchased ex-
emption from the ballot for five years ; in the Army of
1 43 Geo. III. cap. 100.
ch.vii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 211
Reserve a fine of £20 purchased exemption for one 1803.
year only. Lastly, men who served in person or by
substitute in the Militia were exempt from the ballot
for the Army of Reserve, and vice versa ; but men who
had only paid the exemption-fine for one of these two
forces were not immune from the ballot for the other.
Again, five days' exercise sufficed to deliver any Yeoman
or Volunteer from the ballot for the Militia, but a
Yeoman must undergo twelve days' drill, and an
infantry Volunteer twenty-four days' annually to obtain
deliverance from the Army of Reserve. These dis-
tinctions were not all of them made quite clear in the
Acts, with the consequence that they were imperfectly
grasped by the county authorities and hardly appre-
hended at all by the body of the people. The natural
result was enormous correspondence between the Home
Office and the Lords -Lieutenant, endless confusion
in making the levies, and deep resentment among all
classes that were liable to the ballot. The task of the
Lieutenancies in raising so great a body of men would
under the most favourable conditions have been very
arduous ; but the action of the Government made it
practically impossible of performance. The wholesale
exemption from all ballots of over three hundred thou-
sand Volunteers, chiefly unmarried men, threw the
obligation upon married men, to whom personal service
was often ruinous. Once again, therefore, the price of
substitutes rose with a bound to ^30, £40, and even
£60. The proceeds of the exemption-fines which, in
theory, were supposed to enable the parishes to pur-
chase substitutes for the men who had paid them,
were of course inadequate. The parish officers resorted
in despair to the crimps. The crimps — and there was
probably at least one crimp, professional or amateur,
in every parish — observant of the daily increasing value
of their goods, were in no haste to place them on the
market. Menaced, therefore, by exorbitant prices on
the one hand, and the spectre of cumulative quarterly
fines on the other, the parochial authorities finally sat
212
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1803. down in despair, hoarding the exemption-fines against
the day when the price of recruits should fall, or a lucky
chance should throw them some poacher or beggar who
would be glad to enlist in order to escape from the law.
Much of the trouble had been brought about by the
anxiety of the Government to create a force of Volunteers ;
yet the Volunteers themselves were in the same con-
fusion as the ballotted levies. In the first place, they
were divided into two totally distinct sections, supported
by two different scales of allowances, enrolled under
two different conditions of service, and governed by
two distinct Acts of Parliament. Those under the
June Allowances, who may be called the Old Volunteers,
were liberally supported, liable by the Government's
own deed to service within their military district only
and were administered under the Volunteer Act of 1802
and the supplementary provisions of the Billetting Act of
1803. Those under the August allowances — the New
Volunteers, as they may be termed — were stinted in the
matter of grants from the Treasury, liable for service
in any part of Great Britain, and administered under the
Levy en Masse Act. The more favourable position
of the Old Volunteers naturally ga*e rise to much
jealousy and incidentally led to much friction. The
Government very rightly encouraged the amalgamation
of isolated troops and companies into regiments and
battalions ; and hence it frequently happened that corps
were composed in various proportions of units engaged
on varying terms of service, half of the companies
perhaps under the June Allowances, and half under
the August Allowances. Thus a man in one company
who absented himself from drill was liable only to the
penalty imposed by the rules of the corps, while a similar
offender in another company of the same battalion could
be fined under the Levy en Masse Act. Again, a man
of one company who misconducted himself on parade
was subject to the fine prescribed by the rules of the
corps ; but a man guilty of the like offence in another
company could not only be mulcted, probably, in a
ch.vii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 213
different sum of money, but could be imprisoned in 1803.
default of payment. Yet again, the Old Volunteers,
being but men, were not immortal, and therefore were
constantly diminished by casualties. Though in theory
no more Volunteers were to have been accepted after
a certain date, except on the August Allowances, it was
impossible to break faith with officers who had raised
corps on the understanding that they should receive
the June Allowances ; and it was therefore laid down
that these should be permitted to fill any vacancies
which left their corps short of establishment. The
commanders of the Old Volunteers, therefore, enjoyed
a peculiar kind of patronage. Being able to offer the
best terms, they could, of course, be sure of obtaining
the best men ; and it was no uncommon thing for
commanders of New Volunteers to find that some of
their most promising recruits had left them without a
word and gone to some troop or regiment of Old
Volunteers.
Incidentally this brought up the whole question
whether Volunteers at large had or had not the right
to resign when they pleased. The Law-Officers of the
Crown decided against any such right ; and the Govern-
ment circulated their opinion to the Lieutenancies for
their guidance. On the other hand, Erskine, the famous
advocate and future Chancellor, who commanded with
extreme inefficiency the Inns of Court Volunteers, up-
held the opposite contention in letters to the public
prints, with all the pomp of florid and redundant
verbiage which was to be expected from a man whose
rhetorical powers were only exceeded by his consuming
vanity. The letters spread like wildfire all over England,
and were not only eagerly devoured but were quoted
as of paramount authority by Volunteers in all quarters.
I Commandants were in despair, for their powers of
discipline were already insufficient. The great mass
of the Volunteers were ordinary labouring men, who
had already discovered that the only penalty for not
jattending drill was a fine, which had little terror for
2i4 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xm
1803. those who possessed no property. The remainder were
men of superior education, though by no means always
of superior character, who had given to their corps the
form of a club, and in many cases claimed the right
to elect their own officers. If every sulky or dis-
contented man could resign whenever he pleased, then,
in the opinion of many commandants, there was an end
of ail discipline. The question agitated the force all
through the winter of 1 803 ; the Government striving
to comfort themselves with the reflection that men who
declined to serve as Volunteers could be trained com-
pulsorily under the Levy en Masse Act, but forgetting
that it would be almost impossible to find officers and
instructors for such levies, and that the establishment of
yet another description of force for home defence would
only further confound the existing confusion. At
length the controversy came before the Courts of Law,
when the Judges of the King's Bench decided, on the
6th of February 1804, in favour of Erskine's con-
tention that every Volunteer had the right to resign at
his own will.
Much trouble was engendered also by the dearth
of arms ; the muskets in the arsenals being utterly
insufficient to meet the enormous demand. Great
numbers of Volunteer corps, with excellent spirit, came
out and drilled for week after week without weapon
of any kind, until at last they very pardonably lost
patience and declared that they would proceed no
longer with such a travesty of training. Ministers
in vain offered to supply pikes to any number : the
men would not receive them. The Volunteer infantry,
by the Government's own direction, had been clothed
in scarlet like the Regulars ; and it had no intention
of being armed except as the Regular Infantry, with
firelock and bayonet. Was not the pike the weapon
of regicide French and rebel Irish? and of what
service would it be against a French musket ? The
discontent was so acute in many quarters that the
Lords - Lieutenant apprehended the dissolution of
ch.vii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 215
very many corps ; and incidentally this same dearth 1803.
of arms gave birth to a legitimate grievance. The
law laid down that Volunteers, to gain their ex-
emption from the ballot, must appear at exercise
properly armed and accoutred for a certain number
of days before the 21st of September. Many com-
manders, naturally unwilling to waste all the days
of drill without training in arms, reserved a certain
number of them against the time when the long-expected
muskets should arrive ; and waiting too long, sacrificed
the exemption for their corps. These naturally pro-
tested against the strict enforcement of the law in their
case ; and many others indignantly asked how it was
possible for them to appear properly armed and accoutred
when Government failed to supply arms and accoutre-
ments. The situation was most awkward, for the
Secretary of State could not override the law ; and he
could only promise to pass a short Act of Parliament at
the earliest possible moment, which he duly did on the
13th of December 1803, to remove the grievance and to
grant exemption for drills thus attended without arms.
However, in spite of all obstacles, the Volunteers con-
tinued to increase steadily during the autumn and winter
of 1803. There was much sound patriotic feeling
as yet at the heart of the movement. Private sub-
scriptions for the foundation and maintenance of corps
had been abundant and generous, so that officers of
regiments on the August Allowances were practically able
for the present to give their men the June Allowances ;
this being the one means whereby harmony could be
kept up between the New Volunteers and the Old.
Enormous sums were foolishly squandered upon dress
and frippery at large ; but for the moment enthusiasm
averted any serious financial pressure. The men were
delighted with their smart new uniforms, and the officers
supremely well satisfied not only with their gold and
silver lace, but with their new titles. In the session
of 1803 there were already so many Colonels in the
Commons that Robert Craufurd, the future leader of
2l6
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1803. the Light Division, was nicknamed the "Regular
Colonel," to distinguish him as the one man who had
any right to the appellation. It may be reckoned also
that at least as many women as men were well pleased
by all this cheapening of rank and uniform. And yet,
if Napoleon had landed at the end of September or
beginning of October, he would have found little to
oppose him but a half- armed, undisciplined rabble,
composed in many instances of fragments of corps
whereof part had marched out to meet him and the
remainder, agreeable to their terms of service, had
refused to move out of their military districts.
But Napoleon had been guilty of blunders as serious
in their own kind as those of Addington and Hobart,
and his preparations were as backward as theirs. On the
2 1 st of July he had mapped out his scheme of invasion
as follows : — There were to be ready three hundred
vessels at Flushing to bring over the Dutch contingent
of his army ; three hundred more at Nieuport and
Ostend to embark thirty thousand men ; three hundred
more at Dunkirk, Gravelines, and Calais for conveyance
of six thousand horses and baggage ; two thousand
three hundred and eighty at Wissant, Ambleteuse, and
Boulogne ; and a few hundred more at Etaples for
transport of three thousand horses and one hundred
and twenty-five guns. All this was clear enough on
paper ; but in practice things were different. Nearly
all of the ports above enumerated were small and
bad, with bars, shoals, or other impediments, so that
it was admittedly impossible for more than a limited
number of vessels to leave them by one tide. This made
it necessary that the craft which left the ports by one
tide should lie in the roadstead till another tide should
release their fellows, during which interval they would
need protection both from British attack and from the
weather. Fortifications were therefore erected in some
quarters to cover the anchorage ; and very extensive
works were also undertaken for the improvement of
the harbours. But excavation and dredging are lengthy
ch.vii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 217
operations ; and, even supposing them to be completed, 1803.
many of the flotilla, having been constructed in distant
ports, would have to run the gauntlet of the British
frigates, which cruised off every promontory, before
they could be concentrated in the Channel. Moreover,
all was by no means well with the flotilla. Too many
of the craft had been put into building at once, which
caused delay. Many others, particularly the vessels
designed to carry horses, were found to be clumsy
sailers and so faulty in many ways that their construction
was suspended. In fact, by the spring of 1804 little
more than three-fifths of the two thousand vessels were
ready. Furthermore, fishing-vessels of light draught
were found to be unobtainable in the number required,
and it was necessary to replace them by large merchant-
men of too great draught for any anchorage but the
Scheldt. Even of the smaller craft many of the heavier
boats had, by Napoleon's perverse rejection of his
Admirals' advice, been apportioned to harbours which
had not water to float them. In a word, the great plan
of the 2 1st of July had broken down completely ; the
building of the flotilla was in arrear ; the construction
of the vessels themselves was defective ; their efficiency
for attack was extremely doubtful ; they could only
with great difficulty be brought into the ports of the
Channel, and if brought in they could only with equal
difficulty be brought out again in any large numbers.
By the end of January 1804 Napoleon therefore
renounced the project of invasion by surprise during the
darkness of winter, and determined not to cross the
Channel until his ships of war had cleared the way for
him. The whole of his armed boats, of which some
four hundred and sixty were concentrated by the end
of March 1804 at Boulogne, Wimereux, Etaples, and
Ambleteuse, thereupon became useless. Had they been
designed merely as transports they would still have
been valuable, but having been intended also for fighting
purposes they had been spoiled for any useful object.
The whole of the money spent upon them had thus
2i 8 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1803. been wasted ; and meanwhile the preparations for
strengthening the French Navy proper had been very
seriously retarded. In brief, Napoleon had lost a
year's work by devoting himself, contrary to all naval
advice, to the wrong object.
It was well for England that this was so ; for when
Nov. 22. the Government met Parliament in November it had
only a miserable story to tell. The casualties in the
Regular Army during 1803 numbered rather over
thirteen thousand ; the recruits gained in the same
period were rather over eleven thousand ; so that
upon the whole the Army had been diminished by over
two thousand men. It must not be supposed that
Ministers were so methodical as to have produced any
such figures, but such was the actual state of the case.
The much vaunted Army of Reserve was in an equally
lamentable condition. Of the fifty thousand men to
be raised within the year, there had been obtained by
the 31st of December just under forty-one thousand,
of whom rather more than one-tenth had deserted.
This loss, together with other casualties, reduced the
effective total to thirty-four thousand five hundred,
of which number rather more than -seven thousand,
tempted by an additional bounty of ten guineas, had
enlisted into the Regular Army and had thus brought
the number of recruits during the year to the figure
above quoted. In fact, the Army of Reserve Act
was a failure. Addington himself confessed in April
1804 that since November 1803 its inconveniences had
exceeded its advantages; and by the end of 1803 it
was in practice already dead. The Militia also, in
spite of endless ballots, was still short of its establishment
by seven thousand men. In short, there was little to
show for the past year's work but about three hundred
and eighty thousand Volunteers and Yeomanry of all
ranks, of whom three hundred and forty thousand
claimed to be effective rank and file, in Great Britain,
and eighty-two thousand in Ireland ; making a total
of some four hundred and sixty thousand men, un-
ch.vii HISTORY OF THE ARMY
219
organised, undisciplined, expensive, and for the most 1804.
part useless.
The Government's first measure was a Consolidated
Volunteers' Act, whereby it was hoped to amend some
of the appalling blunders committed during the last
session. As a vast number of the members of both
Houses were Volunteer officers, the measure was
sure of a stormy reception. Bitter and scathing
comment was passed upon the confusion over the
matters of arms, exemptions, and various allowances ;
and since the question of exemptions touched not only
the Volunteers but the Militia and the Army of Reserve,
the bill brought the entire military policy of the
Government under legitimate review. Yorke declared
that the points which chiefly needed attention for the
improvement of the Volunteers were the election of
officers, the control of corps by committees, and the
general question of discipline. As to the evils that
followed upon the two first, there should have been
no question ; but the election of officers was defended
not only by Sheridan but by so shrewd and sensible a
man as Whitbread ; while it was declared by Yorke
himself, in absolute defiance of the truth, that the
committees devoted themselves exclusively to financial
business. As to discipline, one member, Mr. Giles,
maintained that the Volunteers might secure it for
themselves by their own rules, but that Parliament had
no right to impose it. The more the whole matter
was thrashed out, the more clearly it appeared that this
huge mass of men was absolutely uncontrollable ; and
even Pitt, after many protestations that he approved of
Volunteers in principle, was fain to admit that " it was
impossible to trust continually to the operation of the
Volunteer spirit."
Colonel Robert Craufurd, more ingenuous and with
greater insight, declared that the entire Volunteer
system was faulty from beginning to end : faulty in
its constitution, its finance, its committees, its ex-
emptions, its training, even its clothing. It was
220
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1804. wrong to allow the Volunteers to be of all descrip-
tions, old and young, sound and infirm, married and
single ; for, if they were called out for service, half
of them would go home unless a decisive action were
fought at once. It was wrong to allow Volunteers to
be self-controlled by elected committees, and in some
cases by general assemblies ; for that meant almost as
many parliaments as corps. It was wrong to let them
be supported by private subscription, for this signified
the taxation of the generous and patriotic for a burden
that should fall upon all : if the expense of Volunteers
were defrayed from Imperial funds there would be
no occasion for committees and assemblies. The
exemptions were wrong, for they crippled every branch
of the forces, even the Volunteers themselves, since they
limited the number of men who could be trained to
arms lest none should be left for the ballot. Moreover,
the Volunteers were a privileged body, the envy and
dislike of the poorer classes, upon whom, by the
exemptions, the whole weight of the ballot was thrown.
The training was wrong, for the Prussian system of
drill was utterly useless for fighting in England, and
was only taught to the Regulars because they were
intended to fight abroad. The clothing was wrong,
because it confused Volunteers with Regulars. The
sight of Volunteers retreating would dishearten the
Regular troops by making them believe that regiments
of the Line had been beaten, and would for the same
reason encourage the French. He himself would much
have preferred to call out the whole of the first class
under the Levy en Masse Act, put them under half-
pay officers, clothe them and train them, with the help
of poachers and gamekeepers instead of drill-sergeants,
to load, fire, and hit their mark, and to advance or
retire rapidly from shelter to shelter. As things were,
if Parliament tried to enact regulations for them, it was
told, not that the rules were just or unjust, but that they
were not agreeable to the Volunteers. " So delicate a
machine," he declared very truly, " is unfit for war."
ch.vii HISTORY OF THE ARMY
221
Craufurd spoke at enormous length and probably 1804.
to an empty House ; and though Windham echoed
every word, his protests fell upon deaf ears. Never-
theless the bill made little progress. The Govern-
ment, represented by feeble men who did not know
their own minds, was constantly overborne and
brought into contempt. By the end of March
the bill had been committed and recommitted four
times ; twenty -four new clauses had been added,
nearly all the original clauses had been altered or
abandoned, and yet the measure was as far from
passing as ever.1
At the same time Ministers had been fighting a
losing battle with the New Volunteers over another
point. These last needed adjutants, instructors, and so
forth, as much as their brothers on the June Allowances ;
but Ministers began by refusing to allow any pay what-
ever to provide them with a permanent staff.2 This
of course provoked much outcry, and the Government
then offered to concede pay for adjutants and sergeant-
majors in all corps of a certain strength, provided that
the New Volunteers, like the Old, would agree to be
exercised for eighty -five days in the year. It was
hardly a fair arrangement, for the Old Volunteers under
the June Allowances received pay for the whole of
their eighty-five days, whereas the New Volunteers,
under the August Allowances, received pay but for
twenty days ; the theory being that drill on every
Sunday made up fifty-two days in the year, which
added to the twenty above mentioned left only thirteen
days of exercise to be performed gratuitously. But it
was out of the question that labouring men should give
up a day's work for nothing ; and this regulation
therefore signified simply that the officer must pay the
men for thirteen days out of his own pocket. The
inevitable result was fresh discontent. Practically the
1 H.D. Commons' Debates, 8th, 27th, 29th Feb. ; 6th, 9th,
19th, 22nd March 1804.
2 Circular to the Lords-Lieutenant, 28th Sept. 1803.
222
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
i 804. entire burden of providing parochial substitutes and of
paying parochial fines for the Militia and Army of
Reserve fell upon the landed interest ; and there was
great resentment at the imposition of this new tax, for
such in efFect it was, upon shoulders that were already
aching. The Government, therefore, was compelled
in February1 to grant a day's pay to all officers and
privates who should attend inspection of their corps by
a General Officer or Field Officer, provided that such
inspection did not recur oftener than once in two
months. The pretext for this allowance was a desire
to ensure regular attendance at inspections ; but it was
in reality only a cloak to disguise a surrender to the
clamour of the Volunteers.
Meanwhile, however, Ministers had for once taken
a wise and sensible step, which helped to extricate
them from their difficulties. In October 1 803 2 Mr.
Yorke had invited the Volunteers of many of the
maritime counties to go out upon permanent duty in
successive reliefs for ten days or a fortnight, receiving
daily pay and voluntarily subjecting themselves to
military law during their period of service. The men
responded heartily ; and the improvement to their
discipline was so great that in March 1804 3 Yorke
renewed the invitation not only to the maritime but to
the inland counties also. At the same time he inti-
mated that he would grant permanent pay, as before,
for any period not exceeding a month and not shorter
than ten days, which should count as part of the exercise
required to obtain exemption and the pay for a per-
manent staff", and would add to this an allowance of a
guinea a man for necessaries, any surplus from which
would be paid into the men's hands. The concession
having been yielded late in the day of course provoked
less gratitude than contempt.
Fighting thus an unsuccessful battle against the
1 Circular to Lords-Lieutenant, 10th Feb. 1804.
2 Circular to Lords-Lieutenant of 12th Oct. 1803.
3 Circulars to Lords-Lieutenant, 5th and 6th March 1804.
ch.vii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 223
Volunteers both in and out of Parliament, Addington's 1804.
Ministry showed increasing signs of weakness. Awed
by the incessant attacks of Windham, Craufurd, and
finally of Pitt upon their neglect of their Regular Army,
the Government, at the end of March, brought forward
a plan for augmenting it. Mr. Yorke, in introducing Mar.
the measure, confessed that the Army of Reserve Act
had broken down completely, the recruits gained during
the past three months having hardly outbalanced the
desertions. He proposed, therefore, to suspend the Act
for one year, and, in view of this removal of competition
in the recruiting market, to raise eight new regiments
and ten new battalions, each one thousand strong, at a
bounty not exceeding ten guineas. He also brought
in a bill to increase the Irish Militia to twenty-eight
thousand men, so as to enable ten thousand of them to
serve in England, which they had offered to do, and
to liberate that number of Regular troops for service
abroad. An augmentation of two thousand men to
the Guards and of three thousand five hundred to the
cavalry, for both of which recruits were always easily
gained, had already been ordered ; so that upon the
whole, the Army would, by one way and another, be
increased by twenty-five thousand men. It does not
appear, however, that Yorke at once announced the
means by which he intended to raise his new battalions.
This was no other than the old resource of raising men
for rank ; and he had already, in fact, set this objection-
able machinery in motion for the augmentation of the
cavalry.1 The Commander-in-chief, however, had no
intention of allowing the abuses of 1794 to be repeated ;
and he laid it down as a rigid rule that no officer should
gain more than one step, no matter how many recruits
he might produce, and, that unless the men were forth-
coming within six months, no step should be granted
at all. Permission was accordingly given for the officers
of the Fourth, Eighth, Twenty - third, Fifty -sixth,
Seventy-eighth, and Seventy-ninth to enlist men for
1 S.C.L.B. 3rd Oct. 1803.
224
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1804. their own promotion in second battalions.1 Letters of
service were also granted on the 14th of May to Lord
Matthew and Colonel Brown, and on the 24th to
Colonels Falkiner and Burke to raise four new regi-
ments in Ireland, of which three formed part of the
Line until 18 18, and Brown's was swept into the
Eighty-seventh Foot.2 But besides this a contract was
concluded with a certain Colonel French and Captain
Sandon for raising five thousand men, of which four
thousand were to be produced within nine months,
and the entire number within thirteen months. The
levy-money granted for each man was thirteen guineas,
raised subsequently to nineteen guineas, with an addi-
tional ten guineas upon the delivery of each batch of
five hundred recruits ; and it was conceded that ten
boys should be allowed among every hundred men.
This levy was a complete failure, the Deputy-inspector-
general of Recruiting in Ireland having set his face
1 The terms were as follows : —
Major for Lieut. -Colonelcy to
raise
82
men
. 82
2 Capts. for Majorities each
90
. 180
10 Lieuts. for companies each
45
. 450
12 Ensigns for Lieutenancies
12
• 144
8 gentlemen for ensigncies
>>
21
. 168
1024
Bounty to Recruit . . . . j£io 10 o
„ to recruiting officer, per man . 220
party „ „ .110
&3 13 0
Besides the regiments named in the text, the 2nd, 5th, 6th, 7th,
and 1 8th, were also selected to raise second battalions.
S.C.L.B. 19th and 24th April 1804.
C.C.L.B. 15th May 1804.
2 C.J. vol. 60, p. 620.
Burke's was numbered 98th, became the 97th in 181 5, and was
disbanded in 181 8.
Matthew's was numbered 99th, became the 98th in 181 5, and
was disbanded in 1 81 8.
Falkiner's was numbered the 100th, became the 99th in 181 5,
and was disbanded in 18 18.
ch. vii HISTORY OF THE ARMY
225
against it from the first, not without insinuations 1804.
that French was a crimp, and not without some justi-
fication for using that term. At the end of twelve
months the Duke of York cancelled the letter of
service, French having produced only two hundred
men instead of five thousand ; and therewith this
extremely objectionable mode of recruiting came to an
end, as it seems for ever. It was none too soon, for
the notorious Mary Anne Clarke, the mistress of the
Duke of York, was mixed up in the affair. Indeed she
contrived, with her customary dexterity, to extract
£iyoo from the pockets of French and Sandon in
return for her good offices (which were very ineffectual)
with the Duke of York to promote the success of the
levy.1 This scandal was not exposed until 1809 ;
but meanwhile it seems astonishing that after the
experience of the past war either Ministers or Com-
mander-in-chief should have countenanced any such
agreement as was made with French ; though it must
be admitted that the supervision of the recruiting
service had been greatly improved, that the Inspector
in Ireland had at once put his foot firmly upon all
malpractices, and that he had been most loyally supported
by the Horse Guards.
These measures, however, were practically the last
of Addington's Ministry. Pitt had long been growing
weary of the attitude of patron and protector which he
had assumed towards it in the first place, and which his
supporters had from the beginning condemned. At
last on the 23rd of April, upon the motion for going
into committee on the Army of Reserve Suspension
Bill, he rose to oppose it and turned violently on the
Government. "No one measure for public defence
Can they be said to have originated," he declared, " and
several they have enfeebled and retarded," and therewith
he proceeded to sketch his own plan for setting matters
1 The whole of the papers disinterred upon this unsavoury affair
are printed in Stratford's authentic edition of the Investigation of
the charges against the Duke of York, vol. ii. 355 seq.
VOL. V Q
226
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1804. right. His motion was lost by a majority of thirty-
seven ; but the fate of the Government was hardly
doubtful from that moment. The bills for the
augmentation of the Irish Militia and for enabling it to
volunteer for service in England were passed on the
3rd of May, and on the 7th the House was informed
that Pitt had been called upon to form a Ministry in
the room of Addington resigned.
[For the authorities upon which the foregoing narrative
is based I must refer the reader to my work, The County
Lieutenancies and the Army, 1803-1814.]
t
CHAPTER VIII
The formation of Pitt's new administration took some 1804.
time, and when completed was anything but satisfactory. May.
The Prime Minister had desired to include in it the
ablest men of all parties without any exception ; but
George the Third would not hear of admitting Fox to
his councils ; and having regard to the instability of the
King's mental powers at the moment, Pitt forbore
to press his wishes upon the Sovereign. Fox very
generously accepted the situation without a murmur,
and promised to advise his followers to accept places in
Pitt's Government ; but they with one voice refused to
take office without their chief, and, worse still, Lord
Grenville and his political adherents declared likewise
that they would enter no Cabinet from which Fox was
excluded. Pitt's position was one of extreme difficulty ;
1 but he decided that at any cost he would supplant
Addington's inefficient administration. This is no
place to discuss the question as to whether he was
right or wrong, but it is certain, at least, that he was
actuated by none but patriotic motives. The result,
however, was that the list of the new Ministers
showed a deplorable number of nonentities ; and their
weakness was not least conspicuous in the departments
with which this history is chiefly concerned. Lord
Chatham, most indolent of men, became Master -
general of the Ordnance. Lord Camden, a nobleman
of tried mediocrity, took charge of the War Office and
Colonies. Henry Dundas, Lord Melville, succeeded
227
228
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
i 804. St. Vincent at the Admiralty. The Home Office, more
May. happily, was committed to Lord Hawkesbury, a man
whose reputation is far below his deserts ; and, best of
all, India was entrusted to one still greater and abler,
Robert Stewart, Lord Castlereagh. On the other hand,
the Opposition, headed by Fox, was rendered doubly
formidable now that it had gained the uncompromising
resolution of Grenville and the insight, eloquence, and
wit of Windham. The parting of these men from
Pitt, in a political sense, had not been friendly ; and
the great Minister now found himself confronted no
longer by a powerless though venomous minority, but
by lost friends whose criticism was sharpened by the
feeling that their late honoured leader had, ever since
the Peace of Amiens, fallen below his reputation and
forfeited their confidence.
When at length Pitt was able to meet Parliament,
June, his first business was to pass the Volunteer Consolida-
tion Act,1 the stormy career of which came to an end
on the 5th of June. Of this it must suffice to say that
by it the Volunteer Act of 1802 and the Billetting Act
of 1 803 were repealed ; that Yeomanry were required to
attend four days' drill and Volunteer Infantry eight
days' drill every quarter to gain them exemption from
the ballot for the Militia or any Additional Force ;
that Volunteer Infantry assembled of their own will
for permanent duty were subjected to military law,
but not so Volunteer Cavalry or Yeomanry ; that
no rules of any future corps were to be binding
unless approved by the King ; that rules made in
the past could be annulled by the same authority ;
and that greater powers of discipline at large were
granted to the Commanding Officers. Several trouble-
some questions were thus finally set at rest, and
means were assured for turning the chaos brought
about by Addington's folly into some kind of order.
But the original blunder in respect of the Volunteers,
due as much to Pitt as to Addington, was for the
1 44 Geo. III. cap. 54.
ch. viii HISTORY OF THE ARMY
229
present beyond correction ; and it was with the 1
whole weight of this blunder round his neck that J
Pitt grappled with the more serious problem of
maintaining the Regular Army.
The Army of Reserve Act had by this time died a
natural death ; and it behoved Pitt to devise some new
scheme which should replace it. The objects which he
set before himself were sound and statesmanlike. First,
the existing competition for recruits between the
Regular Army and the multifarious forces designed for
home service only must be ended, and the enormous
height of bounties must, by this and other means,
be brought low. Secondly, all obstacles in the way of
establishing a Permanent Additional Force as a standing
foundation for the maintenance of the Army must be
done away. He had already sketched his device for
attaining these ends in a speech on the 25th of April ;
and on the 5th of June he introduced a Permanent
Additional Force Bill which embodied his scheme in its
maturity. In substance the bill was as follows : — First,
the Militia of Great Britain would be reduced to its
original quota of 1802, namely fifty-one thousand men.
Next, the quotas of the Supplementary Militia and the
Army of Reserve would be merged into one, making a
total of seventy- nine thousand men.1 This would
provide a permanent reserve for the Army ; and
machinery would be devised for making good any
drains upon it to the extent of one-sixth, or thirteen
thousand men, annually. The intention of his proposals
was therefore excellent ; it remained to seek out the
means for their fulfilment.
In the first place, both the Army of Reserve and the
Supplementary Militia were seriously short of their
establishment, to the extent altogether of nearly twenty
1 Army of Reserve for United Kingdom . . 49,880
Supplementary Militia for Great Britain . . 29,071
Total . 78,951
Ireland had no Supplementary Militia.
230 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
i 804. thousand men ; 1 and it was necessary to raise that
June, number before the Permanent Reserve could be said to
exist. In addition to these there must be levied also by
the 1st of October 1805, the first annual instalment
of one-sixth, which was modestly set down at eleven
thousand men, to replace those who should have enlisted
from the Reserve into the Army. On the whole,
therefore, the scheme required thirty- one thousand
men to be supplied within the ensuing fifteen months.
How was this number to be obtained ? The ballot of
1803, owing to the false principle of substitution, had
produced only inferior men and a gigantic rise in
bounties. Pitt resolved, therefore, to dispense with it
altogether, and to call upon every parish of Great Britain
for its quota of the number of men required. In brief,
he threw the work of raising the levy upon the parochial
officers. To preserve its local character he limited their
range of recruiting to a distance of twenty miles around
their parishes within the same county, or of ten miles
in an adjacent county. To ensure that they should
not compete with the recruiting parties of the Regular
Army he restricted their bounty to twelve guineas,
being three-fourths of that allowed *fo the Regulars,
which was sixteen guineas. The parochial recruits were
to be enlisted for home service only and for five years
or until six months after the cessation of war, but were
to be encouraged by a further bounty of ten guineas to
take service with the Regulars. To stimulate the zeal
of the parochial officers, they were to receive one guinea
for every man that they produced, whereas if they
failed in their new duty their parishes were to be
mulcted in £20 for every man deficient of the quota.
The fines thus collected were in the last resort to be
paid to the general recruiting fund of the country ; and
the commander of the battalion concerned was then to
1 Deficiencies in Army of Reserve . . 12,477
In Supplementary Militia . . . 7,305
Total . 19,782
ch.viii HISTORY OF THE ARMY
231
fill the vacancy or vacancies in his regiment by ordinary 1 804.
recruiting, paying the same bounty as that offered by June,
the parish and no more. Finally the whole of the men,
when raised, were to be formed into second battalions
to the Regular regiments of the Army.
The plan was bold and, if the expression may
be used, conciliatory. The ballot had become very
oppressive during 1803 : Pitt proposed to leave
it unused. There had been loud complaints of the
burden laid on the agricultural interest by parochial
rates and fines under the Militia and Army of Reserve
Acts : Pitt transferred the entire weight of the bounties
under his new measure to the Imperial Treasury.
Nevertheless, critics were not wanting to call into
question every advantage expected from the measure.
Windham prophesied that if any men at all were
brought forward by the parochial officers, they would
be purchased from the crimps. Another member
predicted that the bill might produce money but would
never produce men, and that, far from giving any
relief to landed proprietors, it would inflict on them
the equivalent of a doubled land-tax. Yet another
pointed out that to offer a man £16 : 1 6s. to enter the
Line directly, and £23 : 2 s. to enter it through the
new force was on the face of it absurd. Lastly, Colonel
Robert Craufurd condemned the whole plan as worth-
less, advocating in its stead compulsory training for all
men of a certain age, with short service and liberal
pensions to tempt them to enlist voluntarily into the
Line. Pitt, however, turning a deaf ear to any croak-
ings of failure, stood up firmly for his bill, which on the
29th of June was duly passed into law.
Meanwhile the general preparations for defence
against invasion progressed steadily towards perfection.
Orders had already been issued on the 31st of October
1 803 for the removal of all live-stock and provisions —
"driving the country" as it was called — but this
procedure, which had been first suggested in 1779, was
so strongly opposed by such capable authorities as Sir
232 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1804. John Moore and the Duke of Richmond that it was
abandoned. Far more valuable was the Duke of York's
recommendation, that among the vehicles registered
under the First Defence Act, one light cart should be
set apart and marked as regimental transport for each
company of Volunteer infantry, and that waggons
should likewise be marked, set apart, and provided with
seats to convey the men from the remoter districts to
any threatened point. Indeed, the organisation for
speedy moving of troops was so far perfected that they
could be readily concentrated in any quarter. The
Volunteers and Yeomanry in each military district
were also organised into brigades, and their brigadiers
duly appointed. The quality of the levies steadily
improved as more and more of them took their turn
of permanent duty ; though their unwillingness to
submit to any officers but their own made their dis-
cipline, already a doubtful quantity, more uncertain
than ever.
Nor was fortification, permanent and temporary,
forgotten. Addington's Ministry had already made a
beginning in this matter by forming entrenched camps in
chosen positions, as rallying points for die forces of each
district ; but these, though, of course, designed by
military men, did not always escape criticism from
officers of the Army. Thus at Chelmsford there had
been constructed at great expense, not a chain of
detached works, but a single line of entrenchment.
What, asked Robert Craufurd in the House of Commons,
was the use of this ? No enemy would pause to attack it,
but would push straight on to London ; and if the force
in the camp closed in upon his rear, the enemy would be
none the worse, for having no communications he could
not be cut off from them. This challenge was answered,
not very effectually, by General Thomas Maitland ; and
the subject was allowed to drop. Pitt, however, infused
far greater vigour into the work of fortifying the country,
even riding about to inspect the works in person with
an energy which Lord Grenville, no longer his supporter
ch.viii HISTORY OF THE ARMY
233
but now his critic, condemned as ridiculous. It is 1 804.
difficult to say who was Pitt's principal adviser in such
matters, for he seems to have been eclectic in his tastes.
Some would have us believe that it was Dumouriez who
was chiefly consulted by him ; and it is at least certain
that Dumouriez, after many wanderings, settled in
England in 1803, received a pension from Government,
and produced a general scheme for the defence of the
country. This, as he had planned a scheme of invasion
in 1779, he claimed to be well qualified to do. But the
military authorities, not unreasonably feeling some
distrust of the man, declined to permit him to make a
close military survey of any ground ; and since he was
therefore compelled to rely wholly upon inaccurate
maps for his premises, his conclusions must necessarily
have been of doubtful value. Furthermore, amid much
that is probably sound in Dumouriez's plans, there is
such a wealth of what can only be described as nonsense,
that it is impossible to suppose that they can have
received much attention.1 One costly work may,
however, perhaps, be ascribed to the French General,
namely the military canal from Hythe to Sandgate.2
1 Dumouriez's plans of defence have been recently published in
Dumouriez and the Defence of England against Napoleon, by Dr. J. H.
Rose and A. M. Broadley, together with a certain number of the
projects which Dumouriez was eternally sending to the Government
unasked, and which are to be found by the dozen scattered among
the papers in the Record Office. Except in a few instances, which
I shall duly point out, I cannot find that his advice carried much
weight, nor can I think, after examination of a good many projets,
that it deserved to do so. Dumouriez was no doubt a man of
exceptional talent and in some respects an exceedingly able soldier ;
but his vanity was portentous, his hold upon facts was never strong,
and he was an inveterate schemer. I am unable, therefore, to accept
the authors' valuation of Dumouriez, or their assurance that he
rendered great service to this country. For the rest, > this book,
together with the two bulky volumes entitled The Great Terror by
A. M. Broadley and H. Wheeler, appear to have been published
chiefly to call attention to a private collection of documents and
caricatures ; for with space to contain much that would be of
priceless value to a serious historian, they provide disappointingly little.
2 But it appears from a letter from the Commander-in-chief to
the Duke of Richmond that the canal, with its ultimate extension
234
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
.. This was made in order to isolate the Romney marshes,
where, according to Dumouriez, an invading force
could otherwise have secured all the cattle and horses
which fed on the marshes. But Pitt is more generally
remembered by the martello towers, which were advocated
by Craufurd among many other officers, and are still to
be seen on the coast. Indeed it seems probable that
Pitt leaned greatly upon Sir John Moore, whose good
work at the camp of ShornclifFe came under his im-
mediate notice while he was organising the forces
of the Cinque Ports, and was thoroughly appreciated
by him.
Meanwhile Napoleon, since the 18th of May 1804
Emperor of the French, remained throughout the year
with his plans in a state of flux. He had realised that
he could not throw his army across the Channel until
his line-of-battle ships had cleared the way for him ;
and having abandoned the idea of an invasion during
the foggy nights of winter, he was inclined to take
advantage of the calmer days of summer for the opera-
tion. It was, however, essential first that the boats,
which were building in every port of France should be
concentrated in the harbours of the Channel ; and this, in
the face of the British cruisers, was no easy matter. The
flotilla in the Scheldt was strictly blockaded ; and though
the Dutch Admiral Verhuell with considerable skill
contrived more than once to baffle the vigilance of Sir
Sidney Smith, and to bring vessels down by Ostend and
Dunkirk to Boulogne, yet little was really accomplished
by him owing to his want of seamen. At Havre the
blockade was equally strict, and was varied by occasional
bombardments which caused much alarm even if they
did little damage. The passage to the Channel from the
ports in the Atlantic was even more difficult, so closely
did the British frigates watch every promontory and
headland. It was necessary for French cavalry and
to Cliff End in Sussex, was suggested by Sir David Dundas. H.O,
Internal Defence, Duke of Richmond to C.-in-C, 1 3th Nov.; C.-in-C.
to Duke of Richmond, 19th Nov. 1806.
ch.viii HISTORY OF THE ARMY
235
artillery on land to follow the course of the boats at sea 1804.
in order to ensure their safety ; and in spite of aid from
the troops and from countless batteries on the coast,
only thirty-five vessels out of two hundred and thirty-one
succeeded in reaching the Channel from the Ocean at all.
Moreover, even when they did reach it, they were glad
to put into the first port that they could find ; and from
this cause there were in Boulogne nearly three times as
many boats as had been allotted to that place. Nor
were they safe even then, for the difficulties of leaving
and entering the port had been little diminished by
Napoleon's extensive improvements ; and a light gale
was quite sufficient to throw the whole of the craft in
the roadstead into confusion.
On the other hand, the British attempts against
Boulogne were one and all unsuccessful. Early in
1804 Addington countenanced a plan from which
great results were expected by the thoughtless. Three
ships were to be filled with masonry, carefully built and
clamped together, and having been run aground upon
the shoal at the entrance to Boulogne were then to be
burned, with the intention that the masonry should
remain, block the mouth of the harbour permanently,
and shut in the whole of the flotilla for ever. This
brilliant idea emanated from a smuggler, by name
Etches, who was supposed to know the navigation about
Boulogne better than other men. Extensive prepara-
tions were carried out, and an effort was actually made to
put the plan into execution, with the help of a few light
vessels of the Royal Navy. It need hardly be said that
the entire project came to a ridiculous end, with the usual
recriminations between the parties concerned therein ;
the smugglers laying the whole of the blame upon the
naval officers, who had viewed the proceedings with
a surly contempt which was fully justified by results.1
Later in the year, on the 2nd of October, a more Oct. 2.
sensible attack was made upon Boulogne by vessels
1 The whole story is in W.O. Orig. Corres. 184, The Stone
Expedition.
236
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1 804. which were practically torpedoes ; but though five of
them were exploded, the damage done was trifling. In
fact, the most serious loss inflicted upon the flotilla at
Boulogne was caused by Napoleon himself. In July he
July, paid a visit of inspection to the port and ordered out
the craft for a review. Admiral Bruix, seeing certain
signs of the approach of bad weather, declined to obey ;
and after a stormy scene, in which the two men nearly
came to blows, Bruix was dismissed and the Emperor
had his way. The result was that twenty or thirty
craft were lost, and from fifty to two hundred men
drowned. The whole affair was, of course, smothered
under a mass of lies, as was Napoleon's manner ; but the
experience can hardly have weakened his dislike for the
naval profession at large.
Meanwhile his sea- going fleets had made little
progress during the summer of 1804. At Brest there
were twenty-six ships paralysed by want of seamen ; at
Isle d'Aix and Orient nothing had been accomplished ;
and only at Toulon, under the impulse of Latouche
Treville, eleven line-of-battle ships were slowly made
fit for service. In May, and again in July, Napoleon
had sketched speculative instructions *for the Toulon
fleet, to which were appended the pompous words,
" Let us be masters of the Channel for six hours,
and we shall be masters of the world." But in
August Latouche Treville died, and the Toulon fleet
had achieved nothing. However, at the end of
Sept. September Napoleon at last produced a more definite
plan. According to this, the Brest squadron was to
carry eighteen thousand men to Ireland, first going far
to westward so as to approach it as if from Newfound-
land ; it was then to enter the Channel so as to favour
the passage to England of the flotilla from Boulogne, or
failing this, to go to the Texel and escort twenty-five
thousand men more to Ireland. At the same time the
squadrons from Toulon and Rochefort were to sail to
the West Indies with reinforcements, raid all the British
islands, return to Ferrol to release the five ships
ch.viii HISTORY OF THE ARMY
237
blockaded there, and then, united, to put in to 1804.
Rochefort.
Napoleon's orders concerning the attack on Ireland
went astray, and their purport reached the British
Government, curiously enough, through the smuggler
Etches.1 Whether this happened by design of the
Emperor or not is doubtful. All that is certain is that
in October he renewed his orders to the squadrons at
Rochefort and at Toulon to embark their troops at
once, while nothing more was said as to the action of
the Brest fleet. It seems, however, that the British
Government now became more nervous about Ireland,
which only in the previous year had been disturbed by
the abortive insurrection of Robert Emmett. Dumouriez
had dwelt with great emphasis upon the fact that it was
the most vulnerable spot in the Empire ; wherefore,
urging that there could be no safety in an attitude of
passive defence, he had advocated attack upon the points
from which an expedition might be expected to sail for
Ireland, namely the ports of the Peninsula and the
Scheldt. Whether moved by this counsel or not,
Ministers in November consulted Sir John Moore
as to the possibility of an attack upon Ferrol with
twenty thousand men, alleging that in the opinion of
the naval officers the destruction of the place by a coup
de main would be an easy matter. Unable to find any
warrant for this view in the papers laid before him,
Moore undertook to reconnoitre the place secretly in
person ; and, though prevented by the suspicions of the
Spaniards from making any close survey of the defences,
he was able at least to satisfy himself that Ferrol was
fully prepared against attack. Upon his report, there-
fore, the enterprise was abandoned.
But in the interim the situation had again changed.
Spain, equally afraid of France and of England, and
longing only to remain perfectly neutral, had so far
yielded to the stronger pressure of Napoleon that the
1 Desbriere, iv. 199, calls him the Reverend Cadman Etches ;
having apparently construed Rd. (Richard) to mean Reverend.
238
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1804. British Government lost patience with her undisguised,
though unwilling, inclination towards the French cause.
On the 30th of September the capture of three
Spanish plate-ships by Sir Graham Moore, the brother
of Sir John, brought matters to a crisis. Napoleon
seized the moment to stimulate Spain to open hostilities ;
and after two months of hesitation the Court of
Dec. 14. Madrid, on the 14th of December, declared war upon
England. The Spanish fleet was therefore now at the
disposal of Napoleon, though it was in no very efficient
state. There were a few fine ships and a great many
indifferent. Some were overburdened with an ex-
cessive spread of canvas, others with an excessive
weight of guns ; and seamen, owing to an epidemic
in the Mediterranean ports, were extremely difficult to
obtain. However, the ships were at any rate to hand ;
1805. and on the 4th of January 1805 Admiral Gravina on
Jan. 4. behalf of Spain and Decres on behalf of France signed
a convention, under which at least twenty-five Spanish
sail of the line and some seven thousand Spanish troops
were to be ready by the 30th of March for a secret
expedition. Meanwhile the squadrons at Toulon and
Rochefort had embarked the troops assigned to them,
and on the 12 th, 14th, and 23 rd they received their
first instructions. Both were to break the blockade at
the first opportunity, and sail for the West Indies.
Villeneuve, with the Toulon fleet, after picking up
three French ships from Cadiz, was first to reinforce
the garrison of Cayenne, and then, dividing his squadron,
to attack Surinam with one division and Demerara,
Berbice and Essequibo with the other ; but in any case
he was, within sixty days after his arrival at Surinam, to
return to Ferrol, liberate the blockaded squadron there,
and proceed with it to Rochefort. Missiessy with the
Rochefort squadron was to sail straight to Martinique,
capture Dominica and St. Lucia, and levy contributions
upon the remaining British islands. Napoleon reckoned
that Missiessy would be master of the Caribbean Sea for
at least thirty days, which period he was to turn to the
ch. viii HISTORY OF THE ARMY
best possible account. Missiessy likewise was to make 1805.
Ferrol his first port on his return. The Emperor also
sketched a suggestion for the use of the Brest, Cadiz,
and Ferrol squadrons, who were to descend upon Ireland
on Villeneuve's reappearance ; but so far he had no
thought of using his fleets in the Channel upon their
return from the Antilles. Indeed, he seems to have
had no design in the expedition to the West Indies
beyond a plundering raid, which could have little or no
influence upon the course of the war.
Thus, to the disgrace of England, the French were 1804.
actually the first to send an offensive expedition across
the sea ; nor was the reason far to seek. The British
after eighteen months of war, following upon a brief
truce which had been preceded by ten years of another
war, did not yet possess an Army. Addington was
chiefly responsible for this, but Pitt also must bear
some part of the blame, for his favourite scheme, the
Permanent Additional Force Act, had proved a dismal
failure. The parochial authorities, conceiving that
funds and not men were expected from them,
christened the measure the " Twenty Pound Act " and
resigned themselves to pay their fines. According to
the strict letter of the law, the twenty thousand men
deficient in the Army of Reserve and Supplementary
Militia were to have been raised by the 9th of August ;
but there were symptoms in the country which led
Ministers to inquire as to the progress of the levy.
The answer from every county was uniformly the
same. Not a man had been raised ; the areas of
recruiting were too much restricted, the bounties to
recruits too low, the rewards offered to parish officers
too paltry. The Government extended the time for
raising the men until the 1 5 th of November and issued
circular after circular, half coaxing, half menacing, to
stimulate the parochial authorities to their new duties ;
but in vain. By the 1st of November fewer than eight
hundred men had been enlisted, and of these a full
eighth had deserted. Parliament met in January 1805,
240
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1805. and a motion was at once brought forward in the Lords
for the repeal of the Act. The measure was defended by
Lord Hawkesbury, who alleged that, under the spur of
many circulars, the parishes had begun to move, and
that the Act was now producing men at the rate of
three hundred a week, or eleven thousand men a year.
Upon this very inconclusive assurance the Lords
rejected the motion for repeal ; but the attack was
Feb. 2 1 . renewed in the Commons a week later by far more
formidable critics ; and on the 6th of March Sheridan
definitely moved the repeal of the Act. The motion
was lost by a very large majority ; but the situation
was serious ; and Pitt knew it. The casualties in the
Regular Army for the first nine months of 1804
exceeded the recruits gained during the whole year
by over three thousand ; and Lord Grenville openly
asserted in the House of Lords that the numbers of
the Regular Infantry were actually smaller on the 1st of
January 1805 tnan on ^e Ist °f January 1804. If
the war were to be conducted on such lines, the ruin
of the nation could only be a matter of time.
Pitt was the last man to trifle with such a situation.
With his usual courage he looked fatts in the face,
Mar. 31. and on the 31st of March brought in a bill to enable
a number ~of men, equal to the actual strength of the
Supplementary Militia in each county, to be enlisted in
the Army. To attract recruits it was enacted that
they should receive a bounty of ten guineas, should
be allowed to choose their own regiments, and should
not be drafted from them without their own consent ;
and special provisions were inserted to reconcile the
Colonels of Militia, as far as possible, to this weakening
of their battalions. Under this Act about eleven
thousand men passed into the Regular Forces between
the 10th of April and the 26th of June, four-fifths of
them into the infantry, and the remainder into the
Marines. Pitt had named seventeen thousand men
as the figure for which he had hoped ; but nine
thousand were by no means to be despised, the less
ch. viii HISTORY OF THE ARMY
so as they were not raw but trained and disciplined 1805.
troops.
Nor had Pitt's diplomacy been idle since his accession
to office. At the outset of the war England had at
once sought the friendship of Russia, which the Tsar
Alexander was very ready to grant ; for he had dreams
of constituting himself the protagonist of Europe
against the Revolution and its representative, Bonaparte.
Where Russia led there was good hope that Prussia
would follow, her despicable King being very willing to
attach himself to Alexander's skirts, though his greed
for Hanover was such that he would have broken any
faith to obtain it. Austria was also approached by
Addington but would commit herself to nothing, which
was not unnatural considering all that she had suffered
during the last war. Napoleon, however, who was
also on the search for allies, unwittingly forwarded
England's interests. In the west he could gain what
he wanted in many cases by threats. Holland and the
Italian Republic were virtually French provinces and
were treated as such. Spain he had intimidated, as has
been told, into furnishing a large monthly subsidy until
she should openly break with England ; and from
Portugal also he had extorted a convention under
which that helpless kingdom gave him money and
commercial advantages as well as a promise of strict
neutrality. Naples, likewise, he overawed, as we have
seen, by an armed occupation. The lesser German
states, Bavaria, Wiirtemberg, Baden, and Hesse, he had
gained early in 1803 by allotting to them the con-
fiscated property of the ecclesiastical states ; thereby so
whetting the appetites of the princes who controlled
them, that Bavaria proceeded to seize all the lands lying
within her borders that were held directly of the
Emperor Francis. The aggrieved owners appealed to
Austria for protection, and the Emperor occupied
all the immediate lordships (as they were called)
both in Bavaria and Wurtemberg with troops. He
withdrew them, however, upon a threat of invasion
VOL.V R
242
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1804. from Napoleon; but from the end of 1803 he pre-
pared quietly for war, and began to hope for alliance
with England and Russia. After this affair Napoleon
could hardly hope to gain Austria, and his main object,
therefore, was to neutralise her by winning Prussia to
his side. He had also made overtures to Russia, but
without success, and by the execution of the Duke of
Enghien on the 20th of March 1804, he alienated the
Tsar beyond any hope of speedy reconciliation.
Such was the state of affairs when Pitt returned to
power. His great objects were three : to secure the
neutrality of Holland ; to paralyse Spain by capturing
her treasure-ships and stirring up revolt in her colonies,
unless she either joined England or remained strictly
neutral ; and to treat with Russia so as to draw Austria,
Prussia, and Naples into a general war. The Tsar,
who was already busily preparing to fight France,
welcomed Pitt's proposals, and on the 24th of May
invited Austria to concert operations with him ; but
the Emperor Francis, wishing first to be sure of a subsidy
from England before the war, and of an accession of
territory after it, would not sign a formal alliance.
Simultaneously Alexander turned to Prussia ; but King
Frederick William was also averse from a treaty,
hoping to gain Hanover by adroit mediation between
Napoleon and the Tsar, which was as though a jay
should mediate between an eagle and a condor. How-
ever, he was so far alarmed by Napoleon's seizure of
May 24. Cuxhaven and Hamburg that he came to a secret agree-
ment with Alexander to resist any further encroachment
of the French upon the North German states. There
remained Sweden ; and here England was sure of King
Gustavus the Fourth, who loathed the very name of
Bonaparte, and used the proclamation of the French
Empire as an occasion to exchange insults with him.
A half-witted king, as England was later to discover, is
not a very profitable ally ; but at the time it sufficed
that he should keep open to her the port of Straisund.
At the end of May 1804, therefore, matters had
ch.viii HISTORY OF THE ARMY
243
advanced thus far towards a Coalition, not without 1804.
vigorous efforts on the part of Napoleon to check them.
At Naples his threats extorted the dismissal of the
English Minister, Acton, and the appointment of his
own emissary, Alquier, in his stead. Prussia he surprised
in the midst of her negotiations with Russia by a question
whether King Frederick William would refuse a passage
to Russian troops through Prussian territory, if it were
demanded ; and he actually drew from the miser-
able king a declaration that, unless the French en-
croached further on the neutral states of Germany, he
would close his frontier to any troops directed against
them. To Austria Napoleon addressed a mixed language
of hectoring and cajolery, first hinting at the coalition
and threatening to crush it at once, then offering her
Wallachia, Bosnia, and Servia in exchange for Venetia.
For the moment Austria deferred to him, and sent
assurances of peaceful intentions ; but at the beginning
of October there was an open rupture of relations
between France and Russia, and the Tsar, putting
further pressure upon Austria, persuaded her to consent
to an alliance ; the agreement being put into the form
of a declaration, so that the existence of a treaty could
be denied. Hereby Austria engaged to enter upon Nov. 6.
military operations conjointly with Russia, in the case
of any further augmentation of the French forces in
Naples ; but Russia was to warn Naples not to provoke
France thereto either by manifesto or insurrection.
Finally, in November a special emissary from St. Nov. 16.
Petersburg reached London, and on the 1 1 th of April
1805 a Treaty between England and Russia was signed
at the Russian capital. Its objects were defined to be
the evacuation of Italy, Hanover, and North Germany
by the French, the security of the Kingdom of Naples,
the re - establishment of the King of Sardinia, and the
independence of Holland and Switzerland. The means
were to be half a million men, for which England was
to pay at the rate of a million and a quarter sterling
for every hundred thousand. Russia was to place
244
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1805. eighty thousand men on the Austrian, and sixty-
thousand on the Prussian frontier. Austria and
Prussia were to be invited to join the alliance, and on
agreeing to do so were to receive a million sterling
apiece for the initial expenses of the campaign. Spain
and Portugal were to be invited likewise to include
themselves in the alliance within three months of the
opening of active operations. The condition for pay-
ment of the subsidies was that, within five months of
the signature of the treaty, Russia and Austria, or one
of them, should set her forces in action against France.
Sweden was comprised in the agreement ; and mean-
while she had already come to a separate arrangement
with England, whereby, in return for an annual subsidy
of j£ 60,00c),1 the port of Stralsund and the Isle of
Rugen were placed at the disposal of the British as
military and commercial stations.
Such was the storm that was gathering round
Napoleon's head at the opening of 1805. He was not
unaware of it, and was ready with counterblasts in
every direction. He prepared to crush Austria if she
did not disarm. He sent Marshal Junot to Portugal
to demand the closing of her ports against the British
and the expulsion of all British agents before the 22nd
of March, on pain of immediate war ; and he hung out
the crown of Portugal as a bait to attract Godoy, the
actual ruler of Spain. He wrote letters to the Shah
and to the Sultan of Turkey to stir them up against
Russia. When Holland complained of the burden
that was laid upon her, he transformed her into a
March. French province. The Italian Republic he converted
into a kingdom, first for his brother Joseph and, when
Mar. 1 7. Joseph upon second thoughts refused it, for himself.
If he could not persuade the really independent states
to throw in their lot with him, he would at least make
sure of his own vassals.
Meanwhile his two fleets put to sea, Villeneuve from
Jan. Toulon on the 18th of January, Missiessy on the nth
1 Pierrepont to Sec. of State, 3rd Jan. 1805.
ch. viii HISTORY OF THE ARMY
from Rochefort. Villeneuve, meeting at once with 1805.
heavy weather which seriously damaged three of his
ships, put back to Toulon, with loud protests against
sending ships to sea ill-fitted, undermanned, and en-
cumbered with troops.1 Missiessy, on the other hand,
made a fairly good passage, and on the 20th of Feb. 20
February arrived safely at Fort de France, Martinique,
with his entire force of five ships of the line, five
smaller vessels of war, and thirty-three hundred troops.
In the British West Indies, General Myers, the com-
mander-in-chief, had been sadly harassed by privateers,
by the weakness of the British squadron both in quality
and quantity, and above all by a sickly season, which had
wrought special havoc in Dominica, Antigua, and St.
Lucia. In the last-named island in particular the Sixty-
eighth Regiment had lost over five hundred men dead
and over one hundred and seventy invalided to Europe
during the last six months of 1 804,2 while in Myers's own
staff, civil and military, twelve out of sixteen persons had
perished. He had asked for reinforcements but none
had yet arrived ; and Missiessy may therefore be said to
have come at a good moment for himself.
Obedient to his instructions, the French Admiral
wasted no time, but on the 21st sailed for Dominica,
and arriving off Roseau early on the 22 nd under British Feb. 21
colours, was received by the harbour-master, who came Feb. 22
aboard the flag-ship not doubting but that he was wel-
coming the British Commodore. General Prevost, who
was in command ashore, speedily perceived the mistake
and opened fire from the batteries upon the French
squadron. The bulk of the ships then remained in
position before Roseau, while two small divisions parted
from them north and south to cover the disembarkation
of the troops.
The landing-place selected by General Lagrange,
who was in command of the French, was between two
1 Desbriere, iv. 299-300.
2 Gen. Myers to Sec. of State, 30th Sept., 14th Oct. 1804 ; 5th
Jan., 10th Feb. 1805.
246
HISTORY OF THE ARMY bookxiii
1805. and three miles south of Roseau and a little to the
Feb. 22. north of Point Michel; and at about seven in the
morning nineteen barges full of troops made for the
shore at this point, under protection of a schooner and
of several boats armed with carronades. Prevost's
entire force for the defence of the island consisted of
about three hundred men of the Forty-sixth, a score
of Royal Artillery, about four hundred of the First
West India Regiment, and a few companies of Militia ;
but even this handful of men he was compelled to
divide between Roseau and Prince Rupert's Bay, the
maintenance of the harbour at the latter point being
vital to the safety of the island. However, he was
resolved to contest every foot of ground ; and with
three selected companies, one from each of his three
corps, he drove back the first of the French boats.
Two French ships then stood in shore to cover the
disembarkation with their guns, whereupon Prevost
withdrew the three companies further inland to a defile
which defended the approach to Roseau. Then, rein-
forcing them with two additional companies of Militia,
more men of the Forty-sixth and two light guns, he
handed the command of the whole tcHMajor Nunn of
the First West India Regiment, with orders not to
yield an inch of ground. The French thereupon
landed over two thousand men and advanced with great
impetuosity to the attack. But the position was strong ;
Prevost's dispositions were good ; the detachment of the
Forty-sixth, which did not exceed two hundred men,
set a fine example ; and Nunn's tenacity was beyond
all praise. The French column suffered much during
its advance from the British artillery, especially from a i
single gun so cunningly placed behind a wall that it j
could only be approached in single file ; and a whole
company of French grenadiers sacrificed itself, man
after man, in a vain endeavour to capture it. At ten
o'clock Nunn was mortally wounded, and the command 1
passed to Captain O'Connell of the same regiment. He I
also was wounded almost immediately, but remained in j
ch. viii HISTORY OF THE ARMY
247
the field until two o'clock, when the French, repulsed 1805.
in repeated attacks with heavy loss, fell back out of Feb. 2
range.
Further north the French ships were retarded by
contrary winds, but at nine o'clock they landed another
strong detachment a mile and a half to north of Roseau
at the foot of Morne Daniel. Prevost had but one
hundred Militia at this point to oppose to over a
thousand of the enemy ; but his handful of men
attacked the boats gallantly as they came up through
the surf, killing eight French soldiers and wounding
several more, till they were driven from the beach by
the guns of the men-of-war. There remained now
only a small redoubt on Morne Daniel, which was
defended by a sergeant of the Forty-sixth with four
men of his own regiment, five of the West India, and
a few Militia with a single three-pounder. This
gallant little party fought desperately, inflicting much
loss on the enemy until the ten men of the Regular
troops had fallen, when the redoubt was carried by
sheer weight of numbers. The French then landed
two hundred men midway between their two points of
attack ; and Prevost, observing them on the march to
get into the rear of O'Connell, at about two o'clock
hoisted the white flag. The French fire thereupon
ceased, and Prevost, ordering the Militia to remain at
their posts, directed the civil Governor to negotiate the
capitulation of Roseau. He himself then drew off the
whole of his Regular troops, white and black, and made
a forced march with them along the whole length of
the island to Rupert's Bay. So steep was the country
and so rough were the tracks that the troops, carrying
their wounded, took four days to accomplish the
I journey ; but Prevost himself with two companies, by
great exertion, reached Fort Cabril at Rupert's Bay in
twenty -four hours, and at once made every pre-
paration for a stubborn defence. With an adequate
garrison, as he knew, the French were powerless to
hurt him except by a regular siege. Thus though
248
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1805. Roseau was lost, Dominica and its precious anchorage
were saved.1
This little affair was extremely creditable to all
concerned on the British side. Prevost had evidently
thought out his plan of operations in every detail, and
though in a measure surprised by the French attack,
was never for a moment at a loss. His officers also
knew their duty and did it ; and of the many tiny
detachments scattered along the batteries on the coast,
every one with a single exception was safely brought in,
without direct orders, to Rupert's Bay. One officer
and seven gunners only were captured, and the losses
of the Regular troops did not not exceed thirty-seven
in killed and wounded. Those of the Militia are
unfortunately unknown, but they were considerable,
for this force behaved with admirable gallantry and
spirit. The casualties of the French were reckoned
by Prevost at about three hundred ; but the General's
spirited defence produced more important consequences
than the death or mutilation of French soldiers.
General Lagrange had begged Missiessy to divide his
squadron so as to attack Roseau and Rupert's Bay
simultaneously, and Missiessy had refused ; so that
when it was realised that Prevost had secured Fort
Cabril, Lagrange felt anything but kindly disposed
towards his naval colleague. The French squadron
reconnoitred Rupert's Bay, but seeing that an attack
upon it was hopeless, sailed first to Guadeloupe, and
then to St. Kitt's, Nevis, and Montserrat, where
Missiessy levied contributions and ransoms on a few
captured ships. Returning thence to Martinique on
Mar. 12. the 1 2th of March, he found new orders from
Napoleon awaiting him. Their purport was that
Villeneuve had been driven back by weather to
Toulon, that his squadron had since been detailed
for another service in a different quarter, that
Missiessy was now to act independently, according
to the spirit of his first instructions, and that Rochefort
1 Prevost to Myers, 1st March, 1805 ; Desbriere, iv. 31 1-3 13.
ch.viii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 249
would probably be the safest port for him to make for 1805.
on his return.1
Missiessy interpreted this as an order to visit St.
Domingo and then return home. Admiral Villaret
Joyeuse, Governor of Martinique, on the contrary, was
urgent that he should first attack the Diamond Rock,
which had been fortified and garrisoned by the British
Navy as a thorn in the French side ; but Missiessy
refused to listen to him, alleging that any such
operation was contrary to the tenor of his instructions.
On the 22nd of March, therefore, he sailed for the port Mar.
of St. Domingo, which was then besieged by the rebel
negroes, threw a reinforcement with supplies and stores
into it, and on the evening of the 28th sailed for Mar.
Rochefort. Myers, however, knew nothing certain of
these movements and remained in the greatest anxiety.
He had received a welcome reinforcement of three
battalions2 at Barbados on the nth of March, but in
the presence of a superior French squadron he was at a
loss to know how to distribute them. Commodore Hood
was indeed collecting his ships at Deseada ; but with
only one vessel of the line and a few frigates he could
not hope to engage Missiessy. Moreover, a convoy
from England carrying troops for Jamaica was known
to be on the way ; and one straggling ship from it
actually arrived at Barbados on the 27th of March,
so that Myers could not tell what disaster might be
impending. A little more enterprise on the part of
Missiessy might have made things very uncomfortable
for us at this time in the West Indies.
It is now, however, necessary to forsake the Antilles
for a moment in order to follow the fortunes of Ville-
neuve. On the 16th of January, two days before that
Admiral left Toulon, Napoleon had produced another
plan, namely, that the squadrons from Brest, Rochefort,
and Ferrol should embark twenty-two thousand men and
sail to the East Indies. Since Missiessy had started on
1 Decres to Missiessy, 27th Jan. 1805 ; Desbriere, iv. 313.
2 The 15th, 90th, and 96th.
250
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1805. the nth with the Rochefort squadron, his participation
in this wild expedition was impossible ; but when
Villeneuve returned on the 22nd, he was ordered to
refit his ships and re-embark his troops as speedily as
possible for a new enterprise which, though the fact was
not actually revealed to him, could only have been in the
East. Evidently, therefore, with Missiessy detached on
an independent service, and the remaining squadrons
appointed for East Indian waters, the idea of invasion
of England had been for the moment dropped. The
attitude of Austria was, indeed, too threatening to
permit of it.
Towards the end of February, however, French
relations with Austria had so far improved that Napoleon
returned to his darling project ; and heartened by the
assurance of full co-operation of the Spanish fleet, he
Feb. 27. framed, on the 27th of February, his final plan. First,
directions were sent to Missiessy to stay in the West
Indies and await further order ; though these, not
arriving until after the Admiral had sailed for Europe,
were given to no purpose. Next, Admiral Ganteaume
was ordered to weigh anchor at once with the Brest
fleet — twenty-one ships of the line — release Vice-admiral
Gourdon's squadron at Ferrol, and sail with it to
Martinique, where he would take the squadrons of
Missiessy and Villeneuve under his command, and with
the combined fleets make for Ushant, attack the British
vessels there, and proceed to Boulogne. If the com-
bined fleets at Martinique were fewer than twenty-five
ships of the line, Ganteaume was to return straight to
Ferrol ; but he was authorised to wait thirty days at
Martinique for the Toulon fleet.
Supplementary to these orders, instructions were given
to Villeneuve to sail to Martinique, unblockading Cadiz
if necessary on the way, to take Missiessy under his
command there, and to wait forty days for Ganteaume.
If the last-named did not appear within forty days,
Villeneuve was to return to Europe by way of St.
Domingo, wait once again twenty days for Ganteaume
ch.viii HISTORY OF THE ARMY
251
at the Cape de Verde Islands, and put back from thence 1
to Cadiz.
This done, the Emperor drew up on the 23 rd of ]\
March and the following days the detailed orders for the
embarkation of the invading force. But these were at
once found to be impossible of execution. In Ney's
corps two divisions had too many boats for their men
and one division too many men for its boats, with the
result that, upon the whole, over fifteen hundred men
were left without any boats at all. In Soult's corps five
thousand men were left without means of embarkation ;
and altogether it was found that transport for twenty
thousand men and for over five thousand horses was
still wanting. Yet, when the matter was examined, it
appeared that after all there were numbers of vessels to
which no men had been assigned. But this was all part
of the general confusion ; for though the total number,
both of troops and boats, might correspond exactly, yet
the distribution was so faulty that in some places there
were too many craft for the men, and in others too
many men for the craft. In fact, the boasted organisa-
tion of the army flotilla of invasion existed only on
paper, being, when reduced to practice, a very chaos.
Napoleon had in fact wasted time and money irrecover-
ably by adherence to his own ignorant methods in
maritime matters, while neglecting the advice of his
skilled and experienced naval officers.
However, he had now set on foot a naval campaign
upon a grand scale ; and it is necessary to see what opera-
tions the British Government was contemplating at this
same time. It must be premised that the Admiralty's
great difficulty was to divine the service upon which the
Toulon fleet was to be employed. By the occupation
of the peninsula of Otranto and the ports at the heel of
Italy Napoleon threw out a standing menace to the
Mediterranean at large ; and the British Ministers were
in constant apprehension as to the point where the blow
would fall. Napoleon by admirable management
contrived that the suspicions of Downing Street should
252
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1805. De turned entirely towards Egypt. He had spread
constant reports of an Egyptian expedition during
1802, which were greedily swallowed by General Sir
John Stuart, at that time the Commander of our troops
at Alexandria.1 After the evacuation of the country by
the British, again, the French agent at Cairo, M. de
Lesseps, declared continually and with firm conviction
that a French fleet was on its way to Alexandria to ask
for a passage thence to the East Indies ; and Major
Missett, the British agent left behind by Stuart, never
ceased to urge the importance of sending a British force
to avert such a catastrophe.2 Lastly, Nelson, to whose
vigilance the watch upon Toulon was entrusted, was
firmly imbued with the idea that Egypt was Villeneuve's
ultimate destination.
But there were other objects besides Egypt within
reach, most notably Sicily, the possession of which in
French hands would have shaken, if not destroyed,
British ascendancy in the Mediterranean. There was
no counting upon the Court of Naples. The King, a
degenerate Bourbon like his brother of Spain, was in-
capable of any fixed resolution ; and the Queen was a
false, dangerous, and scheming woman,-*vho was more
likely than not to favour Napoleon if by so doing she
could advance any small interest of her own. From the
very outbreak of war Nelson had urged the occupation
of Messina ; and Addington had given the Governor of
Malta discretionary orders to employ two thousand men
for the purpose, if Nelson and Mr. Hugh Elliot, the
resident at Naples, should ask for them-3 The Court
of Naples, however, would not hear of permitting the
British to protect Messina for them, dreading, according
to Nelson, the jealousy of the Russians at Corfu rather
than that of the French. Yet at any moment the King
1 W.O. Egypt, 346 ; Stuart to Sec. of State, 20th Jan., 26th
Oct. 1803.
2 W.O. Egypt, 346 ; Missett to Sec. of State, 25th Aug. 1803 ;
25th, 26th Jan., 27th Feb., 2nd, 16th March, 28th May 1804.
3 Nelson to Addington, private, 28th June 1803 ; Nelson to
Hobart, 22nd Dec. 1803.
ch. viii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 253
might be compelled to fly from Naples to Palermo ; and 1
the internal state of Sicily was as bad as it could be,
with an oppressive nobility, an enraged middle-class, and
not so much as a company of troops. When, therefore,
Villeneuve broke the blockade in January 1 805, Ministers
took the peril to heart and resolved to strengthen the British
garrisons in the Mediterranean before it was too late.
Accordingly towards the end of March Lieutenant-
general Sir James Craig received orders to take four
battalions together with a small detachment of cavalry
and artillery to Malta, and to assume command in the
whole of the Mediterranean excepting Gibraltar. The
principal object of his force was to be the protection
of Sicily, and this object he was to fulfil with or
without the consent of the King of Naples, but always
in his name. If that potentate had gone so far as to
exclude British ships from his ports, then Craig was to
take possession of Sicily for King George ; but if the
French had invaded it, or threatened invasion, he was
to dislodge them or repel them, according to circum-
stances, in the name of King Ferdinand. As regarded
the further destination of the force, it was necessary to
keep several contingencies in view. The Russians were
preparing to attack the French in the Mediterranean,
and might drive them from the Neapolitan dominions ;
or again the French might attack Naples before Sicily,
and the Russians might call upon the British for assist-
ance. In either case Craig might co-operate with the
Russians, if summoned either by Elliot or by the
Russian commander, putting himself under the orders
of the latter if the foreigner were his superior in rank.
Yet again the French might attack Turkey, in which
case the occupation of Alexandria might be necessary ;
or, as Nelson dreaded, they might turn their arms against
Sardinia and block the way to the Levant. For these
cases no special instructions were given ; but they were
indicated to show the possible scope of Craig's duties-1
1 W.O. Entry Book, 52, Sec. of State to Craig, most secret, 28th,
29th March 1805.
254 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xm
1805. Craig, accordingly, sailed on the 17th of April,
April 1 7. carrying with him two battalions for Gibraltar besides
the troops assigned to his own command. The whole of
them filled thirty-seven transports, which were escorted
by a small squadron of three ships under Rear-admiral
Knight. But meanwhile Villeneuve had slipped out of
Mar. 30. Toulon on the 30th of March with eleven sail of the
line and eight smaller ships of war, carrying in all
over three thousand troops besides the crews. He was
seen by two British frigates ; but obtaining by good
luck intelligence that Nelson was at Palma, on the
south-west coast of Sardinia, he shaped his course to
evade him by hugging the coast of Spain. At Car-
thagena Villeneuve found six Spanish ships of the line,
which were placed at his disposal by their commanders ;
but he decided to leave them behind, and profiting by
a favourable wind, passed the Straits of Gibraltar on
April 9. the 9th of April. Arrived before Cadiz, he dispersed
the blockading force under Sir John Orde, and liberat-
ing Admiral Gravina's squadron, hurried on without
waiting to incorporate it with his own. Orde fell
April 30. back to the Channel fleet ; and on the 30th of April
Admiral Knight, being at the moment off Finisterre
with Craig's army under convoy, learned to his great
dismay that the Toulon fleet was at large. The
Admiralty had written to Nelson on the 15th of
April to provide for the safety of Knight and his
charge on their passage from Gibraltar eastward ; but
the Board had never dreamed, apparently, that the
convoy might be cut off before it reached the Rock.
Unaware that Villeneuve was hastening westward with all
May 7. speed, Craig was much alarmed ; and on the 7th of May
the convoy, with the exception of two transports which
had parted company, took refuge in Lisbon. Not
knowing whether the French and Spanish squadrons
might not attack him even there, Craig made every
preparation to land, seize the Portuguese forts and
turn the guns upon the enemy's ships. It was a
desperate expedient and by no means in accordance
ch.viii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 255
with the so-called law of nations; but men must not 1805.
be too hardly judged when they find themselves, by
no fault of their own, thrust unexpectedly into a
false position.
Meanwhile Nelson, on receiving news of Villeneuve's
departure, had made at first for Sicily ; and it was not
until the 19 th of April that he ascertained that the April 1
French Admiral had passed the Straits of Gibraltar.
Nelson then followed him, much delayed by foul winds
and greatly apprehensive lest Craig's force might have
come to disaster. On this point, however, he was
presently satisfied. Owing to the protests of Junot,
the French Ambassador at Lisbon, Knight was com-
pelled on the 10th to remove his convoy from that May 1
port, and on the following day he fell in with Nelson May 1
off Cape St. Vincent. Nelson thereupon made his
decision, reinforced the convoy by one line-of-battle
ship, and sailed straight for Barbados ; while Craig
pursued his way safely to Gibraltar.
Upon the first news of Missiessy's appearance in
the West Indies the Admiralty had ordered Admiral
Cochrane thither. On the 3rd of April that officer April 3
reached Barbados with five ships of the line and three
frigates. Thence, after adding to this squadron Hood's
flag-ship the Centaur^ he sailed away to leeward on the
5th in pursuit of the French Admiral. For more than April 5
a month General Myers at Barbados waited anxiously
for news of his success ; and then there came on the
13th of May a warning from England that a large May i-:
French fleet had been seen off Cadiz. This was
followed on the 18th by a report from Martinique itself May iS
that a fleet of twenty-nine sail in all, with the flags
of one Spanish and two French admirals among them,
were coming into Fort de France. " Of course none
of the islands are safe for long with the enemy so
strong here," wrote Myers. " A more deplorable
force than our Militia in Barbados was never
seen." He prepared, therefore, for the worst, never
doubting that Napoleon's object was to harry the
256
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1805. whole °f ^e British West Indies. The British
Government also interpreted the mission of Villeneuve's
May 1 8. fleet in the same sense; and on the 18 th of May-
ordered Sir Eyre Coote to take command of some
seven thousand troops,1 and to sail with them at once
to the rescue of the British islands. Nevertheless,
if the French movements should prove to be a feint
only, Myers was ordered to send these troops back
again ; and even if Villeneuve should have captured an
island or two, it was left to the General's discretion to
decide whether he should recapture them at once or
send Coote's force to Halifax to await the healthy
season. The appalling experience of 1793 to 1795
had not been wholly thrown away upon Pitt ; and he
was not prepared again to squander soldiers by the
ten thousand in fighting over sugar-plantations. Still
it was a time of anxious suspense for the authorities at
Whitehall as well as in the Antilles, for the West
Indian merchants were powerful, and a destructive
raid upon their cherished property would have damaged
the Government greatly.2
Napoleon's plans, however, had been but imperfectly
realised. Villeneuve's squadron witk five thousand
May 1 4. troops on board had indeed arrived on the 14th at
Martinique, where three of his missing Spanish ships
had anchored before him ; but Ganteaume had failed
to make his escape from Brest. On the 24th of
March, when only {iftcQti British vessels were blockad-
ing him, he had asked permission to go out and fight
them with his own fleet of twenty-one, but Napoleon
forbade him. Within the next few days the British
fleet was reinforced, and Ganteaume, after a vain
attempt to put to sea on the 27th, retired once more
on the 29 th within the inner harbour. Villeneuve, of
course knowing nothing of this, set himself to wait
1 The 8th, 24th, 32nd, 38th, 62nd, 71st, 72nd, 83rd, 89th,
and 93rd Infantry of the Line ; in all 6493 rank and file ; besides
artillery.
2 Myers to Sec. of State, 14th, 18th, 24th May ; Sec. of State
to Myers, 18th, 25th May 1805.
1
ch.viii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 257
patiently for Ganteaume's arrival, according to his 1805.
orders. He projected vaguely an attack upon Dominica,
as the nearest island to Martinique, but finally re-
duced his offensive operations to the recapture of the
Diamond Rock, a tiny islet which had been occupied
by the British in order to harass the French merchant-
men. On the 30th there reached him a frigate, and
on the 4th of June two line-of-battle ships and eight June 4.
hundred additional troops under Admiral Magon,
bringing final orders from Napoleon dated the 14th
and 17 th of April. These were to the effect that
Villeneuve was to wait thirty-five days after Magon's
arrival for news of Ganteaume, and, if he received
none, that he should return at once to Ferrol, release
and take under his command the fifteen French and
Spanish vessels blockaded there, proceed with them to
Brest, and having set Ganteaume also free, sail with
the united force to the Channel. Meanwhile he was
to capture St. Lucia, Dominica, and as many other
islands as possible ; but due arrival before Boulogne at
the appointed time was the duty above all imposed
upon him. There he would find the Emperor in
person ; and the fate of the world would depend upon
the punctuality of his coming.1
At last therefore it had occurred to the Emperor to
turn his raid upon the West Indies into a feint which
should give him the mastery of the Channel ; but on
the 2nd of June Admiral Cochrane, having ascertained June,
that Missiessy had sailed for Europe, returned with his
ships to Barbados ; and on the very day on which
Villeneuve received his new orders, Nelson likewise
put into Carlisle Bay with his fleet. By the addition June 4.
of Cochrane's vessels Nelson saw his force raised to
twelve ships of the line ; and though the French fleet
counted half as many again, neither he nor Myers had
an idea of remaining idle with such strength at their
disposal. Myers's latest intelligence reported, falsely,
that Villeneuve's fleet had been seen heading for
1 Desbriere, iv. 513-515.
VOL. V S
258
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1805. Trinidad ; and he at once proposed to Nelson to
embark two thousand troops and sail to the relief of
the threatened island.1 The Admiral eagerly complied ;
June 5. and early on the morning of the 5th the armament
departed. On the 6th it passed Tobago, on the 7th
Trinidad, and on the 9th Grenada, and found all safe ;
but off the island last named a British man-of-war
brought the news that the French had passed Rupert's
Bay on the morning of the 6th. Nelson at once stood
June 12. over to Antigua and ascertained on the 12th that the
French had passed Antigua on the 8th, steering north ;
whereupon he promptly dropped Myers and his troops,
and sailed in pursuit. With bitter disappointment
Myers saw him go, for he had looked to a campaign
with Nelson as the happiest chance of his life ; and
the great Admiral had been so much struck with the
spirit of the General and of his troops that he had
written with his own hand a letter in warm com-
mendation of both.2
Thus within, not thirty-five, but fourteen days of
Magon's arrival Villeneuve had taken hasty flight. He
had already written to Paris on the 1st of June that the
state of his supplies did not permit him to carry out
the new instructions received through Magon ; but
nevertheless he had made some show of activity, so that
the information of Myers was not altogether at fault.
On the 5 th of June Villeneuve had stood over to
Guadeloupe to embark additional troops for an attack
upon Barbados ; on the 6 th he had sailed for the Bar-
bados with close on nine thousand soldiers ; and on the
8th he had captured fourteen merchantmen to leeward
of that island. But from them he learned of Nelson's
arrival and of his junction with Cochrane ; and this
was enough for him. After consultation with Gravina,
1 The force consisted of the 15th, the 96th, and detachments of
the 4th and 6th W.I.R. with artillery, altogether 2024 of all
ranks, nearly 600 of which were black troops.
2 Myers to S.S. 3rd, 4th, 12th June ; Nelson to S.S. nth June
1805.
ch. viii HISTORY OF THE ARMY
259
he decided to send his troops back to Martinique in 1805.
frigates, and to take his own fleet straight to Ferrol ; and
on the 10th he finally turned his back upon the West June 10.
Indies. Nelson, as we have seen, followed hard after
him, sending warning both to England and to the
British squadron before Ferrol.
In England, of course, nothing was known of all this.
The War Office, upon the news of Missiessy's return to
Europe, had counter- ordered the despatch of Coote ;
but on hearing of Villeneuve's arrival in the West
Indies, it decided again on the 5th of July to send him July 5.
with four battalions only to Barbados, so as to provide
for the safety both of that island and of Jamaica ; the
latter being suspected to be the object of the French
attack. It was a small force for the purpose, but the
season was a very deadly one, and the Government
would not risk the loss of more. On the 8th of July, July 8.
however, intelligence of Villeneuve's departure for
Europe reached London ; and Coote's sailing was again
delayed until further orders, though the troops were
still kept on board their ships at Cork to prevent
desertion. Such, indeed, was the loathing and dread of
West Indian service that several men jumped over-
board and swam ashore to escape it. Finally, on the
26th of July Coote received an intimation that the July 26.
troops were required for a different object ; and the
idea of extraordinary military reinforcement for the
West Indies was abandoned.
As to naval reinforcement, it has already been told
how the Government sent Cochrane westward im-
mediately upon hearing of Missiessy's destination, and
how Nelson followed Villeneuve to the Antilles upon
his own initiative, though with the full approval of the
Admiralty. On the first intelligence of Villeneuve's
departure from Toulon there had been great alarm lest
he should release the blockaded squadrons at Cadiz,
Ferrol, and Brest, and enter the Channel to cover an
invasion from Boulogne. " During the week just past,"
said the Morning Chronicle, " no one has slept in
26o
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1805. peace/' The Government, however, had early intelli-
gence of Villeneuve's true destination ; and on the 27th
April 27. of April the squadrons of Collingwood and Orde were
ordered to meet at Madeira and pursue the French fleet.
Lord Gardner took upon himself to delay this move-
ment, which was cancelled when it was certainly known
that Nelson had sailed to Barbados ; and on the 1 6th
of May the Sun newspaper commented with satisfaction
upon this, remarking that the departure of Villeneuve
westward might well be a feint to draw the English
fleet after him to the West Indies, while he doubled
back to appear in force in the Channel. Admiral
Decres called Napoleon's attention to this in a letter of
June 1. the 1st of June ; 1 but the Emperor none the less kept
multiplying impossible instructions to Villeneuve as to
junction with the fleets at Cadiz, Ferrol, and Brest,
all with a view to securing a few days' control of the
Channel. " If," he wrote on the 8th of May, " your
presence makes us masters of the sea for three days
before Boulogne, we shall have every chance of
forwarding our expedition of one hundred and fifty
thousand men embarked in two thousand vessels." In
vain Decres urged that these junction© of fleets were
not so easily effected, that winds and tides might well
prevent them, and that Nelson would infallibly hang on
to Villeneuve's skirts wherever he might go. The
Emperor answered only that the mind of Decres was
too small for great operations, and continued to frame
vague and speculative plans. However, as none of the
Emperor's letters of this period ever reached Villeneuve,
no great result could follow from them.2 On both sides j
June, of the Channel throughout the month of June the j
directors of the naval operations were at fault for lack of {
information. In England, indeed, there seems to have
reigned a curious sense of security, which on the 28 th
of June called forth a remarkable warning from
1 Desbriere, iv. 596.
2 Decres to Napoleon, 1st June ; Napoleon to Decres, 6th June ji
1805 ; Desbriere, iv. 596, 602.
ch. viii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 261
Colonel Robert Craufurd in the House of Commons. 1805.
The danger of invasion, he said in effect, was not yet
over. The French fleet after a raid in the West
Indies might return unexpectedly, gain temporary
superiority in the narrow seas, take possession of the
Downs, and bring over Napoleon's immense army of
invasion. The Secretary at War, William Dundas,
greeted the suggestion with a smile, to which Craufurd
replied by asserting that such a plan had certainly
been suggested by de Bouille to Count de Grasse before
the latter encountered Rodney in 1782.1 There can
therefore be no doubt that Napoleon's much vaunted
scheme of naval operations was not so subtle but that
it could be penetrated both by journalists and military
officers.
In July the situation began to clear itself up. On
the 9th the British Admiralty received intelligence of July 9.
Villeneuve's departure from the West Indies ; on the
19th Nelson, having outstripped his quarry, arrived July 19-
at Gibraltar, and, finding no news of Villeneuve,
anchored on the 21st at Tetuan for rest. A day later, July 21.
Villeneuve with twenty ships encountered the fifteen July 22.
vessels of Sir Robert Calder's fleet about fifty leagues
west of Ferrol, and after an indecisive action, which cost
him the loss of two Spanish ships, entered Vigo on the
27th. Finding no instructions or information there, July 27.
he left three crippled ships in the port and sailed for
Ferrol, but in obedience to orders received from France,
anchored on the 2nd of August at Coruna, with his Aug. 2.
crews very sickly and his fleet generally in a miserable
plight.
Now for the first time he could form some idea of the
course of events and of his master's matured plans, for
so far he had received no intelligence of later date than
I the 3rd of May. First he was informed that Admiral
Gourdon at Ferrol had been instructed to move to
1 Coruna. He was therefore ordered to add this force to
his own, which having done, he was to pick up either
1 H.D. v. pp. 668-669.
262
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1805. the Rochefort squadron or the Brest squadron, and
manoeuvre to gain the mastery of the Channel for four
or five days. If through any cause unforeseen circum-
stances had altered the situation, he was to release the
squadrons at Rochefort and Ferrol only, and anchor
with them by preference at Cadiz. In comment upon
these orders it must be mentioned that Gourdon had
found it impossible to move from Ferrol to Corufia,
that a wind which was fair for ships leaving Coruna
was foul for ships leaving Ferrol ; and that the Rochefort
squadron, under Admiral Allemand, who had superseded
Missiessy, had put to sea on the 1 6 th of July. Allemand
had vague instructions to make a raid upon Ireland so
as to draw off some of the British ships from before
Brest, and then to slip away, join Gourdon not earlier
than the 3rd of August or, failing that, wait at an
appointed rendezvous at sea until the 13th of August.
Aug. 3. However, poor Villeneuve wrote dutifully on the 3rd
of August that he would try to enter Brest or evade the
British and enter the Channel, if he saw any chance of
success, but in the contrary event would put into
Cadiz. He then sent out a frigate to find Allemand
and, waiting till the 8 th for its retuTn, received the
news that Nelson had arrived at Gibraltar on the 20th
and sailed out into the Atlantic again on the 26th of
July. The frigate never returned, having been cap-
Aug. 13. tured by a British ship, and on the 13th Villeneuve
picked up the squadron at Ferrol, which increased his
fleet to twenty-nine ships in all, and again put to sea.
Meanwhile Napoleon had continually reiterated his
orders to him, to release the various French fleets from
Cadiz to Brest and proceed to Boulogne. " Make me
master of the Channel for the space of but three days," j
he wrote on the 26th of July, " and with God's help I
will put an end to the career and existence of England.
. . . One hundred and fifty thousand men are embarked
in two thousand vessels." On the 3rd of August the
Emperor betook himself to Boulogne in person, and
then for the first time he learned not only of Villeneuve's
CH. viii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 263
return to Vigo, but of Nelson's arrival in European 1805.
waters also. On the 1 3th of August he ordered Decres
to censure Villeneuve's inaction ; at the same time
directing the force in Holland to make a feint of
sortie in its transports, in order to keep twelve British
ships employed. He was now very anxious for an
action to be fought off Ferrol, and gave Villeneuve
positive orders to attack the British fleet if it did not
exceed twenty-four ships. All this was useless. After
two days' battling against northerly winds, Villeneuve
on the 15th turned southward and put into Cadiz. Aug. 1
On the same day Nelson joined the Channel fleet
before Brest, bringing it up to a total of thirty-nine
sail, so that, had Villeneuve persisted in making his
way northward, he would have been beaten. And
even if the French admiral had reached Boulogne
triumphantly, Napoleon would not have had one
hundred and fifty thousand men ready to cross the
Channel ; for at no time had he more than ninety
thousand men assembled at the ports of embarkation.
The truth is that the great plan had failed at all
points, and that the Emperor knew it.
Since the middle of July, too, the attitude of Austria
had become more and more menacing. On the 9 th of Aug. 9
August that power formally joined the alliance with
Russia and England ; and on the 1 3th, the very day on Aug. 1
which Napoleon ordered Villeneuve to be rebuked for
inaction, he informed Talleyrand that he had suspended
the invasion of England in order to defend his southern
frontiers. He still continued to write stimulating letters
to Villeneuve. " Lose not a moment, but enter the
Channel with my united fleets," so ran one of the 22nd Aug. 2
of August, " England is ours ; we are quite ready, and
everything is embarked. Come only for twenty-four
hours and all is over." Yet on this very same day he
gave his first orders for the army to break up and march
upon Ulm ; and by the 1st of September not a man Sept. 1
was left at Boulogne. Other letters followed, containing
unfair censure of Villeneuve ; and yet others implying
264
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1805. that the flotilla had been from beginning to end no
more than a feint. All of this was nothing but clumsy-
lying, designed to cover the Emperor's own blunders.
Historians will debate for ever the question whether
Napoleon really intended to invade England or not.
Personally I have no doubt that he did so intend, pro-
vided that he could see any reasonable chance of trans-
porting a sufficient force across the Channel. It was
one of the dreams of his life, to which he constantly
reverted, even as was the wild project of an invasion of
India. The man was continually conjuring up attractive
visions of conquests over the sea, and amusing himself
and distracting his officials by executing them upon
paper. Twice he endeavoured to realise them, in
Egypt and in St. Domingo, and on each occasion the
attempt ended in disastrous failure. In the case of
England, he might have gone nearer to success had he
not wasted untold sums in building boats of the wrong
kind, according to his own untutored ideas, and had he
acknowledged more fully his complete ignorance of all
naval matters. The true secret of the flotilla is
probably to be found in his passionate impatience of
making war without the possibility- of taking the
offensive ; and it must be freely confessed that he
successfully reduced the feeble Addington to a
passively defensive attitude. At least, therefore, he
should receive credit for having scared a British Govern-
ment into the most foolish and futile preparations
conceivable for an effective war.
The further problem of the failure or success of an
invasion, had Napoleon succeeded in passing a large
force across the Channel, must remain insoluble.
Without details as to the number of men disembarked,
the place of landing, the time of disembarkation, and,
above all, of the warning received of his coming, all
speculation is useless. In the early winter of 1 803 his
chances would not have been bad ; but in 1 804, and
still more in 1805 they would have been less promising.
By that time the people knew what they must do, and
ch.viii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 265
were prepared to do it. The positions for rendezvous 1805.
and for defence had been chosen, and effective measures
had been taken for concentrating large bodies of troops
at the point of attack. The general tactics of defence
had also been thought out. The invaders were to be
confined as far as possible to a narrow front and
perpetually harassed in flank and rear, a task which the
British superiority in cavalry would have made easy.
The best Generals in the Southern District, Sir David
Dundas and Sir John Moore, had fully made up their
minds to retreat to a flank if defeated, so as to make
pursuit the more difficult and hazardous. If Napoleon
had succeeded in reaching London, his task would not
have been done, for every provision had been made for
transporting the seat of Government to Worcester ; and,
with the stout old King to show an example, there
would have been no talk of surrender. Once in
London, the French Army would probably have taken
leave of all discipline for a time ; the sick list would
have been enormous ; and the force must have been
much scattered to secure the entrance to the Thames
and the capital at large. Moreover, after a few months,
supplies would have failed ; and it would then have been
necessary to procure grain and forage, by sending out
armed parties which would certainly have been attacked
and probably defeated in detail. Upon the whole, if
the French Army had managed to get into England,
it could never have got out again. The capture of
London would not have been such a death-blow as
it would now be ; and, though the loss and suffering
to England would have been enormous, it is probable
that an army of Russians and Austrians would have
made France suffer even more.1 Thus a successful
disembarkation of a French army in England might well
have abridged the troubles of Europe by ten years,
for it is hardly possible that the rule of Napoleon could
have survived it.
1 But Napoleon himself thought that if he captured London no
one in Europe would dare to move. Marmont, Memoir es, ii. 216.
CHAPTER IX
1805. The dread of invasion was past. The Third Coali-
tion was come into full play ; Napoleon's columns
were streaming away towards the Danube, and the time
was fully ripe for England to take the offensive.
Pitt, before he came into office, had sketched the spheres
of employment for the troops of the various nations.
The Neapolitans, ten or fifteen thousand British, and as
many Russians were to be employed in South Italy,
the Austrians and sixty thousand more Russians in
Northern Italy. Forty thousand Russians, with a body
of Hanoverians and the Swedish Army in Northern
Germany, were to advance towards Holland, where
a second British force would make a differsion.1
Here, as usual, may be observed Pitt's incurable
failing — the passion for frittering England's little force
away in minute divisions, instead of keeping it united
at a single point. As has been seen, he had already
sent a force to the Mediterranean with Craig, a de-
tachment so puny as to call forth strong censure from
the House of Commons. " The force is unnecessarily
strong for the defensive," was Robert Craufurd's
criticism, " and too weak to take the offensive."
Napoleon was openly and justly contemptuous. " The
celebrated secret expedition," he wrote, " entered Lisbon
on the 7 th of May and left it on the 10th. Whither
is it bound ? ... If it is destined for Malta, all the
better. Nothing can better prove the folly of the
English Cabinet ; for these combined Continental move-
1 Stanhope, Life of Pitt, iv. 223-225.
266
ch. ix HISTORY OF THE ARMY 267
ments founded on a few thousand men are pygmy 1805.
combinations. If, therefore, you find the expedition is
gone to Malta, you may rub your hands, for the
English will have deprived themselves of six thousand
men and of a certain number of ships." 1
During June and July, while the British and French
fleets had been restlessly moving from side to side of
the Atlantic, Craig's position had been an anxious one.
The naval operations had reduced the escort of his forty
transports to a single frigate and a sloop ; and when
the armament reached Gibraltar, it was met by a May 13.
command to halt there until further order. Rear-
admiral Knight dared not keep the ships at anchor
for fear of the Spanish gunboats at Algeciras. For
six weeks, therefore, the convoy cruised on and off
Gibraltar in anxious suspense, until at last on the 22nd June 22.
of June Rear-admiral Bickerton received directions to
furnish ships sufficient to bring it safely to Malta.
Even then the passage was delayed by a gale ; and it
was not until the 18th of July that Craig finally carried July 18.
his detachment into Valetta.
In the meanwhile the British Government had ordered
him to consider the feasibility of an attack upon
Minorca ; and the General was able to report that,
though the garrison of the island had been raised to
five thousand men, these could only defend themselves
by meeting his own six thousand in the field, and that
therefore the enterprise offered no great difficulty.
On arriving at Malta, however, he found that Ministers
had after all pushed forward their original project for
British co-operation with Russia on the mainland of
Italy. A letter from General Lascy, the Russian
Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean, was awaiting
him, asking what force he could spare for active
service ; and as this had been written from Naples on
the 9th of July, it was clear that the court of King
Ferdinand had for the present decided to throw in its
lot with the Coalition. Moreover, before long there
1 Corres. de Napoleon, 8787.
268 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1805. reached Craig a further letter from London, to say that
fifteen thousand tons of shipping would be placed at his
disposal to convey Russian troops from the Black Sea or
elsewhere, and that he must do his best to give them
transport for twenty-five thousand men, while reserving
enough to carry eight thousand of his own force.1
The outlook, therefore, seemed promising. An army
of thirty thousand men, though none too strong, might
at least make some diversion in the Mediterranean.
But further inquiry into the Russian resources revealed
some doubts as to the strength of their expeditionary
force. General Lascy gave it as fifteen thousand ;
General Anrep, commanding the Russian troops at
Corfu, reckoned on twelve thousand from Odessa and
nearly ten thousand more from the garrison of that
island ; though both agreed that nothing could be done
until the arrival of the detachment from the Black Sea.
Nor was Lascy's plan of operations calculated to inspire
confidence. The bulk of the French forces, about
fourteen thousand men, were, according to his informa-
tion, in the districts of Bari and Otranto, whereby they
secured a country rich in corn and cattle, to the
privation of the Allies. It was most important alike
to dislodge them from this and at the same time to
exclude them from other fertile provinces, notably from
La Terra di Lavoro, wherein Naples itself is situated.
Lascy therefore purposed to land fifteen thousand
Russians in the Bay of Naples, and to advance rapidly
to the first good position to be found within twenty
miles of the city, so as to cover both the district and
the city itself and to enable the Neapolitan levies to
be organised. Meanwhile the British, counting about
seven thousand men of all 'ranks, would create a diver-
sion by landing in the Gulf of Tarento, a little to the
north of the river Crati, occupying the Castle of Roseto
so as to close the road to Tarento, and advancing
1 W.O. Mediterranean, 142, Craig to Sec. of State, 15th, 16th
May, 17th, 22nd, 24th June, 21st July; W.O.E.B. 85, Sec. of
State to Craig, 1st May, 8th June, 27th July .1805.
ch. ix HISTORY OF THE ARMY 269
to a strong position in the mountains, which could 1805.
certainly be found within a few miles. The French
corps nearest to this point (so urged Lascy) would be
at least seventy miles distant, and if extended towards
that side would be exposed to the risk of being cut off
by the advance of the Russians from Naples eastward
upon the province of Puglia. Hence the British dis-
embarkation would probably be unmolested and their
march practically unopposed until they reached Matera
or Tarento. At that point the Russians would come
into line with them, forming up on their left ; and
further operations in Puglia and Abruzzi could be
subsequently concerted.
With admirable moderation Craig put forward his
criticisms upon this absurd plan. The final embarkation
for active service could not take place until the third
week in September. By that time strong winds would
have begun to blow, and the slightest surf would make
disembarkation impossible. The selected landing-place
for the British was not sheltered ; the transports would
not dare to remain close to the coast ; and the troops
would have to be landed in the ships' boats, for there
were no others. The disembarkation of the men would
therefore take, in the most favourable circumstances, one
whole day, and that of the supplies and stores another.
If in the middle of the operation a strong breeze sprang
up, the ships would have to stand off, when perhaps
half of the force or half of its stores was afloat, and
the other half ashore. In such circumstances there was
imminent risk of the destruction of the British in detail.
Nor would any movement of the Russians serve to
protect them. In the first place, the disembarkations
of the British and of the Russians could hardly be
i simultaneous, for they were to be carried out on opposite
sides of the same peninsula, so that the wind which was fair
for the one would be foul for the other. The Russians
j being based upon Naples and all its resources, and being
I also superior in number, might have little to fear if the
British disembarkation failed or was delayed. But the
270
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1805. British force, weak, isolated, and without horses, would
be liable to be overwhelmed. Supposing both disem-
barkations to be simultaneously accomplished, the French,
being warned of the coming storm, would concentrate
their troops and either occupy Naples or take up some
such central position as Matera, from which they could
fall upon either division at their choice. The British
even if safely landed, could not draw supplies from the
country, owing to the enemy's cavalry, but would be
obliged to stick to the coast ; and the landing of the
Russians would not prevent the French from over-
powering them. For the Russians would need some
days to collect transport before they could advance ;
they would be obliged to weaken themselves by guards
for depots and magazines ; and they would find it hard
at once to cover Naples and to cut off the French.
The whole force, Russians and British, ought therefore
to land together in the Bay of Naples ; but even so
it could hardly be expected that the French would not
evacuate Bari and Otranto, if they saw the slightest risk
of being intercepted.1
Lascy, an easy-going gentleman of Irish descent
and near eighty years of age, was convinced by this
reasoning, though his Quarter-master-general, Opper-
mann, drew up a long memoir in support of the
original plan, which was of his own designing and was
dictated not merely by ignorance but by treachery.
Naturally the concerting of a campaign between two
commanders at points so far distant as Malta and
Naples took much time ; but Craig was able to turn
the delay to account in equipping his army for the field,
though he was driven to his wits' end to obtain horses
and mules, which were equally few and equally bad
both in Neapolitan territory and in Sicily. Meanwhile
the Austrians had set their troops, under General Mack,
in motion for the Black Forest, while ninety thousand
men under the Archduke Charles were concentrating on
the Adige ; and Craig now learned for the first time
1 Craig to Sec. of State, with enclosures, 16th Aug. 1805.
ch.ix HISTORY OF THE ARMY 271
that Lascy's operations were to depend on those of the 1805.
Archduke, of which he knew nothing. At length at
the end of September the Russian troops at Corfu sent
for their transports, which were duly despatched to
them on the 1st of October. But at about the same
time the British Minister at Naples reported that
Napoleon had reinforced his troops in that Kingdom
to twenty thousand men, notwithstanding that Massena
had but fifty thousand with which to oppose the ninety
thousand under the Archduke Charles on the Adige.
St. Cyr, therefore, was in a condition to seize Naples
in a few days, whereas the Allies could not reach it in
less than a month, and would even then be unable to
move from want of transport. King Ferdinand at once
took the alarm. On the nth of September he had Sept. 11
ratified a secret convention with Russia ; but on the
21st he sent a mission to Paris with an abject offer to Sept. 21
observe perfect neutrality if Napoleon would be pleased
to withdraw the French troops from his kingdom.
The Emperor, however, had not reinforced St. Cyr
without a purpose. He had already exacted a treaty
of neutrality from the Neapolitan Minister at Paris,
and he now presented this to Ferdinand through his
representative at Naples, with a demand that it should
be ratified at once. Quaking with fright, the miserable
old King complied ; but at the same time he delivered
to the Russian Minister a declaration repudiating
this convention with France, as having been extorted
by threats, and calling upon the Russian and British
troops to repair to Naples as though no such instrument
had ever been signed.
Meanwhile the campaign on the Danube was
approaching its crisis. General Mack had concentrated
the Austrian army at Ulm to block the usual line of the
French advance from the Black Forest. But by the 7th Oct. 7.
of October one hundred thousand men had reached the
Danube in his rear, and a few days more saw two
complete French corps astride the line of his com-
munications with Vienna. Then followed a succession
272 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1805. of bloody combats, one and all adverse to the Austrians ;
and urgent orders were dispatched to the Archduke
Charles to stand on the defensive in Italy and to
send every man that he could spare to the rescue of
Oct. 20. Mack. Finally on the 20th of October came the
crowning disaster, when Mack surrendered with thirty
thousand men, and the Austrian Army of the Danube
virtually ceased to exist. Thenceforward there could
be no hope of an Austrian offensive campaign in Upper
Italy.
Lascy, however, knowing nothing of all this, on the
Oct. 30. 30th of October gave orders for his projected expedi-
tion to go forward ; and on the following day Craig
embarked his troops, numbering just over seven thou-
sand of all ranks.1 The British commander did so
with no very good grace, for the treacherous behaviour
of the Court of Naples towards Napoleon had been
brought to his notice ; and he vowed in disgust that,
but for his pledge to support Lascy, he would not have
countenanced such double dealing. Putting to sea,
Nov. 3. however, on the 3rd of November, he joined the Russian
fleet near Cape Passaro ; and after a very long passage
Nov. 20. the united corps landed at Naples on thft 20th. There
they were met by the news of Mack's capitulation at
Ulm, and of the consequent withdrawal of the Austrians
from Upper Italy. The Archduke Charles, as a matter
Oct. 29- of fact, after repelling a desperate attack of the French
31, at Caldiero, was in full retreat, with Massena pressing
closely upon his rear -guard. The French in the
Neapolitan dominions who, after the signature of King
Ferdinand's convention with Napoleon, had been
1 2 squadrons 20th L.D., 335 of all ranks; R.A., 273 ; R.E., J
19; 20th Foot, 801; 27th, 1063 ; 35th, 1003 ; 58th, 973 ; 6lst, I'
834; Watteville's, 725; Chasseurs Britanniques, 645; Corsican
Rangers, 740 ; Staff Corps, 20. The force was organised as
follows : — Advanced Corps : Brig.-gen. Broderick, 1 batt. Corsicans,
L.I. battalion, Grenadier battalion, Chasseurs Britanniques. First
Brigade: Brig.-gen. Acland, 20th, 35th, 61st. Second Brigade:
Brig.-gen. Cole, 27th, 58th, Watteville's. R.J. : 2 light brigades !
and one heavy brigade, 4/12-prs., 4 howitzers, 8/6-prs.
ch. ix HISTORY OF THE ARMY 273
hastening northward to join the Marshal, were halted ; 1805.
and Eugene Beauharnais was collecting thirty thousand
men to re-occupy Naples. But so far Craig had no
knowledge of anything except of the disaster at Ulm
and the Archduke's retirement ; and, though instructed
to second the Austrian operations on the Adige, he
had never been placed in communication with their
commander nor with the Court of Vienna. He could,
indeed, obtain no information whatever except through
Russian channels, which he believed, not wholly without
reason, to be untrustworthy. Not until long after his
arrival at Naples did he hear that on the 21st of
October Nelson had broken the naval power of France
and Spain at Trafalgar.1
However, after disembarking his troops, he collected
draught -animals as fast as the miserable Neapolitan
Government could supply them, and, by cutting down
the baggage of the army to the smallest possible bulk,
gradually brought his brigades forward from the coast.
Lascy had so arranged his line of cantonments on the
northern frontier that seven thousand Neapolitan troops
occupied the mountains of the Abruzzi on the right,
with the fortress of Pescara in their rear ; the strong
fortress of Gaeta, on the extreme left, being guarded
by a Neapolitan garrison under a hard-drinking, most
gallant old soldier, the Prince of Hesse- Philips tadt.
The Russians held the centre, with head- quarters at
Sulmona, being fourteen thousand strong and professing
daily expectation of six more battalions ; and the
British formed the left, in Sessa and other villages
about the Lower Garigliano. And there the twenty
thousand men lay, holding a defensive position, with no
enemy, except the garrison of Ancona, nearer to them
than the Po. Had Lascy on hearing the news of Ulm
— or even earlier, seeing that on the 16th of October
he knew the neutrality of Naples to be secured — directed
his troops to Trieste or Venice, Massena could never
have pressed the Archduke as he did, and Napoleon's
1 Bunbury, pp. 206, 207.
VOL. V T
274
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1805. campaign might have ended differently. But Lascy
had been chosen not for his ability but for his age, so
that at all costs he might be senior to Craig ; and it
was vain to expect great energy from the veteran.
So the little army lay still ; and from time to time
came French reports of Napoleon's steady advance into
Upper Austria, of the reverse suffered by Marshal
Mortier's corps at Krems on the nth of November, of
the retirement of the Emperor Francis to Pressburg in
order to organise continued resistance in Hungary, and
finally of the presentation of an ultimatum, in circum-
stances which shall presently be described, by Prussia
to Napoleon. Amid these hopeful signs arrived a
letter from the Archduke Charles himself, written from
Lay bach on the 22 nd of November during his retreat
through Carinthia. Until that day, through extra-
ordinary negligence in some quarters,1 he had remained
uninformed of the withdrawal of the French troops
from Neapolitan territory ; but now, realising that
Lascy's force was lying idle, he urged the Russian
commander to embark it at once for Venice, which was
held by a strong Austrian garrison, and from thence
to fall upon Massena's rear. But as Craig pointed out,
the Archduke had no intention of standing at Laybach ;
wherefore Massena would either continue to follow
him beyond hope of being overtaken, or would mask
Venice with part of his force and beat Lascy with the
remainder. Moreover, the British and Russian divisions
possessed no cavalry whatever except two squadrons
of the Twentieth Light Dragoons ; that of the
Neapolitans was thoroughly contemptible ; and to
attempt to harass superior numbers of the French, under
such a leader as Massena, with twenty thousand infantry
and only three hundred horse was utterly absurd.2
Meanwhile the campaign on the Danube had pursued
Nov. 13. its course. On the 13th of November the French
1 Bunbury hints strongly at treachery on the part of the Russian
Minister at Naples. P. 20.
2 Craig to Sec. of State, 2nd Nov., 9th Dec. 1805.
ch. ix HISTORY OF THE ARMY 275
entered Vienna ; and Napoleon bent all his energies to 1805.
the task of preventing the junction of the retreating
Austrians with the Russians. He failed : the allied
commanders united their forces successfully at Wischau
on the 19 th, and the game was in their hands. They Nov. 1
needed only to wait under the guns of Olmiitz for the
arrival of the Archduke Charles who was hastening,
though necessarily by a wide detour, to join them with
the Army of Italy, in order to place Napoleon in a
most dangerous position. The Russians, however, were
presumptuous and headstrong. They preferred to
advance and fight at once ; with the result that on
the 2nd of December they were utterly overthrown at Dec. 2
Austerlitz.
This news, together with that of the armistice con-
cluded with France by Austria on the 6th of December, Dec 6.
was speedily passed on to Naples by French agents,
and reduced Lascy to great embarrassment. He had
no instructions to guide his action, nor had the Russian
agent at Naples ; and he did not even know whether
there was or was not a suspension of arms between
Russia and France. As a matter of fact there was not.
Napoleon, having granted to the Tsar a safe retreat and
restored to him the prisoners which he had taken
among the Russian Imperial Guard, never doubted but
that the war was over ; but Alexander was too young
in misfortune to yield after a single defeat and waved
aside all proposals of peace. Napoleon, therefore, had
a campaign in Poland still before him ; but nevertheless
Austria had been separated from Russia by the armistice,
and this was sufficient to make Lascy's position most
critical. His information was still imperfect ; but he
knew at any rate that French forces were moving
southward, and that Napoleon had publicly declared
his resolution to drive the Bourbons from Naples and
to take possession of their kingdom. Nor were these
his only causes for disquietude. His own troops were
extremely unhealthy ; he had more sick in each of his
battalions than the British in their whole division ; his
276 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1805. fourteen thousand bayonets had shrunk to a bare eight
thousand, and the six additional battalions expected
in November had never appeared. A few days more
passed away ; and at the end of the year came definite
information that from thirty to thirty-five thousand
French soldiers were in full march southward and
would reach the Neapolitan frontier in ten days. It
behoved Lascy therefore to come without delay to a
decision.
It was not difficult to determine that defence of the
Neapolitan frontier was hopeless. In spite of all efforts
Craig had been unable to find horses even for the
whole of his artillery, to say nothing of his baggage-
waggons. It would have been possible to take up a
strong position to cover the plains of Naples, and even
to repulse for a time a force of superior numbers. But
the Allies, having no transport, could not move, and
the French could always have covered their retreat with
cavalry and renewed their attacks until they succeeded,
in which case the re-embarkation of the British and
Russians would have been difficult if not impossible.
Lascy, in council of war, broached the proposal to
retire into Calabria and there hold out^depending upon
a small port in the Gulf of Policastro for supplies ; and
this found favour with every officer present, British and
Russian, excepting Craig and Major-general Campbell,
his second in command. The harbour was reported by
a British naval officer to be unsafe for shipping, too
small for its purpose, and unapproachable on the side
of the land except by the roughest mule-tracks. This
was one drawback ; and there was another which Craig
did not venture to mention, namely, that the Russians,
having neither money nor credit, must live upon the
country and would thus infallibly bring upon the entire
force a savage and dangerous struggle with the Calabrese.
Lastly Craig retained a lively recollection of his instruc-
tions to secure Sicily, and on that account was anxious
to re-embark at once. Lascy, however, dared not re-
embark without orders ; and the Court of Naples in an
ch. ix HISTORY OF THE ARMY 277
agony of rage and fear would hear of nothing but a 1805.
desperate resistance which would cover the capital till
the last moment. In this mood King Ferdinand
absolutely prohibited any withdrawal to Calabria ; and
the situation was becoming extremely dangerous to the
Allies, for Craig, though utterly disapproving as a
soldier any futile attempt to resist the French, thought
himself bound in honour not to forsake the Russians.
Fortunately, however, on the 7th of January 1806 1806.
Lascy received orders, dated a full month back, from Jan- 7-
the Tsar that he should return at once to Corfu ; and
the two armies parted not unwillingly, for the Russians
had not yet forgotten their supposed grievances in
North Holland in 1799. ^he Russians marched to
Naples, and the British to Castellamare, where on the
14th they began their embarkation. Craig's health, Jan. 14
always uncertain, had broken down under the anxieties
of the past weeks ; but now came the most trying time
of all for him. Mr. Hugh Elliot, our Minister at
Naples, always a witty and usually a sensible man, for
some reason set his face against a retreat of the British
troops to Sicily, and would have had them return to
Malta. The jealous imbecility of the Court of Naples
was of course offended by the thought of the British
repairing to Messina ; and King Ferdinand went the
length of announcing that, if they occupied Sicily
without his consent, he would join forces with the
French to drive them out. Elliot so far humoured
this folly that he offered to open a negotiation on the
Queen's behalf with the advancing enemy. In vain
Craig protested that such a course would assuredly
sacrifice Sicily. The faithlessness of the Neapolitan
Government was proverbial ; Napoleon would accept
nothing but a French occupation of Sicily in redemption
of King Ferdinand's misdeeds ; Colling wood's squadron
had left the Mediterranean for Cadiz, leaving the sea
open to the French ; and, if the British troops retired
to Malta, they would probably be unable to return
before Syracuse and Messina had received French
278 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
806. garrisons. All arguments were thrown away. Elliot
persisted in his mad scheme of negotiation ; and Craig
finally taking matters into his own hands sailed away
. 19. on the 19th, and on the 22 nd anchored at Messina.
The French marched on, playing meanwhile with King
Ferdinand's emissaries as a cat with a mouse, and within
three weeks the King himself came flying over to Sicily,
where Craig's foresight and firmness had provided for
him a safe refuge.1
Before quitting Mediterranean affairs for the present,
it is worth while to emphasise the extreme futility of
this expedition under Craig. The criticisms of Craufurd
and Napoleon were amply justified. The combination
which Pitt had projected was a pygmy combination,
and deserved no success ; yet, paltry though the British
force was, no true effort was made that it should be
fit for the field. At Malta, instead of a reserve, there
was a positive dearth of ammunition ; and Craig, who
had only brought with him four hundred rounds for
each of his six thousand men, was obliged to give one
hundred and sixty of this proportion to the garrison. I
Again, though he was supposed to co-operate with the
Austrians and might therefore find himself in the plains i
of Northern Italy, only two squadrons of cavalry ;
were granted to him, and no notice was taken of his j
urgent requests for more. Once more, though Aber-
cromby had done his best to impress upon the Cabinet
in 1799 that an Army cannot move without horses and
waggons, yet Craig's handful of dragoons and the j
whole of his artillery were shipped abroad without their It
horses. It would have been easy to ascertain from the j
officers who had served with Charles Stuart in the I
Mediterranean in 1798 whether horses and mules were |t
procurable in Naples and Sicily ; yet Craig was sent j
upon his mission with easy assurance, as though the | t
animals could be obtained for the asking. As to his j
instructions, they show plainly that the Government 1
1 Craig to Sec. of State, nth Feb. 1806, enclosing correspond- ;
ence with Elliot.
ch. ix HISTORY OF THE ARMY 279
had no definite military policy and no distinct object 1805.
in dispatching a division of infantry to Malta at all.
Craig was to go to the Mediterranean and do some-
thing somewhere within its limits between Alexandria
and Cagliari. In brief, the whole enterprise bears upon it
the unmistakable mark of Pitt's military administration.
But Pitt's efforts to take the offensive were not
limited to this paltry expedition of Craig. Holland
had for some time been virtually a province of France ; 1
and it therefore behoved England to look well to the
Cape of Good Hope. It has already been told how,
upon the first alarm of Villeneuve's departure to the
West Indies, large reinforcements had been prepared
for the British islands under the command of Sir
Eyre Coote. Nelson's pursuit and Villeneuve's return
rendered the departure of these reinforcements un-
necessary, and, as the troops were on their transports
at Cork, it was resolved to send a portion of them
under Sir David Baird to capture the Cape. Baird
received his instructions to this effect on the 26th of
July, and sailed a few weeks later for his destination,
whither in due time we shall follow him. It will be
remarked that the decision to send his force out of the
country was taken a full month before the break-up of
the camp at Boulogne ; and it was therefore reasonable
to suppose that, when Napoleon was in full march for
the Danube, some far more formidable operation would
be undertaken. Troops might now be easily spared
from England, and moreover Pitt had had the good
fortune to meet with a windfall. Officers and men of
the Hanoverian Army, which had been broken up by
the capitulation of 1803, soon afterwards drifted over
to England, where in rage and shame they entreated
George the Third to reform them and take them into
his service ; and in December 1803 was begun the levy
of a King's German Regiment which was very soon
expanded into that of a King's German Legion.
The force grew apace. In January 1805 it already
1 Sorel, vi. 423.
280
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1805. included one regiment of dragoons, another of hussars,
two battalions of light and four of heavy infantry, with
two batteries of horse -artillery and three of field-
artillery. Negotiations were opened with Sweden to
procure recruiting depots at Stralsund and Riigen,
which were duly accorded by a convention of the 3rd
of December 1804 and before the end of 1805 the
Legion counted in all five regiments of cavalry, ten
battalions of infantry, and six batteries of artillery, in
all some fourteen thousand men. And these were no
mere mercenaries like the Hessians of former days.
They were not only excellent soldiers under excellent
officers, but loyal and patriotic subjects, devoted to
the King, and burning to avenge themselves for their
humiliation in 1803. They had their will ; and these
Hanoverians enjoy the proud distinction of being the
only Germans who from 1803 to 18 14 bore arms
unceasingly against Napoleon.
With so valuable an addition to his offensive force,
Pitt was really in a situation to make the arm of
England felt on shore as well as at sea. His first
thought, not unnaturally, was to end the fear of
invasion at once by destroying the fiWilla in Boulogne
and the adjacent ports. The project was entrusted to
Sir John Moore who, after careful investigation, reported j
that, unless undertaken by a really formidable force and
with a sure port for re-embarkation, the enterprise was .
unduly hazardous. Ministers very reasonably decided
to abandon the idea. But with Napoleon's army
plunged into the heart of South Germany to meet the
Austrians and Russians on his front, there could hardly
fail to be good opportunity for dealing a stroke upon
his flank or rear. Such a blow might fall either upon
Holland or upon Hanover, both of which were reputed
to be weakly held by French troops ; or it might be
dealt by a force landing at Stralsund, where the King
of Sweden could without difficulty be persuaded to i
permit a disembarkation. But in this last case the
1 F.O. Sweden, 33 ; Pierrepont to Sec. of State, 3rd Jan. 1805.
ch.ix HISTORY OF THE ARMY 281
co-operation of Prussia was essential ; and indeed 1805.
without at least the countenance of Prussia, it would be
difficult if not impossible to effect anything decisive
in North Germany. All therefore turned upon the
attitude of the Court of Berlin.
Some account has already been given of the artful
fashion in which Napoleon kept Hanover dangling
before the greedy eyes of Frederick William, and of
the King's infatuation in believing that he, weakest
and stupidest as well as falsest of men, could contrive
to obtain the coveted province from the Emperor and
yet remain friendly with the Tsar. As the outbreak of
hostilities between France and Austria became more and
more certain, Napoleon strove more and more to bind
Prussia to himself. In July he invited her to occupy
Hanover and to keep it at the end of the war, if
Frederick William would recognise the French annexa-
tion of Genoa and give him a free hand in Italy.
Frederick William's answer reached the Emperor on
the 22 nd of August. The King was quite ready to Aug. 2
take over Hanover ; but, seeking as usual an impossible
neutrality, he desired explanations as to Napoleon's
dealings with Hanover, Italy, and Switzerland. The
Emperor stood by his terms, and answered plainly that
unless Prussia threatened Austria, she should not have
Hanover. Meanwhile Austria likewise urged Frederick
William to join with her ; and the Tsar, to whom Prussia
was bound by treaty, pressed him in exceedingly firm
language to enter the coalition, or at any rate to allow
Russian troops to pass his frontier, hinting not obscurely
that these concessions, if not freely granted, might be
extorted by force. Simultaneously General Duroc
arrived at Berlin, as envoy from Napoleon, to propose
an active alliance. Embarrassed and bewildered, sure
only that he wanted everything and would give nothing,
the King on the 7th of September put his army on a Sept. 7
footing of war ; warning the Tsar that any act of violence
would drive him into the arms of France, but at the
same time intimating to Duroc that Prussia could
282
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1805. hardly preserve neutrality without the occupation of
Hanover. The rival powers then became keener in
their competition for Frederick William's help. On the
Sept. 15. 15th of September the Tsar sent a polite ultimatum,
again claiming the alliance of Prussia, and passage for
Sept. 17. his troops through her territory; and on the 17 th
Duroc, under Napoleon's orders, became more than
ever importunate for Prussia's alliance with France, since
one of the French columns was going, freely or by
force, to march through country which was under
Prussian protection. The King once more declared that
he would maintain strict neutrality, and sent a reproachful
letter to the Tsar, asking for an interview, which missive
arrived just in time to avert a forcible entry of the
Russian troops into his dominions. Count Hardenberg,
who by his own account had done his best to urge
Frederick William to break definitely with France,
became much agitated over the situation and professed
impatience to see a British force disembark in Hanover.
His hope was that his master, when he realised that
Napoleon could not give him the province, would at
last throw in his lot with the coalition.
All this happened at the end of September. On the
Sept. 27. 27th of that month the Tsar wrote again to Frederick
William politely asking him to hasten the moment
for Russian troops to pass the Prussian frontier, and
promising a subsidy of a million and a quarter ster- I
ling from England for every hundred thousand
Prussians put into the field. The King still stuck to
his neutrality, and Hardenberg was in despair ; but
Oct. 6. fortunately on the 6th of October, Frederick William |
learned that the French troops, by their passage through I
Anspach, had violated his own sacred territory. Then I
the weak man, becoming suddenly violent, wished to j
send the French envoys their passports on the spot, |!
and to invite the Russians to cross his boundaries I
immediately. Hardenberg averted this folly ; but j
Oct. 7. on the next day it was decided in Berlin first to j
inform Napoleon that Prussia considered herself |
ch.ix HISTORY OF THE ARMY 283
absolved from all obligation to France, next to 1805.
summon Alexander over the frontier, and finally — a
thoroughly characteristic move — to occupy Hanover.
The matter seemed so far settled that, on the 15th of Oct. 15.
October, the shrewdest head in Europe, Metternich,
who was in Berlin at the time, reckoned on seeing the
Prussian and Russian troops united on the Bohemian
frontier in a few weeks. But on that same day the
news of Ney's victory at Elchingen on the 14th reached
Berlin, and the King began again to waver. He
summoned Count Haugwitz, the advocate of peace, to
share the Foreign Office with Hardenberg, the advocate
of war, and wished not only to close his boundaries to
the Russians but to evade his interview with the Tsar.
Alexander thereupon announced that he would come
to Berlin in person, and arriving at Potsdam on the 25th Oct. 25.
of October, soon revived the Prussian monarch's drooping
spirits. Duroc took his leave with threats ; and after
enormous persuasion Frederick William was induced
to send Count Haugwitz to Napoleon. This envoy
was instructed to offer the Emperor the basis of
negotiations laid down in the Anglo- Russian treaty
of the nth of April, to give him until the 15th of
December to accept or refuse it, and, in the event of
his refusal, to intimate that Prussia would join the
Coalition with one hundred and eighty thousand men.
Metternich tried hard to reduce the period of grace to
forty -eight hours, lest the Allies should be devoured
piecemeal, but in vain. The agreement was signed on
the 3rd of November ; Haugwitz departed on his Nov. 3.
mission on the 14th ; and Frederick William relapsed Nov. 14.
into misery over the fact that he had actually committed
himself to a decision.
Such and so abject was the man upon whom the
fate of Europe at this crisis depended ; and such the
course of events at his Court during the momentous
months of the autumn of 1805. It is now necessary
to turn to Pitt's dealings with him. Whether
Hardenberg's saying as to a landing of the British in
284
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1805. Hanover reached their ears or not, it is certain that early
in October Pitt and his colleagues were considering
the possibility of rousing and supporting an insurrection
in that province. They had at first some idea of landing
troops at Stralsund, and marching into it from that
quarter. Negotiations had been going forward through
Mr. Pierrepont, our Minister at Stockholm, since the
beginning of 1805 for the defence, through the help of
British subsidies, of Swedish Pomerania by a joint force
of Swedes and Russians. The task of concluding a
convention between these two powers was of enormous
difficulty, for the mad King of Sweden haggled in-
cessantly for absolute control of all the forces, which,
though his own contingent formed but one-third of the
whole, he was to command in person. However, in
February 1805 the agreement was signed. The Tsar
was to send from forty to fifty thousand troops, and
King Gustavus twenty to twenty-five thousand ; the
British Government was to provide ^50,000 to place
Pomerania in a state of defence ; and it was arranged
that the treaty should take active effect whenever the
French in Hanover should move either towards Olden-
burg, Mecklenburg, or Holstein. «
Then followed months of wrangling over the sub-
sidy to be paid to the Swedish troops by England,
and new difficulties over the landing of the Russian
force in Pomerania ; for it is ill negotiating with any
lunatic and worst of all with a royal lunatic. How-
ever, at last all obstacles were overcome, and at the
Sept. end of September a treaty of alliance was signed
whereby Sweden engaged to furnish ten thousand
men for defence of Pomerania, but to call them
twelve thousand ; England on her part agreeing to
pay for the latter number at the rate of £12 : 10s.
a man. At the same time the Russian troops, twenty
thousand strong 1 under Count Tolstoy, disembarked at
1 Infantry 15,836; Cavalry 1705, with 1 61 5 horses; Artillery
1749, with 590 horses. Total (including the train), 19,348 and
3205 horses.
ch.ix HISTORY OF THE ARMY 285
Stralsund on the 5th of October, so that matters showed 1805.
signs of real progress. A few days later, on the 14th Oct. 14.
of October, news reached the Swedish Court of Prussia's
changed attitude towards France, in consequence of the
violation of her dominions in Anspach. This infused
new life into the preparations. Pierrepont urged the
King of Sweden to advance into Hanover at once,
before Prussia could offer to do so ; and simultaneously
the British Foreign Office pressed Tolstoy to take the
same course. The King of Sweden did not love
Prussia and had returned to Berlin his Order of the
Black Eagle, on hearing that Frederick William had
accepted the insignia of the Legion of Honour. He
was likely therefore to seize any opportunity of making
himself disagreeable to his brother potentate ; and
altogether all indications pointed to an early recovery
of Hanover.1
In England the Ministry had meanwhile resolved to
send a force to aid in the reconquest of the province.
On the 10th of October orders were issued for six Oct. 10.
thousand men of the King's German Legion to embark
for foreign service under the command of Lieutenant-
general Don, who was to proceed to Berlin in advance
of his force in order to ascertain the feelings of that
Court towards the landing of a British force in North
Germany. The plan of operations was sketched by
Brigadier van der Decken, a Hanoverian officer who
had been prominent in raising the first corps of the
King's German Legion. He urged that the force
should not be of smaller strength than twenty-five
thousand men, so as to enable it to advance into
Hanover with confidence and without delay. Napoleon,
as he pointed out, could constantly detach troops to
overwhelm any British army that landed in North
Germany ; and between November and March such an
1 F.O. Sweden, 33. Pierrepont to Sec. of State, 13th Jan., 7th,
15th Feb., 20th March, 8th, 26th April, 9th July, 25th Aug., 1st
Sept., 4th, 14th Oct. ; Sec. of State to Pierrepont, 25th June, 18th
Oct. 1805.
1
286
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1805. army could not re-embark, if hard pressed, but must
cross the Elbe, which might be a hazardous operation,
and retire eastward into Lauenburg. Owing to the
approach of winter and the prospect of navigation
being obstructed by ice, the detachment of the King's
German Legion ought to sail at once, without waiting
for the result of Don's mission to Berlin, disembark at
Gltickstadt on the Elbe, occupy and fortify Stade, and
establish magazines at Cuxhaven and Bremerlehe.
These two last should be the places of disembarkation
for the rest of the troops, since the dearth of provisions
and horses in the country was such that it would be
imprudent to land the entire force at one spot. The
British contingent should be concentrated at Verden on
the Weser and should advance towards Nienburg, while
the Swedes and Russians moved towards Lttneburg, Zell,
and Hanover. The French were concentrated at
Nienburg, at Hameln, and at Fort St. George, over
against Hameln, on the west bank of the Weser ; but
Hameln was the only place which was really formidable
and would require a regular siege.1
Oct. 16. Decken's advice bore immediate fruit. On the 16th
Don was informed that nearly eleven, thousand men2 I
would be embarked at once for the Elbe in order to
expel the French, now under four thousand strong,
from Hanover, and that five thousand more would be
held in readiness in the Downs. Meanwhile he himself
was to go out at once to Berlin. His original in-
structions bade him sound the dispositions of Prussia
towards the projected enterprise and discover if she
had an understanding with either France or Russia as
to the occupation of Hanover ; though it was not to be
supposed that on any ground she could object to King
George's reoccupation of his own dominions. He was
also to ascertain the views of Denmark in case a retreat
1 Sec. of State to C.-in-C, 10th, 14th Oct. ; Don to Sec. of State,
14th Oct. ; Decken to Sec. of State, 16th Oct. 1805.
2 K.G.L. 4808 ; 4 cos. 95th Rifles, 400 ; Brigade of Guards,
2000 ; 1st Regt. Caval. K.G.L. 575 ; 4th, 14th, 23rd Foot, 2800 ;
2 brigades of Artillery, 300.
ch. ix HISTORY OF THE ARMY 287
of the British troops through Holstein should be 1805.
necessary, and those of the Duke of Mecklenburg, in the
event of their wishing to advance through his territory
upon Stralsund. As regards the operations, he was not
to land nor advance into the interior unless assured of
the safety of his force, nor to remain in the country
after the harbours were frozen unless certain of a
safe retreat ; and his chief business would be to collect
the army of the Hanoverians.
These orders were due to intense and rightful distrust
of Frederick William ; but on the 18 th the news of that Oct. 18
sovereign's fury against Napoleon over the affair of
Anspach set many misgivings at rest. Then Ministers
suddenly woke to the idea that, with the concert of
Prussia, it would be possible to recover not only Hanover
but Holland. For a moment there was some idea of a
descent upon Walcheren ; and on the 24th orders were Oct. 24
sent to Don not to put to sea until futher directions should
reach him. It seems, however, that the military officers
discouraged the project by urging the possible difficulties
of a re-embarkation during the depth of winter ; and on
the 25th Don was finally directed to sail with the first Oct. 25
detachment of troops to the Elbe, Lord Harrowby
having been appointed to take his place on a special
mission to Berlin.1
By the 29th the first division was embarked ; and Oct. 29
three days later van der Decken sailed forward in
advance to collect supplies and transport. Arriving on
the 8 th of November, he sent home a report to the Nov. 8.
following effect. Both Swedes and Russians were
advancing westward. Prussian troops had actually
entered Hanover and taken up positions on the
Ems, securing the chief passages into the Nether-
lands by the occupation of Bentheim, and meanwhile
living on the country with extreme hardship to the
inhabitants. The people rejoiced greatly over the
arrival of the British troops ; but between the exactions
1 Sec. of State to Don, 16th, 17th, 19th, 25th, 28th Oct. ; to
Lord Keith, 24th Oct. 1805.
288 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1805. of the French and of the Prussians the province was
much exhausted, and horses would be difficult to pro-
cure. The whole of the French force had been withdrawn
into Hameln, where it was blockaded without hostilities
by a Prussian detachment. The Prussian Commander-
in-chief, the Duke of Brunswick, was very anxious for
his men to be relieved in all their present stations by
the troops of the Allies. For the advance into Holland
Brunswick would detach fifteen thousand of his own
troops to co-operate with the British, distributing the
rest of the force between the middle Rhine and
Moselle to keep up communications between his main
army and that of the Allies. Finally, on pretext of
guarding his magazines, the Duke wished to keep two
battalions in Bremen ; and this van der Decken evi-
dently considered an extremely suspicious circum-
stance.1
Nov. 17. A few days later, on the 17th, General Don, after
long detention by foul winds, anchored at Cuxhaven,
and, pursuant to instructions from Harrowby, prepared
for immediate disembarkation. But affairs were not
going happily with the allied force. The King of
Sweden upon landing in Stralsund found that Tolstoy
had rushed off to Berlin to see the Tsar, leaving no
report concerning his army, nor so much as an officer
to receive His Majesty. This was unmannerly in any
case, and Gustavus was one who was quick to construe
discourtesy as insult. He was already greatly incensed
that Frederick William had ordered Prussian troops to
Hanover without informing him ; and he instantly sent
orders to halt his advanced guard, which had already
reached Lauenberg on its march westward, vowing that
he would return home. Pierrepont hastily intervened
It was his function to keep his Swedish Majesty in good
temper, and he stood by Gustavus as a man stands at
the head of a nervous horse, watching for every motion
of eye and ear, and lavishing soft words and caresses
Tolstoy returned hurriedly from Berlin with apologies
1 Decken to Sec. of State, 12th November 1805.
ch.ix HISTORY OF THE ARMY 289
though he did not conceal that he disliked the imposi- 1805.
tion of any man as commander over his head ; and the
incensed Gustavus, having thrown everything into
confusion for several days, at last consented that his
troops should cross the Elbe.1
Having made his peace, Tolstoy hastened to Liine-
burg, summoning Don thither to go with him to the
Duke of Brunswick's head-quarters at Hildesheim, some
thirty miles south of Hanover ; and there at last some
definite arrangements were made. The British troops
were for the present to occupy a line on the Lower
Weser with their right at B lumen thai, their left at
Verden, and advanced posts pushed forward on the
river Hunte ; while Tolstoy's right division should
occupy the Weser from Hoya towards Minden and its
left should blockade Hameln. In these positions the
two commanders hoped in the course of a few weeks to
be able to find horses and drivers for their artillery, and
to mobilise their forces generally for an advance into
Holland, towards which French reinforcements were
already said to be marching. How any one could
expect for a moment that a mixed force, in great
measure dependent on the wills of such men as the
Kings of Sweden and Prussia, could operate successfully
against such a master of energy and action as Napoleon,
it is difficult to see. The British Government did in
fact lose patience, and, after urging upon Don an
immediate descent on Holland, decided to embark
twelve thousand additional troops without waiting
longer to hear of the intentions of King Frederick
William. This reinforcement increased the British
contingent to twenty-five thousand men, of which
Lord Cathcart was appointed Commander-in-chief.
He was directed to disembark it in the Ems, Ministers
expecting that, by the time of its arrival, Don and
Tolstoy would already have advanced from the Weser
to the Yssel. But meanwhile Tolstoy had come to the
conclusion that the reduction of Hameln by a strict
1 Pierrepont to Sec. of State, 28th Oct., 3rd, 9th Nov. 1805.
VOL. V U
290
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
blockade was a very important object ; and that this
operation, requiring as it would nine thousand men,
would leave too few for an invasion of Holland. He
was ready, if the British Government pressed him, to
leave a corps to observe Hameln and to advance at once
to the Yssel ; but he and Don agreed that it would
be better to delay a forward movement until the
Swedes should have come up and Prussia should
have finally declared against France. Then with
their armies mobilised and a frost to make the
waters passable, invasion of Holland would be an easy
matter.1
The British Ministers bowed to the inevitable. The
Allied Army in Hanover, having neither transport nor
supplies, was plainly unable to move ; and Cathcart's
division was ordered to disembark, as Don's had done,
in the Weser. Cathcart himself was to sail at once,
and the mission of his force was explained to be not
only to recover Holland but to assure the Allies of the
British on the Continent of England's firm determina-
tion to aid them not only by liberal subsidies but by
active operations. All, however (such was the purport
of his instructions), must depend upon Prussia.
Harrowby's latest reports left no doubt that she would
remain neutral ; but it was certain that she had sent
an ultimatum by the hand of Haugwitz to Napoleon,
and there was every hope that Napoleon would reject
it. In this case Prussia would be committed to war,
and intelligence of the event ought to reach the Weser
by the 15 th of December. It was understood that
Frederick William was desirous of the recapture of
Holland from France, and he would probably be
strengthened in his zeal by Harrowby's representations
of England's readiness to assist him in this object. In
fact, a main object of sending the British contingent of
troops was to enable Prussia to march a force into
1 Don to Sec. of State, 19th, 25th, 28th Nov. ; Sec. of State to
Don, 19th, 27th Nov. ; to Lord Harrowby, 27th Nov. ; E. Cooke
to H.M. Consul, Embden, 26th Nov. 1805.
ch.ix HISTORY OF THE ARMY 291
Holland without unduly weakening her strength in 1805.
Franconia and Lower Saxony. But it was possible that,
if the King of Sweden advanced with all his troops,
they, together with the Russians and British, might
well suffice to reduce all Holland north of the Meuse
and Rhine ; and if Gustavus did actually take command
of the Swedes and of the Russians whom the Tsar had
placed under his orders, then Cathcart was, as a pro-
visional arrangement, to obey directions from him like-
wise. Finally the British troops were not to advance
into Holland on any ill-concerted errand, as a mere
diversion ; but it was hoped that no such idea would be
in contemplation, for the British Ministers were specially
anxious to recover Holland during 1805, and would
deeply lament the necessity of deferring the operation
to another year.1
Meanwhile Haugwitz was on his way to Napoleon
charged with the momentous ultimatum which, as the
Allies hoped, would throw Prussia into their arms.
He journeyed slowly, being delayed partly by his own
inclination and partly by Napoleon's orders ; but at
last on the 28th of November he was permitted to Nov. 28.
reach Briinn and was received with icy coldness by the
Emperor. He put forward Prussia's scheme of media-
tion none the less, and Napoleon accepted it, upon the
condition that no troops, Russian, Swedish, or British,
should pass the frontier of Holland. Haugwitz readily
consented to this, thereby light-heartedly upsetting
the whole of England's combinations and all the
elaborate arrangements that Harrowby and Hardenberg
were debating at Berlin. Napoleon then sent him to
Vienna to confer with Talleyrand. The Emperor
was on the eve of a great battle ; he understood
thoroughly that Prussia would turn upon him if he
were beaten, and he did not forget her intrusion upon
him at so critical a moment. Four days later, as Dec. 2.
has been told, he fought and won the battle of
1 Instructions to Cathcart, Nov. ; 5th Dec. ; Sec. of State to
Harrowby, 7th Dec. 1805.
292
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1805. Austerlitz ; on the 6th was concluded the armistice
Dec. 6. which eliminated Austria from the struggle ; and on
Dec. 14. the 14th Napoleon sent for Haugwitz to vent upon
him his rage against Prussia. The interview was a
stormy one, and the Emperor closed it with the ominous
words that in a few days peace between France and
Austria would be signed, and that he would not say
what his relations with Prussia might then be. He
was, however, still anxious to conclude an alliance with
Frederick William if it were possible ; wherefore
summoning Haugwitz once more to his presence, he
warned him that if his King forced France into war,
Hanover should never belong to Prussia. He then
offered him a treaty of offensive and defensive alliance
upon the following among other terms — that Prussia
should take Hanover, should give Anspach to Bavaria,
should cede Neufchatel and Cleves to Napoleon himself,
should guarantee to France her present dominions and all
future gains in Italy, and should further guarantee to
Bavaria and Wiirtemberg such new possessions as might
be dealt out to them by himself as reward for their
services to France. Haugwitz duly accepted this
Dec. 13. offer, and on the 13th of December the Treaty was
Dec. 20. signed at Schonbrunn. On the 20th Haugwitz was
given to understand that the article concerning Italy
included Naples, and that Hardenberg must be dis-
missed from King Frederick William's councils.
Therewith he was suffered to take his departure to
Berlin.
During the interval the British Cabinet awaited in
anxious suspense the issue of Haugwitz's mission. Pitt
had gone to Bath, a dying man, though as yet he knew
it not ; and Mulgrave and Hawkesbury had gone with
him. Harrowby's letters gave none but unsatisfactory
accounts of the attitude of the Court of Berlin.
Frederick William was evidently waiting upon events ;
and the Prussian Staff was opposed to a direct attack
upon Holland as a permanent operation, though
favouring the advance of a small detachment towards
ch. ix HISTORY OF THE ARMY 293
it to make a diversion. Anxious, however, to show 1805.
zeal and good-will, Ministers ordered eight more British
battalions and some German cavalry to sail for the
Weser on the 10th of December, with the melancholy Dec. 10.
result that the transports were at once dispersed by a
heavy gale and part of them cast away. Cathcart,
arriving at Cuxhaven on the 15th, was met by the news Dec. 15.
of Austerlitz and by an intimation from Harrowby that,
in consequence of the armistice between Austria and
France, the Prussian Staff deprecated any movement
towards Holland. He therefore detained all his trans-
ports so as to be ready for re-embarkation. A day or
two later came a strange rumour, which found its way
even to England, that the Russians and Austrians had
fought a second action against Napoleon and had driven
him back upon Vienna. The Ministers in London
therefore ordered yet more troops to sail for the Weser,
and continued to urge Prussia to come to a decision
as to her policy and her plan of campaign. They also
condescended to explain that England had made
enormous efforts to give the Allies solid support upon
the Continent, that she was running great risks by
sending men to North Germany at a season when they
might be unable to re-embark, and that foul winds and
ignorance of Prussia's intentions were really account-
able for the delay in the appearance of her troops.
Cathcart was further apprised that the position of the
British on the Weser was now becoming a matter of
substantive importance in itself, for the French troops
were reported to be collecting in Holland, and there
was always the chance that Napoleon might direct a
force upon Hanover from the south and east. The
Cabinet was anxious to protect the unfortunate province
in order alike to save it from a renewal of harsh treat-
ment, to ensure the recruiting of the German Legion,
to secure the British magazines on the Elbe and Weser,
and to maintain easy communication between England
and North Germany. Finally a long and confused
statement of the disposition of the Prussian armies was
294 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
805. enclosed to the British General to show that operations
of some kind were still possible.1
29- On the 29th of December, however, the British
Ministers in London received unmistakable news, long
delayed by foul winds, of the disaster of Austerlitz and
of the armistice between Austria and France. Being
unable in the absence of Pitt to give Cathcart further
instructions, they merely sent him additional transports
to bring off his troops, which in the circumstances was
the wisest thing that they could do. Affairs were steadily
going from bad to worse. The King of Sweden, after
allowing part of his troops to march as far as the Elbe,
and even moving himself some way westward, declared
that he would not act while the attitude of Prussia was
so uncertain, though the first shot fired from a Prussian
gun would be the signal for him to advance in force.
The Tsar, however, after retiring in deep depression to
St. Petersburg upon the defeat of Austerlitz, had
placed Tolstoy's detachment under the orders of the
King of Prussia ; and King Gustavus very naturally
refused to make himself in any way dependent upon
the commands of Frederick William, «whom he rightly
held in utter detestation and contempt. The position
of Cathcart was very difficult. Additional British
troops continued to arrive ; but many transports were
missing, and comparatively few of his battalions were
complete in consequence.2 The French force to west
1 Sec. of State to C.-in-C. 19th Dec.; to Harrowby (private),
21st Dec; to Cathcart, 23rd Dec. 1805.
2 Troops of the second division arrived on the Weser on or
before 1st Jan. 1806 :
Major-general Sir Arthur Welleslefs Brigade .
3rd Foot,
590
8th „
447
99 99 '..«. .*
36th „
657
Major-general Fraser's Brigade
26th „
438
91 n • • •
28th „
968
91st „
508
Major-general Sherbrooke's Brigade
5 th „
480
99 99 • • *
27th „
251
9 9 99 . ' ' * *
34th »
402
Royal Artillery, 3 companies, with horses ; R.E. detachment.
ch. ix HISTORY OF THE ARMY 295
of the Yssel under Louis Bonaparte was increasing ; tso6.
and another force under Augereau was menacing
Hanover on the south from Frankfort on Main. The
behaviour of Prussia was growing more and more
equivocal ; her preparations for war were backward ;
and her army, owing to the age and apathy of its
generals, was deficient in the discipline which consti-
tuted its sole strength. Nevertheless, evacuation of
North Germany by the British would, in Cathcart's
judgment, certainly precipitate Prussia towards a
disastrous peace, whereas the presence of a British force
might hearten her to stand firm until the Russians had
recovered themselves. On the other hand a frost
might at any moment make re-embarkation impossible,
and then there would be no retreat except into Prussian
territory and on to the Prussian armies. This retreat
King Frederick William refused to grant unless the
British troops on the Weser retired in rear of the
Prussians, so as to ensure that there should be no pro-
vocative action towards Holland, and unless the
blockade of Hameln were relaxed so as to give some
relief to the French garrison. The whole state of
affairs was so uncertain that Cathcart could only arrange
a temporary disposition of his troops in concert with the
Prussian General Kalkreuth, and then await orders. The
British therefore occupied Bremen and Verden, and the
Russians Hoya and Nienburg. The Swedes were per-
force left on the Elbe to act as a reserve, if they should
consent to act at all; and the Prussian contingent
remained in observation on the line of the Ems, ready,
if need were, to lean its right upon Minden so as to
cover the British left and keep up communication with
Magdeburg.1
Such, however, was Cathcart's distrust of Prussia
that he made every preparation to collect and embark
the recruits which had been gathered for the King's
German Legion, lest King Frederick William's officers
1 Sec. of State to Cathcart, 29th Dec. 1805 ; Cathcart to Sec.
of State, 1st (with enclosure), 2nd, 6th Jan. 1806.
296
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1806. should try to take them from him. At length, on the
Jan. 7. 7th of January 1806, Hardenberg informed Harrowby
that there was every prospect of his master's coming to
an arrangement with Napoleon to occupy Hanover, until
peace should be concluded between Britain and France.
He added that hostilities between Prussia and France
were most improbable, that the King was about to
recall Tolstoy's troops from North Germany, and that
he saw no advantage in any continuance of the British
troops in that quarter. Harrowby took his leave on
the same day, first sending a letter to inform Cathcart
of his departure, which message, however, did not
Jan. 21. reach that General until the 21st. Cathcart without
delay sought Tolstoy, who had always been frank and
open with him, and learned that fifty thousand Prussians
were on the march to occupy Hanover in force. A
few days later he received a copy of Haugwitz's treaty
of the 15th of December, with an intimation from the
British Minister in Berlin that it had been ratified
(which was not strictly correct), and would be carried
into effect at once. Almost immediately afterwards
he received orders from England tg re-embark his
force, which was now over twenty-six thousand strong,1
for the King's German Legion had increased by one-
Feb. 13. third during its stay in Germany. By the 13th of
Feb. 15. February all was ready, and on the 15th the army
sailed with a fair wind, leaving Hanover to the tender
mercies of Prussia, possibly with a hope, and most
1 British. — 1 / Coldstream Guards ; i/3rd Guards; 1 /3rd, 1 /4th,
i/5th,f i/8th, i/9th, 1/14-th, i/23rd, i/26th,f 2 /zy th,t i/28th,
i/3oth,t 2/34th> i/3^th, 1/89A, 1/9151, i/95th* R.A.; R.E.
Waggon Train.
(+5 companies only arrived ; J 6 companies only arrived ; * only 4 com-
panies sent.)
Germans. — 1st and 2nd Heavy Dragoons ; 1st and 3rd Light
Dragoons ; 1st and 2nd Light Battalions ; 1st to 7th Line
Battalions ; Regiment of Artillery.
Total-. British . 510 officers ; 14,058 N.C.O.'s and men.
„ German . 382 „ 11,693 „ „
892 25,751
ch. ix HISTORY OF THE ARMY 297
certainly with an ardent wish, that Prussia might pay 1
dearly for it.
Such was the end of the expedition to the Weser,
not a small expedition measured by the standard of that
day, and not destined, as was thought, to play an
unimportant part. It proved to be an egregious farce ;
but at this distance of time it is perhaps difficult to
judge of it aright. The general idea of operating upon
Napoleon's flank and rear was no doubt sound ; but
for success the whole plan depended necessarily on
Prussia. The King of Sweden was so uncertain and
his force so small that his help was of little moment ;
but the Russian contingent was an important matter,
and these troops could not obtain access to the sphere
of action without leave from Prussia ; nor in truth
could any important operation be undertaken without
the actual aid of Prussian regiments. Was Prussia a
power to be counted upon at such a crisis ? To this
question all previous experience since the French
Revolution answered emphatically in the negative.
Blindness, timidity, self-seeking and double-dealing
had from the first been the special characteristics of the
Court of Berlin ; and, while Frederick William remained
in power, it was hopeless to look for change or improve-
ment. It may of course be urged, probably with some
correctness, that Cathcart's army was intended to play
a diplomatic part, partly tempting and partly forcing
Prussia to join the Coalition. But was it likely that a
man who would not keep his engagements with his
dearest friend and most powerful patron, Alexander of
Russia, but compelled him almost to extort the fulfil-
ment of them by armed strength — was it likely that
such a man would learn strength of purpose and
common honesty from an unskilful negotiator such as
Harrowby, backed by a handful of British soldiers?
There was therefore some further motive to prompt the
dispatch of this futile expedition ; and this was almost
certainly the anxiety of the British Government to have
a British force in Holland when the overthrow of
298
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1806. Napoleon should be accomplished. This idea of
eternal petty expeditions to the Netherlands was a
mania with Pitt, which he most unfortunately bequeathed
to his successors. The ultimate destiny of Holland
was no doubt of overwhelming importance to England ;
but it was idle to suppose that England's part in the
shaping of that destiny would be determined by a small
party of red-coats on the spot rather than by the
successful operations of a strong British force against
France in another quarter. Yet such seems to have
been the fixed idea of Pitt and his colleagues. They
appear to have argued that the expedition to the Weser
might simultaneously answer a number of ends. It
might cause Prussia to declare against Napoleon, in
which case it might lead to the recovery of Holland ;
at all events it would collect recruits for the King's
German Legion, and show the earnestness of the
British intentions. But, if Napoleon won a great
victory over the Russians, the whole enterprise fell
to the ground, for every one in Europe knew that
Prussia would side with the conqueror. On the
other hand, if Cathcart's troops had been thrown
into Italy together with Craig's, then, no matter what
the action of Prussia, no matter what the success or
failure of Austria and Russia, the diversion was
bound to tell. Such employment of an army for a
definite military purpose was, however, outside the
scope of Pitt's intelligence. That military and diplo-
matic operations can go hand in hand, each seconding
and abetting the other, no man understood better
than Napoleon ; and his perfect mastery of the art
of combining the two constitutes one of his greatest
claims to supreme genius in the conduct of war. Pitt
had some inkling of the advantages of this art, but
lamentable ignorance of its practice. For this reason
again and again he sent generals to different quarters of
Europe with vague orders to do something, no great j
matter what, but at any rate something, which would
show that England was an active ally. Such was the
ch. ix HISTORY OF THE ARMY 299
purport of the instructions which Abercromby carried 1806.
to Holland in 1799, Craig to the Mediterranean, and
Cathcart to North Germany in 1805, with results that
are too well known to us. By this purposeless dis-
tribution of troops the armed force of England was
frittered away in paltry and useless detachments ; for, if
an expedition is to do nothing in particular, there is no
reason why it should consist of forty thousand men
rather than four thousand. The practice was infinitely
mischievous. It demoralised the men ; it discouraged
the officers ; it took the heart out of the Generals.
More than any other cause it brought about that readi-
ness to re-embark and to abandon enterprises which
made the British Army the laughing-stock alike of its
own nation and of Europe.
Before Cathcart returned Pitt was dead, worn out Jan. 23
by disease, anxiety, and overwork. Wholly unsuccessful
as he was as a Minister of War, it were ill to dismiss
so great a man with no eye but for his military failures.
The story of his genius as an administrator during ten
years of peace must be left to others to tell, but that of
his leadership of England through a time of supreme
peril must not be set aside without brief commemoration
in a military history. It was well that at a time when
many were dazzled by the spectacle of a great people
uprising in blind fury to conquer what it hoped might
be its liberty, the forces of order should have found
such a champion as Pitt. It is true that, as such, he
was bound to join or to seek as allies rulers so abject as
the Bourbons of Naples and Sicily, so contemptible as
Frederick William of Prussia, so insane as Paul of
Russia and Gustavus of Sweden, so weak as the Emperor
Francis ; but that was the misfortune of his time, not
the demerit of his cause. For the crusade of the
Revolution as initiated by the Girondists, continued by
the Convention and the Directory, and finally prose-
cuted to its death by Napoleon, was a crusade not of
liberty but of enslavement. It was against this that
Pitt stood forth, as a man who had learned the nature or
3°°
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1806. freedom not from the writings of sentimental dreamers,
but from the history and the wisdom of his own
countrymen, and was aware that it is a " plant of slow
growth," which has its roots in patience, charity, and
self-respect, and cannot be forced into blossom by
violence, intolerance, and spoliation. Amid reptile
Bourbons, cringing Hohenzollerns, and irresolute
Hapsburgs, the figure of Pitt towers aloft gigantic ;
and gigantic not from the meanness of their stature
only. For this was a man of such singleness of purpose,
such immovable integrity, such dauntless courage, such
lofty patriotism, that he could not but exalt and purify
any cause that he embraced. To Englishmen he was
the incarnation of uprightness, and he was trusted by
them accordingly. He could not be infallible, and he
was frequently deceived. At a time when the world
was agitated by forces which seemed to be beyond the
range of human experience, the insight and calculations
of the ablest statesman might easily be at fault. But
the people felt certain that he would take the course
which he thought best and most worthy for the country,
and would pursue it with perfect contempt of possible
disadvantage or danger to himself, so only his honour
should be safe. Napoleon ascribed the extraordinary
ascendancy of his great rival to his eloquence, and
envied him his gift of oratory. He was mistaken.
Pitt's strength lay in his perfect straight-forwardness 1
and unblemished character, without which his speeches,
in these days unreadable, might have seemed wearisome
even to his contemporaries. So great an example was
not lost upon his successors, even the least of whom
faced Napoleon with a boldness which modern French : l
historians survey with astonished admiration ; and in \
truth England's part in the struggle was dignified to
the very end by the commanding nobility of William
Pitt.
I
I
I
CHAPTER X
The Ministry which succeeded to power upon the death 1806.
of Pitt was that known by the name of All the Talents ;
and the array of great names was such as to justify the
title. Lord Grenville was Prime Minister ; Fox was
at the Foreign Office ; Charles Grey, later Lord
Howick and Earl Grey of the Reform Bill, at the
Admiralty ; Lord Moira at the Office of Ordnance ; and
William Windham in charge of the department of
War and the Colonies. This last appointment was
significant, for Windham had been the most bitter
critic of the military measures of Addington and Pitt,
and there could be little doubt that he would introduce
drastic reforms. Nor were reforms unnecessary, for
the "Twenty Pound Act," as Pitt's Additional Force
Act had been nicknamed, was conclusively proved to
be an utter failure. Attempts had been made at the
end of 1805 to galvanise it into life by increasing the
reward to the parochial officials for every recruit that
they might levy, and by sending military officers round
the country to instruct them in their duties. Nor had
these efforts been wholly unsuccessful. In all some
thirteen thousand men had been attested under the Act ;
and Pitt's supporters maintained that since the be-
ginning of 1806 it had furnished on an average three
hundred recruits a week. But these figures were
fallacious. Of the thirteen thousand enlisted, nearly
three thousand had deserted ; and investigation showed
that the remainder had for the most part been purchased
from crimps, which was the thing that Pitt had been
301
302
HISTORY OF THE ARMY bookxiii
1806, specially anxious to avoid. The fate of the Act was
therefore certain. The one thing uncertain was the
nature of the new plan that should follow upon its
repeal.
April 3. On the 3rd of April Windham in a speech to the
Commons set all doubts upon the subject at rest.
After a long preliminary discussion of the methods
employed for raising men in the past, he laid it down
that voluntary enlistment alone was possible to recruit
the Army for service abroad, and that to make
voluntary enlistment a success the Army must be
rendered an eligible calling. This object could be easily
accomplished by an increase of pay ; but such a resource
was economically impossible. Much might neverthe-
less be done by encouragements and rewards, and by
limiting military service to a term of years instead of
extending it, as heretofore, for life. He proposed
therefore to allow every two years' service in the West
Indies to count as three ; to increase the scale of
pensions ; and to allow men to enlist in future for a
short period, at the end of which they could engage
for a second term, with a slight increase of wages, and
again for a third term with a further increase. At the
end of the second term they would be entitled to a
pension roughly equivalent to half pay ; and at the end
of the third term they would finally retire on little less
than full pay. The three periods of service for infantry
were to be each of seven years ; for cavalry, ten, seven,
and seven years ; for artillery, twelve, five, and five
years. By this arrangement he confidently believed
that the ranks of the Regular Army would be kept
permanently filled.
The proposition was bold and startling, but it
was not novel ; and it seems tolerably certain that
Windham really borrowed it from Robert Craufurd,
who had repeatedly declared his belief in short service.
To sound the feeling of the Army upon the subject,
the Duke of York had in 1804 called for the opinions
of fourteen prominent General Officers, seven of whom,
ch. x HISTORY OF THE ARMY 303
including Lord Moira, were in favour of the change, 1
six were against it, and one was doubtful. It was, how-
ever, remarkable that General Hewett, the Inspector-
general of Recruiting, was strongly opposed to it, and
that Sir John Moore wrote an impatient answer, as
though the proposition were hardly worth discussing.
In his view it was idle to talk of keeping the Army
full except by some form of compulsion, in which case
service ought certainly to be limited in point of time ;
but no change in the terms of enlistment would procure
men who could not be obtained without it. "If," he
argued with much force, " limited service and enormous
bounties could tempt men to enlist, would the Army of
Reserve and the Permanent Additional Force created
by Mr. Pitt's Act be incomplete ? " However, the
House was very willing to give Windham's plan a fair
trial ; and the necessary legislation was easily effected
by a few changes in the schedules of the Mutiny Act.
On the other hand, Windham guarded) himself against
possible danger from the total failure of the system by
a second measure, which permitted fifteen in every
hundred men of the Irish Militia to enlist in the Army
every year, thereby assuring a supply of from three to
four thousand recruits from this service annually.
Pitt's Act was repealed ; the fines, amounting to
^1,800,000, which were due from defaulting parishes,
were remitted ; and the traditions of military policy
inherited from Pitt, so far as they concerned the
Regular Army, were definitely abandoned.
Nor did Windham shrink from making an equal
break with the past in respect of the rest of the land-
forces. The ballot was suspended for two years, until
the strength of the Regular Militia should be reduced
to the establishment of 1802 ; and Windham did not
conceal his hope that in future the ranks of that force
might be filled by voluntary enlistment for a reasonable
bounty. Finally he turned upon the Volunteers,
whom he had always condemned as a costly encumbrance,
and announced his intentions of gradually taking away
304 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xm
1806. all their allowances, and of withdrawing privileges
and exemptions of every kind from all corps which
accepted more from Government than their arms
and accoutrements. To create a force which should
take their place, he introduced and passed an Act
which, after repealing the First Defence Act and the
Levy en Masse Act, provided for the training of all
the men in the country who were liable to service in
the Militia. Two hundred thousand of them, chosen
by ballot, were to be called out every year and trained
for not more than twenty -four days, for wages of
one shilling for each day, and at no greater distance
than five miles from their homes. Substitutes were
forbidden, but exemption from one year's service
could be purchased by a fine of £10 ; and every man
who had undergone one year's training was exempt
from the ballot for two years. No provision was
made for the organisation of the men into companies
or battalions, though the King was empowered to
appoint officers and non-commissioned officers to in-
struct them ; but in case of invasion the trained men
could either be formed into new corjps or embodied
with old corps ; and it was Windham's firm intention
that at any crisis of national danger the trained men
should be drafted into regiments of the Line.
Thus at last some effort was made to exercise the
manhood of the country in arms for its defence, a step
which ought to have been taken by Pitt in 1794.
But though the principle of the measure was right and
sound, the details were crude and, as the sequel showed,
insufficient. Windham's idea apparently was so to
instruct the nation in the use of weapons that, after
augmenting the Regular battalions to the greatest
strength compatible with efficiency, the citizens should
group themselves into bands under local leaders, and
carry on a harassing warfare after the fashion of La
Vendee. There was and there is very much to be said
for such warfare against an invading enemy. Indeed
the lesson cannot be too strongly impressed upon the
ch.x HISTORY OF THE ARMY 305
body of the people that, if a foreign force should land 1806.
on their shores, every citizen who kills, captures or, to
use the modern phrase, puts out of action even a single
man of the enemy, has rendered a national service.
When every straggler, every messenger, every unwary
sentry, every weak patrol and every small party is
taken, shot, or knocked on the head, war speedily
becomes a weariness to the invaders, as the French
discovered in Spain from 1808 to 1813, the Germans
in France in the winter of 1870, and as we ourselves
have learned from more than one experience. But
though Windham's Act professed to train the nation to
the use of arms, its author had only the haziest notions
as to the manner in which instruction should be
imparted ; and it seems that for this most important
matter he relied upon the parish-constables. These
functionaries were required to be present at all exercise
of the men ballotted under the Act, in order to arrest
any who should be guilty of misconduct and bring them
before a magistrate, who could punish them by fine, or
by imprisonment in default of payment. The House
of Commons, while giving those enactments the force of
law, was greatly disposed, and with very good reason, to
treat them as a joke. Nevertheless in due time a man
arose who was able, as shall be seen, to take what was
good in Windham's Act and turn it to useful account.
Meanwhile the state of the Army for the moment
was by no means unsatisfactory. In March the Regular
force at home, which had been recruited for general
service, numbered, including the King's German Legion,
twenty-two thousand cavalry, sixty thousand infantry,
xnd ten thousand artillery. There was no danger of
nvasion, so that from thirty to forty thousand men
were at disposal for offensive operations. Moreover,
the year had opened well with the news, which arrived
it the end of February, that the expedition to the Cape
}f Good Hope had been completely successful. It will
oe convenient before going further to give a brief
iccount of this campaign.
VOL. V X
306
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1805. Baird's force, as has already been told, was a part of
that which had been embarked at Cork for despatch to
Jamaica in 1805, upon the alarm of Villeneuve's raid in
the West Indies. It consisted of rather more than six
thousand men,1 two hundred of which were cavalry ;
and Baird was ordered, immediately after fulfilling the
object of his mission, to send the Thirty-eighth, Fifty-
ninth, and Twentieth Light Dragoons to India. The
convoy, consisting of sixty-one transports escorted by
nine men-of-war under Commodore Sir Home Popham,
Aug. 31. sailed from Cork on the 31st of August, reached
Funchal in Madeira on the 28 th of September, and
sailing again on the 3rd of October, put into Bahia
Nov. 10. on the 10th of November. A transport and a store-
ship were wrecked while working into the bay, and
Brigadier Yorke, who was in command of the artillery,
was drowned, together with two men. After making
good defects, the ships again sailed on the 26th of
l8o6 December, made the land in the neighbourhood of
Jan. 4. Table Bay on the morning of the 4th of January 1806,
and on the evening of the same day came to anchor
between Robben Island and the Blueberg. Baird had
intended to land next morning at an inlet in the coast
to the north of Melkbosel Point and within sixteen
miles of Capetown ; but during the night a gale set in
and, though one brigade was actually ordered into the
boats, the surf was too heavy to allow a landing. He
Jan. 5. therefore, on the night of the 5th, detached Beresford
with the Thirty-eighth and his few mounted men to
Saldanha Bay, sending a frigate in advance to take
1 3 cos. R.A.
. 285
i/83rd .
701
Royal Staff Corps
20
1 /93rd .
622
1 /24th Foot
• 493
i/59th .
906
1/38A .
. 913
Detachments
149
i/7ist .
• 764
20th L.D.
200
i/72nd
• 599
Total .
5652
Add one-eighth for officers and
sergeants .
708
6360
ch.x HISTORY OF THE ARMY 307
possession of the port and secure, if possible, horses and 1806.
cattle. He himself had intended to follow with the
rest of the army on the morrow ; but on the morning
of the 6th the surf had so far abated as to make dis- jan. 6.
embarkation possible ; and accordingly the Highland
Brigade 1 was ordered into the boats under command of
Brigadier Ferguson, who had previously made careful
reconnaissance of the coast. There was no force to
oppose a landing except a single company of burgher
I militia, which was kept at a respectful distance by the
guns of four ships ; and the chief danger arose from
the surf, which was still violent. A small transport was
run aground to act as a breakwater, and thanks to this
I precaution and to the skill of the bluejackets, one boat
only, containing thirty-six men of the Ninety-third, was
swamped. Every one of the unlucky Highlanders was
drowned ; and these together with another man killed,
two officers and two more men wounded by the bullets
of the burghers, constituted the only casualties of the
disembarkation. The rest of the force with some
artillery and supplies was landed next day ; and the first Jan. 7
and greatest difficulty of the expedition was overcome.
It seems surprising that the Dutch commander,
General Janssens, having had full forty-eight hours'
warning, should have made no better preparations for
resistance ; but in truth every circumstance was adverse
to him. By the use of signal guns he alarmed the
whole country within fifty leagues of Capetown ; but
the wheat was threshing ; the grapes were ripening ;
the farmers were in the midst of their busiest season ;
and the heat was such that journeys could only be
undertaken by night. Apart from the burghers, the
resources of Janssens were small. He had one battalion
of Waldeck mercenaries four hundred strong ; a second
of half that number, consisting of sharp-shooters
recruited from all nations ; and a third — the Twenty-
second regiment of the Dutch line — besides a few
dragoons and artillery, making up a total of twelve
1 71st, 72nd, 93rd.
308
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1806. hundred regular troops. In addition to these he had j
two hundred and forty French sailors, between three
and four hundred coloured artillerymen and infantry,
and rather over two hundred burghers, the whole
composing a heterogeneous and ill-assorted force such
as is seldom brought together. However, he collected
it for what it might be worth, in all about two
thousand men with sixteen guns, and at one o'clock on
Jan. 8. the morning of the 8 th he marched out towards the
Blueberg to meet the British.
On the same morning and at nearly the same hour
Baird likewise began his march upon Capetown with over
four thousand men, two howitzers and six light guns,
and seized the heights of the Blueberg before Janssens
could reach them. From thence discerning the Dutch
General in the act of forming line of battle to encounter j :
him, he divided his force into two columns ; the t
Highland Brigade advancing straight on the road to i
Capetown, and the remaining brigade1 turning off to 2
the right. Arriving within cannon-shot, Baird opened (
fire from his artillery and was answered by the Dutch i
guns ; but, at the sight of a few rouni shot falling near t
them, the Waldeckers turned and ran. The Dutch jj
Twenty-second thereupon also gave way, and, after f
rallying for a moment under Janssens in person, fled I
again at the sight of the Highlanders advancing and i
could not be stopped. They had suffered little, for the ?
Highland Brigade had committed the fault, rare in t
British troops, of firing a volley at long range before -
closing with the bayonet ; and indeed the behaviour of ;
this Dutch Twenty-second and the Waldeckers was the •
more discreditable since the rest of Janssens' troops, •
French, Dutch, and negroes, regulars and irregulars, c
stood and fought with great gallantry. However, with j
his line thus weakened, Janssens had no alternative but j
to fall back. At Rietvlei he was able to collect what | .
was left of his force, when he sent the Waldeckers to c
Capetown in disgrace, and led the rest, with the |
1 24th, 59th, 83rd,
ch.x HISTORY OF THE ARMY 309
exception of the French sailors, into the mountains of 1806.
Hottentot Holland. His losses appear to have some-
what exceeded two hundred killed and wounded.
Those of the British were one officer and fourteen men
killed, nine officers and one hundred and eighty-eight
men killed, wounded, and missing. Five-sixths of the
casualties occurred in the three Highland battalions, the
remaining brigade having been but little engaged. It
is worthy of note that Baird reported Janssens' force to
be five thousand instead of two thousand strong, and
yet contrived that only the Highland Brigade should be
j employed in the fight. Such proceedings long have
w been, and still are, far too common among our Scottish
i Generals.
On the evening of the action Baird bivouacked
I at Rietvlei, in much anxiety as to the possibility of
! obtaining provisions from the fleet. Popham, however,
I by great exertions contrived to throw a small quantity
ashore ; and on the 9th the army pushed forward to Jan. 9.
Capetown over arid sand, taking up a position at Salt
) River, about a mile and a half north of the town, where
the General hoped to ensure communication with the
* fleet and if necessary to land his siege-train. Here
I Beresford and his detachment joined the army, and here
Baird received overtures for a suspension of arms from
the Commandant at Capetown ; with the result that
I within twenty-four hours a capitulation was signed and
i| the town was occupied by the British. Janssens still Jan. 10.
:| remained to be dealt with, but his force was fast
\\ dwindling owing to desertion ; and Baird, while making
I his dispositions to attack and cut him off, endeavoured
, \ to end matters by a letter complimenting him upon his
,1 gallantry, urging the fruitlessness of resistance, and
j offering honourable terms for the surrender of the
j colony. After a little hesitation these were accepted,
I and on the 18th of January was signed the final Jan. 18.
} capitulation which delivered Cape Colony to the British.1
, 11
1 R.O. Cape of Good Hope. Military Transactions, i. pp. 104-
i 142 ; TheaPs History of South Africa, i. 138-15 0.
310 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xm
1806. So far all had gone well. The capture of the Cape,
of course, signified the locking up of from three to four
thousand men in a distant garrison, but this was no
great price to pay for the safety of India. There was
little to be feared from the inhabitants. The Dutch
and French troops, which had formed the bulk of
Janssens' army, were sent back to Europe under the
treaty of surrender ; and the enlistment of the Wal-
deckers from the Dutch into the British service more
than made good the casualties of Baird's short campaign.
An additional stroke of luck came soon after. The
Dutch colours were kept flying in Table Bay for some
time after the country had past into British hands ;
and a French frigate, deceived by this wile, sailed into
the anchorage and was at once taken. She proved to 11
have on board several companies of the Second and t
Fifty-fourth British regiments, which she had captured in 1
transports at the mouth of the Channel, and was carry- is
ing to Mauritius. These men were homeward bound !;
from the Mediterranean, so that they were isolated
from their battalions, but at all events they were :
recovered, and were no unwelcome^addition to the 0
garrison at the moment. Unfortunately, however, c<
Baird chose to turn this windfall to the worst possible 0
account.
Sir Home Popham, the commander of the fleet :
which had escorted Baird, was a restless officer of 0
insinuating manners, who had early in his career gained B
favour in high places. In 1793 and 1794 he had been n
entrusted with the charge of gun-boats, pontoons, and
similar matters under the Duke of York, and had
acquitted himself always with credit. Running back-
wards and forwards between the Low Countries and
England with despatches, he had been seen and consulted
by Ministers, and, being always ready with a decided
opinion upon any enterprise, enjoyed, in a quiet way, con- | r
siderable influence with them. He was by no means . |c
without ability. He had devised and was constantly
improving a code of naval signals ; and in the matter of
I
ch. x HISTORY OF THE ARMY 3 1 1
embarking and disembarking troops in an enemy's 1806.
country he was full of skill and resource. He had
worked so much with the Army that he thoroughly
understood the service, and would spare no pains
to ensure the health and comfort of any troops with
which he was concerned. In the Navy also he was
« popular, for he looked carefully to the interest of the
men and officers under his immediate command,
particularly in the matter of prize-money, which was
frequently the main object of his operations* This,
indeed, was his weakest point. Constant employment
in more or less independent stations had given him an
opportunity of dabbling in mercantile transactions
which, in the opinion of his contemporaries, were by
no means to his credit. The same cause had led him
to persuade himself that he was a great diplomatist and
administrator; and in his distant command at the Cape
he thought that he saw an opportunity for adding both
to his wealth and to his importance.
Already, in previous volumes of this history, the
reader has encountered the name of Miranda, in
connection with revolutionary movements in the Spanish
colonies of South America. Miranda was a Venezuelan
of Caracas, who in 1782 had been dismissed from the
Spanish service under an accusation of complicity in illicit
trading with North America and of corrupt delivery
of the plans of the fortifications of Havana to the
! British Government. From that time onwards he
1 never ceased his efforts to drag the British Government
; into countenancing and supporting a revolution in South
1 America. In 1783 he put forward a complete plan for
I the emancipation of the Spanish Colonies with the help
of England, but was repulsed by Fox and North. In
1 1790, at the time of the dispute over Nootka Sound, he
i brought the same plan before Pitt and, though cordially
! received, was foiled by the pacific settlement of the
controversy. Failing then to obtain a pension from
Pitt, he entered the service of the French Republic and
I fought under Dumouriez. In 1796, upon the outbreak
312
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
of war between England and Spain, he again sought
Pitt, and so far commended his scheme to the Ministry
and its advisers that, as we have seen, an expedition was
actually prepared, and only abandoned with the greatest
reluctance and regret. On this occasion he contrived
to enlist the sympathy not only of Henry Dundas
and Popham but even of so sober a person as Lord
Grenville. When he found that England had her hands
already overfull, he returned in 1801 to France to try
his fortune there. As however he could obtain nothing
from Bonaparte, he came once again to England in
1802, when Addington gave him encouragement and
countenance, though shrinking from the final step of
equipping a ship for him. But, when Pitt returned
to office, Miranda and Popham, having already gained
over Lord Melville 1 at the Admiralty, urged their views
upon the Prime Minister with increased vehemence ;
and matters went so far that Popham on the 16th of
October 1804 produced a long memorandum, working
out the details of an expedition to South America.
Sir Arthur Wellesley, at the request of Ministers, like-
wise compiled similar particulars for~a descent upon
the Orinoco.
Nothing however came of this, though Popham
afterwards affirmed that, from his recollection of what
had passed, the Ministry had given him a free hand to
make a descent upon Buenos Ayres. It is possible that
both Pitt and Melville were guilty of some indiscretion
in their frequent conversations with Popham, for the
enterprise was exactly of a nature to captivate their
unmilitary minds. Popham averred that the imports
from South America into Spain in produce and specie
were worth some twenty millions annually, that two-
thirds of this sum passed into the hands of France
and that, unless the British anticipated him, Bonaparte
would shortly send expeditions to Vera Cruz, Mexico,
Brazil, and Rio de la Plata. How Napoleon was to
send so large a force over the sea with a navy so inferior
1 This of course was the Henry Dundas above mentioned.
ch.x HISTORY OF THE ARMY 313
to England's Popham did not pause to explain nor the 1806.
Ministers to inquire. Lord Grenville, on the other
i hand, had taken a truer measure of Miranda than his
late colleagues and, whatever he may have thought
I of him in 1796, was unwilling to trust him in 1804 ;
1 but, being in opposition during Pitt's administration, he
i was of course without influence with the party in power,
j The truth is that Miranda was simply a shallow,
I unscrupulous adventurer, not wholly innocent of knavery,
I and that Popham's character at bottom perhaps differed
not very greatly from that of Miranda.1
The result of all these discussions as to seconding a
revolutionary movement in South America was that
Popham, finding himself at the Cape with a fairly
strong squadron and no immediate work to be done,
thought the opportunity a good one to make a sensational
stroke for his own hand. He therefore besought
Baird to trust him with a battalion in order to make
a beginning by the capture of Buenos Ayres and of the
province now known by the name of Argentina. It says
much for his powers of address that he could persuade
Baird even to listen, for that General was hard, rough,
difficult, and jealous of his own authority. But a Scot
is rarely loth to perpetrate a job for his own countrymen.
The General therefore told the Commander that if he
chose to take his own regiment, the Seventy-first, he
might do so, but that he should have no other.
Popham gladly accepted the offer. The Seventy-first
was embarked under the command of Colonel Beresford,
the future marshal of Portugal, together with a few
artillerymen r four guns, and a handful of dragoons;2 and
■
1 Athenaum, April 19, 1902, Pitt and General Miranda, by-
Hubert Hall ; Popham's memo, of 1 6th Oct. 1804 in Popham to
Sec. of State of 30th April 1806 ; Dropmore Papers.
2 R.A., 3 officers, 33 n.c.o. and men, 4 guns (2 complete with
horses and drivers)
20th L.D. 1 officer, 6 men.
71st Foot. 32 „ 883 „
Total 36 officers, 922 men. Also 60 women (6 to each company)
and 40 children.
3H
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1 806. the Colonel received instructions intimating that, in
Baird's opinion, a force of less than a thousand men, with
a few seamen and marines, was sufficient to master the
Spanish possessions on Rio de la Plata — a country half
as large as Europe, with a capital containing seventy
thousand souls. In case of failure, continued the
instructions, Beresford was to return at once with all
his troops to the Cape. This clause was very neces-
sary ; for Popham was quite capable of making a
long marauding voyage round the Spanish settlements
after the Elizabethan fashion. The Commodore then
ordered the whole of his squadron to get under way,
leaving not a single ship upon the station ; and on
April 14. the 14th of April the armament, much envied by the
rest of the garrison, sailed away to the west.1
For a week the voyage was prosperous ; but on the
April 21. 2 1 st one of the transports with two hundred men on
board parted company and disappeared, diminishing the
military force so seriously that Popham thought it
prudent to bear up for St. Helena. From thence he and
Beresford wrote to England on the 30th to report what
they had done ; Popham with long and elaborate explana-
tions which betrayed his consciousness of having acted
amiss ; Beresford with a short but urgent appeal for
instructions as to his dealings with the inhabitants.
Popham then contrived to wheedle the Governor of St.
Helena into granting him a reinforcement of nearly four
hundred men 2 from the garrison of the island ; and on
May 21. the 2 1 st of May the armament resumed its voyage to
Rio de la Plata. After a long and tedious passage Cape
St. Mary, which marks the northern side of the entrance
June 8. to the river, was sighted on the 8th of June ; Popham
himself together with an officer of engineers having gone
forward in a frigate on the 27th of May to explore the
navigation of the channel and reconnoitre the country.
I
1 Baird to Sec. of State, 14th April 1806 ; "Recollections of the j
British Army," in Colburne's Military Magazine, June 1836.
2 Artillery : 1 officer, 10 1 n.c.o. and men. St. Helena Infantry :
8 officers, 278 n.c.o. and men.
ch.x HISTORY OF THE ARMY 315
Owing to fogs and baffling winds the convoy did not 1806.
overtake this frigate until the 14th of June ; and then June 14
the two commanders decided that the point to be
attacked must be the open town of Buenos Ayres.
This, it must be remarked, was a serious deviation
from Popham's original plans. Monte Video was the
place which he had at first intended to occupy, for he
trusted, upon extremely slender information, that its
fortifications were in ruins and that it would surrender
without firing a shot. His design had then been to
send the few Spanish regular troops in the country to
Europe, and by repairing the defences of the city to
give the British a place of arms from which they would
not be easily dislodged, or where, at worst, they could
have some chance of a safe re-embarkation. The
reason alleged for his change of plan was that the bread-
stuffs of the troops were exhausted, that none could be
spared from the men-of-war, and that there was greater
certainty of collecting supplies at Buenos Ayres than at
Monte Video. The cogency of such arguments must
be admitted ; but with our knowledge of Popham's
antecedents and character, it may also be suspected that
the Commodore doubted the success of an attack upon
Monte Video, and that he therefore declared for an
immediate movement on Buenos Ayres, where he could
be sure of finding the object of which he was really in
search, namely prize-money.1
Accordingly such troops as were in the line-of-battle
ships were transferred to transports of lighter draught ;
and on the 16th the vessels moved up the river, groping June 16
their way slowly owing to fogs and difficulty of naviga-
tion. At length on the night of the 24th of June they June 24
lay off Buenos Ayres, and next morning reached Point June 25
de Quilmes, some eight miles below the city. The dis-
embarkation was accomplished without mishap or
opposition in the course of the afternoon and night,
though a hostile force was visible two miles away upon
1 Popham to Sec. of State, 30th April ; Beresford to Sec. of
State, 30th April ; to Baird, 2nd July 1806.
3i6
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xi
1 806. a slight eminence at the village of Reduction.1 At eleven
June 26. o'clock on the next morning Beresford moved off. The
space between his camping ground and Reduction was
a level plain which the rains of winter would presently
convert into a swamp, but which was at the moment
passable even by guns. The enemy numbered about
two thousand men, chiefly undisciplined cavalry, with
eight guns ; and as the open character of the ground
forbade any attempt at a turning movement, Beresford
formed the bulk of his force into a single line with two
six-pounders upon each flank and two howitzers in the
centre, holding only the St. Helena Infantry with two
more field-guns at a short distance in rear, in case the
Spanish cavalry should menace his flanks. On coming
within range of the enemy the advance was checked by
a tongue of swamp, and Beresford halted his line to
enable the guns to pass round it. The forward move-
ment was then resumed and the Spanish cannon opened
a well-aimed fire. Beresford's troops therefore quickened
step, found themselves plunging into another swamp,
which brought the guns to a standstill, but hastened on
in spite of all difficulties to the foot of-ihe hill occupied
by the Spaniards. The enemy's artillery, being ill-
served, did small damage after the first few minutes ;
their infantry retired when the British reached the foot
of the hill ; and a few volleys from the crest scattered
the whole force in precipitate flight. Four guns were
the trophies of this insignificant combat, and Beresford
halted for two hours to find the means of moving them,
Force disembarked-
Staff
7
officers
R.E.
1
n.c.o.
R.A.
3
» 33
St. Helena Artillery .
„ IOI
20th L.D.
» 6
71st
3i
„ 833
St. Helena Infantry
7
» 175
>>
Marines .
• 9
» 33i
W
Seamen
. 10
» 9°
?>
Total
. 70
off., 1571
men,
3 horses,
en.
1 3 „ four 6 prs.
two 5^-in.
howitzers.
two light 3 prs.
ch.x HISTORY OF THE ARMY 317
and also to extricate his own pieces from the swamp. 1806.
This done, he marched at once to secure the one bridge
over the Rio Chuelo, a small stream about thirty yards
wide which lay about eight miles from Reduction,
barring the way to Buenos Ayres. Before he could
reach it he perceived that the bridge was in flames, and
though he pushed forward a small detachment in the
hope of saving at least a part of it, he found that he was
too late. The enemy could be heard through the
darkness moving guns down for the defence of the
passage ; and Beresford therefore called the detachment
back to the main body, a mile from the river, where
he bivouacked for the night.
At dawn of the next morning reconnaissance showed June 27.
that the enemy was in position on the further bank,
sheltered by houses, hedges, and shipping, whereas the
hither bank offered no cover nor shelter of any kind.
Beresford at once brought forward to the water's edge
the light company of the Seventy-first together with his
eleven guns, and was received by a wild and ill-aimed
fire of all arms. His artillery soon silenced that of the
Spaniards, and the passage of a few British troops in
rafts and boats brought the enemy's feeble resistance to
an end. By eleven o'clock the whole British force had
passed the river ; no enemy was to be seen in the
three miles that separated the stream from Buenos
Ayres ; and Beresford sent a summons to the Governor
to surrender. After a short parley the terms were
agreed upon ; Beresford granting to the garrison the
honours of war and to the people protection of private
property, with continuance of the existing municipal and
judicial authority, and restoration of captured coasting
vessels to their owners. Upon these conditions, and at
a cost of one man killed and a dozen wounded,
Beresford's handful of troops obtained possession of a
town of seventy thousand inhabitants with fortifications
containing eighty-six guns of all calibres.1
So far Popham's audacious stroke was crowned with
1 Beresford to Sec. of State, nth July 1806.
3i 8 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1806. success, and success of the kind which was dearest to
his heart, for Beresford sent home nearly eleven hundred
thousand dollars of prize-money. But the situation of
the British was critical, and Beresford was fully aware of
it. There remained in the Colony about two thousand
Spanish infantry, of poor quality indeed but still regular
troops, besides four to five thousand irregulars, which
could assemble at need ; and it was tolerably certain
that these would fall upon the invaders with over-
whelming strength upon the first appearance of weakness
or misfortune. It was possible to conciliate the popula-
tion of the city itself, but not that of the entire country ;
and to reduce it to submission Beresford needed a strong
force of cavalry, which he did not possess. Moreover,
the coming of the British had thrown everything into
disorder. The viceroy had fled into the interior ; and
the inhabitants, while seizing the moment to shake off
the yoke of Spain, had not yet yielded to their new
masters. All therefore was unstable and unsettled.
The one thing certain was that the Colonists were deeply
ashamed of having surrendered to so puny a force, and
not less alarmed at having no greater protection to count
upon in case of an attack by an expedition from Spain.
Their position was thus both unfair and intolerable.
Beresford, while seeking to remove the most conspicuous
of their grievances, rightly refused to commit the British
Government to any definite line of policy. It was only
natural, therefore, that the Colonists should regard his
forcible intrusion upon them and his confiscation of the
King of Spain's property as little better than an act of
piracy. Popham might represent the proceedings as
intended to further the cause of emancipation in South
America ; but the Colonists were to be excused if they
considered a British occupation of their capital as a
strange and unwelcome form of liberty.
Matters at Buenos Ayres had reached this point
when, at the end of July, the letters of Beresford and
Popham from St. Helena reached Downing Street.
The enterprise having been undertaken without the
ch. x HISTORY OF THE ARMY 319
knowledge or sanction of the Government, and its 1806.
issue being still unknown, Windham was unable to
give Beresford further instructions than to maintain
himself if he could, to avoid all share in any revolu-
tionary enterprises, and to interfere generally with the
inhabitants as little as possible. If he found that he
could not hold his own, then he was to send the troops
back to the Cape and return home on leave. In any
case, however, a reinforcement of two thousand men
under Sir Samuel Auchmuty, together with supplies
and stores, would be sent out to La Plata immediately.1
It is difficult to see what more, in the circumstances,
the Government could have done ; for Popham, as it
turned out, had chosen a singularly inopportune
moment for his wild adventure. The victory of
Austerlitz and the change of Government in England
had led to rapid and startling results in Europe, to
meet which the Ministry of all the Talents had need
of all the resources of England. Austerlitz at a single
stroke had driven Austria from the Coalition, wrecked
the Holy Roman Empire, confirmed Prussia in a
trembling neutrality, decided the fate of Naples, and
incidentally clouded the victory of Trafalgar with the
dust that rose from the collapse of Pitt's pygmy
combinations in the Mediterranean. Napoleon's first
act had been to reward his German allies by the grant
of higher titles and the promise of large tracts of jg^.
Austrian territory. These promises the Treaty of Dec. 26
Pressburg enabled him to fulfil. Thereby Austria
yielded to Baden and Wiirtemberg sundry petty fiefs ;
to Bavaria, Tirol and Voralberg ; and to France every
inch of territory that she had gained at Campo Formio ;
recognising Napoleon also as King of Italy, and
retaining on the Adriatic no more than Trieste. On
the same day Napoleon ordered St. Cyr to march
upon Naples ; on the 27th he decreed that the Dec. 27
Bourbons had ceased to reign in that kingdom ; and
on the 31st he nominated his brother Joseph to carry Dec. 31
1 Sec. of State to Beresford, 24th July 1806.
320
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1805. his decree into effect. Months before, he had in-
corporated the Ligurian Republic into the French
Empire, and he now designed to make Holland, which
was already a department of France, into a kingdom
for his brother Louis.
None the less when the Emperor returned to Paris
on the 24th of January 1806 his further plans for
the reconstitution of Germany were not yet feasible,
and his situation was still an anxious one. The Tsar,
despondent for the moment after Austerlitz, recovered
himself and resumed his defiant attitude when he
reached St. Petersburg. In the Mediterranean the
British and Russians had been driven from Naples,
but not yet from Sicily. Lastly there was always
uncertainty as to the intentions of Prussia. It is
true that Napoleon had extorted a favourable treaty
from Haugwitz at Schonbrunn on the 15th of
December, but it remained to be seen whether
Frederick William would ratify it. As a matter of
fact Haugwitz, returning triumphantly with his treaty,
was extremely ill-received. Frederick William hated
any definite arrangement which he could not evade;
and Haugwitz had brought him back an alliance with
France. The weak King again became violent for a
time, and assured the Russian envoy that he would
never divide his fate from that of the Tsar. Then
he subsided into abjection and resolved to ratify the
treaty with modifications. He would have the alliance
with France to be purely defensive ; he would guarantee
Venetia only, among the new acquisitions of France in
Italy ; and he would hear of no guarantee for Naples until
England sanctioned the transfer of Hanover to Prussia.
He then again assured the Tsar of his unalterable
friendship, ordered his troops to occupy Hanover —
the one thing which he was sure that he wanted — and
sent Haugwitz to Paris with the treaty thus amended.
The man's only idea of honour was a graduated scale
of deceit, of which he reserved the lower degrees for
his friends and the intenser for his enemies.
HISTORY OF THE ARMY
321
Haugwitz reached Paris on the 1st of February, 1806.
and on the 3rd was received by Talleyrand with
alarming coldness. On the 4th Napoleon heard the Feb. 4.
news of Pitt's death and of the accession of Fox to
the Foreign Office, and at once conceived the idea of
detaching England from the Coalition, or at any rate
of paralysing her for a time by negotiations. Fox
gave him an opening by warning him of a plot for his
assassination ; and the overture was joyfully welcomed.
But first it was necessary to come to decisive con-
clusions with Prussia ; which was duly effected on the
5 th of February. On that day Talleyrand informed Feb. 5.
Haugwitz that the treaty of the 15 th of December, not
i having been ratified, was void; and ten days later he Feb. 15.
I peremptorily submitted to him a new treaty to the
, 1 following effect. Prussia was to take over all the
1 dominions of King George the Third in Germany, and
\ in return was to yield Neufchatel to France, Cleves to
a nominee of Napoleon, and Anspach to Bavaria ; and
» I the several parties were to enter into possession of the
^ territories thus transferred within five days of the
> i ratification of the treaty. Prussia was further to close
1 \ Liibeck and all ports and rivers in the Baltic to
1 British shipping, to guarantee the French Empire,
1 including Venetia and Naples, as also the integrity of
1 Turkey, Bavaria, Wurtemberg, and Baden.
Rightly thinking that rejection of this treaty would
e mean war, Haugwitz signed it and sent it on to
e 1 Berlin. There also Hardenberg perceived that the
I1; only alternative to ratification was war, and King
" Frederick William accordingly confirmed the agreement
1 on the 26th of February. He was well advised ; for Feb. 26.
e Napoleon, finding that Prussian troops had already
- loccupied Hanover, took possession of Anspach, Neuf-
ichatel, and Cleves without waiting to hear of the fate
M of the new treaty at Berlin. However, this point of
'e friction between the two powers, though ominous for
y> (the future, did not disturb the most important condition
iwhich had been accepted by Frederick William — the
vol. v y
322
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1806. closing of the Baltic ports to British trade. This
stroke against England was followed up by open
declarations of Napoleon to his Legislative Chamber
Mar. 2, 5. on the 2nd and 5th of March that Italy, Belgium, and
Holland were thenceforward essential parts of his
Empire, subject to his immediate direction, and there-
fore, as a necessary consequence, barred to British
commerce.
The object of the Emperor's policy was now com-
paratively plain. He had, as he hoped, tied Prussia
hand and foot by his last treaty. It remained for him
to come to an agreement either with Russia or with
England, in full confidence that the secession of either
power from the Coalition would force the other to come
to terms. But this was no such easy matter. In the
first place, the restrictions laid by his late measures upon
British trade were evidently designed to dragoon rather
than to persuade England towards a peaceful settlement.
In the second, Fox was resolute to prosecute no negotia-
tions except in concert with Russia. In the third, no
arrangement with England could be final unless it decided
the fate of Hanover, which country Napoleon had already
promised to Prussia ; and until the question of Hanover
was determined, the Emperor could not carry out the
final reconstitution of Germany which was to take
shape shortly in the Confederation of the Rhine.
Lastly, the darling wish of Napoleon's heart was to
turn the Mediterranean into a French lake ; and this
of necessity involved the attainment of two preliminary
ends, namely, predominance of French influence with
the Ottoman Porte, and, still more important, the
possession of Sicily. All circumstances combined to
create a diplomatic situation of extraordinary intricacy,
which was not simplified by the fact that all parties
were striving eagerly to second their diplomacy by
some telling strategic blow.
The negotiations with England were informally
opened by Talleyrand with Lord Yarmouth, one of
the travelling Englishmen who had been detained in
ch.x HISTORY OF THE ARMY 323
France by Napoleon's decree at the opening of the 1806.
war. Yarmouth declined to enter into any discussion
of the subject except on the preliminary condition that
Hanover should be restored to its rightful sovereign.
To this Talleyrand raised no objection ; though the
article which was most vital to Prussia in the recent
treaty was thereby very seriously imperilled. The
effrontery of Talleyrand's action was sufficiently cynical,
and yet it was not unjustifiable, for Frederick William
the Little had been as careless of his obligations as
Napoleon the Great. No sooner, in fact, had the King
of Prussia signed his treaty with France than he sent the
Duke of Brunswick to St. Petersburg to report it to the
Tsar ; with the result that, within six weeks of binding
himself by an alliance with France against Russia, he
concluded a secret agreement to ally himself with
Russia against France. Every precaution was of course
taken to lull Napoleon into false security while this
trickery was going forward ; but Frederick William
had deceived too many parties to escape betrayal by
some one of them. The British Ministry, indignant
over the occupation of Hanover by Prussian troops,
made public the papers concerning Lord Harrowby's
negotiations at Berlin, which showed that it was not
from goodwill towards France that Prussia had refused
to join the Coalition. Napoleon, after reading these,
published in the Moniteur so furious an attack upon Mar. 21.
Hardenberg that Frederick William hastened to Mar. 29.
dismiss that Minister ostensibly, though not actually,
tlfrom office, in order to allay the Emperor's wrath.
MBut the British nation was not less angry than
tH Napoleon over these revelations, particularly when
)i Prussia added injury to insult by closing her ports to
i# I British trade. The British Government promptly April 1.
\ retorted by laying an embargo on all Prussian vessels
I in British ports, and declaring the Ems and Weser in
Ufa state of blockade; and these measures were finally Apr. 4-5,
I clinched on the 21st of April by a Royal message to April 21.
' jParliament declaring war against Prussia by sea. In
324
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1806. both Houses members seized the opportunity to state
as pointedly as possible their opinions of King Frederick
William and of his policy ; and if that monarch failed
to awake to a sense of his own contemptibility, it was
certainly not the fault of the debaters at Westminster.
The lesson was enforced by the sweeping of the
Prussian flag off the seas in the course of the next
few weeks ; and yet this invective and these reprisals
were directed at one who really clung with desperate
though dissembled tenacity to England's most valuable
ally, the Tsar Alexander. Never was there a more
grotesque political situation.
Throughout this time Fox was pursuing active
negotiations with Russia, with the special object of
thwarting Napoleon's designs in the Mediterranean.
Throughout the long diplomatic game with Russia the
French Emperor's great card had been Turkey, which he
was equally ready to dismember in order to conciliate the
Tsar, or to champion in order to embarrass him. The
Eastern question had become more urgent since the
Peace of Pressburg ; for by the acquisition of Dalmatia
the French Empire was extended to the marches of
the Ottoman. The partition of the Sultan's dominions
having long been a favourite project with Russia, the
Tsar embraced the opportunity to press it upon
England ; and Fox, though unprepared to go to such
extreme lengths as this, nevertheless assured the
Russian Ambassador that, in case of need, England was
prepared to occupy Alexandria. The point must be
borne in mind, for, as shall be seen, this arrangement
for upholding Russian influence at Constantinople,
whatever the cost, was actually carried out within
twelve months.
At the time, however, Napoleon was checked in
Eastern Europe by the intrigues of Russia with the
Montenegrins concerning Cattaro. This place under
the Treaty of Pressburg should have been delivered
up to France ; but as no French commissioners
arrived at the time to take it over, Russian agents
ch.x HISTORY OF THE ARMY 325
persuaded the inhabitants that they might yield the 1806.
place to whom they chose. The Montenegrins at once
rose in insurrection, compelled the small Austrian
garrison to surrender the fortress, and transferred it
to the Russians, who hastened to occupy it in force.
Napoleon was furious. He suspended the march of
his army from the German states into France, and de-
clared his intention of holding Braunau on the Inn
until Cattaro should be delivered up to him. He had
hoped to close the eastern coast of the Adriatic
altogether to British ships ; and it enraged him to
see its most important port still open to them.
However, he characteristically indemnified himself by
seizing Ragusa, neutral territory against which he had
neither quarrel nor grievance ; which done, he pro-
ceeded to develop his further plans alike for excluding
the British from the Mediterranean, and for bringing
fresh pressure to bear upon Russia by skilful manipula-
tion of Turkey. On the 9th of June,1 he ordered June 9.
Sebastiani to repair to Constantinople, there to assure
the Sultan of his firm friendship and support against
all enemies and in particular against Russia, while
he himself prepared to assemble a force in Dalmatia in
order to second Sebastiani's mission by threats.
During this time the Emperor's negotiations with
England continued, but made little progress, the two
parties being steadily at variance over two principal
points. The first of these, as has already been men-
tioned, was Fox's refusal to treat except in concert
with Russia ; the second was the cession of Sicily to
France, which Napoleon persistently demanded, and
Fox as persistently refused. The Emperor designedly
protracted the business, hoping always that the capture
of Sicily by Joseph Bonaparte might give him the
upper hand in dictating conditions of peace ; but, as
we shall see, his expectations upon this head were
doomed to something more than disappointment.
erS None the less, the dexterity which he showed in the
1 Corres. de Napoleon, 10,339.
326 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xhi
1806. diplomatic struggle was extraordinary. After much
discussion, he deferred to Fox's determination not
to treat apart from Russia ; but he did so only to
seek reconciliation with Russia apart from England.
The Tsar, as it happened, was willing, though rather in
the hope of gaining time than of coming to an under-
standing, to open informal negotiations, for which
purpose he despatched M. d'Oubril to Paris, ostensibly
upon some business of exchange of prisoners. Delaying
d'OubriFs arrival on various pretexts lest he should
meet and take counsel with Yarmouth, Napoleon made
a last effort to break down the resolution of the English
nobleman. Finding persuasion to be useless, Talleyrand
did not scruple to threaten that France would seize Spain
and Portugal, shut their ports against the British, and so
force England to come to terms. The menace failed
to move Yarmouth ; and d'Oubril was then admitted to
the capital. The Russian proved to be clay in
Talleyrand's hands ; and in a few days he was beguiled
July 20. into signing a treaty whereby, among other matters,
Russia recognised the cession of Cattaro and Dalmatia
to France, and of Sicily to Joseph Bonaparte as King of
Naples. Having obtained this, Napoleon flourished it
in the face of Yarmouth in the hope that it would scare
him into accepting the terms of France, which con-
cession would in its turn compel the Tsar to ratify
d'OubriFs treaty. He offered also to restore to
England the sovereignty of Hanover and to confirm
her in possession of Malta, requiring in return that she
should acknowledge Joseph as King of the Two Sicilies.
Since Fox had lately shown signs of relenting upon the
July 26. article of Sicily, Yarmouth upon the 26th of July agreed
to cede that island to France ; and Napoleon felt with
some confidence that he had at last brought both
Russia and England to the point of signing peace.
Without delay therefore he proclaimed the dissolution
of the Holy Roman Empire, and the reconstitution of
Germany under the Confederation of the Rhine. The
Confederation consisted of sixteen states : two kingdoms
ch. x HISTORY OF THE ARMY 327
— Bavaria and Wttrtemberg ; three grand duchies — 1806.
Baden, Darmstadt, and Berg ; one ecclesiastical principality
— Frankfurt ; and ten secular principalities, over which
presided two princes of Nassau, two of Hohenzollern,
two of Salm, and one each of Isenburg, Arenberg,
Lichtenstein, and de Leyen. The whole were under
Napoleon's protection, and were bound to provide
him with sixty -three thousand troops when called
upon. Berg, it may be added, was given to Murat
under Napoleon's new system of appanages, even as
Holland had been given in June to his brother Louis,
and Naples to Joseph. Austria was pressed to accept
this new model of Germany under threats ; and Prussia
was tempted to accede to it by the insinuation that
Hanover should be assured to her and that Frederick
William might shortly look for an imperial crown.
Unfortunately, however, Yarmouth in his cups betrayed
to Lucchesini, the Prussian Ambassador at Paris, that
Napoleon had already promised Hanover to England ;
and this fact was promptly reported to Berlin. Never-
theless the Emperor continued to believe in the prospect
of a speedy peace with England, for on the 5 th of Aug. 5
August a formal negotiator from Fox arrived in Paris
in the person of Lord Lauderdale. But in the mean-
while the intelligence of d'Oubril's treaty had reached
London and raised a storm of indignation, which
was heightened by the news of the Confederation of
the Rhine, signifying as it did further restrictions upon
England's commerce. Lauderdale, moreover, had been
directed after all to insist that Sicily should not be
abandoned to France ; and indeed had Fox known
at the moment, as Napoleon did know, what had
lately passed in Calabria between . the British and
I French troops, his instructions would no doubt have
been even firmer upon this point than they were.
However, Lauderdale was resolute enough as to Sicily,
and, finding Napoleon equally determined to the
contrary, on the 9th of August demanded his passports. Aug. 9
Day after day Napoleon excused himself from granting
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1806. them, hoping that time would work in his favour.
Francis of Austria, in obedience to his mandate, had
renounced the title of Emperor of Germany and had
recognised Joseph as King of the Two Sicilies ; and any
day might bring the Tsar's ratification of d'Oubril's
treaty from St. Petersburg. Then England, forsaken
both by Russia and Austria would, as the Emperor
reckoned, be thankful to close with his conditions.
But at this point, to the general surprise, the whole of
Napoleon's combinations were upset by a sudden revolt
on the part of Prussia. When the Confederation of the
Rhine was first reported at Berlin, Frederick William
received the news with satisfaction, giving out that he
would himself form a similar confederation of Northern
Germany, with Prussia, enriched by the possession of
Hanover, at its head. But presently he realised that
thereby he would commit himself completely to
Napoleon's side against Austria and Russia ; and the
bare thought of this caused the greatest indignation
among the many Prussians who felt ashamed of their
Sovereign's ignoble truckling to the Corsican adventurer, s
A few days later there arrived at Berlin Lucchesini's i
report that Napoleon had actually offered Hanover to
England ; and certain suspicious movements of French ]
troops, added to other unpleasant circumstances, brought
matters to a crisis. The miserable King completely 1
lost his head. Public feeling in his capital had passed 1
hopelessly out of his control ; the moment of trial which i
he had so long evaded was at hand ; and at this perilous )
moment, his trusted friend the Tsar had, as he thought,
Aug. 9. made his peace with Napoleon. He indited a humble
letter to Alexander begging for help ; and on the next l
day he ordered his army to be mobilised, remaining in \
despicable and trembling suspense until a courier from
St. Petersburg should apprise him of his fate. On the 1
Aug. 26. 26th the answer arrived. Alexander had declined to i
ratify d'Oubril's treaty, and had disgraced d'Oubril
himself. The clamour of the Prussian army for war
was at once redoubled ; and Frederick William saw j
ch. x HISTORY OF THE ARMY 329
that the die was cast. The occasion was one in which 1806.
even a Bourbon of that period might have risen, if only
for a moment, to the height that is worthy of a patriot,
if not of a King. But of this Hohenzollern it had been
written, " Upon thy belly shalt thou go, and dust shalt
thou eat." He wrote frantic letters to all the neighbours
whom he had swindled and deceived, with abject
promises to do anything that they wished. He would
freely grant Bavaria to Austria, nay, if need were, he
would share Germany with the Emperor Francis ; he
had never intended to keep Hanover against the wish
of England, and he would gladly defer the final settle-
ment of the question until the close of the war upon
which he was about to enter. No doubt at the moment
he was sincere, for he was sincerely frightened ; but he
had sown abroad too many lies to reap any but a
goodly harvest of contempt.
Napoleon's answer to all these preparations was an
order to Berthier to countermand the return of his
troops to France, to concentrate at Bamberg, and to
send officers to reconnoitre the country between Bamberg
and Berlin.1 He had no intention of refusing Prussia's
challenge, though the situation for him was serious.
Here, within less than a year of Ulm and Austerlitz, was
a new coalition of England, Russia, and Prussia leagued
against him ; and a defeat would bring all Europe
upon his back. Above all, there were bad signs in
Italy, where since July things had gone but ill with
Joseph Bonaparte and his arms. It is now time to
look into Italian affairs more closely.
1 Corres. de Napoleon, 10,730, 10,744, 3rd, 5th Sept. 1806.
CHAPTER XI
1806. Our last sight of Sicily was in February 1806, when
by the firmness of Craig, in spite of Mr. Elliot's pro-
tests, the small British force in the Mediterranean was
brought into the harbour of Messina after the evacua-
tion of Naples. Upon the flight of the Neapolitan
Court to Sicily, the help of these troops was hastily
Feb. 16. invoked for defence of the island ; and on the 16th of
February they began their disembarkation at Messina.
On the same day Craig, worn down with illness and
anxiety, wrote to ask leave to resign his command,
since he felt himself no longer equal t^the burden. It
was in truth no light one. The people of Messina from
the highest to the lowest welcomed the British as pro-
tectors ; but the Neapolitan army, which should have
seconded their efforts, did not exist. By the Queen's
command, her reigning favourite, M. de Damas, and
the Hereditary Prince of Naples were left behind with
some six or seven thousand men to bar the entrance to
Calabria. These were attacked by a much smaller
body of French and scattered to the four winds by the
first shot. About a thousand of them, chiefly mounted
troops, fled after the Prince to Reggio, from whence
they were carried by British transports into Sicily. The
Mar. 24. French followed close upon them ; and on the 24th of
March French posts and picquets were lining the northern
shore of the Straits of Messina. But for the presence
of the British, they would have passed the sea at the
same time — almost in the same boats, to use Sir John
330
ch.xi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 331
Stuart's own phrase, — with the fugitives. So truly were 1806.
vindicated Craig's foresight and resolution.1
This defeat of Damas, for he and not the Hereditary
Prince was in truth the commanding officer, proved to
be a blessing in disguise. Though the mishap was prob-
ably no fault of his, he was of course held responsible
for it. He was, therefore, dismissed from all his offices
to make room for the return of old Sir John Acton,
who, until sacrificed to the wish of Napoleon, had for
many years been King Ferdinand's principal adviser.
By Acton's counsel, the feeble old monarch was induced
to come alone to Messina, nominally to issue orders
for defence of the country, but really in order that he
might be withdrawn from the influence of the treacherous
Queen and of her party. In fact, it was little help that
the Neapolitan Government could afford, for even the
most important fortresses were destitute of guns and
stores ; and the only national garrison consisted of
some seven thousand worthless troops in and about
Palermo. Practically, therefore, the whole weight of
the defence was laid upon the British ; and Craig was
compelled to summon the Eighty-first regiment from
Malta to Sicily, which he did very unwillingly, for the
garrison of Valetta contained, in his opinion, far too
large a proportion of untrustworthy foreign troops.
Shortly afterwards, at the beginning of April, Craig April,
sailed for England, so ill that he was not expected to
reach it alive, and the command in the Mediterranean
devolved upon Major-general Sir John Stuart.
Meanwhile a conviction was growing in the British
Cabinet that the general theatre of the war was moving
eastward, and that the British force in the Mediterranean
might play an important part in it. . The controversy
over Cattaro had turned Windham's attention to the
eastern shore of the Adriatic ; and on the 10th of May
he wrote privately to Craig lamenting the weakness of
his little army, but authorising him, if he could do so
1 Craig to Sec. of State, 12th, 16th Feb.; Sir J. Stuart to
Mr. Cooke, 19th Feb. ; to Sec. of State, 26th May 1806.
332
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1 806. without endangering Sicily, to send troops to occupy
some of the ports in Dalmatia. As it happened, even
while Windham was writing, Craig was on his way from
Plymouth to London, with his health much restored by
the voyage, and hence with full ability to give informa-
tion and advice exactly when it was most wanted.
Windham's design of frittering away his troops in
Adriatic ports arose from an idea that Napoleon,
having once established himself in Dalmatia, would
carry the war into Hungary, the Turkish provinces,
and ultimately into Russia. Craig gently set his
foot both on the design and on the reasoning. The
occupation of Adriatic ports by the British would, he
said, be useless in itself and would cause extreme
jealousy in the Russians. As to Napoleon's advancing
from Dalmatia into Russia, such a notion was highly
speculative ; for a country without roads, population,
or supplies was ill-calculated for operations against so
powerful an enemy as the Russians ; while an advance
of the French upon Constantinople would certainly
bring the Austrians down at once upon their flank and
rear. Napoleon's assembly of troops %as in fact, as we
have seen, simply a device for strengthening Sebastiani's
diplomacy with the Porte. Instead therefore of wasting
men and money on visionary schemes, Craig recom-
mended rather the despatch of heavy guns and carriages
for the fortification of Syracuse, Agosta, and Milazzo,
and of light field-pieces which could be carried on the
backs of mules for the defence of the interior of
Sicily.1
This advice Windham wisely took to heart. Already
roused by the negotiations to a sense of the importance
of Sicily, he had directed Collingwood to detach a
squadron for its protection, and ordered two more
battalions, the Seventy -eighth 2 and Eighty-ninth, to
reinforce the garrison. Moreover, Stuart, upon the spot,
was energetic in self-help. In April King Ferdinand
1 Craig to Sec. of State, 8th, 28th May, 7th June ; Windham
to Craig, 10th May 1806. 2 z/jSth.
ch. xi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 333
placed under his command, unasked, the line of defence 1806.
from Milazzo to Cape Passaro, though the Neapolitan
force which was allotted to this charge amounted
to fewer than four thousand bad and discouraged
men. The Militia was, indeed, placed at the General's
disposal, but, as it consisted merely of a list of names,
was of little profit. Stuart, therefore, obtained leave
from the Court to raise a corps of five hundred Sicilian
Fencibles, drawing British pay and wearing the British
uniform ; and men were readily found to fill its ranks.
At the same time a flotilla of small craft was organised
for the defence of the straits, the men being chiefly
mariners of Sicily and the Lipari Islands, under the
direction of a few officers of the British Army. It is
curious that the crews of these vessels declined to come
forward until General Stuart permitted them to serve
under the British flag, for they refused utterly to fight
under that of King Ferdinand. Thus by the end of May May.
the British force, increased to seven and eight thousand
men, lay ensconced with its left fortified at Milazzo
and with outposts on its right extending towards
Taormina ; the flotilla scouring the straits, and a few
vessels of war being anchored at Messina.1 Altogether
the situation was greatly improved, and would have
been promising but for the defects of the military and
naval commanders.
Stuart, whom we have already seen in Egypt, was
not without brains and energy ; but he was vain, flighty,
and superficial, and therefore incapable either of project-
ing or executing any sound or far-seeing plan of
operations. Sidney Smith, the naval commander,
though brave and restlessly active, was quite as super-
ficial as Stuart and a great deal vainer. He had
rendered a very conspicuous service at Acre, and took
good care that all the world should know it. As a
partisan leader he had unquestionably great gifts of
daring, readiness, and resource; but for the higher
operations of war he was absolutely unfitted, having
1 Stuart to Sec. of State, 26th May 1806 ; Bunbury, 227-229.
334
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1806. neither depth nor foresight nor fixity of purpose. He
could talk of no subject but himself ; he worked chiefly
if not exclusively for his own hand and his own dis-
tinction ; he would flaunt himself like a peacock in any
company ; he had a pestilent love of displaying his
name and exploits in the newspapers ; and, worst of
all, he was docile even to servility when concerned with
crowned heads. In a word, he was utterly unfit for
supreme command.
The French, on the other hand, were little more
fortunate than ourselves. Joseph Bonaparte was timid,
irresolute, and querulous, and as a general absolutely in-
capable. Subordinates, indeed, he had many, to the
extent of two marshals and twenty-seven generals for a
force of fifty-two thousand men. Massena, the ablest
of them, joined to the highest military gifts a low
character and an avarice so insatiable as to swallow up
all principles of honesty.1 Reynier, the most prominent
of the rest, was a fairly good officer, but pompous and
fatally conceited. The entire army was spoiled by easy
successes. The regimental officers, though undoubtedly
brave and probably able, were careless to the last
degree, negligent of the elementary rules of their pro-
fession, and content, from a sense of their own and
their army's superiority, to accept any risk rather than
be troubled to take the simplest precautions.2 Their
first advance into Neapolitan territory had been
practically unopposed ; and Napoleon had never ceased
to urge Joseph to press on to Sicily at once, being the
more anxious to possess it for the hold that it would
have given him over the British in the current negotia-
tions. But there was one Neapolitan General who was
ready to fight and could make his men fight, the
Prince of Hesse -Philipstadt, who held the sea-girt
fortress of Gaeta in defiance of the new King of Naples
and all his men. Gaeta was a terrible thorn in Joseph's
1 See, for Napoleon's opinion of him, Nap. Corres. 10,311 ; one
among many such judgments of the man.
2 See the letters of Paul Louis Courier.
ch. xi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 335
side. Throughout the month of March Napoleon was 1806.
urging his brother to besiege it ; and though at last at
the beginning of April the operations were begun, they
made no progress until by Napoleon's positive order
the direction was given in June to Massena.1 Another
sore trial to Joseph was a tendency of the Calabrese
to rise in insurrection, obedient to the agents sent
among them by the Queen of Naples. His brother
adjured him to be severe and merciless, not wholly
without effect ; 2 but these troubles caused him to
scatter his troops at wide intervals over the country.
This, as Napoleon early pointed out, was a perilous
arrangement when his enemy was master of the sea, and
able at any moment to land a force which could sever
his communications.3
Sidney Smith, to his credit, soon perceived the
opportunities offered to his squadron by the conforma-
tion of the Italian peninsula. He had arrived on the
2 1 st of April at Palermo, from whence he presently April 21.
sailed to the true centre of operations, Gaeta. The
fortress was exceedingly strong ; though blockaded by
the French on the side of the land, it was always open
from the sea ; and so long as Gaeta held out, Joseph's
hold upon Neapolitan territory was precarious. Smith
threw a much-needed supply of ammunition into the
place, and left a part of his naval force to second a
sortie of the garrison on the 15th of May, which was May 15.
attended by complete success. This was good and
essential service, but it did not suit Smith's vanity to
mix himself up in any operations in which he had not
supreme command. He therefore turned aside to
attack Capri. This island was by no means unimportant,
since it covered the maritime communications of the
French to southward ; but on the other hand every
insular post thus seized signified the locking up not
only of troops but of ships for its protection ; and this
was doubly true of Capri because of its vicinity to a
1 Nap, Corres, 10,296. 2 Ibid. 10,131.
3 Ibid. 10,085-6.
336
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1806. strong French force at Naples. Smith, however, was a 1
man who looked no further than to the issue of the
next Gazette. He could master Capri with the resources
of the squadron alone, and would be able to write a
pompous despatch upon the subject. He attacked the
May 12. island accordingly on the 12th of May, took it with
little difficulty, wrote his pompous despatch, and asked
Stuart to provide his conquest with a garrison. Stuart
thereupon sent five companies of Corsicans under an
excellent officer, whose reputation still lies crushed
under a mountain of slanders, Captain Hudson Lowe
June. At the beginning of June Smith returned to Messina
where he requested of Stuart the loan of a few troops
to make raids and destroy batteries on the Neapolitan
coast. Stuart rightly refused to squander detachments
of soldiers upon objects so trivial, but offered to supply
a large force for operations on a greater scale, and
suggested a descent upon Calabria. Smith assented
and sailed away to Palermo to ensure the assistance of
the Neapolitan Court.
A descent upon Calabria, that is to say, a mere raid
with no ulterior object, was, it will4)e observed, the
highest enterprise which these two vain and jealous men
could set before themselves. It was a painful contrast
to the wise and far-seeing designs which Charles Stuart
had thought out when he sailed to Messina eight years
before. Moreover, Smith and Stuart, as it happened,
had founded their plans upon false information. They
reckoned that Joseph had but thirty thousand instead
of fifty thousand men in all, and that five thousand of
these were in lower Calabria under General Reynier,
scattered and isolated, and therefore easily to be dispersed
with the help of the Calabrese insurgents. As a matter
of fact about fifteen thousand men were with Massena
round Gaeta ; three thousand more were holding Naples ;
about twelve thousand under St. Cyr were occupied in
subduing Apulia ; and the troops in Calabria under
Generals Verdier and Reynier counted ten thousand.
And these numbers represented effective men, Joseph's
ch.xi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 337
original army having been reduced by casualties and 1806.
sickness from fifty to forty thousand. However, an
offensive movement founded upon false intelligence was
far better than no offensive movement at all ; and
Stuart even carried his projects so far as to hope,
vaguely, that upon his landing the partial insurrection
of the Calabrese would become general, and that without
further exertion upon his part Massena would be
forced to raise the siege of Gaeta. He therefore made
his preparations quietly and stealthily, embarked the
necessary stores by degrees and without ostentation,
sent his transports to various little ports, and kept his
troops marching from quarter to quarter as though to
occupy a more extended line of defence ; whereby he
was able at once to bring the men into condition and to
conceal his real designs. With all his defects, Stuart
was by no means without ability of a certain kind.
Meanwhile Smith sailed, as has been said, to Palermo,
where his servile instincts and portentous vanity made
him a ready tool of the Queen. The King, Queen, and
Royal family, to his intense delight, accepted hospitality
from him on board his flag-ship, the Pompk ; and he
obtained from them a decree, dated on the 28th of
June, investing him with unlimited authority, by land
as well as by sea, within the Neapolitan dominions.
By this instrument he became in fact the King's vice-
gerent for the recovery of his kingdom ; and he was
fully authorised to take command of any Neapolitan
troops or subjects without reference to Stuart. It need
hardly be said that he was careful not to consult the
General before accepting this office ; and it is superfluous
to add that this accession to his importance inflated his
conceit to bursting point. Basking in the moonshine
of the royal smiles, Smith omitted all further communi-
cation with Stuart concerning the projected expedition,
until on the 23rd of June the General lost patience, June 23,
and announced that, unless the Admiral appeared before
the 27th, he would sail without him to the Bay of St.
Euphemia, under the escort of the senior naval officer
VOL. V Z
338
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
806. at Messina. The time, Stuart added, was propitious ;
for the French had enraged the Calabrian peasants by
attempting a forced levy of them for military service,
and the whole population was ripe for insurrection.
Smith answered with the air of a man who had more
important matters to attend to. The Prince of Hesse
had written that Gaeta was in distress for supplies ; the
Admiral had therefore sent two Neapolitan men-of-war
with troops to his assistance, and was himself about to
fly to the succour of the place. In the circumstances
he recommended Stuart to cruise along shore, menace
Policastro, Salerno, and the Bay of Naples, then by a
" night-run " relieve Gaeta from immediate pressure,
land in some unexplained and mysterious fashion on
both sides of the besieging army, " make a clean sweep
of the besieger," fill up Gaeta with stores, and return
to profit by the alarm which would be spread by the
appearance of his armament on the coast. In fact, Smith
scribbled down every wild idea that occurred to him at
the moment, in singularly incoherent, ungrammatical,
and unintelligible English.1
Meanwhile, without waiting for thi» precious missive
25. to arrive, on the night of the 25th Stuart had called
his transports alongside the quays to take in the guns
and horses. The men likewise had received their orders
to march to their appointed places and embark at day-
break. The duty was performed with perfect order and
secrecy ; not a soul had an idea of the object of the
expedition except the General and two of his staff ;
and altogether it must be said that this part of the
proceedings was admirably managed. The troops con-
sisted of seven battalions besides artillery, numbering in
all about five thousand five hundred of all ranks,
and were organised into an advanced corps and three
brigades.2 Two of these battalions were composed,
1 Sidney Smith to Stuart, 26th June 1806. Enclosed in Stuart's
narrative.
2 Stuart's embarkation-return, forwarded in his despatch of 6th
July, gives the strength of the force, artillery included, at 4795
ch. xi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 339
according to the accepted but vicious practice, of jflank- 1806.
companies. Indeed Craig had so far extended the
principle of forming the choicest men into special
corps, as to take the best shots from the battalion-
companies also and set them apart, with the name of
" flankers,' ' as sharp-shooters under picked officers.
The " flankers " of the Thirty-fifth only accompanied
the expedition, and, added to the flank-companies, must
have represented the cream of the regiment. The
flank-companies generally, excepting those of the Eighty-
first, were, to use Bunbury's expression, hard, biting old
soldiers ; and the battalion-companies of the Twentieth
and Twenty-seventh were of the same quality. The
three remaining battalions were young and had never seen
a shot fired. Of cavalry Stuart, for want of horse-
transports, had none, except sixteen of the Twentieth
Light Dragoons to act as orderlies. The Brigadiers
were, taken together, a far abler lot of officers than
were generally to be found in a British force ; Cole,
Kempt, Oswald, and Ross being all men who made
their mark later in the Peninsula. Any one of the
four would have made a better commander than Stuart.
Sailing on the 26th under the escort of the Apollo June 26.
frigate and of two more ships of war, the expedition
rank and file. Adding one-eighth for officers and for the sergeants,
we get a total of 5400. The returns given by Mr. Oman, Journal
of the Royal Artillery, March 1908, show a total of 251 officers and
5280 non-commissioned officers and men.
Advanced Corps : Colonel Kempt. Light Companies of 20th,
or L. I. Brigade. l/iyth, 1/3 5th, 1 /58th, i/6ist, i/8ist, and of
Watteville's regiment.
"Flankers" of 1/3 5th.
2 companies of Corsican Rangers.
I company of Sicilians. 2 four-pounder guns.
1st Brigade. Cole, \jzjth. (8 companies). Grenadier-Com-
panies of 20th, 1 /27th, 1 /36th, 1/5 8th, 1/8 1st,
and Watteville's. 3 four-pounder guns.
2nd Brigade. Acland. 2/ySth. (10 companies), i/8ist (8
companies). 3 four-pounder guns.
ird Brigade. Oswald. 1 /58th, and Watteville's (each 8 com-
panies). 3 four-pounder guns.
20th Foot (8 companies) detached to make a diversion.
34°
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
i 806. reached the Bay of St. Euphemia on the 30th of June,
June 30. Colonel Ross with the Twentieth being left to make
a feint of attacking Reggio and Scilla, with orders
to follow the main body as soon as the purpose
of making a diversion should have been fulfilled.
The transport which carried Kempt and his Light
Infantry had lagged astern ; wherefore Colonel Oswald
was appointed to lead the debarkation at dawn
July 1. of the next day with seven flank-companies and the
Corsican Rangers. No enemy appeared on the beach ;
and this first division was safely landed a mile below
the village of St. Euphemia itself. As the boats
returned to shore with a second load of men, Oswald
pushed his party forward in extended order towards the
village, the ground being covered with trees and scrub.
Very soon they were met by a sharp fire in their front,
and the Corsican Rangers were driven in upon their
supports by a sudden rush of the enemy. Oswald,
however, speedily restored the fight, and, seeing that
the second division of troops was now on the beach,
advanced rapidly, charging his opponents on both flanks
and routing them completely, with^the loss of ten
officers and some eighty men killed and taken. They
proved to be three companies of Poles from the French
post at Monteleone ; and it was fortunate that their
commander was so ill-advised as to make his resistance
after, instead of during, the disembarkation of the
British.
Following up his success, Oswald pushed forward
and occupied St. Euphemia ; and by the evening of
July 1. the 1st of July every man, gun, and animal had been
disembarked. The engineers were then set to work to
form lines of defence with sandbags on the beach,
using an old ruined tower as a centre, so as to cover
the re-embarkation in case of disaster ; while the
Advanced Corps moved on to Nicastro, five miles
inland, where they were j'oined by two hundred armed
Calabrese, described by one of Stuart's officers as ruffians
July 2. of the lowest type. On the 2nd there came to Stuart
ch. xi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 341
a letter from Smith, written off Amantea, on the coast 1806.
about fifteen miles north of St. Euphemia. Smith was
I careful to mention that he had been long delayed by
! the presence of the royal family of Naples on board his
ship, that he had been further detained by the necessity
: of arranging for a diversion in Sardinia and for throw-
l ing stores into Gaeta, and that consequently he had not
1 been able to leave Palermo until the 29th. He added
:| that he had received no news of Stuart at Milazzo on
; the previous night, and could perceive no sign of him
/ at daylight on the 1st ; that he did not like to go
5 into St. Euphemia's Bay, in case he should not find the
1 General there and might not be able to get out again ;
: and that he was therefore cannonading Amantea as a
, diversion in his favour. Finally he announced that he
, had circulated the Royal Decree, which appointed him
r Commander-in-chief, to the insurgent leaders, and had
, much pleasure in authorising Stuart himself to give
t orders to them and to the natives at large. The
, General, though consumed with inward wrath at the
s patronising tone of this letter, dissembled his feelings
1 and replied quietly by begging Smith not to distress the
f I adjoining coast, as it would only turn friends into
1 enemies. He intimated further that he had already issued
r a proclamation to the inhabitants as Commander-in-chief
of King George's army, and could see no necessity for
authorisation of his proceeedings by King Ferdinand
or his deputy. This statement was only too true,
for Stuart had gone so far as to call upon the in-
habitants to rise, giving them an indefinite promise of
assistance from England ; a proceeding which was
beyond his powers and instructions, and which rightly
brought upon him the censure of the Government.1
However, the immediate point for us is that the two
commanders were already within measurable distance
of a quarrel.
Throughout that day and the next Stuart remained July 3.
stationary. His landing had been a complete surprise ;
1 Sec. of State to Stuart, 15th Sept. 1806.
342
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1806. and, to turn this advantage to full profit, it was obvi-
ously his policy to advance at once, and to fall
upon Reynier's troops while they were still dispersed.
Unfortunately a heavy surf rose on the beach on the
night of the 1 st of July, which made the landing of pro-
visions, reserve-ammunition, and baggage-animals a slow,
difficult, and dangerous matter ; and it is hard to blame
the General for refusing to take the risk of marching
until he was sure of his supplies and stores. None the
less, the delay enabled Reynier to collect a superior
force and to move at once against his opponent. As
a matter of fact, the bulk- of the French General's
troops were immediately under his hand at Reggio
or within a day's march of it ; and the detachments
which held his line of communications could all be
picked up on the way as he marched northward upon
St. Euphemia. Starting accordingly, with four thousand
men, upon the first intelligence of Stuart's departure
from Messina, Reynier gathered up in succession three
battalions at Palmi, Tropea, and Monteleone, and in
three days covered the eighty miles from Reggio to
Maida, where he arrived on the nigkt of the 2nd to
3rd of July. The force then with him included about
fifty-seven hundred infantry in nine battalions, rather
over three hundred sabres of cavalry, and one battery
of horse artillery, with close upon four hundred gunners
and engineers, making in all just under six thousand
four hundred of all ranks.1 The infantry was organised
1 The exact figures, for which we have to thank the industry
and research of Mr. Oman, are : —
6 French battalions . . . . 4123
1 Swiss battalion ..... 630
2 Polish battalions . . . . . 937
Cavalry . . . . . . 328
Artillery and Engineers . . . . 373
Total . . 6391
Mr. Oman, and apparently Reynier's return, make the total 6440,
which does not tally with the sum of the details ; but the difference
is trifling.
ch. xi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 343
into two brigades under Generals Compere and Digonet, 1806.
Compere's consisting of the 1st Light Infantry and
42nd of the Line, each of two battalions, Digonet's of
the two battalions of the 23rd Light Infantry and the
three battalions of Poles and Swiss.
On the morning of the 3rd Stuart received positive July 3.
intelligence that Reynier was encamped by the river
Lamato, below San Pietro di Maida; but the reports
as to his numbers were extremely contradictory, some
stating them at six thousand, others at three thousand,
with the commentary that more troops were expected
from Reggio but were not yet come up. Stuart there-
fore rode out in the afternoon with his staff, escorted by
a company of Grenadiers, and reconnoitring the French
position from a height over against it, decided that it
must be turned by its left flank ; for its entire front
was covered by the Lamato, which though fordable was
an impediment, and its flanks, especially on the right,
were protected by dense underwood. The country
being much broken by olive-yards and thick brushwood,
he reconnoitred also the edges of the forest of St.
Euphemia, gave special directions as to the outposts,
and rode back, little suspecting that Reynier, with a
small escort of cavalry, had been in the wood at the
same time as himself, observing the British position,
and had only missed him by a few minutes. That
night Stuart issued his orders that the troops should
march at daybreak next morning to attack the French
position. Four companies of Watteville's with artillery-
men and three field-guns, altogether about three
hundred and thirty men, were appointed to hold the
I entrenchment on the beach ; leaving something under
I forty-three hundred of all ranks (for Ross's battalion-
companies of the Twentieth Foot had not yet appeared),
with three field-guns and eight mountain-guns, to enter
the line of battle. In sanguine confidence Stuart had
accepted the lowest estimate of the French army, and
felt sure of numerical superiority.
Accordingly at daylight on the 4th of July the July 4.
344
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1806. British troops moved southward along the shingly
JulX 4- beach and the marshy pastures that adjoined it, upon
the river Lamato, from whence they were to strike inland
upon the left of Reynier's position. The march was
made in two parallel columns ; Kempt's brigade leading
the left or inland column, with Cole's in rear, and
Acland's the right column, with Oswald's in rear. Two
light mountain-guns, carried by mules, were attached
to each brigade ; three slightly heavier field-guns
followed Acland's column ; and the Apollo with two
smaller vessels sailed parallel to the army by sea, to
protect it in case the French should fall upon its flank.
The march was slow and fatiguing, the marshes being
in many places deep and the sand on the shore so heavy
that the field-guns could only with difficulty be brought
forward. The sun rose intensely hot before the few miles
along the beach had been traversed, and the men were
already jaded when they reached the Lamato, where the
columns wheeled inland to their left and entered the plain
of Maida. It was now a quarter to nine. The patrols
of the French cavalry, which so far had followed the
march of the British, fell back ; andmReynier's army
was seen filing by its right from its bivouacking ground
and descending into the upper portion of the same
plain. Reynier likewise was advancing confidently to
the attack, though he believed himself to be inferior in
numbers. Five thousand men, he said, were enough
to drive six or seven thousand English into the sea ;
and the great Emperor himself had written less than
a month before that with nine thousand picked troops
of Joseph's army he would undertake to beat thirty
thousand English.1 Reynier, who had tested the
quality of the red-coats in Egypt, ought to have known
better than this ; but he, in common with the whole
of the French army, was demoralised by easy successes.
Upon wheeling eastward into the plain the British
columns had to thread their way through the marshes
of the lower Lamato and through belts of coppice ; upon
1 Corres. de Napoleon, 10,325.
ch. xi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 345
emerging from which Stuart formed them into order of 1806.
battle and continued the advance in echelon of brigades July 4-
from his right. Kempt's Light Infantry led the way
with its right skirting the thickets that bordered the
Lamato ; next to it came Acland's brigade, and next to
Acland's that of Cole ; Oswald with his twelve companies
and three field-guns formed a reserve in rear of the centre.
Meanwhile the French cavalry and horse - artillery
manoeuvred in the front, raising much dust, which,
added to the haze of a burning day, obscured the
movements of their infantry. Their guns and the British
field-pieces exchanged shots during the advance ; and
on reaching the French huts by the Lamato, Kempt
deployed his light companies and detached the Corsican
Rangers, supported by the light company of the
Twentieth, across the thread of water and bed of
shingle which represented the Lamato, to clear some
thickets on the further side. The Corsicans had hardly
entered the wood when a sharp fire and a charge from
two companies of sharp-shooters, which had been con-
cealed there by Compere, drove them back in confusion
upon their supports. The company of the Twentieth
was hard pressed and its captain was killed, but it
stood its ground until the " flankers " of the Thirty-
fifth came to its help and drove the French back in
disorder. The Corsicans, rallying, followed them up,
and the British companies doubled back to their places
on the right of Kempt's brigade.
And now the French cavalry galloped away towards
the British left ; the dust subsided ; the French infantry
was seen advancing rapidly to the attack ; and the
British officers could not fail to notice that it was
considerably superior in numbers, to their own.
Reynier's plan, as he reported after the action, was to
make " a vigorous charge which should break up a
section of the enemy's force, so that the remainder
should not be able to embark, and would be obliged to
surrender, especially the part which had been turning
the French left." He formed his troops therefore into
346
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1806. three columns. On the left was Compere's brigade,
July 4- namely the 1st Light Infantry and the 42nd of the
Line, veteran regiments of deserved reputation and
counting over twenty-eight hundred bayonets. Next
to Compere's, and intended either to support it
or to form the centre of the line, was Peyri's brigade
of one Swiss and two Polish battalions, altogether
fifteen hundred bayonets. Finally on the right was
Digonet's brigade, which included twelve hundred and
fifty bayonets of the 23rd Light, besides the cavalry
and guns. Since the French camp faced to north, and
Reynier's line of battle was to face westward, the French
army had to begin by changing front to the left.
Hence it necessarily followed that Compere's brigade,
which formed the left of Reynier's line, was the first to
come into position, Peyri's and Digonet's having to
make a wider circuit to take up their new alignment.
The consequence was that Reynier's advance, like that
of Stuart, was made in echelon of brigades, but from
the left instead of from the right ; both armies refusing,
as was natural, the flank which was unsupported.
From this again it followed that the 4ieads of the two
echelons, namely the brigades of Compere and Kempt,
were bound to be the first that should come into collision.
Kempt, true to British methods, deployed his two
battalions into line, two deep. Every man of his seven
hundred soldiers 1 was a good marksman ; and he
trusted to missile-tactics. A quarter of a mile to his
left rear was Acland's brigade, thirteen hundred strong.
Opposed to him was the brigade of Compere who,
either from design or from eagerness to close, was
advancing in echelon of regiments, the 1st Light lead-
ing and the 42nd of the Line, one thousand strong, to
its right rear. The two battalions of the 1st Light were
therefore those with which Kempt had to deal. They
1 The Corsican Rangers had been left in the wood on the other
side of the river. The British of Kempt's brigade numbered 661
non-commissioned officers and men, say 630 firelocks ; and the
Sicilian company, say 100.
ch. xi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 347
came on, each of them eight hundred bayonets strong, 1806.
in columns of companies three ranks deep, that is to say, July 4-
with a front of not more than fifty men apiece, and with
no great interval between them ; for Compere, faithful
to the Revolutionary traditions which had never been
abandoned by Napoleon, relied mainly upon shock-tactics.
He led his men rapidly, and they followed him eagerly ;
for Frenchmen love fighting, and the experience of
these old soldiers was that, after one or two not very
destructive volleys at long range, their opponents would
turn their backs. At a range of one hundred and fifteen
yards Kempt poured in his first volley with telling
effect. The French returned the fire, though feebly,
owing to the narrowness of their front, but continued
their advance gallantly enough, when at eighty yards'
range the British delivered their second volley.
Compere, doubtless seeing his men waver, hurried
them on, calling to them to fire no more but to charge
with the bayonet. Kempt on the other hand halted,
with the words " Steady, Light Infantry. Wait for the
word. Let them come close.' ' Biding his time until the
French were within thirty yards, Kempt gave the word
to fire, and a third volley sent almost every Frenchman
flying back. Compere's right-hand battalion, which
being overlapped on both flanks may be presumed to
have suffered the more heavily, broke and fled without
attempting to close. Of his left-hand battalion, whose
left flank was level with the British right, a few brave
men did come up to the bayonets of the Twentieth and
Thirty-fifth, led by their gallant Brigadier. He, though
struck by two bullets, rode actually into the British
ranks, gesticulating wildly with his unwounded arm and
swearing with the strength of seven, devils. It was a
fruitless effort. Kempt after the third volley gave the
word to charge, and the French were swept away with
fearful slaughter ; for Englishmen were not afraid of
killing a foe in those days. The fugitives fled headlong
up the hill towards their camp with the red-coats dashing
savagely after them. Through the camp and along the
348
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1806. hill-side for more than a mile the pursuit continued,
July 4. untii at iast) at village of Maida, Kempt succeeded
in halting and rallying his men. By that time the 1st
Light had lost nearly nine hundred men in killed,
wounded, and prisoners, whereas Kempt had hardly lost
fifty. None the less, for the future purpose of the
battle, Kempt's brigade was useless and out of action.
Immediately upon the rout of the 1st Light, the
French 42nd of the Line came into action with
Acland's brigade. Acland opened fire at three hundred
yards ; and the 42nd, dismayed by the flight of their
comrades and seeing themselves to be outnumbered,
would endure only two volleys before they too turned
and ran. But even so the fire of the British had been
terribly severe, and more than a third of the French
were lying on the field. The fugitives fled straight to
their rear along the Catanzaro road ; and Acland
following them came upon the three foreign battalions
of Peyri's brigade. The two Polish corps, which were
opposed to the Eighty-first, behaved very badly and
gave way directly. The Swiss on the other hand almost
succeeded in turning the whole tide of tke action. They
wore a scarlet uniform ; and it is said that the Seventy-
eighth, mistaking them for Watteville's Swiss, allowed
them to approach unharmed within very close range
and received from them a very sharp volley. Certain
it is that for a few minutes there was some con-
fusion in both battalions of Acland's brigade, that
the two commanding officers misapprehended orders
and lost their heads, and that the Seventy-eighth actually
began to retreat. The retrograde movement was
fortunately checked in the nick of time by the Major,
David Stewart ; 1 the Seventy-eighth recovered itself at
1 My authority for this incident is a very modest memorandum
of David Stewart's service, wherein he declines to give full details
from respect for the officers concerned, but adds that General Stuart
only forbore to notice the occurrence in his despatch on Stewart's
own urgent request. I have to thank Lady Tullibardine for most
kindly placing a copy of this document at my disposal. The truth
of the story is confirmed by Bunbury, p. 252.
ch. xi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 349
once ; and after a short struggle the Swiss retired in 1806.
good order towards their right, where they rallied and July 4-
reformed upon Digonet's brigade. Acland pressed
forward in his pursuit, but the French cavalry and
horse -artillery came forward to check him ; and
Acland ordered his two battalions to form squares.
Being young troops, flushed by their first action and
their first success, they were already in some disorder ;
and as they were further crowded together in an attempt
to execute this complicated manceuvre, they suffered
some loss from the French guns. However, they had
done their part well ; and it is now time to turn to the
left of the British line.
Cole's brigade had been early thrown back beyond
its proper distance in the echelon by the first menace
of the French cavalry and guns, owing to which it had
been halted until its own artillery could be brought
! forward. Hence it did not come into action until
some twenty minutes later than Acland. Its strength
was about thirteen hundred men, and Oswald's reserve
was at hand to support it. Opposed to it were the two
I battalions of the 23 rd Light of nearly equal numbers,
supported by the rallied Swiss of Peyri's brigade, two
squadrons of cavalry, and four guns. Seeing how ill
the battle was going for the French, Reynier used this
force as a rear-guard, which was very skilfully handled
by General Digonet. Placing the 23rd on the one flank
; I and the Swiss on the other flank of his guns, this officer
i stood on the defensive on slightly rising ground,
f threatening every movement of Cole's with a charge
5 of cavalry, and detaching his light companies to harass
, the British battalions from the brushwood on Cole's left
t flank. Cole threw back the left of the Twenty-seventh
to repel this attack ; but he could do no more than
I, hold his own, for ammunition was running short, and
rt the men were growing exhausted under the intense heat
's of the sun. Oswald presently brought up his reserve
J on Cole's right, which improved matters ; and just at
1 the critical moment a staff-officer galloped up to report
35°
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1806. that Ross had landed with the Twentieth Foot and was
JulY 4- hurrying forward in double quick time. Sidney Smith
had arrived in St. Euphemia that morning, and seeing
Ross's transports coming in, had happily advised that
the troops should be landed at once at the mouth of the
Lamato. During the disembarkation Ross heard the
firing begin, andr the progress of the boats being slow
owing to a heavy surf, he did not wait for the last loads
but ran with all speed to the scene of action. He was met
by Bunbury, who briefly explained the state of affairs ;
when, promptly grasping the situation, Ross plunged
into the brushwood on Cole's left, drove out the sharp-
shooters, poured a volley into the French squadrons,
which sent them into the rear in confusion, and then
wheeling to the right opened a shattering fire upon the
flank of Digonet's battalions. This decided the action.
After a feeble attempt to hold his ground Reynier drew
off his troops towards the 42nd, which had rallied some
distance in rear, and, skilfully covering his retreat by
his cavalry and sharp-shooters, retired rapidly towards
Catanzaro. Had the British possessed but two or three
squadrons of cavalry, hardly a man o^Reynier's army
could have escaped.
The action, as has been seen, was fought in three
sections by each of the three British brigades in-
dependently, from which it might be surmised that
the Commander-in-chief had been killed. But it was 2
not so. Stuart was cantering about all over the field,
heedless of personal danger, enjoying himself keenly as | 11
a spectator, but giving not a thought to the direction n
of the battle. From the moment when Kempt's I t
brigade had routed that of Compere, Stuart's head was 1
completely turned by the brilliancy of present success Qi
and visions of a glorious future. His staff, unable pr
to obtain any orders from him, gave information as ii
to what was passing to the Brigadiers, who carried on i
the action practically by themselves. When, however, all
was over, Stuart was obliged to say whether there should | ic
or should not be a pursuit, and he decided that there
ch.xi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 351
should not. The men were indeed jaded by the march 1806.
and the fight and choking with thirst ; water was only July 4-
to be found in the Lamato ; and there was no means of
bringing forward supplies. But the action after all
had lasted little more than two hours ; it had been
brilliantly successful, and victory will carry troops far.
Moreover, Ross's regiment was fresh and Kempt's
brigade was well forward — indeed was actually marching
for some time parallel with the retreating French —
though in the absence of orders from Stuart, Kempt
dared not take the initiative. After a while therefore
he halted, only detaching the Light Company of the
Twentieth under Captain Colborne — the future Lord
Seaton — to keep touch with the enemy. Kempt's
brigade did not return to camp till next morning ;
and Colborne, as was to be expected from so
good an officer, hung closely to Reynier's skirts
as far as Borgia, within ten miles of Catanzaro,
when finding himself unsupported he was fain to
return.
Meanwhile Stuart ordered the rest of his army back
to the beach for repose ; and each of the brigades
received permission in turn to bathe in the sea.
Cole's brigade was enjoying this privilege when a
staff- officer, deluded by the dust raised by some
frightened buffaloes, came galloping down, crying aloud
that the French cavalry was approaching. Then followed
a scene which has no parallel in the history of the
army. The Grenadiers and Twenty- seventh rushed
out of the water, seized their belts and muskets and
fell into line with ordered arms, ready to fight and give
a good account of themselves without a shred of
clothing.1 The staff- officer, who . has fortunately
preserved the scene for us, treats only of its ludicrous
aspect ; but to us it gives also some insight into the
discipline and spirit of the old soldiers of the past.
It is only unfortunate that Colonel Bunbury did not set
down the judgment passed by these men, in their own
1 Bunbury, pp. 249-50.
352
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1806. language, upon the hapless but imbecile officer who
July 4. gave tne faise alarm.
Stuart for his part was subjected to a trial which
must have been inexpressibly galling to him. Still
intoxicated by his success and troubled only by nervous
anxiety to give proper expression to it in his despatch, he
found on his return to the shore that the Pompee was
at anchor in the bay with Sir Sidney Smith on board.
On that very morning a letter had reached the General
from that illustrious sailor, explaining at great length
the reasons why he, as King Ferdinand's vicegerent,
had thought right to delegate certain authorities to his
military colleague, and adding that, since Stuart was
content with the naval assistance already at his dis-
posal, he should go with his flag-ship to northward.
Yet there the Admiral was, and, worse than this, he
accounted for his presence by saying that he had fully
expected the army to be beaten, and had resolved to
run the Apollo ashore with her broadside to the beach
to cover the flight of the red-coats. However, he was
full of compliments and hospitality, invited Stuart and
his staff on board the flag-ship, tallied a great deal
about himself and the siege of Acre, instructed Stuart
in the art of folding a turban on a lady's head, and
incidentally asked him how he could best serve him.
" By going northward," said Stuart, with such emphasis
as can be guessed. " Everything to southward is now
July 5- in the power of the army." Next morning came news |
that Reynier was endeavouring to rally his army at ::
Catanzaro ; and at daybreak the General returned t
ashore, after receiving once again Sidney Smith's assurance
that he would sail to the north, or in plain words to
Gaeta.
There was in fact a great opportunity open to these
two commanders. By hastening at once to Gaeta with
a thousand troops and the news of the victory, Sidney
Smith could have put new life into the garrison ; and 05
if at the same time Stuart, after leaving a small force to r
secure Lower Calabria, had carried the rest by sea to p
ch.xi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 353
threaten Naples, the French must not only have raised 1806.
the siege but evacuated both the Calabrias in order to July 4-
save the capital. The insurrection might then have
gained formidable headway ; the French hold upon the
Neapolitan dominions would have become extremely
precarious, and Italian affairs might have marred
Napoleon's plans on the eve of his quarrel with Prussia.
But General and Admiral alike were impostors, and the
favourable moment was allowed to pass. For forty-
eight hours the army was left " kicking its heels and
eating grapes," to borrow Colonel Bunbury's picturesque
phrase, while the General laboured in travail with his
despatch. So absorbed was he in the task of adorning his
exploits with an appropriate setting, that he could spare
no attention for the movements of the army — so eaten
up with self-esteem that he could find no time for duty.
In truth the action of Maida was an extremely
brilliant and creditable little affair. Five thousand two
hundred British troops had met six thousand four
hundred French in the open field, with no advantage of
circumstances or position, and had inflicted upon them
so crushing a defeat as to amount very nearly to a
disaster. Reynier's losses, considering that the British
had not a mounted man in the field, were almost
incredibly severe, and Stuart's as incredibly small. Of
the British there fell in all three hundred and twenty-
seven, of whom one officer and forty-four men were
killed, eleven officers and two hundred and seventy-one
men wounded. The heaviest casualties fell upon the
Seventy-eighth and Eighty-first, though in each of these
two battalions they were fewer than one hundred. On
the French side Reynier acknowledged a loss of thirteen
hundred killed, wounded, and prisoners ; but the true
figure was probably over two thousand. The number
of the killed was abnormally great. According to
Stuart's despatch, over seven hundred bodies were buried
on the field ; according to his Quartermaster-general,
who is more probably correct, over five hundred. The
prisoners, wounded and unwounded, exceeded a
vol. v 2 A
354
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
i 806. thousand, and the wounded who were not captured
cannot have fallen far short of another thousand. The i
British were lucky in the contempt with which their
opponents treated them, and still more lucky in the \
timely arrival of Ross and his regiment on the field ; [
but nothing can detract from the credit of their victory, L
The conduct of all the men was good, and that of the 1
old soldiers admirable.
The action has long been celebrated because, accord-
ing to Stuart's despatch, the British and French crossed b
bayonets. The fact is at best doubtful ; and Maida U
has of late received more proper and sensible com- a:
memoration as an early instance of the triumph of %
the British line over the French column. The fight \{
presents all the familiar features of the later battles in |(
the Peninsula — a reckless dashing of a deep but narrow l:
mass of bayonets against a shallow but broad front of a
muskets, with the inevitable result that the narrow L
front could not compete with the broad in development
of fire, and that the columns were shattered to pieces
in front and flank by bullets before the bayonets could
come into play. The consequence which seems in- Ij
variably to have followed was, psychologically, most c:*
curious. The head of the column, though staggering
and wavering, still strove gallantly to advance, but the K
tail turned and ran ; and the leading files finding
themselves abandoned, broke at once before the charge
of the victorious line. Reynier, in reporting the
results of the action, most unjustly laid upon his
troops all the blame which was by right his own ; L
and King Joseph's staff very foolishly supported (•
him. "The 1st Light should remember," wrote Cesar ^
Berthier to Reynier, " that it has never feared the E
English, and hitherto has always made them fly. His
Majesty knows not to what to attribute their moment
of panic. He hopes that the regiment has by this time
recovered." 1 But in fact the gallant and unfortunate 0.
1 Intercepted letter of 8th July in Gen. Fox to Sec. of State, &
2nd Aug. 1806. Ca;
ch.xi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 355
corps had been sacrificed by the blundering of its 1806.
commanders.
The true issue of the matter is, however, obscured
by narrowing it down to a mere contrast of tactical
formations, of line against column. It is really a
contrast of tactical principles, of missile-action against
shock-action. All nations, through an old-fashioned
prejudice, value themselves on their prowess with the
bayonet, all having had experience of demoralised or
imperfectly trained enemies who would not await their
advance to close quarters. But from the days of the
archers onward the British have won their victories by
cool and steady marksmanship ; and the whole secret
of Maida, as of Wellington's triumphs in the Peninsula,
lies in the fact that the British troops, by good training
and strict discipline, could disable at a range of fifty or
a hundred yards an infantry which, however imposing
in appearance, was powerless for deadly mischief at a
greater range than thirty-six inches.
To return now to the course of the operations,
Stuart, after a prolonged struggle of forty-eight hours
with his despatches, wrote to Sidney Smith on the 6th July 6.
of July that he should detach a brigade under Colonel
Oswald to Monteleone, with orders to capture all the
posts upon the west coast on his way southward, and
that he himself should lead his main body over the
mountains to Catanzaro. Smith answered on the same
day that he should use every effort to give the General
naval force on the Adriatic, adding in his usual
inflated style, " I hope to electrify the people of Terra
di Lavoro by our pressure on the enemy at Gaeta."
Satisfied with this assurance, Stuart, after a most un-
justifiable delay of three days, pushed Oswald's Light
Brigade forward on the evening of the 7th to July 7
Monteleone. The garrison of three hundred and
seventy of all ranks at once surrendered ; but Stuart,
on entering the place, learned to his amazement that
Sidney Smith was still on the south coast, renewing the
capitulations of all the places that had already yielded
35^
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1806. to the army on shore, and that he had even despatched
July 7- a naval officer, in advance of Oswald, to summon
Monteleone in his own name. Thus the Admiral, in
the face of his promise, had left Gaeta to its fate, and
was following the track of the General in order to
steal his poor laurels from him. Stuart's vanity was
unfortunately wounded more deeply than his sense of
military honour. Without a thought for Gaeta, he
deliberately halted for four days at Monteleone to
write a tale of complaints to Mr. Elliot.1 This letter
ran to the efFect that he could not continue to expose
the lives and reputation of his victorious troops for the
re-establishment of the Kingdom of Naples, so long as
King Ferdinand's decree, instead of inculcating confidence
in the army, directed public obedience and attention to
" another channel,1 ' or in other words to Sir Sidney
Smith. He had, he continued, advanced as far as
Borgia in pursuit of Reynier, when he perceived that
the said decree paralysed his efforts to direct the country.
He therefore trusted to Elliot "to impress upon the
Court of Naples the magnitude of his army's services
and their great importance to the future security of the
Kingdom of Naples." 2
Practically therefore this man of small mind re-?
nounced all the few profits still to be gathered from his
victory owing to sheer sulkiness over the proceedings of
his still smaller colleague. In fact he confessed to Mr.
Elliot a few days later that it was Sidney Smith's
assumption of supreme command, and the medley of
control resulting from it, that had arrested his pursuit
of Reynier.3 But it was really true that Sidney Smith
1 Bunbury says that he employed these days in polishing still
further his despatch concerning Maida, which in fact was not sent
to England (though a vessel was ready to take it) until a fortnight
after the action. No doubt this is partly true ; but Bunbury either
did not know, or loyally concealed, the bitterness of Stuart's feeling
against Smith.
2 Stuart to Elliot, 10th July 1806; enclosed in his general
narrative.
3 Same to same, 19th July 1806.
HISTORY OF THE ARMY
357
had enormously increased Stuart's difficulties. That 1806.
volatile officer, completely under the influence of the
infamous Queen of Naples, had been flitting about the
coast, scattering arms and proclamations among the
refuse of the population and inciting them to insur-
rection. These people, generically known as the
Masse, quickly formed themselves into bands under
leaders termed the Capitani delle Masse, and laid
themselves out for a carnival of brigandage. No con-
fidence could be reposed in these ruffians, whom Smith,
in his shallow ignorance, had chosen to dignify as patriots.
The Capitani would forsake their commands at the
mere rumour of the approach of the French, and were
more likely to join than to oppose them if the French
were victorious ; and meanwhile they turned their arms
against their wealthier compatriots and confounded the
whole of Calabria with cruelty, murder, and rapine.1
Stuart restored order so far as his strength permitted ;
but before the 12th he learned, while still at Monte- July 1
leone, that the insurrection had produced at least
one weighty result. The insurgents had hoisted the
royal standard at Cosenza ; General Verdier, his
ammunition being exhausted, had been compelled to
retreat with some loss by forced marches from thence
northward ; 2 and, more important still, Reynier's direct
retreat was now cut off, and the only line left open to
him was the road that followed the windings of the
eastern coast. Yet Stuart in reporting these facts to
England could find nothing to present with them but a
request that a medal might be granted to his army for
Maida.3 He appears never to have thought of the
effect that Verdier's retreat would produce on Reynier,
who still lingered at Catanzaro, trying to restore order
and spirit in his demoralised army. It seems never to
have occurred to him that he might himself have
1 Gen. Fox to Sec. of State, 31st Aug. 1806.
2 Intercepted letter from Verdier to Reynier, 15th July, in Fox
to Sec. of State, 2nd Aug. 1806.
3 Stuart to Sec. of State, 12th July 1806.
358 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1806. marched to Cosenza and effected by design what had
now come about by happy chance.
Within the paltry sphere of operations to which he
had limited himself, all was going as well as possible.
His faithful naval helper, Captain Fellowes of the
Apollo^ was moving steadily down the coast and
gathering in the isolated French posts one after another,
his first capture being that of one hundred prisoners
July 7. at Tropea on the 7th. Brigadier Brodrick, again,
who had been left in command at Sicily, grasping at
once the true significance of the victory at Maida, had
collected twelve hundred British and Neapolitans, and
with the co-operation of Captain Hoste of the Amphion,
had crossed the straits to Reggio. Surrounding the
place before the garrison could escape, he received its
surrender, together with that of some six hundred
prisoners, after two days' investment. The news of
July 14. this success reached Stuart on the 14th at Palmi, to
which he had at last moved after his long delay at
Monteleone. But additional news accompanied it,
which only made the General the more anxious to
return to Sicily. It now appeared tfcat Sidney Smith,
under pretext of sailing to Gaeta, had but disguised
another determined effort to wrest from the General
the credit of the military successes. Instead of sailing
to Gaeta he had hurried round to Scilla, had landed his
marines, and was actually besieging the fortress accord-
ing to his own peculiar military ideas. Meanwhile he
had sent to Sicily pompous accounts of the naval
operations and of his share in the success of Maida,
which were duly published in the Messina Gazette.
He claimed to have taken four hundred prisoners at
Amantea, a piece of news which somehow never reached
the army while the Pompee lay in the Bay of St.
Euphemia. He averred that Stuart had landed under
the fire of the Apollo^ which was not only untrue but
absurd, for there was nothing for the Apollo to fire at.
He informed the Queen of Naples, in language of almost
incredible bombast and absurdity, that the success of the
HISTORY OF THE ARMY
359
recent operations was due to the vesting of the superior 1806.
direction in himself.1 Nothing could be more false ;
and, as a matter of fact, the King of Naples, in reply to
Elliot's remonstrances, incontinently cancelled the decree
under which the Admiral had acted, declaring that it
had been turned to a use for which it had never been
intended. But this was not the worst of Sidney Smith's
shortcomings. On the 19th of July he wrote again July 19.
to the Queen of Naples that the reaction caused by
recent measures had made itself felt at Gaeta, and that
on the 9th three thousand French troops had been
seen by a British naval officer marching from the
trenches upon Naples. But, in truth, on the 18th, July 18.
even before he had written the words, Gaeta had
surrendered.
This disaster, for it was nothing less, was due
wholly to Sidney Smith's egoism ; and by a righteous
nemesis, it occurred in circumstances which deprived
him of an extraordinary opportunity of gaining dis-
tinction. Smith's leading motives in avoiding Gaeta had
been two, jealousy of the Prince of Hesse-Philipstadt,
to whom would justly have been awarded the chief
credit for a successful defence ; and jealousy of Stuart,
over whom he claimed to hold command. It so
1 I give here the text of the letter, slightly abridged. Impostors
of Sidney Smith's type are always among us ; and it is well that a
brand should be set upon any one of them who is detected. " The
advantage of the concentration of authority is already manifest.
He who can speak as supreme commander can accomplish coups de
maUre. It is this unity of plan and action which gives Bonaparte his
success. Now this unity of power is vested in me. Let it remain
in me, and I will dare to do more than he will dare to imagine.
If Italy can dispute no longer the empire of the world with France,
she can at least preserve her independence. Stuart has done what
he promised me. He beat Reynier in a masterly fashion. One
more battle, and both Calabrias are ours. We have already Further
Calabria except a few ports which I am now engaged in reducing."
Yet upon Stuart's complaint of Smith's delegation of authority to
him, the Admiral had written (2nd July) that the powers given to
him by the Court of Naples were much greater than he had thought,
and that he considered it his duty to the General to remove any
possible difficulty.
360
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1806. happened that the gallant old Prince was wounded;
and, released from the pressure of his strong hand,
the Neapolitan officers of the garrison at once be-
ly 14. thought them of surrender. On the 14th news
reached Capri that affairs in Gaeta were going amiss,
whereupon Captain Rowley of the Royal Navy resolved
to proceed there at once, taking with him the naval
force at his command and an officer of engineers, lent to
him by the military commandant. Hudson Lowe was,
indeed, eager to go himself ; and was only restrained
by the fact that Rowley's withdrawal left Capri exposed
to the attack of a superior naval force at Naples. The
British officers inspected the works of Gaeta and
finding them still tenable ordered repairs to be made,
taking the Governor with them to explain what should
be done. To their surprise, the Governor had never
even seen the batteries of the fortress, much less
Massena's lines ; but for all that he refused to deliver
up his command to a British officer. The utmost
that could be extorted from him was, that he would
consult his officers before thinking of surrender, and
that at worst he would ask for an armistice of three
days. The British captains went back to the ships, but,
hearing that a flag of truce had been sent to Massena,
relanded to find that the Neapolitan chiefs were drawing
up a capitulation. Breaking in upon them, they read
the articles, which seemed to be honourable. The
Neapolitans also pledged themselves to fight to the
death if their terms were refused, and to take no final
step without communication with their allies. Satisfied
by these assurances, the British officers retired for the
night. A few hours later they heard that the best of
the Neapolitans had deserted to the enemy, and that
ly 18. the rest had signed a disgraceful surrender. Treachery,
of course, underlay the whole transaction ; but if Sidney
Smith had arrived there with, or even without, a
thousand men on the day after Maida, the whole
garrison would have been heartened ; and, after the
disablement of the Prince of Hesse, Smith would
ch.xi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 361
certainly have secured command and could have added 1806.
a second really fine and useful service to his defence of
Acre.
As things fell out, he not only missed the glory of
. Gaeta, but was ignominiously repulsed from Scilla, which
by a delightful irony became the trophy of the army,
i The French commandant made a most gallant defence,
' and the walls of the fortress were so thick that the
1 British could make no impression upon them until they
i brought up their siege-artillery. With heavy guns, how-
lj ever, Colonel Oswald speedily reduced it to surrender, July 24
\ and made its garrison of nearly three hundred men
1 prisoners of war. Sidney Smith had already disappeared,
i on the 1 8 th, bound at last for Gaeta ; but meeting the
I news of the surrender on the way, he turned aside to
f carry on a little warfare of his own in the Gulf of
s Policastro. Deprived of the command-in-chief, of
r which he had made such parade, and threatened with
t the prospect that the name of Gaeta might be thrown
in his teeth, he doubtless thought it prudent to hide
himself away. Stuart, on the other hand, embarked
his troops at Reggio, leaving garrisons there and at
Scilla, and returned to Sicily. He expressed some
compunction at leaving the Masse, who had now
committed themselves deeply against France ; but the
insurrection was the work of Sidney Smith, for which,
in consequence, he did not feel responsible. He
hoped nevertheless to second and encourage them by
demonstrations upon the coast, for which purpose he
sent General Acland with the Fifty - eighth and
Eighty -first to cruise off Salerno and the Bay of
Naples. As regards Reynier, Stuart was content to
send one battalion, the Seventy -eighth, by sea to
Catanzaro with Captain Hoste of the Amphion.
:j Surrounded as the French General was on all sides by
1 insurgents, Stuart thought that he would find it difficult
to escape so long as Gaeta held out, for on the 27 th of July 27
July he had not yet heard of the fall of that fortress.
There were, however, unpleasant reports from Palermo
362
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1806. that Massena was marching with ten thousand men to
the rescue of his colleague, and therefore, in Stuart's
opinion, it was necessary to act with caution.1 No one
would dream from his despatches that he considered
either Gaeta or Reynier's army to be any concern of
his ; he had won a brilliant action in the open field, and
that sufficed him.
Fortunately Hoste and Colonel Macleod of the
Seventy-eighth were men of a different stamp. Sailing
from Reggio on the evening of the 25th, they caught
July 26. sight of part of the French army next morning in full
retreat upon Cotrone. The road ran nearly parallel to
the beach and within gunshot of the sea, being bounded
to the landward by a chain of mountains, on which
Macleod had entreated the Masse to assemble in order
to harass the enemy's flank. Macleod at once sailed
ahead of the French column, and made a demonstration
of landing. The column halted, and changed direction
towards the mountains, whereupon Hoste opened fire
on its centre and rear and dispersed it ; and had the
insurgents but been present to do their part, they might
have inflicted very heavy loss. But nof a man appeared.
The leaders upon whom Sidney Smith had lavished arms
and flattery, disbanded their followers upon the mere
rumour of a French advance ; and a great opportunity
was thus lost. Hoste's cannonade killed and wounded
fifty or sixty men ; and the fleet then sailed to Cotrone
where it anchored, after exchanging a few shots with
July 27. the citadel late in the evening. On the following
morning Hoste allowed the French to take up a position
within range of his guns, when he stood in and again
drove them to the mountains. Several deserters came to
the British that evening, who reported their comrades to
be much harassed and discontented and their leaders
much perplexed ; but after a day's halt the column
July 28. resumed its retreat northward on the 28th, wreaking
savage vengeance on the villages that lay in its path.
Unable to ascertain by what route they were moving,
1 Stuart to Sec. of State, 26th July 1806.
ch. xi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 363
Macleod urged the peasants to pursue and harry them ; 1
and after receiving the capitulation of Cotrone, returned
to Messina. He brought with him five hundred
prisoners, half of them wounded, from the hospital at
Cotrone. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that
by a little more vigour immediately after Maida
Reynier's army might have been almost totally de-
stroyed.1
Stuart meanwhile returned to Messina to exhibit his
laurels, as his chief staff-officer expressed it. In truth,
in spite of his failings, he had done some solid work.
He had fought an action which had shaken the reputa-
tion of the French and enhanced that of the British ;
he had destroyed five hundred of their best troops, and
taken from two to three thousand prisoners ; he had
driven the enemy from both Calabrias, capturing all the
stores, guns, and boats that they had collected for the
invasion of Sicily ; and by the occupation of the ports
on the north of the straits he had averted, for a time
at least, all danger of such an invasion. But on the other
hand Gaeta had fallen, and not all his petty successes
could counterbalance this great failure. Naples, which,
by a little attention to his duty, Stuart might have
made a distraction to Napoleon for another twelve
months, perhaps even to the wrecking of the Emperor's
plans in Germany, was now firmly established in French
hands ; and, while this was so, Sicily could not be con-
sidered safe. It is true that Sidney Smith was far more
responsible for this state of affairs than was Stuart,
for the Admiral had actually given the General to
understand that he would sail to the relief of Gaeta.
No language of reprehension can be too strong for his
behaviour. But Stuart also was greatly to blame for
his general inefficiency ; and happily he met with his
reward.
On arriving at Reggio he heard that General Fox
had been appointed to command in the Mediterranean,
1 Macleod to Fox, 27th, 29th July ; in Fox to Sec. of State,
3rd Aug. 1806.
364
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1806. and that large reinforcements were on their way to him.
This in itself was nothing very mortifying. Fox was
high up on the list of Lieutenant-generals, though by
reason of his age, health, and mediocrity, he was by
no means the man who should have been appointed to
the post, which, in fact, he owed to the interest of his
brother Charles James. Having much of his brother's
generosity and sweet temper, Fox nominated Stuart to
command in the two Calabrias, sought his advice, and
did everything that a courteous gentleman could do to
uphold his subordinate's honour and importance. All
this was pleasant enough for the victor of Maida ; but
together with Fox the Government very wisely sent out
Sir John Moore, to be actually though not nominally
Commander-in-chief. Now this was the rival of whom
above all others Stuart was most jealous. Moore was
not only his senior in the service, but of far greater
reputation, a man of clear insight into the heart of
things, of high disdain for charlatans, and of a critical
faculty which was but too keen. Good-natured old
Fox might be cajoled ; but Moore was a man who
would put hard questions with a bright searching eye,
and would combat hollow arguments with unsparing
contempt. Stuart shrank from the ordeal, and obtained
leave to go to Malta until he could take a passage to
England. He was rewarded with the ribbon of the
Bath, which he ill deserved, and his chief subordinates
with a medal for Maida, which they had most justly
earned. We shall see Stuart again in the Mediter-
ranean, and shall find him unchanged.
July 22. Fox arrived in Sicily on the 22nd of July, and
within a fortnight the situation had become anything
but satisfactory. Sidney Smith's wild proceedings
and the belated dispatch of Acland to Salerno had done
great mischief. Several leaders on the coast about
Naples and Salerno had called their followers out to
insurrection prematurely, only to find French columns
descending upon them directly after the fall of Gaeta.
The Masse made no attempt to withstand the enemy by
ch.xi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 365
uniting their bands, nor even to impede them by 1806.
occupying the passes. It served the purpose of their Julv-
leaders much better to use the arms, which Smith had
given them, for forcible plunder of their own towns and
villages. With great difficulty Hudson Lowe per-
| suaded many leading persons in the Principato to
; ; remain quiet ; and it was well for them that they did
1 so, for the French took signal vengeance on the native
villages of the worst offenders, and shot all men taken
1 with arms in their hands. Meanwhile refugees in in-
[ conveniently large numbers were crowding into Capri ;
and the French were steadily advancing southward.
: The British consul for the Ionian islands had applied
r to the Russian commander at Corfu to spare some
i portion of his eight ships of the line and twenty-nine
j armed vessels for a demonstration on the coast of Puglia
• and Abruzzi ; but the request was refused on the ground
f that the security of Cattaro forbade compliance,
j Furthermore, when the news reached Palermo of
1 d'Oubril's treaty with Napoleon and of his cession of
Cattaro, the Court of Naples at once veered round
towards friendship with France ; the Queen's party
regained the ascendency ; Acton was dismissed from
office, and Circello, Her Majesty's reigning favourite,
was installed in his place. Altogether the outlook was
extremely disquieting, and Fox very wisely sent Moore
in a vessel up the western coast to inquire and to report.
Moore sailed accordingly, and fell in with Sidney
Smith in the Bay of Policastro, with his flag-ship
seriously damaged and a long list of killed and
wounded, the result of cannonading a tower armed with
one gun and garrisoned by thirty Corsicans, who were
only waiting for the Admiral to cease fire in order to
desert from the French service to the British.1 Having
satisfied himself that Smith was doing far more harm
than good by indiscriminate distribution of arms and
1 Bunbury, pp. 267-8. Sidney Smith of course said nothing of
this in his despatches, and merged the casualties into those of
several weeks of petty operations.
366
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1806. incitement to rebellion, Moore sent Acland and his
AuS- two battalions back to Messina, in order to give no
countenance to further risings. Before the fall of
Gaeta such demonstrations might have been of service,
but they were so no longer. Every day in fact showed
that, by their fatal neglect of that one essential point,
Smith and Stuart had ruined all favourable prospects in
the Mediterranean. The force in Sicily, though aug-
mented by the arrival of three new battalions1 to a
strength of between twelve and thirteen thousand men,
was none the less compelled to stand on the defensive,
for the entire French army was now released for active
Sept. operations in the field. At the beginning of September
Reynier began again to push his patrols towards
Monteleone. The few Neapolitan troops that held the
place, being unsupported by the Calabrese, fell back
before them ; and the French General finally fixed his
headquarters at Mileto, from whence his advanced posts
were thrust forward towards Palmi. Meanwhile he
made every preparation against the arrival of reinforce-
ments, which should enable him to reoccupy the entire
coast of Lower Calabria. I
It may seem strange that Fox, with Moore at his
elbow, made no attempt to beat up Reynier's quarters ;
but there were two strong reasons against such action.
In the first place, both the Generals on the spot and the
Government at home were rightly averse from raising
false hopes among the Neapolitans by petty raids which
were of no permanent value. In the second, after the
signature of d'Oubril's treaty, Fox was firmly persuaded,
having no information to the contrary, that France and
Russia had come to an agreement, and that England,
being now isolated in Europe, must most carefully
husband her resources. He was strengthened in this
conviction by the fact that further reinforcements
1 These appear to have landed on July 26th, and were the
i/2ist, 2/27th, 2/35th. They all came from England. The two
second battalions were very weak, and composed of the indifferent
material which had been collected under the Army of Reserve Act.
ch.xi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 367
promised to him from England had not appeared. 1806.
The truth was that the British Cabinet, in consequence
of Talleyrand's threats against Portugal, was urging the
Court of Lisbon to emigrate to Brazil with its fleet and
army ; and on the 6 th of August had resolved to support Aug. 6.
its diplomacy by the dispatch of an armament to the
Tagus. A force of nine battalions,1 was therefore
embarked under the command of Lieutenant-general
Simcoe, though it could only be completed by inter-
cepting the reinforcements that had been designed for
the Mediterranean and South America. The plan was
however abandoned ; and in the middle of September
the Government decided to dispatch these troops to
their original destinations. In December, therefore, Dec.
after a long voyage of three months, nearly five thousand
men 2 were added to the force in Sicily, increasing it to
a total of nearly nineteen thousand of all ranks.
But meanwhile the storm in Germany had burst, and
all the hopes of the Coalition had been dashed to the
ground. On the 12th of September Napoleon called Sept. 12.
upon Prussia to disarm, and receiving only defiance
in reply, took up the challenge, and on the 6th of Oct. 6.
October declared war. All Europe was high in hope
that deliverance was come at last. Godoy, impatient of
the control of Spain by France, opened negotiations
with England ; and Italy, fired by the successes of
1 1 and 3/ 1 st Guards, i/i 3th, i/40th, i/45th, 1/5 2nd, i/62nd,
i/87th ; 8 cos* /95th.
The Brigadiers were Wynyard, Paget, Brent Spencer, and Sir
S. Auchmuty.
and 3/ 1st Guards .... 2559 rank and file.
i/52nd „ ... 961 „ „
1 /62nd „ ... 498 „
4018
2 companies R.A. .... 250
Sec. of State to Fox, 15th Sept. 1806. Return in Bunbury,
p. 459.
* These appear to have been3 cos. of i/95th and 5 cos. of 2/95^. Cope's
History of the Rifle Brigade, p. 17. But this portion of Cope's book is
extremely slovenly and inaccurate.
368
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1806. Maida and Capri, was ready, as in 1799, to turn upon
the French. In three weeks all was over. On the
Oct. 14. 14th of October were fought the battles of Jena and
Auerstadt, and by the 31st Prussia's boasted army had
ceased to exist and her power was shattered to frag-
ments. Her collapse was not only complete but
ignominious, and excited little pity though great dismay.
Russia still remained in arms ; but Alexander had
chosen this most inopportune moment for a quarrel
with the Turks. England's part was above all things
to give him assistance ; but the chances of a successful
offensive in Italy had been wasted by Sidney Smith and
Stuart, and unfortunately British troops which should
have been employed in Europe were diverted far over
sea by the avarice and self-seeking of Smith's brother
charlatan, Home Popham. It is necessary, therefore,
now to return once more to events in South America.1
1 The authorities for the operations in the Mediterranean are
the official records in the Record Office. W.O. Mediterranean,
Vols. 142 seq., and the Secretary of State's Entry Books, W.O.
Vols. 52 seq. Bunbury's Great War with France is also invaluable
as well as admirably written ; and there is useful information also
in Boothby's Under England's Flag, and the Life of Lord Seaton.
Mr. Oman in his study of Maida {Journal of the Royal Artillery,
March, 1908) has collected most valuable statistics and facts from
the French archives. The inimitable letters of Paul Louis
Courier are of the greatest interest and worth on the French side.
CHAPTER XII
Immediately upon his occupation of Buenos Ayres, 1806.
as has been told, Beresford wrote to Baird an urgent
appeal for reinforcements. Sir David promptly responded
by dispatching to him two battalions, three squadrons,
and other small detachments to the number of about
twenty-two hundred of all ranks,1 which sailed from the
Cape on the 29th of August. Sir Home Popham, for Aug. 29.
his part, took the extraordinary step of sending a
circular round to the leading merchants of London,
reporting that he had opened a gigantic market for their
goods and inviting them to take advantage of it.
Nevertheless Beresford was not deceived as to the
danger of his position ; and very soon the Spanish
colonists awoke to a shameful sense of the surrender
which they had made to a handful of men. By the
third week in July Beresford was aware that a
rising against him was in preparation, and that the
leaders of the movement were two men, Captain Liniers
1 R.A.
i/38th . . .
47th
1 company /54th
2 squadrons /20th L.D.
1 squadron /21st L.D.
Add one-eighth for officers, sergeants,
and drummers
6
811
685
103
191
140
936 rank and file.
244
2180
VOL. V
369
2 B
370 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
i 806. of the Spanish Navy and Puerridon, one of the municipal
officers of Buenos Ayres, who had at first been most
friendly towards him. These two began to collect :
forces on both sides of the river, Liniers at Monte :
Video, and Puerridon at Pedriel, about twenty miles i
outside Buenos Ayres. Leaving Popham to check r
Liniers, Beresford marched at two o'clock on the 1
Aug. 1. morning of the 1st of August upon Pedriel, with five :
hundred and fifty men and six guns. Misled by his 1
guides, he did not reach his destination until eight z
o'clock, when he found about two thousand hostile i
troops drawn up in a good position with ten guns, ci
Twenty minutes sufficed to disperse them and to capture t
all their cannon ; and Beresford returned to Buenos 1
Ayres the same night, having lost five of his own men j
wounded, against a loss to the enemy of about one r
hundred killed, wounded, and taken.
Beresford counted upon this success to secure him t;
at least until reinforcements should arrive ; but on the 1
Aug. 3. night of the 3rd Liniers successfully crossed the river
with twenty-eight vessels, unobserved by Popham's 1
squadron, and landed at Las Conchas,*4:wenty-one miles ti
from Buenos Ayres. Gales and torrents of rain pre-
vented Liniers from moving and Beresford from
marching out to attack him, as he desired ; but at length,
Aug. 10. on the 10th, Liniers, having been joined by several j
thousand raw levies from Buenos Ayres, began his advance
upon the city, sending forward a summons to Beresford j
to surrender. The latter replied by a defiance ; and
shortly afterwards one of his outlying guards was surprised t<
and attacked at the north end of the town. Sallying t
forth to rescue this party, he found himself too late ; \
whereupon taking up a defensive position in front of c
the fort, he resolved, if there were yet time, to retreat. s
Aug. n. On the nth accordingly he ordered the sick, the women j j
and the children to be embarked during the night,
and arranged a signal with Popham which would
intimate to the Commodore that the troops had
evacuated the fort and were marching to Ensenada to
ch.xii HISTORY OF THE ARMY
37i
Jl re-embark. Throughout the 10th and 1 ith, however, 1806.
!j a constant fire was maintained upon his men from
i the houses adjoining their position ; and on the morning
§ of the 1 2 th it was evident that the whole population Aug. 1
% had turned out to the attack. Beresford's chosen
k refuge was in the square directly in front of the fort,
e an open space about one hundred yards across, and
e divided almost in half by a long colonnaded building,
is Two streets entered it from the rear on each side of
it the fort and were protected by its guns ; two more
le debouched into it from each flank opposite to the ends
si of the central building ; and two more again met at
e each of the further angles. In the building itself
is was stationed the Seventy-first ; the St. Helena infantry
n was posted so as to enfilade the rear entrances ; and the
ie marines and seamen were drawn up in front. Guns
were also brought up to close the approaches on
n the flanks, and the principal houses in the square
ie were likewise occupied.
i At about half-past nine the enemy delivered their
'j attack upon Beresford's front and both flanks, directing
s their artillery chiefly against his front. In the streets
the assailants were easily beaten off and three of their
j guns taken ; but a galling fire from the tops of the build-
%l ings that commanded the fort and square worked havoc
al among the British. Towards noon Beresford, having
:ej lost one hundred and sixty-five men 1 and being unwill-
dling to sacrifice more to no purpose, ceased firing and
d| hoisted the white flag. The tumultuous levies opposed
I to him showed no respect to the flag ; and it was some
J time before Liniers could check their further aggression,
J towards which, as is usual in such cases, the absence
oil of any danger prodigiously emboldened them. After
tl a short parley with Liniers, a capitulation was drawn up
a and signed by the two commanders, to the effect that
it, British property should be respected, and that Beres-
1 2 officers and 46 n.c.o. and men killed.
8 officers and 99 n.c.o. and men wounded.
tc j 10 „ „ „ missing.
372
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1806. ford and his people should become prisoners ; but that
they should be immediately exchanged for the prisoners
captured by him at Buenos Ayres, and should be shipped
to England. There can be little doubt that Liniers
intended faithfully to observe this treaty, for he sent
his own aide-de-camp to Popham with orders to bring
up the transports for embarkation of the troops ; but
circumstances were too strong for him. Popham's
raid had caused an insurrection against the authority
of the Spanish Government ; the Viceroy had been
driven out ; and revolutionary leaders had usurped his
power. Such folk, especially if they are of southern
blood, do not boggle at trifles. The colonists had
lost six or seven hundred killed and wounded in the
attack, and their chiefs had some excuse for feeling
vindictive against the British. They therefore re-
pudiated the treaty, confiscated all British property, and
carried Beresford and his men away prisoners some
hundreds of miles into the interior.
Here then closed the first act of this little drama.
Popham, and later on Beresford, inveighed bitterly
against the treachery of the colonists,* who had turned
against them after swearing allegiance to King George.
Such outcry was ridiculous. If the British had offered
the inhabitants deliverance and protection from Old
Spain, they would have been received with open arms ;
but there was no reason why the colonists should expose
themselves to the vengeance of their mother-country
simply to satisfy the cupidity of a British Commodore.
Most unfortunately Popham was safely on board his ship
in the river, so that the colonists had no chance of
hanging him as he deserved. However, it was no
pleasing task for him to report the disastrous issue of
his raid, which he endeavoured to palliate by alleging
that at least it had done material damage to Spain.1
But, long before his letters reached home, Spain was
negotiating for alliance with England ; and when that
1 Popham to Admiralty, 25th Aug.; to Duke of York, 6th Sept.
1 806.
ch.xii HISTORY OF THE ARMY
373
alliance was finally made two years later, the memory 1806.
of this attack, being naturally though wrongly ascribed
to the British Government, still rankled in the minds
of good Spaniards. However, the mischief was
done ; and Popham could only withdraw his ships,
having first embarked a few small British detachments
which were still ashore, and drop down the river to a
safer anchorage.
A month later, on the 13th of September, Beresford's Sept. 1
report of his original capture of Buenos Ayres arrived
in England, and was received by the nation at large
with transports of delight. Visions of new markets,
boundless wealth and relief from the terrible burden
of taxation rose before the eyes of all ; and merchants
and speculators hastened to ship off large cargoes to La
Plata in response to the imprudent circular from Popham.
Only the unfortunate Cabinet which, with its hands
already over-full, had to provide for a new and unforeseen
demand for troops, was touched by doubt or dismay.
At least one of its members, the Prime Minister Lord
Grenville, was extremely angry ; and it was, I suspect,
mainly at his instance that the decision was taken to
recall Baird, the Governor of St. Helena, and Popham,
and to try the last named by court-martial. But,
most regrettably, no effort was made to repudiate the
Commodore's action. We have seen that a force had
already been appointed to sail for Rio de la Plata under
Sir Samuel Auchmuty, and had been countermanded in
order to furnish troops for the Portuguese expedition
in August. The latter enterprise having been aban-
doned, there was no reason why the reinforcements
should not proceed to South America ; and Auchmuty
received instructions to that effect on the 22nd of Sept. 2
September. His troops numbered in all rather over
four thousand of all ranks,1 and his orders bade him
1 Auchmuty's force —
1 /40th 1000
1/87U1 826
3 cos. /95th ..... 300
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1806. place himself under Beresford's command. Incase
Beresford should be in difficulties or should have
surrendered, he was to endeavour to repair the loss
and to obtain a footing which should enable him to hold
his own, pending the arrival of a further reinforce-
ment of three thousand men, which would sail three
weeks after him. If this task should appear hopeless,
he was to return to the Cape. In any case, the further
reinforcement above mentioned was required elsewhere,
and was not to be detained longer than was demanded
for the relief of Beresford or the recovery of a station
on the coast.
To Beresford himself Ministers wrote with a certain
grimness, which showed their embarrassment and mis-
giving. " You are not accountable for the expedition/ '
they said in effect, " and your conduct is approved.
We have for long been restrained from invading Spanish
South America by the fear of exciting a revolt against
Spain, which could only be controlled by a British force
of superior strength. It is with this view, as much as
with that of securing valuable possessions, that your
force has been so much increased. Use your judgment
and your troops principally to avert the evil of such
a revolt as we have mentioned, making none but un-
avoidable changes in the Government. Above all,
avoid pledging the King's Government to conditions
which it might not be able to make good. We can
only assure the inhabitants of protection so long as
our troops are there ; and our desire is that they shall
never suffer from their amicable disposition to us." 1
From such scanty information as was before them
with drivers } * .170
17th L.D 700 (dismounted)
2996 rank and file.
(Sec. of State to Auchmuty, 22nd Sept.). Military Transactions, i. 20.
adds the 9th L.D., and calls the total 3400 r. and f. But the 9th had
not sailed in November. Courts and Cabinets of George III., iv. 95.
1 Sec. of State to Beresford, 21st Sept. 1806.
ch. xii HISTORY OF THE ARMY
Ministers could hardly have written more fairly than 1806.
this. Beresford, upon the first hasty view, had reported
that the inhabitants were friendly, and that a rein-
forcement of two thousand infantry and six hundred
cavalry would be sufficient to hold the country. More-
over it was true that Ministers had refused to invade
South America, Lord Grenville having declined to
listen to the most insinuating arguments of Miranda;
and their unwillingness to incite an insurrection, which
they could not support, had doubtless been heightened
not only by the memories of La Vendee, but by
Sidney Smith's recent follies in Calabria. Why then
did they direct Auchmuty to make good or to supple-
ment Beresford's work by the employment of force?
The only explanation is that they yielded to the
pressure of the merchants and to the outburst of vulgar
enthusiasm with which England is apt to greet those
self-seeking adventurers who, under pretext of wreaking
an old national grudge, force their country into war for
their private advantage. Moreover, it must be granted
that the temptation to undertake the venture was strong.
Napoleon's great plan for excluding British commerce
from the Continent of Europe could be laughed at if
the whole of South America were thrown open as a new
market ; and there was promise of further advantage
in the interception of the gold which flowed through
the channel of Spain into the Emperor's treasury.
Still, piratical raids of the kind, from Cromwell's attack
upon St. Domingo onward, have never prospered when
countenanced by Government ; and it would have been
a good warning to adventurers of later generations if
Popham's action had been repudiated and Popham
himself disgraced.
Auchmuty sailed on the 9th of October ; and four Oct. 9.
days later Baird's reinforcements from the Cape entered Oct. 13.
Rio de la Plata, to learn with blank amazement that
Beresford and the whole of his men were prisoners.
Lieutenant-colonel Backhouse of the Forty-seventh
thus found himself in command of some two thousand
376
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1806. men in a strange land, with no orders and no means
of divining what the Government might wish him to
do. However, after consultation with Popham, he
determined to land and take up a position on shore.
Oct. 29. Disembarking accordingly on the 29th with four hundred
men of the Thirty-eighth off Maldonado, he swept away
with the bayonet some six hundred colonists, who tried
to protect the place, and duly installed himself, having
Oct. 30. captured their two guns. On the following day the
island of Goretti, which secured the harbour, as well as
batteries mounting thirty-two guns, were surrendered
to him ; and thus both ships and men were completely
provided for at a cost to the British of six men, and to
the colonists of fifty men, killed and wounded. After
this brief encounter no enemy came within ten miles of
Maldonado for some time ; and this was fortunate, for
it was an open town and so situated as to be untenable
by a small force. However, since Backhouse did not
discover that fact, he was not uneasy ; and as Popham
had obtained a good anchorage, which was all that he
wanted, he was careful not to point out the defects
of the position, even if (as was very improbable) he
perceived them. Moreover, Backhouse was able at first
to procure horses for his cavalry, and to bring in
supplies with little difficulty or danger. There he
remained, therefore, for over three months, unmolested
indeed, but wholly isolated from the world until in due
time Auchmuty arrived in the river.
But meanwhile popular pressure or infection by
popular sentiment had enlarged the Government's
ambition with regard to South America ; and in the
course of October Windham evolved one of the most
astonishing plans that ever emanated from the brain
even of a British Minister of War. Robert Craufurd,
a Colonel low down on the list was, to the great
indignation of his superior officers,1 the instrument
selected to carry this out. His instructions began by
1 An Authentic Narration of the Proceedings of the Expedition under
Brig.-Gen. Craufurd (London, 1808).
ch. xii HISTORY OF THE ARMY
377
premising that the fame of the superiority of British over 1806.
Spanish rule must no doubt have crossed the Andes, and
that it was therefore intended to send four thousand
men,1 escorted by a sufficient squadron, to gain a footing
upon the west coast of South America. The reduction
of the province of Chile was to be the ultimate purpose,
and the capture of a strong military post on the west
; coast the primary object, of the expedition. If Craufurd
: should succeed in conquering Chile, or any part of it,
! he was to preserve peace and order. He was not to
I encourage revolt in the neighbouring provinces, and not
r to pledge England to give protection longer than her
) troops should remain on the spot ; but at the same time
' he was to be most careful to announce and to prove
f that protection and not booty was the purpose of the
f enterprise. If he should obtain possession of Valparaiso,
1 he was to lose no time in informing Beresford, " and in
t concerting with him the means of securing by a chain
1 of posts, or in any other adequate manner, an unin-
Si terrupted communication both military and commercial
s between Chile and Buenos Ayres." 2
e This last brilliant suggestion for carrying a chain of
t posts across the Andes along a line, as the crow flies,
n of nine hundred miles — the distance, roughly speaking,
e from Madrid to Amsterdam — is added to the draft of
d the despatch in Windham's own handwriting. How it
e was to be effected, and how at the same time Valparaiso,
Buenos Ayres, and Monte Video were to be occupied
y by a total force of six thousand men, the Minister did
s not explain. Nor is it obvious how an invading General
16 1 1 The force originally appointed for him consisted of : — I /5th,
it 678; l/36th, 900; I /45th, 661 ; l/88th, 762; 5 cos./95th, 500 ;
2 cos. R.A., 250 ; deserters, 250. Total, 4001 r. and f., say 4500
of all ranks. But a subsequent return (S.S. to Whitelocke, 5th March
1807) stated it as follows: — 2 sq./6th D.G., 299; R.A., 243;
l/5th, 836 ; l/36th, 822 ; I /45th, 850 ; l/88th, 798 ; 5 cos./95th,
364. Total, 4212 r. and f., say 4800 of all ranks. The deserters
above mentioned were probably men enlisted from among the French
prisoners of war, — a most dangerous and foolish practice if the
recruits were of French nationality.
2 Sec. of State to Craufurd (secret), 30th Oct. 1806 (two letters).
378 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xin
1806. could proclaim, especially in the face of Popham's raid,
that he came to afford protection and not to take
booty, and at the same time give no assurances to the
population that the protection would be more than
temporary. Military officers by incapacity and mis-
judgment have frequently placed Ministers in situations
of cruel difficulty, but it may be doubted whether any
General has ever set them a task quite so impossible as
that prescribed, not in the doubt and turmoil of a
campaign but in the tranquillity of the closet, by
Windham to Craufurd.
However, this expedition to Chile by no means
exhausted the projects of the Ministry for South
America. Lord Grenville, of all men, who had so far
maintained his sobriety, came forward at about this
same time with a plan for an attack upon Mexico from
both sides ; from the east with six thousand European
and half as many black troops ; from the west by a
thousand Europeans and four thousand Sepoys from
India, who should first attack Manilla and thence
proceed to Acapulco. " The objection obviously is,"
he wrote with a candid self-criticism* that is infinitely
ludicrous, "that these two attacks cannot correspond
exactly in point of time ; " but none the less he was inclined
to risk the eastern expedition alone rather than delay
it. Accordingly Sir Arthur Wellesley was directed
in November to report upon the matter and to draw
up plans of operations, which he duly did at great
length,1 discussing further the feasibility of an attack
upon Venezuela. The irony of the whole situation
was heightened by the fact that in June Miranda had
returned to the British West Indies from an abortive
attempt to excite a revolution at Caracas, and had begged
men, arms, and ammunition from General Bowyer at
Barbados. Bowyer very properly refused to have any-
thing to do with him ; but Miranda, who was nothing
if not persistent, contrived to make his way again to
Caracas, where he published on the 2nd of August
1 Wellington, Suppl. Desp., vi. pp. 35-61.
I
ch.xii HISTORY OF THE ARMY
379
I an impudent proclamation that he had come to fight 1806.
e " for the independence of the Venezuelans under the
e auspices and protection of the British fleet." This
ti done, he wrote to Sir Eyre Coote at Jamaica for any
i assistance that could be afforded. Coote, like Bowyer,
s declined to send him anything, and in November the
y. Secretary of State wrote to approve of Coote's action.1
§ To judge by appearances, therefore, the audacious
a I greed of a Commodore had sufficed to throw the
y entire Ministry off its balance, so that it swayed to
and fro, in hopeless vacillation, between the expediency
s either of devoting all the strength of England to the
h conquest of South America, or of leaving that con-
r tinent wholly untouched.
s Fortunately Grenville's wild idea was abandoned ;
II though Craufurd's force, after long delay, sailed from
ti Falmouth amid much curiosity as to its destination,
a Some of the troops had already been embarked for
11 months, but by the care of their officers they were in
e good health ; and Craufurd before sailing examined
" every ship minutely himself, giving liberal orders for
y all articles that could contribute to the comfort of the
I men. The whole convoy numbered forty sail of
d transports and merchantmen,2 and was escorted by
y four ships of the line and as many smaller vessels
J: under Commodore Stopford ; but this squadron was
J to be replaced before the end of the voyage by a fleet
it I under Admiral Murray, who was the naval commander-
1 in-chief of the expedition. On the 14th of December Dec. 14.
J the fleet anchored at Porto Praya in the Cape de
in Verde Islands, to await the arrival of Murray. Three
;| weeks passed without a sign of the Admiral ; and on l8o7
d| the 6th of January Craufurd, pursuant to his orders, Jan. 6.
it I sent off the Ninth Light Dragoons under convoy of a
J frigate, to Rio de la Plata. On the following day he Jan. 7.
5 1 represented to the Commodore that Government had
1 Bowyer to Sec. of State, 20th June ; Coote to Sec. of State,
51 ! 26th August ; Sec. of State to Coote, 6th Nov. 1806.
2 The 9th L.D. sailed with this convoy.
38o
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1807. particularly urged haste upon him, and proposed that,
unless Murray should come in by the nth, Stopford
should escort him on to the Cape of Good Hope.1
Jan. 1 1. Stopford agreed; and accordingly on the nth the
squadron, less two ships of the line which returned
Feb. 23. home, weighed anchor, and on the 23rd of February
reached Table Bay. Here Admiral Murray, who had
left Porto Pray a after Craufurd's departure, was already
expecting his arrival impatiently ; for new orders had
just come in from England. Vague reports of the
recapture of Buenos Ayres had penetrated to London
by way of Lisbon on the 2nd of January ; and a swift
sailing vessel had been sent forward to the Cape to
direct Murray and Craufurd to proceed straight to
Rio de la Plata. To Auchmuty 2 likewise were now
sent definite orders to recover the territory of Buenos
Ayres, and, only after that object had been accomplished,
to despatch Craufurd to fulfil his original mission.
Meanwhile Auchmuty himself after a weary voyage
Jan. 5. had at last reached Maldonado on the 5th of January.
His transports being bad sailers, he had been obliged
to put into Rio Janeiro for water ; 3hd having there
heard of the recapture of Buenos Ayres and of the
occupation of Maldonado by a force of unknown
strength, he was prepared for the possibility of
unpleasant news on his arrival. Nothing, however,
was yet amiss with Backhouse, though his provisions
were becoming scanty and the difficulty of obtaining
them was very seriously increased. The enemy kept
four hundred horse perpetually hovering round
Maldonado, and these troops had become extremely
troublesome. They were armed with musket and
sword, and their methods of warfare were such that
the English dragoons, whose natural bulk added to a
cumbrous equipment was far too heavy for the native
horses, were powerless against them. " They ride up,"
wrote Auchmuty, " dismount, fire over the backs of
1 Craufurd to Sec. of State, nth Jan. 1807.
2 Sec. of State to Auchmuty, 3rd Jan. 1807.
ch. xii HISTORY OF THE ARMY
38i
their horses, mount and gallop off. All the inhabitants 1 807.
are accustomed to this sort of warfare, and every
inhabitant is an enemy." 1 The prospect was not
cheering. Feeling himself too weak to attempt
Buenos Ayres, Auchmuty, after consultation with
Admiral Stirling, who had come out with him to
supersede Popham,2 decided that the only possible
enterprise was an attack upon Monte Video. This,
however, was no easy matter. Four twenty -five
pounders had indeed been sent with him, but no
battering-train, no ammunition, no sappers, no military
artificers, very few entrenching tools, and only one
subaltern of engineers. All material for a siege had to
be drawn from the ships ; and Popham's squadron had
already expended much of its powder. But there was
no help for it. Auchmuty on the 13th evacuated Jan. 13.
Maldonado, leaving a small garrison on the island of
Goretti ; and sailing up the river landed on the morn-
ing of the 1 6th in a little bay, west of the Caretas Jan. 16.
rocks, about nine miles below Monte Video. The
Spaniards, though assembled in force and with guns
in position, made little attempt to oppose the dis-
embarkation, few being bold enough to face the fire
of the ships. Auchmuty was thus able to post his
army strongly about a mile from the shore in order
to cover the landing of supplies and stores ; and on
the 19th he advanced upon the city. A force of Jan. 19.
four thousand mounted men offered a feeble resist-
ance to him, but was speedily brushed away ; and
the fugitives seem to have carried panic with them,
for on the same evening the suburbs of Monte Video
were evacuated. Auchmuty, while halting his main
body for the night two miles from the citadel, pushed
his advanced posts forward almost to the walls. In
1 Auchmuty to Sec. of State, 7th Feb. 1807.
2 The Admiralty, which did not love Popham, carried its
resentment against him so far as to leave him to pay for his own
passage home in a merchant brig. Colburne's Military Magazine,
August, 1836, p. 491.
382
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
807. this position he was attacked next morning by a force
. 20. Qf sjx thousand men with several guns. They advanced
in two columns, the right consisting of cavalry which
threatened to turn his left flank ; while the left, made
up of infantry, assailed his left centre. The infantry
was checked by a picquet of four hundred men, which
held its own until reinforced by three companies of
the Fortieth. But the Spanish foot refused to yield to
a charge of this little body until the Rifles and Light
companies fell upon their flank, when they gave way and
were pursued with great slaughter into the town. From
two to three hundred Spaniards were killed and as
many taken ; and the cavalry, seeing the fate of their
comrades, at once retired, leaving Auchmuty free to
invest the city without the slightest further molestation.
Monte Video stands on a rocky ridge of distinct
formation from the land around it, and at that time
covered no more than a peninsula measuring about
a mile north and south by a mile and a half east and
west. Surrounded by water on three sides, it was
fortified upon those sides with a series of thirteen very
heavy seaward batteries, which were* built to suit the
configuration of the ground and were connected by a
covered way. All were difficult of approach owing to the
rocky nature of the shore ; the most important of them
were covered by a small enclosed fort, called after
St. Philip, at the north-western angle of the peninsula ;
and the only landing-place was on the northern front,
at a stone pier within the harbour. On the east or
landward side the city receded from the water on each
flank in such manner as to form a great salient angle,
of which the southern face was about a thousand yards
long, and the northern about twelve hundred. The
landward front had been originally protected only by
a stone wall some four feet thick and fifteen feet high,
but to this had been added, at the point of the salient
angle, a square fort with four bastions, whereof the face
towards the country was further covered by a ditch and
a small ravelin. The whole was revetted with brick,
ch.xii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 383
and possessed no entrance except from within the town 1
over a small drawbridge. On each flank of this fort
were two demi-bastions, mounting heavy ordnance ;
and beyond these again, at a distance of about three
hundred yards, stood two more demi-bastions, that on
the north side mounting fourteen, and that on the south
side seven guns. The entrances to the town were two :
the north gate between the citadel and the fourteen-
gun battery ; and the south gate, about one hundred
yards from the river, being strongly protected not only
by the cannon of the seven-gun battery but by two heavy
guns in a round tower near the water. Altogether the
defences of Monte Video showed one hundred and
thirteen pieces of artillery, twenty-four of them in the
citadel, and over forty more on the landward face. The
works, contrary to the information furnished to Auch-
muty, were in excellent repair ; and in their vicinity
the rock was so close to the surface that ordinary
entrenching tools were useless. The garrison numbered
six thousand brave but imperfectly trained men. Auch-
muty's numbers were slightly superior, but his troops were
by no means all of the first class. The Forty-seventh
was in indifferent order ; the company of the Seventy-
first consisted of mere children ; and Auchmuty could
only describe the Eighty -seventh as fine boys. The
Thirty-eighth, Fortieth, and Seventeenth Light Dra-
goons were, however, excellent ; and it was on them,
together with the seamen and marines, that Auchmuty
depended chiefly for success in a hazardous enterprise.1
1 Auchmuty to C.-in-C, 6th Feb. 1807.
The force was brigaded as follows : —
Cavalry Brigade. Col. Lloyd, 17th L.D. ; 17th, 20th, 21st
L.D. 959 sabres.
1st Infantry Brigade. Col. Browne, 40th ; 38th, 40th, 87th, and
3 cos. of 95th.
2nd Infantry Brigade. Brig.-gen. Lumley ; 47th, 1 co./7ist, naval
batt. (800) L.I. cos. of infantry regiments.
R.A. 123 men with 6 guns.
Total. 5632 r. and f., say 6300 of all ranks.
Admiral Stirling had generally 1400 men ashore, and his flag-ship
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1807. The General's first task was to land his own heavy
guns and several others borrowed from the broadsides
of the fleet, the latter of which, owing to the small size
of their wheels, were a source of much trouble. Mean-
while the scattered buildings outside the northern front
were cleared away, the largest only being left standing
in order to cover the erection of the first batteries,
namely one of four twenty-four pounders and another
Jan. 23. of two mortars, against the citadel. On the 23rd an
additional battery of two guns was constructed with
the object (which was not attained) of preventing
the enemy's gunboats from bringing stores, supplies,
and even water into the town from the other side of
Jan. 25. the harbour. On the 25th the four-gun and mortar
batteries opened fire, while the smaller vessels stood in
to cannonade the town ; but the attack produced no
appreciable effect either on the works or on the spirit
Jan. 28. of the inhabitants. On the 28th, therefore, another
battery of six guns was established against the citadel,
which soon knocked the parapet to pieces, but left the
ramparts little injured. The supply of powder now began
to run short, and Auchmuty, as a last resource, threw
up another battery of six guns within six hundred yards
of the works, in the hope of breaching the wall close to
Feb. 2. the south gate. By the 2nd of February the breach
was reported to be practicable, and since a hostile force
of four thousand men was said to be approaching,
Auchmuty summoned the Governor to surrender. He
was answered by defiance, and resolved to assault before
dawn on the morrow. The forlorn hope consisted
chiefly of men of the Fifty-fourth under a sergeant of
the Thirty -eighth and Lieutenant Everard of the
Queen's, who though attached to the Thirty-eighth,
claimed the privilege as belonging to the senior
regiment. Two companies of Rifles, the flank-
battalions, and Thirty- eighth were to follow them, \
with the Fortieth in support. One company of Rifles
was frequently left with only thirty men aboard. Stirling to
Admiralty, 8th Feb. 1807.
ch. xii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 385
and the Eighty-seventh were posted by the north 1
gate, which was to be opened for them by the other
column. The remainder of the force was held in re-
serve against the possible arrival of a relieving force from
without.
At three o'clock, in extreme darkness, the attacking F
column stole out towards the breach, arriving close to
it before it was discovered. The first discharge of the
enemy's guns struck down only one man, but the second
laid low twenty-five men out of thirty who were follow-
ing in immediate support ; and the leaders on arriving
at the breach mistook it for the untouched wall and
passed it by. In truth the enemy had so cunningly
barricaded it by vast piles of hides, laid one upon
another, that it was hardly practicable. For fifteen
minutes the column wandered about under a very
heavy fire, until at last Captain Renny of the light
company of the Fortieth found the breach, and fell as
he mounted it. With great difficulty, for the passage
would admit but three men abreast, his soldiers forced
their way to the summit and dropped from it twelve
feet into the body of the place. Some then dashed
into the town, while others turned to their left and
carried in succession all the batteries round the place as
far as Fort St. Philip. Even so, however, the Fortieth,
which followed in support, also missed the breach, and
passed twice under the fire of the batteries before they
found it. Meanwhile the second column by the north
gate grew impatient, and some of the Rifles, scaling the
wall, forced the gate open to admit their comrades.
The streets, which were laid out regularly at right
angles, were defended by field-guns unlimbered at their
[nlheads ; but these were speedily captured and the town
iorlcleared with the bayonet. The citadel still made a
iklshow of resistance, but some riflemen ascending the
raltowers of the cathedral, which commanded the works,
9a ispeedily made an end of it. At half-past eight the
t, place surrendered at discretion ; and after some slight
disorder, which was easily repressed, the troops were so
II vol. v 2 c
386 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xm
1807. thoroughly under control that within a few hours the
inhabitants were walking as usual about the streets.
The enemy's loss in the assault was very heavy.
About eight hundred were killed, five hundred wounded, I
and two thousand taken prisoners, the remainder
escaping across the harbour in boats, unmolested by the
British squadron. The British casualties also were not
light — six officers and one hundred and ten men killed ;
twenty-one officers and two hundred and fifty-eight
men wounded. The Light Battalion, with sixty-three
killed and eighty-four wounded out of four or five
companies, suffered most heavily, and next to them the
Thirty-eighth with twenty-seven killed and one hundred
and twenty-one wounded. In this regiment alone nine
officers were struck down, three of them by mortal
hurts. It was noticed that, in the case of wounds of
the lower extremities, tetanus invariably supervened,
with fatal results ; and to this cause were due the deaths
of Colonel Brownrigg and Colonel Vassall, the excellent
commanding officers of the Light Battalion and Thirty-
eighth. Altogether the action was creditable to
Auchmuty and to his troops, for the cross-fire upon
the breach from the uninjured batteries on each flank
was terrific, and would have daunted any but good and
resolute soldiers. In fact, but that the shortness of the
range prevented the enemy's grape-shot and canister j
from scattering,1 the attack would very probably have
failed.
The losses of the British during the siege had been
trifling, and those in the preliminary operations had not
amounted to one hundred and fifty ; but Auchmuty,
none the less, felt powerless to do more until Craufurd's
Feb. 6. detachment should arrive. On the 6th a welcome
reinforcement appeared in the shape of the Ninth Light
Dragoons, which had been sent forward, as has been;
already related, from Porto Praya ; but this in itself
was insufficient. The population was to all appearance
inveterately hostile ; and the only operation which
1 Colburne's Military Magazine, loc. citat.
ch.xii HISTORY OF THE ARMY
387
might possibly alter its attitude was the capture of 1807.
Buenos Ayres. But even if this were successfully
accomplished, six thousand men were too few at once
to hold Monte Video and to occupy a capital of sixty
to seventy thousand inhabitants. The province, more-
over, continued to be unquiet. In Buenos Ayres the
revolutionary party had installed General Liniers as
Governor ; and the Spanish Viceroy, who was hovering
near Monte Video with a small force and watching
Auchmuty's movements, was seized by emissaries of this
party and carried prisoner to the capital. Convinced
by this that the inhabitants, however hostile to the
British, were still more hostile to Spain, the General
was about to invite them to throw off Spanish rule and
accept that of King George, when he was surprised by
the sudden appearance of Beresford and Pack who, by
the help of two South American gentlemen, had con-
trived to escape, while travelling inland towards their
appointed place of confinement. Beresford declined to
take the command from Auchmuty, and prepared to go
home ; but he was able first to assure him that, though
the party which was friendly to England was strong,
yet that it looked above all things for independence,
and would not accept British rule except with a proviso
that the country should not be handed back to Spain
upon a peace. This being the one pledge that Auch-
muty was unable to give, his overtures naturally came
[to nothing. To strengthen his position, therefore, he
occupied Colonia del Sacramento on the north shore
over against Buenos Ayres, kept small columns in
movement around Monte Video to preserve order and
bring in supplies, and possessed his soul in patience
until reinforcements should arrive.1
Meanwhile the British Cabinet, looking to the
diversion of Craufurd's force to Rio de la Plata and to
the steady accumulation of troops in that quarter from
ar"lEngland and the Cape, decided to send out a senior
TC|pfficer to take command of the whole. One member at
1 Auchmuty to Sec. of State, 6th, 20th March 1807.
388
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1807. least of the Cabinet would have been content to leave
Auchmuty in charge of the entire army ; 1 but it was
always possible that Beresford might have been released
through Auchmuty's operations, in which case the
supreme direction would have fallen to him. Upon the
whole, therefore, Windham was probably right to send
out a new commander-in-chief ; for Beresford, whether
or not through his own fault, had not been very success-
ful, and nothing was yet known of Auchmuty's acquittal
of himself in this his first independent command. The
choice fell upon Lieutenant-general John Whitelocke,
an officer who was last seen by us at St. Domingo in
1794, and who had since been Inspector-general of
Recruiting. The reasons for this selection are not very
obvious. Windham personally wished to appoint either
Sir John Stuart, who was just returned clothed in the
glory of Maida, or Robert Craufurd ; but the Duke of
York very properly objected to both, Stuart being such
a man as we know, and Craufurd so junior an officer
that he could not have passed over Auchmuty's head.
Lord Grenville proposed Sir George Prevost, who had
shown most admirable spirit and resowce in Dominica
on the occasion of Villeneuve's raid in 1805. Finally
Lord Granville Leveson-Gower, who was not in the
Cabinet, suggested Whitelocke,2 possibly with a view to
gaining the appointment of a kinsman as his second in
command ; and Whitelocke was finally chosen. It is
not easy, after the misfortunes that subsequently befell the
man, to form an opinion as to Whitelocke's ability ; but
he had certainly done good service in the West Indies,
and was not without knowledge of his profession. His
most objectionable characteristic seems to have been
arrogant but spasmodic self-confidence, with an affecta-
tion of coarse speech and manners which he conceived
to be soldier-like bluntness, but which often degenerated
into mere rudeness towards some of his inferiors and
familiar obscenity of language towards others. He
1 Courts and Cabinets of Geo. III., iv. 123.
2 Windham's Diary, p. 497.
ch. xii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 389
stooped to court the favour of the rank and file by 1807.
affected use of their phrases, with the inevitable result
that he earned only their thorough contempt.1 The
inference is that he sought popularity with the lower
ranks of the Army because he was unable to gain the
respect of the higher. Such an officer is wholly unfit
for any command.
The only additional force sent out with Whitelocke
was a single battalion — the Eighty-ninth — a draft of
five hundred recruits, and one battery of Horse-Artillery,
altogether about eighteen hundred men of all ranks.
His instructions directed him simply to reduce the
province of Buenos Ayres ; but the object of his enter-
prise was defined to be, not so much to annoy or
distress the enemy, as to occupy such stations or
territory as could most easily be captured and would
not require a larger garrison than eight thousand men.
It was still uncertain whether Craufurd had received his
orders to sail to Rio de la Plata ; but Auchmuty's troops,
added to the eighteen hundred men now dispatched
with Whitelocke, were considered sufficient to capture
Buenos Ayres and to enforce the recovery of Beresford
and of his fellow-prisoners. Finally it was intimated to
Whitelocke that he might raise native troops, if he
thought proper, and that if Buenos Ayres were mastered,
he was to be civil Governor of the province, with a
salary of £4000 a year from the provincial revenues.2
The General sailed accordingly in the Thisbe frigate
at the end of March, and reached Monte Video on the
10th of May after a voyage of nine weeks. He found May 10.
all well with Auchmuty. An attempt had been made
on the 22nd of April to surprise Pack's detachment at April 22.
Colonia, but this had been foiled with trifling loss, and
all was quiet. On the other hand, neither Craufurd
nor the reinforcements from England had arrived ;
and Whitelocke decided to await their coming before
attacking Buenos Ayres, devoting himself meanwhile to
1 Colburne's Military Magazine, loc. citat.
2 Windham to Whitelocke (secret), 6th March 1807.
39o
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1807. preparations for an advance. These were not easily
accomplished. In spite of all exertions, horses enough
could not be procured for the guns and cavalry. Such
as were obtained were unbroken, and soon sank under the
burden of unwonted work and insufficient food ; for it
was midwinter south of the line, when the native grass
contained little nourishment and no other description of
May 30. forage was obtainable. At last, on the 30th of May,
Craufurd's detachment was reported to be off the
mouth of the river. On arriving at Table Bay on the
23rd of March, he had agreed with Admiral Murray to
sail in ten days, as soon as the transports should have
been victualled and watered ; and in fact the armament
actually sailed on the 6th of April, reached St. Helena
on the 2 1 st, and, after taking in water, set off again on
the 26th. But even on the 30th of May Craufurd's
voyage was not nearly over. Fogs and contrary winds
June 14. delayed him in the river, and not till the 14th of June
did the whole of the transports reach Monte Video. By
that time some of the troops had been on board ship
for nine full months.
Meanwhile the enemy was collecting reinforcements
to cut off or attack Pack's isolated troops at Colonia ;
and Whitelocke had found it necessary to reinforce the
post to a strength of some fifteen hundred men. On the
June 6. evening of the 6th Pack received intelligence of a body
of the enemy encamped at San Pedro, some twelve
miles away, under the command of General Elio, an
officer lately arrived from Spain. Starting at three
June 7. o'clock on the next morning with a force of about
eleven hundred men of all ranks,1 Pack came upon
Elio at seven o'clock, and found him securely posted on
rising ground, with a deep and marshy stream covering
his front and both flanks, and the only ford defended
by four field-guns and two howitzers. He decided to
attack at once. The troops therefore crossed the ford
1 9th L.D., 54; R.A., 315 40th, 481 ; 95th, 200; Light
companies, 247. The detachment at Colonia consisted of 9th L.D.,
40th, 3 cos. /95th, 3 cos. L.I.
ch.xii HISTORY OF THE ARMY
39i
on a very narrow front, waist deep in water, formed up 1807.
on the further side, always under heavy fire of artillery, June 7-
and advanced to the attack without firing a shot. The
enemy's cavalry fled at once, but the infantry stood
until the British were within a few paces, when they
suddenly broke and were pursued with heavy slaughter.
They left on the field one hundred and twenty dead,
as many wounded, over one hundred prisoners and
eight guns, while Pack's casualties did not exceed forty-
eight, nearly one -third of which were due to the
accidental explosion of an ammunition-waggon.
Now, therefore, it was for Whitelocke to determine
upon his plan of campaign ; and in order to do so he
had first to decide some very difficult questions. That
his first object must be to capture Buenos Ayres there
was no doubt ; and there was equally no doubt that
the brunt of the work must fall upon the Army, for the
river near the shore was so shallow that the men-of-war
could not approach nearer than within six to eight
miles of the city. First, therefore, a place of dis-
embarkation must be selected ; and the investigations of
the Navy soon narrowed the choice down to a single
point. Above Buenos Ayres the navigation was too
difficult and intricate for a fleet of transports ; below it
there was but one place where an army could be dis-
embarked under cover of the ships of war, namely
Ensenada de Barragon, some twenty-four miles below
the city. If the protection of the fleet during the
disembarkation were dispensed with, there was the
Point of Quilmes, where Beresford had landed, which
possessed the advantage of lying within eight miles, as
the crow flies, from Buenos Ayres ; but reconnaissance
showed that a battery had been erected to command
the passage through the marsh, and so to foil any
future attempts similar to Beresford's. It was therefore
no reproach to Whitelocke that he fixed upon Ensenada
for his landing-place.
Next, how was the march from the strand to the city
to be accomplished? The shore from Ensenada to
392
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1807. Buenos Ayres to a distance of two to four miles inland
is but two feet above the level of the river, and in
the rainy season was almost entirely under water.1
Beyond this marshy ground the land rises gradually to
a height of twelve or fifteen feet ; and this higher tract
extends westward, broken only by a multitude of little
streams, as far as the village of Reduction, where
another wet level, running far up the country, is inter-
posed between that village and the capital. Through
this level runs the little river Chuelo, over which the
wooden bridge, which had been destroyed on the occasion
of Beresford's landing, had been replaced. Little,
however, was known or could be learned of the country,
except of that portion of it which had been traversed by
Beresford between Point Quilmes and Buenos Ayres.
The few colonists of Monte Video friendly to the
British knew nothing of the opposite shore over one
hundred miles away ; and little more was to be learned
at Colonia, which lies indeed over against Buenos Ayres,
but rather remoter from it than is Calais from Dover.
Such vague information as could be collected amounted
to this. From Ensenada to Reduction^the distance was
twenty miles ; and from Reduction to the capital nine
miles more. There were three different roads, one on
the sands, a second through the marsh, and a third,
which was the best, on the heights. To reach this
last some marshy ground must be passed, which was
reported to be always practicable for a coach, and to be
commonly traversed by the waggons of the country ;
but, the heights once gained, the road was firm and
good. From Reduction the high road crossed the
Chuelo by the bridge ; but by making a detour the head
of the river could be turned. There were few farm-
houses on the road, and the troops could expect little
shelter short of the suburbs of Buenos Ayres. As to
fuel, it was not to be found except in human dwellings,
for there was not a tree to be seen for miles. With
regard to supplies, the plain swarmed with cattle, which
1 An Authentic Narrative, etc., p. 183.
ch. xii HISTORY OF THE ARMY
could be caught by the native lasso-men, but there 1807.
could be no certainty of finding bread-stuffs in any
quantity until Buenos Ayres was reached. Such details
as the extent and condition of the swamps behind
Ensenada and the obstacles, excepting the Chuelo, that
lay on the road, were utterly unknown. It may be
urged that Whitelocke should have sent an officer to
explore the route ; but it is extremely doubtful whether
this would have been possible. The population was
bitterly hostile. There were indeed a few British
officers who could speak Spanish, but probably not
one who could have successfully disguised himself.
Had such an one travelled alone the country, the people
would have made little of cutting his throat ; 1 had
he taken an escort, it would have been quickly sur-
rounded by superior numbers and overpowered. Pos-
sibly it might have been practicable to bribe a priest
to go as travelling companion with a reconnoitring
officer, but even then it would not have been safe to
trust the priest. At any rate no such thing was done,
and no reconnaissance of the landing-place or line of
march was made.
Then came the question of transport. Horses, as
has been told, were difficult to procure ; and those that
had been obtained were for the most part unbroken and
in any case too weak for any but the lightest work. In
a campaign where cavalry was all important and where
the equivalent of three strong regiments of British
dragoons was on the spot, Whitelocke found it
impossible to mount more than two squadrons. It was
therefore evident that the men must carry rations for
I three days upon their backs, and that, upon the
occupation of Reduction, communication with the fleet
must be opened at Point Quilmes in order to draw fresh
supplies from the ships. So entirely was this necessity
(accepted by Whitelocke that he gave no orders to the
i commissariat to provide animals for purposes of trans-
port. The only means of carriage that were provided,
1 An Authentic Narrative, p. 189.
394 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1807. therefore, consisted of half a dozen small mule-carts to
bear supplies from the water's edge to any chosen depot ;
and it was not until the ships actually anchored before
Ensenada that the Commissary, according to his own
account, realised that the army was to be landed not five
miles, but more nearly thirty miles from Buenos Ayres.
Next arose the question of the time for the attack, -
which was most difficult to decide. The rainy season
was immediately at hand and, though implying no such '>
deluge as the monsoon in India, signified none the less
a heavy though intermittent rainfall, which would I
cause much sickness among the men if they were long *
exposed to the weather, with great gales which would 3:
impede the operations of small craft in the river.
Good fortune might or might not delay the rains
until the army reached Buenos Ayres ; but it was
only reasonable to expect that, if Whitelocke deferred
his operations until the rains ceased, the enemy would
take advantage of the respite to convert Buenos Ayres
from an open into a fortified town. On the other
hand, Craufurd's detachment, which constituted fully
one-half of the effective force, had betn on board ship
for quite nine months, and some of the corps for even
longer ; and it was certain that these men, after being
cooped up and lowered by marine diet and lime-juice,
would be weak, an easy prey to sickness, and wholly
unfit to undergo immediately the hardships of a
campaign. Colonel Denis Pack, who had been in the
country for a year, was strongly of opinion that the
operations should be delayed, but Whitelocke never
consulted him upon the point, and Pack therefore kept
his ideas to himself.1 If, however, the army remained on
the left bank of the river, Whitelocke was apprehensive
lest he should be unable to feed during the winter so
large a force as that which he commanded ; and for this
and other reasons he decided to open the attack at
once.2 In support of this view of Whitelocke's,
Leveson-Gower wrote to Windham on July 9 that
1 C.-M., p. 423. 2 Ibid. p. 23.
ch. xii HISTORY OF THE ARMY
395
the army on arrival, though not positively pressed for 1807.
victuals, was so short of flour that, in order to
provide twenty-one days' bread, it was necessary to
use a ship-load of flour sent from the Cape at Auch-
muty's request. This difficulty, however, could probably
have been overcome ; for Auchmuty had twice written
to England for flour, on the 7th of February and 20th of
March, so that a supply was to be expected from thence
very shortly.
There remained one minor point to be settled before
the campaign was opened. Should Colonia be held as
well as Monte Video, and converted into an advanced
base of operations and a second fortified station upon
the river La Plata ; or should it be abandoned ?
Whitelocke seems to have left the determination of this
matter to Leveson-Gower, who was sent to Colonia
with discretionary orders to hold the place, if it could be
safely retained with a diminished garrison, or to evacuate
it. Auchmuty and Pack were in favour of keeping a
garrison in Colonia since, among other advantages, it
would have facilitated the collection of a supply of
cattle for the army ; but they were not consulted.1
Leveson-Gower, after a short survey, destroyed the guns
of the place and withdrew the troops from it to the
main army. It seems that Whitelocke had some idea
of transporting his main body to Colonia and keeping
it there embarked until an advanced column should
have occupied Reduction, and enabled Point Quilmes to
be used as a place of disembarkation. This would have
been a sensible plan ; but it was promptly negatived by
Leveson-Gower.
Meanwhile the army was formed into four brigades 2
under Auchmuty, Lumley, Craufurd, and Mahon ; and
a garrison of thirteen hundred rank and file was set
1 C.-M., pp. 198, 205.
2 Brig.-Gen. Sir S. Auchmuty' s brigade : 5th, 38th, 87th.
Brig.-Gen. Craufurd's brigade : 9 cos. L.I., 95th (8 cos.).
Brig.-Gen. Lumley's brigade : 17th L.D., 36th, 88th.
Col. Marion's brigade : 2 sq. 6th D.G., 9th L.D. (both dis-
mounted), 40th, 45th.
39^
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1807. apart for Monte Video, consisting of two companies of
the Thirty-eighth, the Forty-seventh, the detachments
of the Twentieth and Twenty-first Light Dragoons,
some Marines and a Local Militia. Here may be seen
the signs of an unpractical mind in the Commander-in-
chief. The Forty-seventh, as Auchmuty had reported,
was not in the best order, and its commander not the
most brilliant of officers, but at least it was in condition
for marching and had experience of active service. The
Thirty-eighth, again, was an admirable corps ; and it
was mere waste of good material to relegate two of its
companies to idleness ; indeed, the proceeding was at
the time ascribed to the Commander-in-chief's spite
against an officer of that regiment.1 The Twentieth
and Twenty-first Light Dragoons had also been for some
time in the country and were ready for work. On the
other hand, the rank and file of the Eighty-eighth,
though good, were very young ; and this regiment, with
its travelling companions the Thirty-sixth and the four
troops of Carabiniers, was certain to suffer greatly from
fatigue after nine months on board ship. Nevertheless
these were chosen for the attack on B*enos Ayres ; and
the Carabiniers, encumbered with their white leather
breeches and jack-boots, were provided with muskets to
convert them into infantry, while the seasoned and
hardened corps which had been for months in the
country were left to walk about Monte Video. Lastly,
Leveson-Gower had contrived to quarrel bitterly
with the cavalry by ordering wholesale and quite
unnecessary destruction of all the spare clothes and
equipment that the regiments had in store ; 2 and
altogether the force was not in the best of tempers when
it started upon its campaign.
1 This officer, Lord Muskerry, was the one person in the army
who knew something of the country between Ensenada and Buenos
Ayres ; and he had declared that no one but a madman would land
at Ensenada in midwinter. Whitelocke, therefore, left two com-
panies of his regiment at Monte Video, and put Lord Muskerry in
command of them. Colburne's Military Magazine, October, 1836,
p. 213. 2 C.-M., pp. 162, 165.
CHAPTER XIII
Contrary winds delayed the departure of the troops 1807.
from Monte Video ; and the first division was not under
way until the 17th of June, nor anchored off Colonia
until the 24th. Gower joined this corps in the evening June 24
and hurried Pack's garrison on board its transports ;
but fog prevented the convoy from sailing until the 26th, June 26
when it met the remainder of the army standing up the
river for Ensenada. On the following day the gunboats June 27
of the fleet were each of them armed with an eighteen-
pounder at the bows ; the Light Brigade under Craufurd
was transferred to vessels of light draught ; and orders
were issued verbally, but not in writing, for the troops
to be ready to disembark on the next morning, every
man with cooked rations for three days. Accordingly June 28
at daylight on Sunday the 28 th of June the disem-
barkation began. A long bar of sand obstructed the
approach to the shore, and the Light Brigade was com-
\ pelled to wade for some distance to reach it ; but later
on a passage through the bar was found, which enabled
! the rest of the troops to be landed perfectly dry. No
resistance was made to the disembarkation which, owing
to the narrowness of the channel of access, was not
completed until dark ; and no sign of an enemy was
seen. Gower had received orders to push inland, with
an advanced corps consisting of Craufurd's brigade,
the Thirty-eighth and Eighty-seventh, to the heights
about four miles distant, which he duly did, arriving
on his ground at one o'clock in the afternoon. This,
1 it may be added, was the beginning of a general
397
398 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1807. derangement of all the organisation prescribed a few-
days before. Four of the eight companies of the
Ninety-fifth were taken from Craufurd and transferred
to the main body under Whitelocke; and Auchmuty
was left disconsolate on the shore with one battalion
only of his brigade, namely, the Fifth, which though in
excellent order had, even as the four1 companies of
the Ninety-fifth, only just been released from three-
quarters of a year on board ship.
June 29. On the following day the main body advanced from
the shore, and then the chapter of surprises was opened
in earnest. Between the strand and the heights lay a
swamp, nowhere less than two feet deep in water, which
extended for a distance of fully two miles. Gower on
the previous day had found what was pointed out to
him as the usual road through it, and in attempting to
discover a better track had several times experienced c
the greatest difficulty in extricating his horse from the
slough. Moreover, the foundation, being not of sand
but of earth, grew steadily worse with the trampling of
many feet ; and the passage was far more difficult for the
rear of his column than it had been for the van. Into
this sea of black liquid mud the six thousand men of
the main body now plunged in a narrow column, and
floundered forward, tripping over reeds and aquatic
plants, and reeling over the treacherous bottom as best
they could. It was trying and fatiguing work ; but all
ranks seem to have accepted it as a good joke, and to
have taken care by judicious splashing that no man should
emerge in a less filthy condition than his neighbour.
But a great deal of the food carried by the men was
rendered uneatable by water ; the guns stuck fast ; and
the defects of the commissariat were found out within
an hour.
Whitelocke had ordered his Commissary to land three
days' rations of biscuit and spirits, which was done on
1 Five companies of the 95th came with Craufurd. They had
been for eleven months on board ship, and one at least of them
must have remained with the advanced party.
ch.xiii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 399
the same day ; but neither General nor staff had taken 1807.
the trouble to inform the Commissary that sixty pack-
saddles had been brought forward to transport these
supplies, and that, if need were, sixty men of the
Seventeenth Light Dragoons would be dismounted to
furnish the necessary horses. The Commissary, by no
means in an unruffled spirit,1 applied to Colonel Bourke,
the Quartermaster-general, for means of carriage ; the
pack-saddles and horses were landed on the same day ; June 30.
and on the morrow the work of loading began. At
once there ensued a scene of wild confusion. The
unbroken horses not unnaturally would not endure
the saddles, but kicked and plunged in all directions.
Several broke away and were never seen again ; others
dashed off with their saddles only, but without their
load ; and, altogether, of some eight tons of biscuit
disembarked, about one ton was forwarded to the army,
a small quantity was re-embarked, but the greater pro-
portion was lost or ruined in the swamp. Attempts
to bring forward the rum in the mule -carts were
equally fruitless. The wheels stuck fast and could
not be moved ; and the Commissary was fain to stave
in the casks where they lay, and to abandon their
contents also to the all-devouring swamp.
Meanwhile the guns, although drawn each by six
instead of the usual team of four horses, had remained
in the swamp until late on the 29 th, when most of them
were extricated by some hundreds of seamen and
soldiers. Sixteen in all had been landed, and of these
five light pieces captured from the Spaniards were spiked
and abandoned. Whitelocke, on joining Gower that June 29.
morning, gave him the Thirty -sixth and Eighty -
eighth, which had just struggled through the swamp,
in lieu of the Thirty-eighth and Eighty-seventh.2 He
then sent him forward for a few miles with these regi-
ments, added to Craufurd's brigade, four six-pounders,
1 The bitterness of Commissary Bullock against Whitelocke can
be read between the lines of his evidence.
2 C.-M., pp. 168, 192.
4oo HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1807. two three-pounders, and a handful of mounted men of
the Seventeenth Light Dragoons ; while the main
body halted on the ground that Gower had occupied
on the preceding night. Gower for his part so arranged
his order of march that Lumley's brigade should
always be three or four miles in rear of Craufurd's ;
the object being that the troops should find fuel
and, to some extent, shelter at the few farm-houses
that lay on the route to Buenos Ayres. The enemy,
after the first day, hovered about the columns un-
ceasingly, not daring to attack, but pouncing constantly
upon every isolated man ; and the mounted troops
with the British force were so few, and grew daily so
much fewer, owing to the collapse and escape of the
native horses, that communication between the different
bodies was impossible. What Leveson-Gower did in
detail for his own division, Whitelocke, doubtless under
his subordinate's advice, did for the whole army, with
the result that the advanced corps led the way in two
distinct bodies, and the main body followed likewise in
two or three distinct corps, all without cohesion and
without communication, and of coucge without power
of mutual support. Strangely enough, though Popham,
the greatest authority upon signalling in the Navy, had
worked so long with the Army, no military officer had
bethought him of introducing a code of visual signals
for service in the field.
Gower, then, plodded forward to his appointed
place, with directions not to advance further until the
main body should come up ; and Whitelocke, the
swamp having been passed, gave orders for his own
division to march at nine o'clock on the morning of
June 30. the 30th. But now arose the awkward question of i
victuals. Owing to the procrastination of the General
and the faulty work of his staff", many of the troops
had never received the order to carry three days'
provisions with them ; owing to the march waist-deep I
through the swamp, much that the men had with them
had been destroyed ; and in any case the village of i
ch. xiii HISTORY OF THE ARMY
401
f Reduction, where supplies could be again obtained 1807.
a from the fleet, was still two days' march distant. June 3°-
J There was therefore every prospect that the force would
i be without food for at least one day, and if overtaken
i by any mishap, would be in a state of starvation.
; Auchmuty imparted his anxiety upon this head to
:1 Whitelocke who, after anathematising his chief supply-
s officer, complained that he was obliged to do the work
I of commissary and store-keeper as well as of General.
- "If a General does not himself attend to the supply of
y his troops, Sir," said Auchmuty, " they will often
is want provisions."
0 As it happened, a flock of sheep was discovered and
e driven in that morning ; and Whitelocke delayed the
it time of marching, already fixed for the late hour of
ti nine, in order that the men might take advantage of
1 this windfall. But there was confusion and delay in
I the distribution. Many of the men received no
0 meat ; none had time to cook it ; and the only real
n advantage of the delay was, that it enabled half a
d ration of biscuit to be served out from the scanty
:r remnant which had been saved by the Commissary
i, from the swamp. Then at last the army marched,
d! leaving Mahon with a very few mounted and a
d great many dismounted men of the Seventeenth Light
Is Dragoons, besides four companies of the Fortieth, to
form a rear-guard and an escort for the artillery,
d Auchmuty's brigade led the main body, which halted
ie at a farm a little before sunset ; and Auchmuty was
ie then sent forward for three or four miles, according to
nlthe fashion approved by Gower, with the Forty-fifth,
)f Ninth Light Dragoons, Carabiniers, and four companies
Jof the Ninety-fifth. These last two corps, it will be
alremembered, had arrived with Craufurd, so that there
Jwas every necessity to spare them any additional exertion.
slBut such reasoning did not appeal to Whitelocke. He
would dismount and march with the men, trying to
exchange the slang of the barrack-room with them and
receiving little response ; but he was incapable of the
VOL. v 2D
4Q2 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1807. incessant watchfulness over their comfort and the
June 30. incessant care to save them unnecessary fatigue, which
really endears a General to his troops. Had he given
them a full ration that morning and promised them
enough to eat on that night, the men would have known
and trusted him to be their friend.
On overtaking Gower in the evening, Whitelocke
urged him to make an effort to reach Reduction that
night. Gower promised to do his best. The marches
had been neither long nor severe, the ground on the
heights being firm, with the exception of some small
but deep streams with boggy bottoms, which from time
to time crossed the line of march and immersed the
men waist-deep. But want of food, and still more
want of condition, had told heavily upon Lumley's
brigade ; and the folly of placing these unseasoned and
immature troops in the advanced corps was now apparent.
Whitelocke was eager to occupy Reduction in order to
obtain supplies. If, in the first instance, he had given
Lumley the troops which had been left behind at Monte
Video, and if he had ordered Gower in the morning to
make a bold push for Reduction a^any cost, Gower
would probably have reached it without difficulty, and
all might have been well. But starting upon a night
march, unfed after a long halt, Lumley's brigade simply
collapsed ; and after traversing three or four miles Gower
halted, reporting to Whitelocke that if he went further
he should be obliged to leave the whole of the Thirty-
sixth and Eighty-eighth behind. Whitelocke approved
July 1. of his action, and riding forward next morning was
so much struck with the exhausted condition of the
Eighty-eighth that he ordered the whole army to leave
their blankets behind and to march on with their great-
coats only. None the less he called upon them to
make a great effort in order to go beyond Reduction
towards the Chuelo, presumably with the object of
securing the bridge. Lumley had taken the precaution
to bring with him from Monte Video native lasso-men,
who produced some bullocks on the morning of the
ch. xiii HISTORY OF THE ARMY
1 1 st ; but the men had no time to cook the meat, and 1807.
i they had received no bread, so that the young soldiers July 1
\of the Eighty-eighth started in greater exhaustion than
ever. Gower had hoped to pass the Chuelo by a ford
i on that day, but found it impossible ; and the advanced
* :orps, after a march of only fifteen miles, halted three
miles beyond Reduction. Gower reported that he believed
jiimself to be still five miles away from the river, and
:hat, having observed a large fire at some distance away,
lie imagined that the bridge had been destroyed.
Meanwhile at a little before sunset the main body
jnoved up to the village of Reduction itself, and there
I lalted for the night.
At last therefore the coveted goal was reached.
'Communication could be resumed with the fleet; but
I here were still two miles of morass between the village
<nd Point Quilmes over which every ounce of provisions
3 nust be carried. Whitelocke in the course of the
[ .vening decided to halt during the next day, with the
E >bject at once of making a personal reconnaissance of
: he fords of the Chuelo, of procuring bread and
pirits from the fleet, and of allowing Mahon to bring
k brward the artillery which was still in the rear.
II Thereupon parties were actually directed to go down
'! 0 Point Quilmes to bring up supplies. A rest would
er ave been very welcome, for the troops were much
er xhausted, not so much by the distance which they had
!' raversed as by want of food and by unnecessary and
e^ ljudicious halts during the march. At 2 o'clock on
3 he morning of the 2nd, however, Whitelocke altered July 2
His mind and dictated a letter to Gower, ordering him
lVip proceed with the advanced corps, pass the Chuelo at
at"|tie first ford which he should find practicable above
t( ; lit bridge, take up a position on the northern 1 suburbs
i°: f Buenos Ayres, open communication with the fleet,
& l nd send a summons to the Spanish commander to
iol
ft. j 1 He called it the western side, but he meant the northern ; the
, 'ientation of Buenos Ayres being incorrectly given in the
ll mtemporary maps.
4o4 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1807. surrender. The reason given by Whitelocke for this
July 2. sudden change of plan was that he was anxious to put
his troops into cantonments, a consideration which was
perhaps pressed upon him by a heavy fall of rain
during the night of the 1st. Bourke, his Quarter-
master-general, protested against the decision, urging
his extreme ignorance of the country and the necessity
for reconnoitring the river ; but Whitelocke was
peremptory, and Bourke rode forward with the letter
himself.
On receipt of the order Gower showed dissatisfaction,
and not without reason. The Thirty-sixth was much
fatigued and the Eighty-eighth, as he alleged, not only
exhausted but unsteady. In fact the horsemen, which
had hovered around him throughout his march, had
become bolder than usual on the previous day, and had
annoyed him much during the night. Bourke advised
him to ride back and to state his objections to White
locke in person ; but Gower answered that he had
received a peremptory order and should obey it, though
he still evinced great uneasiness as to the consequences.
Bourke promised to report his misgivings to Whitelocke
adding that probably the advanced corps would be
supported by the entire army, and thereupon rode back ik
towards Reduction. Auchmuty had already approached b
Whitelocke that morning to represent the necessity of ad
allowing the troops to rest at least for the day, point
ing out that his own brigade was much fatigued, and Ike
that the advanced guard, judging by the number oi
stragglers left by Lumley's battalions in Reduction, was
in a still worse plight. The General replied that his
decision would depend upon a letter from Gower
Bourke in due time appeared and was greeted by the
General with the question, " Well, does General Gower
seem pleased with his orders ? " Bourke presented
Gower's letter, the chief point of which was an intima-
tion of his resolve to keep to the high ground and
cross the Chuelo either by marching round its source
or by some practicable ford high up the stream ; since jj'
it:
ch. xiii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 405
by all reports the Paso Chico, which was the ford 1807.
indicated by Whitelocke, was impracticable. Bourke July 2.
then urged that, looking to the condition of the
Eighty-eighth, some support should be given to the
advanced corps, whereupon Whitelocke agreed to send
Gower a battalion. Shortly afterwards, to the general
astonishment, he ordered the entire army to march at
once. Some oxen had been procured and slaughtered,
ei|and the meat was about to be cut up and distributed ;
but the men were commanded to leave it on the ground,
and were not allowed to carry the pieces in their
haversacks. Auchmuty remarked to the General that
the troops had no provisions. " Don't you see that
it is going to rain ? " was the only reply ; and at ten
□'clock the starving army moved away.
Gower, for his part, had marched an hour earlier,
so that his rear must have been at least four miles
ahead of the main body. By this time his force was
seriously diminished. The Light Battalion numbered
under nine hundred men, and the Thirty-sixth and
Eighty-eighth were reduced, owing to the multitude
of men unable to march, to no more than one thousand
bayonets jointly. The mounted troopers with him,
who had never exceeded sixty, had shrunk to a mere
handful in consequence of the break-down of the horses ;
and Gower was obliged to mount his two orderlies upon
lis own spare chargers. Experience had shown that, in
:he midst of the enemy's irregular horsemen, communi-
cation between the different divisions of the army was
alansafe unless ensured by a force of the strength of a
:ompany. One of Gower 's aide-de-camps had been
raptured while carrying his orders between the two
idvanced brigades, and another had been stabbed
Within three hundred yards of the line.1 Gower had
10 information of the enemy's dispositions, except that
;hey had erected powerful batteries to defend the
1 Gower to Windham, 9th July 1807. Gower, however,
[pmitted to mention that his two brigades were habitually four or
live miles apart.
406 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1807. passage of the bridge on the Chuelo ; and it was pretty 2
July 2. evident that Whitelocke intended him to turn the «
defences of the river. But where he should discover a t
ford, what forces he might find opposed to him as he t
approached Buenos Ayres, and whether the main body :
was to remain halted or follow to support him — all t
these things were hidden from him. After a short k
time signs of the enemy could be seen on the other Qt
side of the Chuelo, and, after two or three hours, r
Whitelocke's division was also visible in the rear, c:
apparently pursuing the same route as the advanced 1:
corps. The question of a ford by which to pass the he
Chuelo was, however, not so easily decided. The t..
nearest was known as the Paso Chico, but this was k
represented to be very difficult ; and Gower, as we oe
have seen, had intimated to Bourke that he should a:
seek another ford higher up the stream. Craufurd, or
whose brigade was as usual far ahead of Lumley's, in
after passing a brook called the Masiel, saw in his n
front a body of the enemy's horse which retired before f
him, and in its retirement appeared to have crossed the 1
Chuelo. Gower therefore decided to-follow them and r:
found the Paso Chico open to him. The water was ti
indeed more than waist-deep for the tallest man, but a
having a sound bottom, presented no difficulties which i:
could not be overcome by care. Thus the principal fs
obstacle in the way of the march to Buenos Ayres a
was passed with ease and safety.
Lumley's brigade reached the ford between two and 1
three o'clock, just as Craufurd's left it. His two |j
regiments were in a miserable state. The men had &
shewn signs of exhaustion very shortly after they j (j
marched, and soon they were straggling in all directions, ]
unable to keep up ; yet even so Gower assigned to i:
them the heavy work of taking four guns across the t
ford. Craufurd presently observing a body of the r
enemy in motion as if to take up a position upon the t
heights opposite the ford, asked Gower's permission to j
forestall them. He received for answer that he might j ;
ch.xiii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 407
■
he
go on and act as he thought best, and that Gower 1807.
would support him with Lumley's brigade. Craufurd July 2
advanced accordingly, gained the heights unopposed,
and marking signs of wavering in the enemy, decided
to take advantage of their hesitation and move straight
upon the town. Twice Gower sent him orders to halt,
but Craufurd answered that in his opinion it was very
desirable to proceed ; and proceed he did. He had
arrived at a house, known to those concerned in the
operations as White's house, about a mile outside the
town on the west side, when Gower came in person to the
head of the Light Brigade. The ground was extremely
blind and intricate, covered with gardens, orchards, and
high fences, so that the enemy, though suspected to be
near at hand, was invisible. The brigade entered the
Id I angle of a large space, which was in fact the Corral
djor slaughter-yard of Buenos Ayres, and halted to allow
sjits few field-pieces to come up. Many of the men
lis were resting themselves by leaning against the house,
re when suddenly they were startled by the report of a
ie| single gun, followed by a heavy discharge of grape and
id I round shot from all parts of the yard. For a moment
as I the troops huddled themselves together. Gower spoke
a few words to Craufurd, who, whatever their intent,
interpreted them as an order to attack ; and the Light
Brigade rushed forward with a cheer, in the form of
a crescent, straight upon the guns. The Spaniards in
dismay left their batteries and fled. Their infantry,
which was lining the hedges, fled likewise, and the
brigade pursued them hotly into the town, bayonetting
several of the fugitives, until an order arrived from
Gower, directing Craufurd to return to the Corral.
The Brigadier answered by a message that he thought
it would be advantageous to continue the pursuit into
the town, and begged permission to do so. Gower
replied by a second and peremptory order to return to
the Corral, adding that the wounded men, who did not
exceed forty, were liable to be cut ofT by straggling
parties of the enemy. Reluctantly Craufurd obeyed.
408 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1807. Craufurd himself was of opinion that if he had been
July 2. left alone he would have captured the town then and there.
The enemy was in fact completely surprised. Their
leaders had in the first place massed nine thousand men
with over fifty guns to guard the bridge over the
Chuelo, but, finding that Gower was avoiding the bridge,
had sent about three thousand men to hold a ford below
the Paso Chico, and a second column to observe the
Paso Chico itself. Upon discovering that the British
had crossed the river, the first column, led by General
Liniers in person, was ordered to retire to the Corral,
where it was routed by Craufurd ; the second, afraid
of being cut off, took a circuitous route to the south-
western angle of the town ; and the remainder, which
had been left at the bridge, were subsequently called in,
after spiking or destroying several guns which they
were unable to bring away with them. Moreover, any
preparations which had been made for defence of the
town had been designed to meet an attack upon the
northern face. From this it is evident that White-
locke's plans were known to the Spaniards ; for it will
be remembered that he had given -Gower orders to
occupy the northern suburbs, intending himself to
march round the northern side of the town and resume
his communication with the fleet. Gower, however,
was not without justification for his caution, quite apart
from his rather absurd plea concerning the wounded
men ; for Lumley's brigade, which should have been
close at hand, had vanished and was nowhere to be
found.
Very soon after crossing the ford Lumley lost sight of
the Light Brigade, and was obliged to follow it as best he
could by conjecture. The men were lagging terribly,
and, when the sound of firing was heard, they were
unable to respond to their Brigadier's appeal to hurry
on. Many dropped down on the road ; and Lumley,
seeing that he must leave half of his force behind him,
hardened his heart and pushed on with as many men
as could keep up. For a time he guided himself by the
ch.xiii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 409
footprints of Craufurd's companies and by the sound of 1807.
the firing ; but the light began to fail, and presently he July 2-
i lost all trace of them. For an hour he wandered
n about, without an idea where to find his comrades,
e until, growing apprehensive of the danger that might
i await a crowd of weary men in a maze of narrow lanes,
ff he wheeled his two regiments northward and by good
e fortune stumbled upon Craufurd's brigade just as it was
li about to retire. He then left outposts on the ground
1! which Craufurd had occupied, and withdrew with him
1, to the Corral, where both brigades bivouacked for
d the night.
But the disappearance of Lumley's brigade affected
h Gower far less than the fact that there was no sign
i, of the main body of the army. Considering that he
j stood upon not the best of terms with Whitelocke, it
j is likely enough that Gower imputed to his chief that
e night a deliberate design to entangle him in difficulties,
e The suspicion was doubtless undeserved, though circum-
• stances might seem to colour it. Whitelocke had
I duly marched at ten o'clock ; he had sent a message to
0 the Admiral to take the fleet as close as he could to the
0 northern end of the town ; and he had despatched
e orders to Mahon, who was on his way to Reduction, to
ij follow him early on the next day. His guide had told
1 him that he would find a good ford over the Chuelo six
4 miles to south-westward, and had provided him with a
n peasant to show him the way, so that he felt easy and
e confident. Towards noon Gower's column was in sight
about three miles away, moving in a direction at right
angles to the march of the main body ; but the guide,
being consulted, declared that Whitelocke's column
would take the same direction as soon as it had crossed
the Masiel, and indicated the landmarks which showed
the position of the ford. Whitelocke's troops accord-
ingly passed the Masiel, and arrived between half-past
two and three at two farm-houses. The advanced
column was now out of sight. Whitelocke afterwards
1 explained that, reckoning upon Gower's avoidance of
4io
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1807. the Paso Chico, he had made sure of overtaking the
July 2. rear of his column ; but that, having lost all trace of
it and seeing no possibility of crossing the river that
night, he turned to his Quartermaster -general and
proposed to halt where he stood for the day. Bourke
demurred, stating that unless orders were sent to
Gower to halt also, the advanced corps would certainly
proceed, pursuant to its instructions, to the northern
suburbs of Buenos Ayres. Whitelocke hesitated and,
as soon as Auchmuty came up, referred the question
to him. Auchmuty, who wished to give his men
food and rest, and for that reason had opposed the
march of the morning, strongly advised a halt, pointing
out that there were plenty of sheep close by and fuel
wherewith to cook the meat. He was, it should be
added, under the impression, which seems to have been
shared by the army generally, that Gower's mission
extended no further than to win the passage of the
Chuelo ; 1 and he knew nothing of Colonel Bourke's
protest against leaving him unsupported. Whitelocke
therefore sent a message back to Mahon, directing
him to remain with the rear-guard a* Reduction, and
halted for the day. Towards evening he heard the
sound of a cannonade near the city, but took no
notice of it ; and the army, which had been
exhausted rather by bad management than by hard
work, was left to enjoy the comforts of an early halt
and a sufficiency of meat and fuel.
July 3. A little before daybreak on the 3rd Whitelocke's
division moved off, and reached a safe but exceedingly
narrow ford over the Chuelo between nine and ten
o'clock. The water being armpit- deep, it was one
o'clock before every man had made the passage ; but a
mile and a half beyond the ford an officer from Gower
met Whitelocke ; and in another hour the entire force,
with the exception of Mahon's detachment, was united
on the west side of the town. Gower, in the morning,
had sent a summons to Liniers to surrender Buenos
1 C.-M., p. 202.
ch. xiii HISTORY OF THE ARMY
411
Ayres, which had been defiantly rejected ; and the 1807.
British outposts had been engaged for most of the day, July 3
though with no incidents of any importance. It was
true that the advanced corps had not taken up its
position in the northern suburbs, as Whitelocke had
directed, in order to open communication with the
fleet ; but it was too late to correct this fault at so late
an hour of the afternoon. Rain fell in torrents as soon
as the main body came in ; and Whitelocke simply-
aligned his troops upon Gower's, further directing the
whole line to fall back in rear of the Corral, in the hope
of drawing the enemy, who had never ceased firing at the
picquets, into the open ground. The movement, how-
ever, failed of its object, and the troops took shelter in
houses for the night, receiving rations both of bread
and liquor, which Gower had collected in the suburbs.
In the evening Whitelocke asked Gower whether,
having been in the suburbs for twenty-four hours, he
had thought of any design for the attack of the town.
Gower answered in the affirmative, and produced his
plan; whereupon, after further consideration, Whitelocke
decided to abandon his own idea of attack and adopt
that of his subordinate. The officers commanding
regiments and brigades were accordingly summoned
to headquarters at nine the next morning, where July 4
Gower was ready to expound his scheme to them. It
was abundantly simple. The army was to enter the
town in thirteen different columns along as many
different streets. One of these was to seize the Plaza
de Toros, a fairly commanding position at the north-
east angle of the city ; the remainder were to push on
to the last row of houses overlooking the river, capture
them, and form up on the roofs. After this explanation
Whitelocke dismissed all but the Brigadiers, and
announced his intention of attacking at noon. Auch-
muty, who had arrived late at the conference, remarked
that his officers were wholly unacquainted with the in-
tended attack, that they would hardly have time to
examine their ground in order to make the necessary
4i2 HISTORY OF THE ARMY bookxiii
1807. arrangements, and that broad noon was not the best
July 4. time for a hostile advance into a populous city. Gower
concurred in this reasoning, and the attack was deferred
until daylight of the following morning. It does not
appear that any of the officers present brought forward
any objection to the plan, though Colonel Pack, who
by reason of his acquaintance with the town of Buenos
Ayres was admitted to the conference of Generals,
hinted at strong disapprobation of it. Whitelocke,
however, evaded further discussion with him ; and
Pack said no more, though he noted that the
Commander-in-chief had the air of a man who was
acting against his better judgment.1
Pack had guessed aright. Upon his first arrival at
Monte Video Whitelocke had pointed out to Craufurd
the peculiar construction of the houses, their flat roofs
surrounded by parapets, and other circumstances which
adapted them admirably for purposes of defence. He
had added that he would never expose his troops to so
unfair a trial as a fight in the streets of a large town
like Buenos Ayres, composed entirely of such houses ;
and Craufurd had heartily agreed with«tiim. So strong
indeed was the General's feeling upon the subject that
he seems to have set down his opinions in writing, with
a corollary that such a mode of attack as he had just
accepted from Gower would not be resorted to, even
under more favourable conditions than the present.
Moreover, his own plan was known, in general terms,
to be that he should rest the left of his army upon the
La Plata, land his heavy guns, and in conjunction with
the gunboats of the fleet batter the town till it sur-
rendered. The reasons which he alleged for the
necessity of an immediate assault were the fatigue of
the troops, the inclemency of the weather, and the want
of provisions.2 The difficulty of feeding his army was
in fact the source of all his troubles during his brief
campaign ; and it is evident that, whether through
incapacity or neglect, he had never set himself from
1 C.-M., p. 410. 2 Ibid. p. 170.
ch.xiii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 413
the first to grapple with it. With a general sense of 1807.
his own incompetence and of the awkward situation in July 4-
which it had placed him, he appealed to Gower on the
afternoon of the 4th to testify to the soundness of his
orders and dispositions throughout. Gower pleaded
the inability of an inferior officer to judge of the
acts of his superior, whereupon Whitelocke declared
that he regarded his second in command as an
avowed enemy and would supersede him in his appoint-
ment.
Meanwhile the Quartermaster-general in the course
of the afternoon endeavoured to point out to the
Brigadiers the streets which were to be followed by the
troops of each brigade. He found the task to be no
easy one. Gower had made all his dispositions in
reliance upon a Spanish map of the city, but this was
found to differ considerably from the actual conforma-
tion of the ground ; and Bourke reported to Gower
that the columns could not be placed as he wished and
expected. He indicated further that if the troops
advanced, as Gower had ordered, from west to east
direct upon the river, the enemy would probably retire
into the streets north and south, close in upon the
columns, and cut them off from any support outside
the town. Gower made light of these objections ; and
the plan was left unaltered. Efforts were made to
collect crowbars and other tools to break in the
doors of houses that might be barricaded ; and a few,
though not nearly sufficient, were brought together and
distributed chiefly to Craufurd's brigade. The reason
for this allotment of the tools will be made clear by a
detailed account of Gower's dispositions.
The town of Buenos Ayres was laid out in regular
rectangular blocks, each about one hundred and thirty
yards square, its eastern face abutting upon the river.
It measured, roughly speaking, about two miles from
north to south by one mile from east to west, the
ground sloping gently upwards from the river inland,
so that the Corral, upon which the British army was
4H
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1807. encamped, overlooked the whole of the buildings down
July 4. t0 tne water's edge. As was natural, the principal
edifices were all close to the shore ; the fort forming
the centre of those along the eastern front. This was
described as a "square work of about one hundred
paces on the exterior polygon, and flanked with small
bastions/' The walls were about fifteen feet high
from the level of the interior to the top of the parapet,
which rose not more than four feet above the rampart,
the guns being mounted en barbette upon field-carriages ;
and there was no ditch except on the side that faced
the town. It was commanded, as Beresford had dis-
covered to his cost, by several houses in the vicinity,
and altogether was wholly insignificant. Its western
face abutted on the Plaza Mayor, or Great Square, the
scene of Beresford's unsuccessful defence, divided, as
will be remembered, by an arcade, with a parapetted
roof. On the north-western face of the square stood
the Cathedral, with a lofty dome and parapet. Nearly
a mile to northward of the Great Square lay another
and more important open space, situated on rising
ground close to the river at the northeastern angle of
the town. This was the Plaza de Toros, in which
stood the amphitheatre for the exhibition of bull-fights,
with the artillery-barracks and arsenal lying beyond it.
It was separated from the town by a little ravine, of
which it occupied the higher side. Below it towards
the river there was a flat unoccupied space, where an
enclosed battery had lately been erected to flank any
approach to the eastern face of the town along the
beach. Southward of the Great Square, and four
blocks distant from it, was another small open space,
having on the west side the convent of St. Domingo,
the largest ecclesiastical building in Buenos Ayres next
to the Cathedral. Yet further south, almost at the
south-eastern angle of the town, stood a large building,
originally designed for a royal hospital, called the
Residencia, standing within an irregular quadrilateral
space of which one-third was open and the rest
HISTORY OF THE ARMY 415
occupied by buildings. This space was enclosed partly 1807.
by the buildings themselves, which presented a lofty July 4-
blind wall to the streets on both sides, partly by a
slighter wall some ten feet high ; and the Residencia
as a whole offered the advantage that its roof was
not commanded by the top of any adjacent houses.
It stood back about two or three hundred yards from
the river ; and if this building, the fort, and the
Plaza de Toros were occupied, there was free communi-
cation between them, unimpeded by any houses along
the shore. On the other hand, in advancing from
west to east the troops would descend steadily from
higher to lower ground ; and all the loftiest buildings
in the town stood at the eastern extremity near the
river.
The dispositions for the attack were as follows. On
the left or northern side Auchmuty was to detach the
Thirty-eighth, complete, to seize the Plaza de Toros
with the ground adjacent to it, and there to take post.
Next to the Thirty -eighth, in succession came the
Eighty-seventh, the Fifth, the Thirty-sixth, and Eighty-
eighth ; which, each of them divided into two wings,
were appointed to advance down eight parallel streets to
southward of the Thirty-eighth. Auchmuty accom-
panied the right wing of the Eighty-seventh ; Lumley
the right wing of the Thirty-sixth. Next to these
came the Eighty-eighth in two wings, this battalion
forming the extreme right of the left attack. The four
central streets were left vacant,1 except that the street
which ran directly from Whitelocke's headquarters to
the fort was to be occupied, but not traversed, by the
Carabiniers with two guns, who were to make a false
attack.2 The first street to southward of the four
central streets was assigned to a part of the Light
Brigade under Pack, the second to the remainder of
that brigade under Craufurd, each column taking with
it one three-pounder. The two wings of the Forty-
fifth were to move parallel with them down the two
1 C.-M., p. 550. 2 Ibid. p. 77.
4i6
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xm
1807. next streets. The whole were to march to the last
July
4- square of houses on the river, as has been said, and to |r
form on the tops of the buildings.1 If any failed to j
penetrate so far, they were to lodge themselves at the L
furthest point to which they were able to advance. As
a general instruction, it was ordained that in all cases of
doubt the detachments were to incline outwards ; that 1
is to say, Auchmuty's and Lumley's brigades, which f.
formed the left wing, were to bear to their left, the I
remainder, which formed the right wing, to their right ; I
but the command to this effect was conveyed in cc
language so loose and obscure that Craufurd's staff-
officer, in making his transcript of the orders, very
pardonably omitted it.2 This initial mistake augured
no good for the success of the attack.
1 In the plan I have attempted, as I trust with success, to show
the street traversed by each party of troops, by the light not of c
Gower's orders but of sundry hints which appear in the evidence
given at Whitelocke's court-martial. But the task has been one of
great difficulty.
2 The order ran thus : — " Each officer commanding a division
of the left wing, which is from the 88th to the 87th inclusively, to "
take care that he does not incline to his rigitf of the right wing, p
that is Light Brigade and 45 th to the left." The order is printed jj
thus both in Military Transactions and in the Minutes of the Court-
Martial, and as it stands is mere gibberish. If it be punctuated as
follows : — " Each officer commanding a division of the left wing,
which is from the 88th to the 87th inclusively, to take care that
he does not incline to his right ; of the right wing, that is Light
Brigade and 45th, to the left," it can, by considerable effort, be
construed into sense. Its true meaning, judging by Whitelocke's
defence, is that which I have given in the text, viz. the columns of
the left wing if they could not follow the streets assigned to them,
were to bear to their left ; the columns of the right wing, namely,
the Light Brigade and 45th, in the like case were to bear to their
right ; and the reason was that, by converging on the centre, they
might come under the fire of the guns in charge of the Carabiniers. 1
Strangely enough, no member of the court-martial seems to have \
taken exception to the wording of this ridiculous clause, so it is j
possible that the orders were written in two parallel lines, and the ^
missing verbs and particles filled up by the words ditto ditto, etc.
The credit for the discovery that this clause was not transcribed
by Craufurd's staff-officer belongs to Capt. Lewis Butler, U. S.
Magazine, Aug. 1905.
ch. xiii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 417
Meanwhile the enemy had recovered themselves and 1807
made every preparation for a stubborn defence ; for
the Spaniards, as they had proved at Numantia and
were shortly to prove again at Saragoza, are never so
formidable as in street fighting. On the evening of
the 2nd their troops had been utterly demoralised.
Their leader Liniers was missing, and for some time he
was actually within the line of the British outposts, his
retreat having been intercepted by the rapid advance of
the Light Brigade. He escaped, however, in the
course of the night, and taking advantage of White-
locke's inactivity on the 3rd, vigorously incited the
people to resistance. Cannon were stationed at the
outlets of the streets whose westward end was held by
the British, and additional ordnance was brought to the
fort to cover the approach by river. Trenches were
ut in the principal streets near the Great Square, and
guns were placed to flank them. The houses were
stoutly barricaded and provided with every description
of missile to be hurled upon the British columns. The
:lergy had used all their influence and oratory to rouse
patriotic enthusiasm ; and every soul, men, women, and
hildren, was ready to play his part, the very slaves
Deing armed with rude pikes. In all, the defenders
seem to have consisted of some nine thousand men,
•egulars, militia, and volunteers, with more or less of
iiscipline and organisation, and some six thousand
Dthers in irregular but not leaderless groups. Of these
ibout five thousand, including all the best marksmen,
occupied the houses, with a store of provisions and an
imple supply of ammunition ; about two thousand
nore occupied the Bull-ring and its neighbourhood,
vhile others were distributed in and about the fort to
)e employed as circumstances should require. The
est of the population seconded them as best they could,
vhich they might do effectively in a city where every
louse was a fortress.
Before dawn on the 5th the British troops took up July 5
heir positions for the attack, in all about forty-five
vol. v 2 E
4i 8 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xm
1807. hundred bayonets.1 Mahon's detachment was still in
Jul7 5- Reduction ; scores and indeed hundreds of exhausted
soldiers had also been left there ; and, through foolish
and unnecessary exposure of the men at the advanced
posts during some sharp skirmishing on the 4th, a good
many, both officers and privates, had fallen. Punctually
at half-past six the firing of a cannon gave the signal
to advance, and the columns entered their appointed
streets. Every British officer noticed the deathlike
stillness of the town, for the very dogs in the houses
had been tied up ; and it was not until the columns
had advanced for some distance that any of them
met with opposition. But, as Whitelocke had decreed
that his army should be divided into tiny isolated detach-
ments, it will be necessary to follow the fortunes of
each one of them separately.
Auchmuty on the left with the two wings of the
Eighty-seventh was the first to come into action. He
had advanced for more than a mile without meeting the
slightest resistance, when suddenly two guns opened a
destructive fire of grape directly before his front. The
regiment pushed on, and presently the cannonade was
supplemented by a heavy fire of musketry upon his left
front. The head of the right wing came to a halt ;
the rear loaded and began to fire wildly ; and soon the
whole of the column wavered and ran back. The
Colonel, Sir Edward Butler, and the officers rallied
the men ; and Auchmuty ordered them to break into
a garden on his right, in order to find a way into the next
street to southward. They succeeded in doing so, and
discovering a deep water-course in the centre of the street,
which sheltered them from the fire, followed it down to
1 Returns from Milit. Trans.
R.A.
Light Brigade
1st .
2nd
3rd
190
1 160
1950
1060
1320
5680 r. and f.
But of these 1100 men were
held in reserve, 600 of them to
act if need were, and the re-
mainder to guard the sick and
prisoners. The force which
penetrated into the town was
about 4500 bayonets, say 5000
of all ranks. C.-M., p. 504.
ch. xiii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 419
the river, where Auchmuty occupied a large house and 1807.
collected the remains of his column. The left wing July 5.
of the Eighty -seventh presently joined him, having
suffered as severely as the right, and having been like-
wise driven out of its course. In spite of its temporary
unsteadiness the Eighty-seventh had done well, having
killed several of the enemy, and captured about one
hundred prisoners and three guns.
There then Auchmuty waited, learning to his
surprise that the fire of musketry which had checked
his advance had issued from the Plaza de Toros which,
according to the map given him by Gower, ought to
have been three streets to his left instead of directly to
his front. But meanwhile the Fifth Foot, next to south-
ward of him, had also advanced. The right wing
reached the banks of the river at a quarter past seven
without encountering the slightest opposition, hoisted
the King's colours on the top of a house, and occupied
a neighbouring church. The left wing under Major
King charged bayonets as soon as it entered the town,
moved rapidly down the street and came upon four
Spanish guns retiring from its left. The Spanish
gunners promptly shot their teams, spiked the cannon
and ran away, leaving King to pursue his path to the
river unmolested. Arrived there, the Major took
possession of a house, and displayed the regimental
colours on the roof, which assured Auchmuty that his
eastern flank was safe. Very soon, however, a galling
fire was opened from the Plaza de Toros, which com-
manded the house that King occupied ; but he main-
tained his position until, between half-past nine and ten
o'clock, the firing from the Plaza ceased.
There was indeed good reason why it should cease.
On the extreme left the Thirty-eighth under Colonel
Nugent, after about twenty minutes' march, found itself
in a narrow lane leading to the Plaza de Toros, at the
head of which was a large house occupied by the enemy.
The lane was so deep in mire that many both of the
officers and the men had their shoes drawn off their
420
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1807. feet ; but the regiment hurried on, leaving a party to
July 5- force the doors of the house, and found itself exposed to
a concentric fire of artillery from several guns stationed
at different points in the open ground round the Bull-
ring. The Ring itself, a brick building of twelve sides,
presented nothing but a blank wall with a gallery above,
from which the Spanish sharp-shooters could fire without
danger to themselves. Nugent, after losing several men
in a vain attempt to storm the batteries, withdrew his
battalion and sent two companies round to his left to
occupy a house on the cliff by the enemy's extreme
right, in the hope of turning their flank. The house
at the end of the lane was first forced, and a single
grenadier of the Thirty- eighth, one of the worst
characters in the regiment, dashed in by himself and
made his way straight to the roof. There he en-
countered fifteen men, of whom he bayonetted two
instantly ; whereupon several of the rest feigned death,
but a group of four retired into a corner to make a
concerted attack upon him. Still single-handed, he
rushed at these, bayonetted one, and had driven another
to leap from the house, when his comrades arrived and
made a speedy end of the survivors. Shortly after-
wards the second house by the cliff was forced, and the
British opened a galling fire from the roof upon the
enemy's gunners. These presently spiked their guns
and retreated into the Bull-ring ; but there remained
still a closed battery to be dealt with, and this was
captured by a sudden and unexpected rush of the
Thirty-eighth from the back door of the house. The
gunners, some sixty in number, unable to reach the
Bull-ring, took refuge in a barrack, but were so closely
pursued that the British entered with them, and after a
short but savage encounter in the barrack-rooms, put
every one of the sixty to death.1 The rest of the
Thirty-eighth meanwhile seized the guns, and finding
a twelve-pounder unspiked, turned it upon the Bull-
ring. At this stage Auchmuty appeared on the scene
1 Colburne's Military Magazine, Dec. 1836.
ch. xiii HISTORY OF THE ARMY
421
with some of the Eighty-seventh, and surrounded the 1807.
building completely. After a few shots, parties of the July 5.
enemy came rushing out, only to find their retreat cut
off ; and presently those that remained in the building
hung out the white flag and surrendered at discretion.
So far, then, all had gone fairly well on the northern
side, in spite of Gower's hasty dispositions. It seems
certain that both the Thirty-eighth and the Eighty-
seventh, though carefully following Gower's orders,
went where he had no intention that they should go ;
but at any rate the Plaza de Toros, the most com-
manding position in the city, had been taken ; and
Auchmuty had also captured about a thousand prisoners
and thirty-two guns. On the other hand, the Thirty-
eighth and Eighty-seventh had suffered so severely that
Auchmuty dared not reckon his brigade that night above
the strength of twelve hundred men. The Eighty-
seventh alone, out of fewer than seven hundred of all
ranks, had lost fourteen officers and one hundred and
seventy-one men killed and wounded.
To southward of Auchmuty, Lumley 's brigade of the
Thirty-sixth and Eighty-eighth was more hardly tried.
The Thirty-sixth took the two streets next adjoining
those traversed by the Fifth, Lumley himself accom-
panying the right half-battalion. The roads had been
broken up, which made progress slow ; and firing
began from various directions upon the columns almost
as soon as they entered the town. None the less the
regiment penetrated to the cross-street next adjoining
the river, and forcing open some houses in the last
two blocks to eastward, hoisted its colours upon a tall
building that overlooked the beach. The enemy
in the fort and in the Great Square thereupon opened
fire from seven guns, with great precision, upon
the house whereon the colours were flying, at the same
time sweeping the cross-streets with showers of grape.
Simultaneously a hail of bullets poured upon the
Thirty-sixth from marksmen concealed behind the
parapets of adjoining houses ; and Lumley, though he
422
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1807. could maintain his position, was absolutely powerless to
July 5- do more. The Eighty-eighth fared even worse. The
left-hand column under Major Vandeleur had not
marched one-third of the distance to the beach when
fire was opened upon it from windows and house-tops
on every side. Vandeleur ordered his men to advance
at the double, which they did with cheers, under an
increasing shower of musketry, hand-grenades, stink-
pots, brickbats, and every description of missile. Two
guns opened upon them from the bottom of the street,
and two more enfiladed them from the Great Square, as
they passed by the cross-streets which led into it ; but
none the less the men pressed on to the very end of the
road, scrambled over a breastwork of sand-bags and a
ditch beyond it, and found to their dismay that they
were in a trap. There was no outlet from the street to
the beach but by a narrow ramp, which was enfiladed
by the guns of the fort at a range of two hundred
yards. Vandeleur with great difficulty forced his way
into the nearest house, but found it impossible to
occupy the roof, because every man was at once shot
down. He tried next to hold another house over
against the first ; but his men were immediately driven
from the roof by the guns of the fort. The hours
passed away without a sign of support from any side ;
and at a quarter past eleven Vandeleur, having lost
great numbers of his men killed or wounded, hoisted
the white flag, and was escorted with his few surviving
soldiers into the fort.
The right wing of the Eighty-eighth, under Colonel
DufF, was so weak when it paraded for the attack that
the commanding officer left the colours behind and sent
a message to request that two companies, which were
detained at headquarters, might be allowed to join him.
The companies arrived in due time with their muskets
unfit for service. General Gower having directed the
flints to be removed. There was some delay while
spare flints were collecting from such men as could give
them ; and the right half-battalion then advanced to a
ch.xiii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 423
church which had been pointed out to Duff by Lumley 1807.
as his objective — apparently the church of La Merced J uly 5
in the second block of buildings westward from the
beach. Strangely enough not a shot was discharged
at the column until it reached the gateway of this
building, when a tremendous fire of musketry was poured
upon it from the adjacent houses. The door of the
church was strongly barricaded ; it was found im-
possible to break it down ; and Duff, after losing many
men, was fain to abandon the attempt and plunge
further into the city towards the citadel. The firing
pursued him wherever he went, and finding that half
of his men had fallen, he turned back, took possession
of three houses, and formed on the roof such soldiers
as were left to him. Here he held out for some hours,
but his men dropped fast under the enemy's fire ; and
at a quarter before noon, seeing no prospect of support
from any side, he too hoisted the white flag and was
escorted into the citadel.
Here he met Vandeleur, his companion in mis-
fortune, who had surrendered half an hour earlier.
Duff's battalion had gone into action about five hundred
strong, and had lost fifteen officers and one hundred
and eighty-three men killed and wounded. A few
men of the Eighty -eighth escaped over the house-
tops and reported to Lumley the disaster which
had overtaken their regiment ; but the Spaniards
had already revealed the fact by turning all their
strength against the Thirty-sixth. Twice they sum-
moned Lumley to surrender, and twice he refused ;
whereupon they brought forward their guns on the
beach, escorted by some seven hundred men, in order
I to shatter the houses held by the British to pieces
1 about their ears. It was a rash movement. Colonel
Burne of the Thirty-sixth with fifty men flew at this
escort at once, drove it headlong before him under the
walls of the fort, spiked the guns, and hurried his
gallant little party under shelter of a wall before the
j cannon of the fort could open upon them. Meanwhile,
4^4
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1807. one of Lumley's officers had contrived to make his
July 5. way to Auchmuty, and to send back a message from
that General, recommending that the Thirty -sixth
should join him at the Plaza de Toros. Lumley
answered by a request for support ; but his message
never reached its destination. However, at two o'clock
the Brigadier collected his men, including a party of the
Fifth which had opened communication with him, and
retiring along the beach under a heavy fire from the
fort, joined Auchmuty, not without some additional
loss, before three o'clock. His brigade had been
sacrificed to no purpose whatsoever.
Such were the fortunes of the left wing, to north-
ward of the four central streets : it remains now to
follow those of the right wing to south of them. On
the extreme right, the Forty-fifth advanced in two
columns, the right under Colonel Guard, the left under
Major Nichols, upon the Residencia, which had
been prescribed by word of mouth as the object of its
attack. This was evidently a verbal variation from the
written orders ; and the result was that the Forty-fifth
moved by two streets a long way to soufck of those origin-
ally assigned to them. The place was reached, taken,
and occupied with trifling loss within an hour ; and
thus a very strong position on the south-eastern flank of
the city was secured, assuring easy communication with
the fleet. Some distance to the left of Nichols, the
Light Brigade moved ofF in two columns ; the left
column consisting of four companies of the Ninety-
fifth and five light companies — in all about six hundred
bayonets — under the independent command of Colonel
Pack ; the right column of four more companies
of the Ninety-fifth and four light companies, under
the personal direction of Craufurd. Both columns
passed through the town to the beach unmolested
except by a few cannon-shot from the Great Square ;
and Craufurd, finding the fort to be within five hundred
yards of him, determined to advance upon it by the
beach, sending orders to Guard to follow him with the
ch. xiii HISTORY OF THE ARMY
425
Forty -fifth in support. No intimation, it must be 1807.
observed, had been given to Craufurd that Guard wasJulY 5-
to occupy the Residencia, nor had any hint of this
intention appeared in general orders.
Meanwhile Pack, having divided his column into
two and given the command of half of it to Colonel
Cadogan, turned northward, along two parallel streets,
two blocks apart, conceiving, as had Craufurd, that the
Great Square and the fort were the points where he was
intended to attack. This movement brought him near
the Franciscan Church, where in a moment half of his
men were struck down, and he himself was wounded by
the fire of an invisible enemy. Hastily retreating to the
street along which he had originally advanced, he found
Cadogan's party also retiring, having suffered the like
maltreatment. Cadogan had led his men with little
loss to the gateway of the Jesuits' College, when every
man of his leading company and every horse and man
attached to his single field-gun had been in an instant
shot down. About half of his men had followed him
into one house ; the rest had dispersed themselves to
seek shelter wherever they could find an open door.
Cadogan himself was in great distress, declaring that
he and his men had done their duty, but that success
was impossible.
Profoundly impressed with the hopelessness of the
enterprise, Pack made known to. Cadogan his intention
of withdrawing to the Residencia. Cadogan deprecated
this idea ; and Pack agreed to stay where he was until
he should see Craufurd. That General soon appeared
at the back of the Convent of St. Domingo, and
was presently joined by Guard, who had come with his
grenadier-company from the Residencia to open com-
munication with the Light Brigade. Pack urged upon
Craufurd the impracticability of the task entrusted to him,
and pressed him strongly to retire to the Residencia.
Craufurd hesitated, representing the expediency of
occupying the Convent of St. Domingo ; and Pack
reluctantly gave way. The door of the convent was
426 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1807. blown open by the second field-gun attached to the ;.
JulY 5- Light Brigade ; the building was occupied ; and the I
captured colours of the Seventy - first, being found I
within, were hoisted above it. No sooner did the r
British troops appear on the roof than a considerable i
fire was opened upon them from the adjoining houses ; 0:
but there was no reason for anxiety until noon, when a 1
Spanish officer appeared with a flag of truce. Not t
doubting but that the messenger bore a proposal from ai
Liniers to capitulate, Craufurd was staggered when he t
was met on the contrary by the news that the Eighty- G
eighth had surrendered, and that Liniers called upon ir
him also to surrender. Craufurd dismissed the flag a:
at once with a curt refusal ; but, shortly afterwards, a a
large body of the enemy marched into the street by c
the entrance to the convent and prepared to seize the c
field-gun, which, being too wide to be brought into the [
building, had been left outside. Then realising how t
critical was his position, Craufurd hauled down the r
colours which he had hoisted, and made ready to retire
to the Residencia. Guard with his grenadier-company
made a rush at the gun, and swept -away the hostile 1
column which threatened it ; but in three minutes I
forty of his men were killed or wounded by the fire
from the adjacent houses ; and Craufurd, seeing that 1
the evacuation of the convent was impossible, ordered i
the men back to their posts and resumed the defence.
Presently all firing ceased except in his own immediate
neighbourhood, which sign he interpreted to mean that
the attack had failed at all points ; and at half past
three, judging that assistance or relief was hopeless, he
surrendered. Cadogan, having lost ninety-seven men \
out of one hundred and forty, besides five officers, had
surrendered some time before.
Thus this curious and disjointed action came to an I
end. Throughout its duration Whitelocke had been
pacing up and down near his headquarters in deep
anxiety. No reports reached him. So slovenly was
the work of his staff that, though he never changed
ch.xiii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 427
his position throughout the day, not one of his Generals 1807.
knew, except by conjecture, where he was to be found. July 5-
But this was of small importance, for no messenger
from any one of the columns could have reached him
alive. At nine o'clock he sent a stafF-officer down
one of the central streets to ascertain what was going
forward ; but the morning was too hazy to allow any-
thing to be distinctly seen even from the house-tops ;
and he therefore directed the column of the Carabiniers
and Ninth Light Dragoons to advance towards the
Great Square. The Dragoons moved forward accord-
ingly, but were presently checked by a destructive fire,
and after heavy losses fell back to a place of safety,
and halted. Whitelocke then sent one of his aide-de-
camps to try to find out the position of the attacking
columns ; and he, after climbing to the top of the highest
house open to him, was able to report at half-past eleven
that British colours were flying on the left and on the
right centre. Subsequent attempts of this officer to
penetrate further into the town were fruitless ; and the
endeavours of another officer to make his way towards
the Residencia with a few mounted dragoons were
likewise foiled. At last, between two and three o'clock,
Whitelocke asked if any officer would volunteer to obtain
news of Auchmuty. Thereupon Captain Whittingham,
afterwards well known as one of our military agents in
Spain, took an escort of about fifty mounted and dis-
mounted men and, after much skirmishing with scattered
bodies of the enemy, made his way to the Plaza de Toros.
Having heard Auchmuty's report, he galloped back with
the dragoons alone, and at half past four was able to
give the General the first information that he had received
of the day's work, namely, that Auchmuty had been
successful, and that the Eighty-eighth had been captured.
Of the fate of Craufurd nothing was known. In fact,
with the exception of some motley bands of Spaniards
which attempted a feeble attack upon the baggage-guard
from the rear, Whitelocke had seen nothing either of
the enemy or of his own troops during the day.
428 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1807. Auchmuty had asked him through Whittingham to
shift his headquarters to the Plaza de Toros at once ; '
but the General decided not to move, hoping that [
further intelligence might reach him during the night. I
July 6. At half-past six on the following morning Whitting- t
ham was dispatched with an escort of forty mounted
and dismounted men to find the Reserve under
Colonel Mahon, and to order him to move at once to
the Corral. Mahon, pursuant to his directions, had
marched from Reduction on the previous day, and
finding the bridge over the Chuelo intact, had crossed '
that river at five in the evening, and encamped on the 1
northern bank within two miles of the Residencia.
Having delivered the message to him, Whittingham
turned next to the Residencia itself, where he found
Major Nichols of the Forty-fifth entirely confident of
his power to hold his own, but unable to give any
news of Craufurd. As if to verify Nichols's words,
the Spaniards actually brought up cannon to batter the
Residencia while Whittingham was there, whereupon
the Major sallied out with a party of the Forty-fifth,
drove them away with a single charge? and brought off
two howitzers in triumph. But meanwhile, very soon
after daylight, a letter had reached Whitelocke from
General Liniers. The Spanish commander, after
stating that he had captured General Craufurd and
considerably over a thousand prisoners, offered to
restore them and all the British soldiers captured since
Beresford's first embarkation, if Whitelocke would
withdraw all his troops from the province ; adding that
if the offer were refused he would not, in view of the
exasperation of the populace, be answerable for the !|
safety of the prisoners. Whitelocke rejected the
proposal, but suggested a truce of twenty-four hours
for collection of the wounded : after which he and !
Gower rode down to join Auchmuty at the Plaza j
de Toros.
There the three Generals consulted together upon
the situation. Whitelocke reckoned his losses in killed,
ch.xiii HISTORY OF THE ARMY
429
wounded, and prisoners at twenty-five hundred men ; 1807.
but he was below the mark. The killed numbered JulY 6.
four hundred and one of all ranks ; the wounded six
hundred and forty - nine ; the prisoners, several of
whom were hurt, nineteen hundred and twenty-four,
making a total of very nearly three thousand casualties,1
or more than half of the force engaged. On the other
hand, the British had captured over a thousand prisoners
and more than thirty guns ; they were in occupation
of strong posts on each flank of the city ; and they had
still an effective force of over six thousand of all ranks
ready for further operations. But the troops had lost
confidence in their commander ; and, apart from this
significant fact, it was evident alike to Whitelocke,
Gower, and Auchmuty that the conquest of the
province was impossible. Moreover, even if Buenos
Ayres were captured, it could only be held by a
garrison of such strength as England could not dream
of sparing. Gower was therefore sent to Liniers with
instructions to obtain, if possible, an extension of time
for the evacuation, and facilities for the British traders
to dispose of their goods. A suspension of hostilities
was proclaimed in the course of the afternoon ; and on
the 7th a definite agreement was signed, to the effect July 7.
that all prisoners on both sides were to be restored, and
that the British should evacuate the province within
ten days. Monte Video was excepted from this last
provision, it being arranged that the place should be
held by the British for two months, and then given
back to the Spaniards uninjured and with its artillery
intact. A proposal that liberty of commerce should
be granted to British traders for four months was
utterly rejected.
Beyond all question the decision of Whitelocke was
wise, the one instance indeed of wisdom that he had
1 Killed . 15 officers, 386 n.c.o. and men.
Wounded . 57 „ 592 „
Taken .94 „ 183 1 „ „
About 250 of the prisoners were wounded.
430 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1807. manifested during the campaign. But the troops, sore •
at their maltreatment by an enemy whom they knew '•
to be contemptible in the field, were furious with rage.
" General Whitelocke is a coward or a traitor or both," [
were the words in which they wrote their opinion of :
him on the walls of Buenos Ayres ; and the harsh :
phrase was eagerly caught up by the multitude when r
the bad news reached London. The English at home 1
indeed had more than usual cause for exasperation. So
humiliating a defeat, following so close upon the victory c
of Maida, was in itself hard to bear ; but the pecuniary i
loss which accompanied it was unendurable. There 1
had been frantic speculation in the new market which
Popham, in his vanity, had proclaimed to be open in *
South America. Not prosperous merchants only, but
large numbers of the needy, the rapacious, and the impe-
cunious had staked their all, or their neighbours* all, in J
the great venture ; and, as is usual in such cases, tons of 1
rubbish, which could find no sale in any other quarter,
had been shipped over to Buenos Ayres. Now it was !
seen that the long and perilous voyage had been
undertaken in vain, and that the whijle of the goods
exported, whether valuable or worthless, would be
returned upon their owners' hands. There were loud
calls for an inquiry, and Whitelocke was put on his
trial by court-martial. The Court was a strong one.
General Medows of East Indian fame was President ;
and among the nineteen remaining members were
Lake, Harris, Moore, Cathcart, David Dundas, and
Henry Fox. It sat for thirty-one days. The charges
were four in number : First, that Whitelocke had
exasperated the spirit of resistance in the people of
Buenos Ayres, by making excessive demands upon them
when they seemed likely to come to terms ; secondly,
that he had mishandled the whole of the military
operations, particularly in attacking Buenos Ayres with
unloaded arms ; thirdly, that he had made no effectual
attempt to control or support the different columns
during the attack ; and fourthly, that, when still in
ii ch.xiii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 431
e a position to have taken Buenos Ayres, in spite of 1807.
? the heavy losses in the assault, he had deliberately
preferred to evacuate the country. He was found
" guilty upon all the charges, except that of prohibit-
if ing all firing during the attack, and was sentenced
h to be " cashiered and declared totally unfit and un-
n worthy to serve His Majesty in any military capacity
e whatever."
0 The finding shows the strength of public feeling at the
jf moment. The first charge may be dismissed as absurd :
y the Spanish colonies on the Plate would have accepted
e a British occupation on no terms except those which
\ Whitelocke was expressly instructed to decline — in-
dependence under British protection. The remaining
charges cannot so lightly be passed over, but it must
be admitted that the General's difficulties were enormous.
Attention has already been called to the initial problem
which was presented to him for solution, namely,
whether he should attack at once or wait until
September, as also to the unfortunate but inevitable
delay in the ascent of the river by the transports of
Craufurd's division. Allusion has also been made to
the virtual impossibility of reconnoitring the country
and obtaining intelligence, and especially to the
obstacles which beset all arrangements for transport
and supply. Whitelocke was fortunate in effecting
his debarkation unmolested ; but the risk which he
encountered was so great as to be justifiable only by
the result. Had he refused, as very reasonably he
might have done, to incur the hazard, the alternative
was to disembark far away from the city and to make
a long march by land, in which case it is hard to see
how he could have fed his army. The fleet was indeed
in the river, but the river was practically an inland sea,
very shallow near the shore, yet dangerous for small
craft in rough weather, and with few safe inlets to
shelter them. No operation could seem simpler upon
paper than that the Army should have marched parallel
to the shore, drawing its supplies from the fleet, which
432
HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
1807. should have moved on a level with it; but none was
in actual fact more impracticable.
On the other hand, it must also be admitted that the I
man did not make the best of his very difficult task. He -
seems on this occasion to have had no self-reliance, and I
to have leaned wholly upon Gower who, it is abundantly fl
evident, was as conceited as he was unpractical, and as ■
overbearing as he was incompetent. Gower has been \
rightly called the evil genius of the expedition ; but t
a strong and able Commander-in-chief would have left 0
him at Monte Video, in defiance of the fact that he t
had been specially appointed by the Secretary of State t
for War.1 Far from that, Whitelocke seems to have t
been torn by doubts whether to bully or to court him, t
with the result that Gower obtained his own way on t
every point, and mismanaged everything. The marches t
were contrived so as to harass the men to the utmost, 1
and the final attack upon Buenos Ayres was simply (
fatuous. The avowed intention was to seize two 1
strong positions upon the flank of the city, which ]
indeed was actually effected ; but why the men should
have been marched through the sheets in thirteen 1
small columns upon these two points is absolutely 1
inexplicable. Whitelocke was sensible enough to see 1
the danger of such a proceeding, but not strong enough 1
to steer clear of it. For reasons best known to him- i
self, he yielded to Gower ; and Gower, as usual, did his i
worst for his chief. Great outcry was raised against i
Whitelocke for not accompanying his army in the
attack and for renouncing all control of it. He
replied that at his headquarters he was as accessible to
the army at large as at any other place ; and this was
undeniable, for if a commander deliberately divides his
force into thirteen parts, and thrusts each of these into
a blind alley from which its retreat can easily be cut
off, the chances are decidedly in favour of his losing
1 Gower thought himself specially beholden to Windham for
his appointment, and went so far as to write to him an apology for
the failure of the campaign. Gower to Windham, 9th July 1807.
ch.xiii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 433
all communication with at least twelve of them. This 1807.
might have been foreseen, and provision might have
been made in orders for the contingency. Some code
of signals could have been arranged ; and, above all,
Mahon's reserve might have been brought up under
the Commander-in-chief s hand to act at any point
where its assistance was needed. But Gower was
purblind and incapable, and Whitelocke was helpless
to correct him. The written orders were meagre and
obscure ; and Gower worse confounded the confusion
that he made, by issuing supplementary verbal orders
to certain individual leaders without imparting them to
the rest. The comment of a Spanish General upon
the assault and the defence is the hardest condemna-
tion to be found of Whitelocke's conduct. " Half
the number of troops which attacked this capital would
make themselves masters of it, supposing the same
defenders, equally armed and disciplined. ... I will
rather say that ten thousand English sheep came to
present their throats to the knife." 1
It is interesting to note that Whitelocke threw the
blame of the main disaster upon Craufurd and Pack,
who, instead of wheeling outwards in pursuance of their
orders, deliberately wheeled inward upon the fort.
Craufurd, for his part, retorted upon Whitelocke the
accusation that the Commander-in-chief had abandoned
him. There was some ground for complaint on both
sides. Mention has already been made of the omission
of an important but unintelligible clause from
Craufurd's copy of the orders ; but, apart from this,
Robert Craufurd was not remarkable at any period of
his career for excessive deference to the commands of
his superiors. Again, his rejection of Pack's advice
to retire to the Residencia, after the failure of Pack's
own preliminary attack, was extremely characteristic of
the man. On the other hand, Auchmuty had equally
disobeyed the written orders ; and, since Craufurd had
penetrated to the river unopposed, it was reasonable
1 Castlereagh Desp. vii. 402.
VOL. V 2 F
434 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
i 807. for him to assume that Whitelocke required more of
him than merely to take refuge at the Residencia.
The enemy's force was supposed to be concentrated about
the Great Square. Presumably Whitelocke intended to
attack it from both flanks ; otherwise why had columns
been sent through all the streets, and why had not
the Light Brigade been sent direct together with the
Forty-fifth to the Residencia ? If the British gunboats
were intended to co-operate in the final attack, the
guns of the fort must first have been silenced by the
army, for they could not be reached, owing to shallow
water, by the cannon of the fleet. Craufurd in fact
argued as if Whitelocke, or Gower in Whitelocke's
stead, had actually formed a plan of operations ;
whereas, as a matter of fact, they had formed none.
They simply directed the columns to enter the town,
expecting little resistance, and left the rest to chance.
In brief, they made the mistake which, though old as
human nature, seems unhappily to enjoy perpetual
youth, of undervaluing their enemy.
As to the question of renewing the attack on the
6th or 7th, in conjunction with the fle^t and with the
help of guns landed from it, there seems to, be no
reasonable doubt that the operation was feasible and
would have ensured the capture of Buenos Ayres.
Indeed, according to the Spanish General already quoted,
if the British had merely maintained and fortified them-
selves in the positions which they had already mastered,
the inhabitants must have laid down their arms within
four days from lack of provisions.1 But, even if the city
had been taken, either by bombardment or by blockade,
the fact would hardly have reconciled the Spaniards to
British rule. Moreover, even when captured, it would
have been, at best, difficult of defence against a hostile
population. All supplies except from the river would
have been cut off ; the entire country would have been
closed to the British ; and, in case of a retreat, re-
embarkation would have been extremely difficult and
1 Castkreagh Desp. vii. 400.
ch.xiii HISTORY OF THE ARMY
435
hazardous, for no channels or docks had been dredged i
out for Buenos Ayres in those days, and consequently
there were no quays. The troops must therefore have
evacuated the city in boats ; and those boats could not
have been covered by the guns of the fleet, for the
men-of-war could not safely lie nearer than four or
five miles from the shore. A re-embarkation from
Point Quilmes would have been still more difficult,
and the retreat thither from the city most dangerous.
Beyond all doubt, therefore, Whitelocke did right to
come early to terms with Liniers ; and, though it may
well be that his sagacity in coming to this decision was
quickened by discouragement, it must be remembered
that he had served for long in St. Domingo, and had
observed the failure of an expedition, conducted upon
much the same principles, in that quarter. From the
military point of view, the only satisfactory feature in
the campaign was the good behaviour of the troops
in the assault.
It remains to pass judgment upon the Ministers
who sent Whitelocke away upon his mad and im-
possible errand. Enough has already been said to show
that they acted in complete ignorance or misconception
of the true condition of affairs on the Rio de la Plata.
No ignorance or misconception, however, can excuse
the absurdity of the orders originally given to Craufurd,
nor the contradictory injunctions addressed to White-
locke. He was to reduce the province of Buenos Ayres
by force of arms and exile the authors of the insurrection
which had overthrown Beresford ; and yet he was
to consider that his main object was not to distress or
annoy the enemy but only to occupy a portion of his
territory. Again, he was to attach the inhabitants
to British rule, but was forbidden to give them assurance
of British protection against the vengeance of Old Spain
after the conclusion of peace. These astonishing
orders emanated from the Ministry of all the Talents ;
and one is tempted to imagine the wit and sarcasm
with which they would have been criticised by Windham
436 HISTORY OF THE ARMY book xiii
i 807. if they had been addressed to him by Whitelocke
instead of to Whitelocke by his accomplished self.
Nevertheless, the extreme difficulties of Ministers must
not be overlooked. It should be remembered that
Popham had committed them, without their know-
ledge or consent, to the extravagant venture against
Buenos Ayres. They duly recalled Popham in dis-
grace, as we have seen, and tried him by court-martial ;
but the Commodore escaped with a severe reprimand,
and was almost immediately employed again upon an
important service. This was utterly wrong, for he
ought to have been dismissed the Navy. But
Popham had succeeded in enlisting the cupidity of
England in his favour ; the pressure of public opinion
was difficult to resist ; and, as has already been said,
the temptation to neutralise Napoleon's Continental
blockade by opening new markets in South America
was extremely strong. Glory, popularity, and pros-
perity all seemed bound to follow upon success ; and
the enterprise commended itself heartily to the gambling
spirit of the nation. But gambling should not have
been confounded with statesmanship.
Again, if Ministers were resolved to play a game in
which the chances, on the mere showing of common sense,
lay very heavily on the side of failure, they might at least
have shunned the additional risk of appointing an
untried commander. Far from doing so, they actually
displaced the capable Auchmuty in favour of the
incapable Whitelocke ; thus proving themselves to be
not only bad administrators but bad gamblers. Never-
theless, by the irony of fate, their mismanagement was
the salvation of England. It was worth the humilia-
tion, the loss of brave men and the expense of money
to be freed once for all from the fatal entanglement of
a permanent and precarious occupation on the Rio de
la Plata. If the indignant shade of Whitelocke still
broods over the fortune of many British Generals who,
though no less deserving of disgrace than himself, have
escaped court-martial and cashierment, it may at least
ch. xiii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 437
find consolation in the thought that the evacuation of 1807.
South America after his defeat was a wise, true, and
courageous service to his country, worthy to rank with
Thomas Maitland's happy evacuation of St. Domingo.
Authorities. — The reports of Whitelocke's court-martial con-
stitute the principal authority for the expedition to Buenos Ayres ;
that of Gurney (2 vols. 1808) is preferable to that of Blanchard,
and Ramsay (1 vol. 1808), being rather fuller and containing far
better maps. Any statement for which I have quoted no authority
may be accepted as based upon these reports. My references are
to Blanchard's edition, which is the more easily accessible, and
are indicated by the letters C. M. The official despatches (W. O.
Orig. Corres. 161, 162) contain little of importance that is un-
printed. There is useful material in An Authentic Narrative of
the Proceedings of the Expedition under Brig.-Gen. Craufurd (1 vol.
1 808, Lond.), and in the numbers of Colburne's Military Magazine,
April to December, 1836. There are also a few details in the Life
of Sir Samuel Whittingham, and in the Journal of a Soldier of the
Seventy-first (Edinburgh, 18 19). The best extant account of the
expedition as a whole is to be found in Captain Lewis Butler's
article in the United Service Magazine for June, July, and August
1905. Though I do not always endorse the opinions therein
advanced, I have found the narrative to be of great value ; and
I must gratefully acknowledge also the advantage which I have
derived from oral discussion of the campaign with the author.
END OF VOL. V
Printed by R. & R. Clark, Limited, Edinburgh.
Emery Walker sc.
I
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April -May, 1804
Scale, 1:95,000
English Miles
Longitude West 55° of Greenwich
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FEB. 22.1805
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1805
Scale, 1:300,000
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Heights in feet 4672
French
landing
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1805
Pi.
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Longitude West 61 20 of Greenwich
Emery Walker sc.
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